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The Angry Birds AI Competition engages artificial intelligence agents in a contest based on the game Angry Birds. This tournament has been conducted annually since 2012, with participants competing for high scores. The organizers of this competition provide a basic agent, termed "Naive Agent," as a baseline indicator. This study enhanced the Naive Agent by integrating a profit-sharing approach known as exploitation-oriented learning, which is a type of experience-enhanced learning. The effectiveness of this method was substantiated through numerical experiments. Additionally, this study explored the use of level selection learning within a multi-agent environment and validated the utility of the rationality theorem concerning the indirect rewards in this environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To safeguard the livelihood of consumers, food producers are required, either by law or regulatory bodies, to inspect their products for quality before selling the products to consumers. This is because food processing, as is the case with most production systems, is not perfect and there is a possibility that some of the processed products do not meet the required quality standard. Likewise, the inspection process is seldom perfect, meaning that it is subject to errors and thus, some of the processed products might be incorrectly classified. In light of this, an inventory model for a four-echelon food processing supply chain is developed. The supply chain has a farming echelon where live items are grown with the possibility that some of them might not survive; a processing echelon where the live items are transformed into processed inventory; an inspection echelon where the processed inventory is classified into good and poorer quality classes under the assumption that the inspection process is subject to type I and type II errors; and a retail echelon where the processed inventory of good quality is sold to consumers. The supply chain is modelled as a profit maximisation problem and a solution procedure for solving the model is proposed. The problem is studied under both centralised and decentralised supply chain structures and from the analysis, the centralised supply chain with a profit-sharing agreement performs better in terms of profit maximisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The declining gender wage gap (GWG) and the wage-productivity decoupling (WPD) are two emerging phenomena for the United States since the 1980s. This article proposes an extension to the usual decomposition method of the profit rate to account for both the GWG and the WPD on aggregate income distribution. It then uses this framework to study the US manufacturing sector from 1960 to 2017. It suggests that gender wage inequality was a source of profitability, especially before 1986, but which was slowly petered out. Since 2001, increases in the profit share have mostly been due to the WPD. These results highlight the relevance of gender-based inequality in the more traditional analysis of the profit rate dynamics. JEL Classification: B51, E11, E25, J16 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is to study the coordination, price and sales effort decisions of a dual channel supply chain under live streaming commerce mode. In nowadays' e-commerce age, more and more people have interest in live streaming especially after the outbreak of COVID-19, but the research on live streaming supply chain is lacking. To fill this gap, a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and an internet celebrity is established, in which the demand is affected by the internet celebrity's sales effort and personal influence. Considering different power structures of the supply chain, price and sales effort decisions are studied in four models: Nash, manufacturer dominant (MD), internet celebrity dominant (KD) and cooperative game models. Subsequently, the feasible region of bargaining game is discussed in terms to share the extra profits and coordinate the supply chain. The manufacturer and the internet celebrity can be coordinated through bargaining problem in the cooperation model, and the extra profits sharing ratio is depend on each other's bargaining power. Numerical analysis is further provided to test the propositions and show the impacts of market share rate, internet celebrity's commission rate and personal influence on supply chain's performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to evaluate the marketing strategy of financing products implemented by Baitul Mal Wat Tamwil (BMT) Rizwa Manbaul Ulum Rejotangan Tulungagung and identify inhibiting and supporting factors in the implementation of financing product marketing strategies in BMT. This study used qualitative research methods, which include observation and interviews. The results showed that BMT Rizwa Manbaul Ulum Rejotangan Tulungagung used a marketing strategy through distributing brochures to the public. Thus, this strategy has not attracted significant customer interest. In addition, there are still certain areas in the red zone criteria, in the sense that the red zone criteria here are the existence of certain community areas that are included in the community area that have negative characters or thoughts about financing products at BMT Rizwa Manba'ul 'Ulum, for example, there are some people who think that financing products at BMT Rizwa Manba'ul 'Ulum have very difficult and burdensome requirements. Therefore, this study suggests improving marketing strategies implemented by BMT Rizwa Manbaul Ulum Rejotangan Tulungagung, such as taking a family approach, promoting through social media, distributing brochures to a wider area, conducting socialization to the surrounding community, and installing banners in front of the BMT office. In addition, this study also confirms the importance of collaboration and cooperation between Islamic financial institutions and other parties in increasing the number of customers and the development of BMT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rigid and flexible contracts, both of which have advantages and disadvantages, are widely used in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. How to choose an appropriate contract type to improve the performance of PPP projects is an important issue that governments need to address. The literature has focused mainly on the strategy evolution of governments and private investors under rigid contracts but has not considered the influence of contract type (rigid versus flexible) on their strategy evolution. In this study, by incorporating an other-regarding preference, evolutionary game models under rigid and flexible contracts in PPP projects are established. We compare the government's supervision strategy and the private investor's cooperation strategy under these two types of contracts and summarize the applicable situations. Our research results show that the type of contract (rigid or flexible) will not affect the government's supervision strategy but will affect the cooperative strategy of the private investor. The applicable conditions of these two types of contracts are determined by profit sharing, the government's expectation of the project performance, and the discount rate as well as other factors. There is no cross-influence between the government and private investor's other-regarding preferences. The private investor's other-regarding preference is conducive to reducing some opportunistic behaviors that cause damage to social welfare and in promoting cooperative behavior. This paper contributes to the literature on PPP project contract design by providing the applicable conditions for rigid and flexible contracts as well as contract choice suggestions for project managers in PPP projects. Choosing a proper contract type is important for the success of PPP projects. This study compares the strategy choices of government and private investors under rigid and flexible contracts, presents the applicability of those two contracts, and provides managerial insights and suggestions for the government to choose a suitable contract type and enhance project performance. First, for projects with small-scale or easy tasks for which private investors need to expend only a low level of effort, the government can pay less attention to the contract type. Second, for projects that have high prospects, i.e., will have high performance in the future (for example, infrastructure PPP projects in cities' core areas), a flexible contract outperforms a rigid contract. Otherwise, a rigid contract outperforms a flexible one. Third, governments should pay more attention to the preliminary feasibility study of a project to avoid either over- or underconfidence and ensure a proper contract choice. Fourth, the government should focus on examining private investors' personal abilities and behavioral preferences and choose private investors with high-capacity endowments and other-regarding preferences. Finally, increasing penalties for opportunistic behavior is not an efficient strategy for the government when a private investor has high cooperation motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a short-run neo-Kaleckian model to investigate the interplay of the functional and personal distribution of income and their impact on growth. Personal distribution becomes relevant in light of the institutionalist hypothesis of consumption emulation, which makes aggregate saving dependent on the concentration of wages and profits. A more equal distribution of wages and/or profits increases aggregate demand and the rate of capacity utilization. But the wage- or profit-led demand regime crucially depends on the difference between the propensity to save out of profits and that out of wages, as well as on the impact of changes in the profit and wage shares on the concentration of personal incomes. Preliminary evidence on Italy over the period 1980s–2010s highlights that demand regimes might be a relatively short-term and cyclical characteristic of that economy, with changes in the demand regime partly explained by changes in personal income distribution. JEL Classification: E11, D31, B52 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationality of profit distribution affects the stability of the multimodal transport alliance. In the multimodal transport alliance, the participation rate of the carrier and the communication structure of the alliance are important influencing factors of profit distribution results. To get a reasonable profit distribution scheme, this paper constructs a profit distribution model considering the characteristics of multimodal transport, called the Choquet Cloud Gravity Center AT model. Firstly, considering the communication structure of the alliance, the Cloud Gravity Center Average Tree method is used as the base model for profit distribution. Secondly, considering the multimodal transport alliance is a fuzzy coalition, the profit for each alliance subset in the base model is calculated by the Choquet integral. Then, the profit distribution model considering participation rate and communication structure is obtained. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the applicability of the model, and comparative analysis is conducted to verify the rationality of the model. This study provides a suitable profit-sharing model for multimodal transport alliances, which is conducive to the stable and efficient operation of alliances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online sellers are increasingly adopting the digital showroom service to reduce consumer valuation uncertainty and boost sales. However, such service also facilitates consumer webrooming behavior, which may reduce the online demand and intensify channel competition. In this study, we develop a theoretical supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer to investigate the optimal digital showroom strategy for dual-channel supply chains in the presence of consumer webrooming behavior. The findings show that when the online shopping cost is relatively high, the digital showroom service can increase the profits of both players under two typical supply chain structures. However, when the online shopping cost is relatively low, the digital showroom service may decrease each player's profit since it increases the selling prices in both channels and aggravates the double marginalization problem under the wholesale price contract. In this case, a new contract that combines a quantity discount component and a webrooming profit sharing component (abbreviated as QD-WPS) is proposed, which can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with digital showrooms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the challenges posed by the widespread distribution of new energy sources in China and their distance from load centers, the power system must effectively integrate both new energy and thermal power transmission. To address this issue, we propose a dynamic coordinated scheduling model that combines wind, photovoltaic, and thermal power to optimize the profit of the energy complementary delivery system. Additionally, we present an improved ant lion optimization algorithm to investigate the coordinated scheduling and benefit distribution of these three power sources. This paper introduces a cooperative mode for benefit distribution and utilizes an enhanced Shapley value method to allocate the benefits of joint operation among the three parties. The distribution of benefits is based on the contribution of each party to the joint proceeds, considering the profit levels of joint outbound and independent outbound modes. Through our analysis, we demonstrate that the upgraded ant lion optimization algorithm facilitates finding the global optimal solution more effectively within the feasible zone. Furthermore, our suggested three-party combined scheduling model and profit-sharing approach are shown to be superior and feasible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islam allowed the selling transaction and prohibited the interest rate. So, can an economy function properly and efficiently without an interest rate? In a conventional economy the interest rate is used as a tool to stimulate investment, savings, money supply, exchange rate, and other economic variables. Thus, the concept of an interest rate is deeply embedded, and plays a vital role in an economy. It is not easy to remove this concept from an economy. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that an economy can function properly without the use of an interest rate by looking at the Palestinian economy. The Palestinian economy is a small, open, and semi-independent on the Israeli economy; it is thus unique in nature, where it is an economy that has no local currency. Palestinians use the New Israeli Shekel, US Dollar, Jordanian Dinar, and Euro. So, the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA) place the role of monitoring the function of the banks, rather than the role of a Central Bank. This is of course due to the absence of a local currency. Therefore, the Palestinian Government has no monetary policy, i.e., monetary policy does not exist in the Palestinian economy. In addition, the concept of an interest rate to an individual Palestinian can be replaced by the concept of profit sharing. That is, a Palestinian can be driven by the concept of profit sharing rather than the concept of an interest rate. This paper concludes by using an empirical example that an economy can function without an interest rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the path of the profit rate and its components in Brazil between 1950 and 2020. The high growth in developmentalism, 1950-1980, in contrast to the great stagnation in neoliberalism, 1980-2020, is interpreted based on the rate of profit and its components: the profit share, the productivity of capital and the level of capacity utilization. The fall in the rate of profit due to the decline in capital productivity resulted in a slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation and economic growth. In the 1980-2020 period there was a structural break in the relationship between productive investment and profits with the adoption of neoliberalism, the same profit rate resulted in lower capital accumulation. The great stagnation is explained by the fall in the profit rate and the adoption of neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The requirements to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and minimize harmful emissions necessitate using renewable energy more effectively. In this regard, a Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) energy trading market in which excess power is sold to neighbors is emerging in place of the typical market where excess power is sold back to the grid. In this study, a bi‐level optimal bidding strategy is proposed in which community energy storage systems (CES) and community photovoltaic (CPV) generation are considered. Moreover, individual PV and CES are taken into account for each household. While optimal scheduling of prosumers is carried out at the lower level, the local clearing price considering the profit of Energy Sharing Provider (ESP) is obtained at the upper level. Furthermore, various case studies consisting of Peer‐to‐Grid (P2G), P2P, and CES‐supported P2P are created under different storage capacities. The devised mixed‐integer linear programming (MILP) based model is tested using each case study, validating the proposed model and proving its effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Well-managed demand-side flexibility can effectively alleviate the stress of power systems caused by the increasing renewable energy penetration. The development of smart grid technologies provides win-win opportunities for system operators and demand-side users. Buildings have great flexibility potential through smart control of flexible loads, passive thermal mass storage and distributed active storage. However, a few fundamental problems on flexibility quantification, optimal coordination and profits sharing are faced when aggregating buildings to reach sufficient size for biding multiple flexibility services in electricity markets. Therefore, this paper proposes a multi-level optimal dispatch strategy and profit-sharing mechanism for non-residential building clusters to maximize flexibility profits and reduce the complexity of the optimization. At building level, a model-based quantification method is developed to evaluate flexibility potential of multiple resources. At cluster level, the coordinated bidding strategy of the aggregator is proposed, and flexibility profits are distributed based on the cooperative game theory at the post-market stage. Test results show that the proposed dispatch strategy can reduce up to 20.4% of daily electricity cost at cluster level and ensure profit increase of individual buildings with different flexibility characteristics. The active participation of building clusters in electricity markets could reduce the use of costly backup generators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The stimulating role of exports is analysed in this paper through what is termed as a structurally-biased investment function where domestic demand and exports have different effects on investment rate. • There are at two central features of this investment function that have been analysed through a medium-run Kaleckian model. Firstly, exports stimulate growth through the investment channel independent of the direction of change in trade balance. Secondly, in contrast to the Bhaduri-Marglin type investment functions, the sign of profit share coefficient in investment function becomes ambiguous. • The structurally-biased investment function is tested for the registered manufacturing sector in India by conducting a panel-data exercise. It is found to be valid under alternative specifications. The coefficient for profit share is found to be statistically insignificant. • The analytical framework is used to classify export regimes into three distinct categories-BOT-improving, BOT-balancing and BOT-deteriorating. The nature of export regime of a country is argued to depend on income distribution parameters, import propensity and investment responsiveness to home demand and exports. This paper examines the relation between investment and exports through a Kaleckian model and highlights the possibility of export-induced growth process despite deterioration in trade balance. The stimulating role of exports is analysed through what is termed as a structurally-biased investment function where domestic demand and exports have different effects on investment rate. There are at least two central features of this investment function. Firstly, exports stimulate growth through the investment channel independent of the direction of change in trade balance. Secondly, in contrast to the Bhaduri-Marglin type investment functions, the sign of profit share coefficient in investment function becomes ambiguous. The structurally-biased investment function is tested and found to be valid for the registered manufacturing sector in India by conducting a panel-data exercise. The coefficient for profit share is found to be statistically insignificant after controlling for the effect of exogenous changes in exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to determine the actual cost of equity capital in the accommodation and food service activites sector in the Czech Republic between 2015 and 2019. The data was collected from the Albertina database and processed based on changes in retained earnings from previous years and the current financial year's profit. The results show the resulting cost of equity capital, which in the years under consideration averaged between 32.40 - 67.25% and the median values ranged between 11.78 - 22.72%. The contribution of this paper can be seen in bringing the resulting value of the actual cost of equity capital in the selected industry on which subsequent predictions for the future can be based. The limitation of the research can be seen in the use of older data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to determine the extent to which the level of benefit of local farmers and the community involved in investment (deposits) in the livestock sector. At the same time providing knowledge for the wider community to encourage them to participate in their money (Desposito) in cooperation for local livestock production. So that later it becomes the value of the common good and boosts the quality of local livestock products. The method used is qualitative phenomenology and literature review. The object of research is local cattle farmers who use a profit-sharing system and the cattle investors. Therefore, this research was conducted in the cattle village of Lalangon Village, Madura Island, Indonesia. The results of this study show that the profit sharing for local livestock, especially cattle, is very good for the livestock investors. For local farmers, it is helped by the existence of capital to buy cows to be reared. This collaboration will certainly help local farmers to earn income and also benefits for the community from the livestock investment. The general profit-sharing scheme is very positive in the nation's economic growth, including being able to create income fields for villagers who are still traditionally traditional and help meet the needs of national agricultural products such as meat needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fidelity Coverage Analysis Analysis of a fidelity claim will vary depending on whether it covers employee dishonesty or employee theft and based on the circumstances surrounding the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the employee. 3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding that kickbacks an employee received from a colluding vendor satisfied the employee theft insuring agreement but that padded amounts paid to the vendor for legitimate services due to the employee misconduct were not covered). Further, identifying the steps in the employee's scheme is necessary to determine whether a loss results directly from employee dishonesty or employee theft. However, issues can arise where a defalcating employee is involved in a kickback scheme containing a mix of legitimate and illegitimate services.24 Query what an insured loses if an employee retains a vendor that renders legitimate services to the insured at a fair price but pays a kickback to the employee for the procurement of the service contract. [Extracted from the article]

We consider the situation where multiple transportation service providers cooperate to offer an integrated multi-modal platform to enhance the convenience to the passengers through ease in multi-modal journey planning, payment, and first and last mile connectivity. This market structure allows the multi-modal platform to coordinate profits across modes and also provide incentives to the passengers. Accordingly, in this paper, we use cooperative game theory coupled with the hyperpath-based stochastic user equilibrium framework to study such a market. We assume that the platform sets incentives (price discount or excess charge on passengers) along every edge in the transportation network. We derive the continuity and monotonicity properties of the equilibrium flow with respect to the incentives along every edge. The optimal incentives that maximize the profit of the platform are obtained through a two time-scale stochastic approximation algorithm. We use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to design a fair profit sharing scheme among the service providers. We show that the profit for each service provider increases after cooperation on such a platform. Finally, we complement the theoretical results through two numerical simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, China's civil aviation industry is in a period of rapid development. The passenger traffic is increasing year by year. The contradiction between the demand and supply of flight resources is becoming more and more prominent, and the competition between airports is becoming more and more fierce. Driven by local development and the country's overall planning, there are more and more multiairport areas, so how to analyze the airport market competition in multiairport areas needs to be further realized. This paper constructs a two-dimensional Hotelling model based on flight frequency and passenger travel cost to analyze the internal mechanism of market competition among multiple airports. It is assumed that, in a multiairport area, two airports are distributed at both ends of a linear straight line, and the other airport is in between, and each airport provides displacement services connecting the same destination airport. The research shows that, (1) with the increase of the flight frequency of the airports at both ends, its equilibrium profit shows a trend of decreasing first and then increasing; the difference of the flight frequencies of the airports at both ends affects the equilibrium profit of the middle airport. (2) With the gradual increase of flight frequency, the reduction of passenger travel cost will make the equilibrium market share and equilibrium profit show a trend of first decreasing and then increasing. (3) Taking the Yangtze River Delta regional airport as an example, it is found after verification that increasing flight frequency or reducing passenger travel costs can increase the balanced profit and market share of Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport and Nanjing Lukou Airport; increasing flight frequency can improve the balanced profit and balanced market share of Sunan Shuofang Airport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its correspondence with cooperative game theory concepts. Explicit coalitions were rather scarce (17%), although coalition stability was implied by 47.8% of the agreements. Efficiency was achieved in the vast majority (82%) of cases, whereas in 34.8% of the agreements, students used a lexicographic ordering of multiple solutions before choosing among them. Regarding the bargaining procedure, in 40% of the agreements, quantities traded were decided before profit sharing rules were negotiated, whereas in 16% of the cases they were simultaneously agreed upon. Our findings suggest that bargaining procedures often do not imply explicit coalitions. Moreover, efficiency can be achieved even in the absence of bargaining processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, rating systems play a crucial role in the attraction of customers to different services. However, as it is difficult to detect a fake rating, fraudulent users can potentially unfairly impact the rating's aggregated score. This fraudulent behavior can negatively affect customers and businesses. To improve rating systems, in this paper, we take a novel mechanism-design approach to increase the cost of fake ratings while providing incentives for honest ratings. However, designing such a mechanism is a challenging task, as it is not possible to detect fake ratings since raters might rate a same service differently. Our proposed mechanism RewardRating is inspired by the stock market model in which users can invest in their ratings for services and receive a reward on the basis of future ratings. We leverage the fact that, if a service's rating is affected by a fake rating, then the aggregated rating is biased toward the direction of the fake rating. First, we formally model the problem and discuss budget-balanced and incentive-compatibility specifications. Then, we suggest a profit-sharing scheme to cover the rating system's requirements. Lastly, we analyze the performance of our proposed mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the possibility of connecting decentralized biogas plants via a pipeline network to terminals that upgrade biogas into biomethane. We present a mixed-integer linear program that forms subnetworks of such plants, decides on suitable terminal locations, and establishes pipeline connections to maximize profit. We apply this model to a real-world scenario in Northern Germany. The results show a much higher total profit for the optimized network compared to the benchmark solutions where each plant upgrades biogas into biomethane on its own. Therefore, plants can increase their profitability by collaborating with other (neighboring) plants. However, the collaboration requires a fair profit-sharing model as network participation is not individually profitable for all plants, especially small ones. • We explore network designs for a profitable upgrading of biogas into biomethane. • We introduce a Mixed Integer Programming model to determine optimal plant networks. • A real-world application for biogas plants in Northern Germany is presented. • Results reveal higher profits for the networks compared to stand-alone upgrading. • Fair profit-sharing mechanisms are important for plant collaborations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the operation mode choice issue on whether brand owners should use the autonomous or the collaborative operation mode in direct online retailing. Results demonstrate that when the service provider's investment is relatively effective and the selling profit sharing ratio of the service provider is high, the brand owner should choose the collaborative operation mode. Surprisedly, we find that brand owners in a dual-channel scenario have more motivation to use the collaborative operation mode than those in a single e-commerce channel scenario. The e-commerce service market may have much potential in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of power of the village governance body is an important perspective from which to understand the form of local governance as well as a crucial aspect of the capacity of local governance. In local government building, the village governance body has the special feature of supportive agency – that is, the secretary of the village Party committee has only incomplete governance power, but he/she does have the power to allocate resources in the village. Different from the personalization of power in an oligarchy, the power of a supportive agent is something that local rural elites rely on to gain resources. They then use those resources as a hook to draw in other participants and use public rules to embed themselves into the governance of village affairs, thereby forming the power structure of the grassroots community. The network of power and interests in the interaction between township and village and the pattern of profit-sharing in the village constitute the basis for this practice of power under supportive agency. The supportive relationship between local government and village cadres has led to a separation between the cadres and the peasants, a rupture of the state-peasant relationship, increasing social differentiation, and weakened village autonomy. The practice of supportive agency reflects changes in the logic of local governance – local autonomy has been turned into local governance statization. Thus, in these circumstances, in order to achieve a successful transition to modernized local governance, the linkage between the state and the peasants should be rebuilt, and the local organization of governance should be reshaped. 摘要: 村治主体的权力实践既是理解基层治理形态的重要路径，亦是构成基层治理能力的重要内容。从基层政权建设角度看，村治主体权力具有扶植型代理的特征，即村书记治权残缺，但掌握村庄资源分配权。不同于寡头主体权力私人化，扶植型代理的权力实践是乡村社会精英依附于基层政权获得资源分配机会，从而以资源为载体吸纳其他村治主体，并运用公共规则，嵌入进村庄治理事务建构治理能力，形成基层治理共同体的权力结构。镇村互动中的权力利益网络与村庄内部分利秩序构成扶植型代理权力的基础。基层政权与村干部代理人角色扶植型关系的形成，导致村干部与农民的脱离，国家与农民互动关系的断裂，造成社会分化、村庄自主性弱化的困境，再造社区秩序。就基层政权建设而言，扶植型代理反映出基层治理逻辑的转变，基层自治演化为基层治理国家化。因而，在基层治理国家化的现状下，实现基层治理现代化的顺利转型，需要重建国家与农民之间的关联机制，推动基层组织转型。 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a cooperative game with a communication structure, a graph describes the communication possibilities of the players, which are represented by the nodes. We introduce a variation of this model by assuming that each edge in the communication graph represents an agent. These agents simply act as intermediaries, but since they are essential for the cooperation and, consequently, for revenue generation, they will claim their share of the profit. We study this new model of games with a communication structure and introduce an allocation rule for these games. The motivation for analyzing this type of problem is based on the construction of a risk index for the different elements of an internal network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering that online comments play an important role in operational decisions of a fresh e-commerce supply chain, we construct single-stage and two-stage models for fresh produce supply chain consisting of a supplier and a fresh e-commerce platform. Utilizing the Stackelberg game and two-stage repeated game, the profit functions of the supplier and platform are established, and then, the optimal retail price and freshness-keeping effort are derived. In addition, to improve the accuracy of models in describing practical problems, we construct an extended two-stage model and a third-party logistics model. Furthermore, we compare the optimal strategies under different models. Our results show that, firstly, the optimal retail price and freshness-keeping effort of supplier and platform vary in different models and online comments play a positive effect on supplier and platform's profits. Secondly, compared with the single-stage model, the fresh e-commerce supply chain grabs more market share and profits under the two-stage model. Lastly, online comments vary in different dominance scenarios and may cause competition between supplier and platform for supply chain dominance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We measure whether profit sharing (PS) influences firm innovation • We disentangle PS effects across organizational groups within the firm • PS for managers is associated with little or no improvement in innovation • PS for non-managers spurs innovation probability by 5%-12%. • Size, unionization, exposure on international markets moderate PS effects In this paper, we measure whether contractual profit sharing (PS) influences firm innovation and, if yes, how. We disentangle PS effects for different and possibly conflicting interest groups within the firm. We exploit the fact that PS schemes rarely cover the workers all together, but more often than not are used at some organizational layer in the corporate hierarchy and not at others. Based on the analysis of a representative sample of Italian firms, the key contribution of the study is to show that the structure of PS plans matters significantly for innovation. While PS for managers is associated with little or no improvement in innovation activity, PS for non-managers spurs the probability of observing innovation by about 5 to 12 percentage points. The difference between managerial and non-managerial PS effects appears wider for process, arguably incremental innovation. We also document how PS effects, particularly for non-managers, change depending on other firm level variables, such as size, unionization, exposure on international markets, the span of managerial control and some characteristics of the workforce. Policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we introduce several improved Shapley values for cooperative transferable utility (TU) games depending on the players' least square contributions instead of their marginal contributions. This work is mainly enlightened by the Shapley value and the player's productivity-based excess (usually called the excess of the player). Based on the player's contribution-based excess, two quadratic programming models for obtaining the players' (weighted) least square contributions are constructed. The efficient weighted Shapley-like value proposed in this paper as an extension of the Shapley value can be characterized by four independent axioms such as the symmetry, the efficiency, the additivity, and the quasi-null player, which are almost similar to the Shapley value's four axioms except that the anonymity is replaced with the quasi-null player. The four axioms are proven to uniquely determine the efficient weighted Shapley-like value. Finally, the advantages of the proposed values are illustrated with a real case about the collaborative profit sharing of the rural e-commerce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, damage caused by negative tweets has become a social problem. In this paper, we consider a method of suppressing negative tweets by using reinforcement learning. In particular, we consider the case where tweet writing is modeled as a multi-agent environment. Numerical experiments verify the effects of suppression using various reinforcement learning methods. We will also verify robustness to environmental changes. We compared the results of Profit Sharing (PS) and Q-learning (QL) as reinforcement learning methods to confirm the effectiveness of PS, and confirmed the behavior of the rationality theorem in a multi-agent environment. Furthermore, in experiments regarding the ability to follow environmental changes, it was confirmed that PS is more robust than QL. If machines can appropriately intervene and interact with posts made by humans, we can expect that negative tweets and even blow-ups can be suppressed automatically without the need for costly human eye monitoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Waqf is an alternative for Muslims to donate their endowment for a charitable purpose. This endowment is also usually purposed to build or develop mosques, madrasas, Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), and other Islamic institutions. From the business perspective of Islamic boarding schools, it can mean a capital asset or something that can be used for productive or valuable purposes. The research examines the concept of optimizing waqf in pesantren and analyzes the implementation of management waqf on the Basmalah franchises (Kopontren Basmalah Sidogiri). This article is based on a field study that used a descriptive-analytical approach. The paper concludes that the optimization of waqf on the Basmalah franchise uses the concept of productive waqf. Kopontren Basmalah, based on an Islamic sharia cooperative, accommodates members and investors collectively to develop waqf assets. The management of the Kopontren Sidogiri also facilitates the new branch of the Basmalah store by accommodating various aqad in a profit-sharing system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has attracted considerable attention. The well-known deep Q-network (DQN) architecture successfully combines deep learning and Q-learning which is a representative reinforcement learning (RL) method. In general, RL and DRL require many trial-and-error searches. To overcome this limitation, alternative approaches called exploitation-oriented learning (XoL) and deep exploitation-oriented learning (DXoL) have been proposed. Although the effectiveness of DXoL for DQNs has been verified, its effectiveness in an environment where multiple types of rewards are present remains unclear. In this study, we apply the DXoL method to two applications with multiple reward types: the driver drowsiness determination system and the decision-making system. Our experimental results show that DXoL is more suitable for learning priorities among multiple rewards than DQNs in these applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two-person games and cost/surplus sharing problems are worth of studying because they provide the basis for extension to the classes of such problems with variable population with the help of very powerful consistency properties. In this paper, a family of cost sharing methods for cost sharing problems with two agents [4] is extended to a class of solutions of two-person cooperative games that are larger than both costand surplus-sharing problems, since cooperative games have no constraints on the positivity of costs and surpluses. The tool for such an extension is a new invariance axiom—self-covariance [1]—that can be applied both to cost sharing methods and to cooperative game solutions. In particular, this axiom replaces the lower composition axiom, which is not applicable to methods used in profit-sharing problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, many mobile apps (MAs) act as an efficient channel for e-tailers to sell products. In addition to selling, some of these apps even include e-payment functions. This creates e-payment convenience but also a concern on privacy. In this article, we consider a supply chain with an e-tailer which sells through such an MA and an online website. The two channels influence the demand of one another. In the basic model, the e-tailer decides the promotion efforts in both channels. We interestingly find that the optimal promotion efforts are independent of e-payment convenience and privacy concern. We analytically establish that profit-sharing contract and two-part-tariff contract can coordinate the dual channel supply chain system but not revenue-sharing contract or sales rebate contract. In the extended models, we first consider the case when the e-tailer makes product pricing as well as promotion efforts decisions together. We analytically derive the optimal solution and find that the optimal pricing and promotion efforts depend on e-payment convenience and privacy concern. We further extend the analyses to the case when the e-tailer is risk averse and uncover that: 1) when the retail selling price is exogenously given, the optimal promotion efforts between the risk-neutral and risk-averse e-tailers are the same and 2) when the retail selling price is endogenous, the corresponding optimal retail selling prices and promotion efforts between the risk-neutral and risk-averse e-tailers are different. In particular, a higher degree of risk aversion will lead to higher (lower) promotion efforts and a higher (lower) retail selling price if demand volatility is sufficiently large (small). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resource sharing within a logistics network offers an effective way to solve problems resulting from inefficient and costly operations of individual logistics facilities. However, the existing analysis of resource sharing and profit allocation is still limited. Therefore, this study aims to model resource sharing in two-echelon delivery and pickup logistics networks to improve the overall efficiency and decrease the total network operating cost. A bi-objective integer programming model is first proposed for two-echelon collaborative multidepot pickup and delivery problems with time windows (2E-CMDPDTW) to seek the minimization of operating costs and number of vehicles. Integrating a customer clustering algorithm, a greedy algorithm, and an improved nondominated sorting genetic algorithm-II (Im-NSGA-II), a hybrid method is then designed to handle the 2E-CMDPDTW model. The customer clustering and the greedy algorithms are employed to generate locally optimized initial solutions to accelerate the calculating velocity and guarantee the diversity of feasible solutions. The Im-NSGA-II combines the order crossover operation and the polynomial mutation process to find the optimal solution of the 2E-CMDPDTW. The comparative results show that the proposed hybrid method outperforms the NSGA-II and the multiobjective genetic algorithm. Furthermore, a Shapley value method is used for allocating total profits of established alliances and finding an optimal coalition sequence of the logistics facilities joining alliances based on the strictly monotonic path strategy. Finally, a case study of 2E-CMDPDTW in Chongqing China is conducted to validate the feasibility. Results indicate that this study contributes to long-term partnerships between logistics facilities within multi-echelon logistics networks in practice and contributes to the long-term sustainability of urban logistics pickup and delivery networks' development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competitive markets, increased fuel costs, and underutilized vehicle fleets are characteristics that currently define the logistics sector. Given an increasing pressure to act in a manner that is economically and ecologically efficient, mechanisms that help to benefit from idle capacities are on the rise. In the Sharing Economy, collaborative usage is typically organized through platforms that facilitate the exchange of goods or services. Our study examines a collaborative pickup and delivery problem where carriers can exchange customer requests. The aim is to quantify the potential of horizontal collaborations under a centralized framework. An Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search is developed to solve yet unsolved test instances. A computational study confirms the results of past studies which have reported cost savings between 20 and 30%. In addition, the numerical results indicate an even greater potential for settings with a high degree of regional customer overlap. Unfortunately, these high collaborative gains typically come at the cost of an uneven customer distribution, which is known to be one of the main barriers that prevent companies from entering into horizontal collaborations. To generate acceptable solutions for all participants, several constraints are included in the model. The introduction of these constraints to single-vehicle instances, decreases the potential collaborative gain considerably. Surprisingly, this does not happen in more realistic settings of carriers operating multiple vehicles. Overall, the computational study shows that centralized collaborative frameworks have the potential to generate considerable cost savings, while at the same time limiting customer or profit share losses and enabling carriers to keep some of their most valued customers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Normative state socialist economic theory appeared in the mid-1920s with Soviet economist Preobrazhensky. In Nigeria, many economic thinkers were influenced by Soviet and other Eastern European economic theory during the Cold War years. Bala Usman and Segun Osoba focused on the destruction of feudal land law and on delinking from the capitalist world economy; Bade Onimode and Ola Oni on emulating state socialist Eastern European economic theory and practice in an effort to overcome structural underdevelopment; Claude Ake in his Marxist phase made use of the Hungarian economist Tamás Szentes's heterodox socialist development theory that the latter developed while the two were colleagues at the University of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Nigeria's oil incomes were to be used in all these plans to kick-start heavy industry in the country. As the USSR's alternative globalization path disappeared and then the Nigerian compradores' share of profits grew by the early 21st century, interest in these radical classics reappeared in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the revenue-sharing contract, bank credit financing, retailer credit financing and blockchain-driven SCF ( supply chain finance) are compared, the optimal strategies of supply chain actors are analyzed under different financing models, and the supply chain performances are studied as parameters vary. Research shows that if the capital cost of retailers is less than that of manufacturers, retailer credit financing is a better financing strategy ; there are two threshold points of platform usage fee, and when the platform usage fee is lower than that of the low threshold point, blockchain-driven SCF is superior to the other two financing strategies. Moreover, as the revenue sharing rate and the profits of manufacturers increase, the profits of retailers decrease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present work models a three-level distribution channel that has a manufacturer, multiple distributors, and multiple retailers under each distributor to analyze channel members' cooperative, semicooperative, and noncooperative decisions for an arbitrary replenishment cycle other than the first in the infinite time horizon. It uses two sequential bargaining processes: forward contract-bargaining (FCB) and backward contract-bargaining (BCB) to eliminate channel conflict and allocate additional profit among channel members. We successfully implement a hybrid contract mechanism that combines wholesale price discount (WPD) and subsidy on holding cost for channel coordination. The concept of Nash bargaining is applied for additional profit sharing. The proposed hybrid contract can fully coordinate the tree-like supply chain and enrich the entire profit of the supply chain at its best. The manufacturer provides WPD to each distributor separately, and each distributor provides a subsidy to each of its retailers independently. Both the sequential bargaining processes are designed in such a way that an upstream channel member always has the opportunity to account for different reservations for its different downstream members. Although each bargaining process eliminates the channel conflict, finds win-win ranges, and distributes surplus profit, the distributors prefer BCB, whereas the manufacturer and the retailers prefer the FCB. Also, without receiving WPD, the distributors have the ability to coordinate the supply chain and find win-win profits by subsidizing the retailers' holding costs. A numerical case is presented to explain the findings of the work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We introduce closed loop supply chain (CLSC) models with dual competitive sales channels. • We consider three reverse channel structures in the CLSC. • The optimal reverse channel choices from the perspectives of channel players and the system are analyzed. • Relevant contracts are designed to coordinate dual-channel CLSCs under the three reverse channel structures. The implications of dual sales channels (direct and traditional retail channels) and closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) have been well recognized in the literature and in practice. In this study, we explore the reverse channel choice for the manufacturer and the design of coordination mechanisms in CLSCs in the midst of dual competitive sales channels. We consider three recycling channel structures: manufacturer collecting (Model M), retailer collecting (Model R) and third-party collecting (Model C) structures. We present the following findings. The manufacturer and the retailer obtain more profits in Model M and Model R, respectively. However, from the perspective of the supply chain system, either the M model or the R model could be optimal depending on the following parameters: channel competition intensity between the direct and retail channels, collection costs and remanufacturing cost savings. Furthermore, we show that a simple price contract that consists of the wholesale price, direct channel price and transfer price of the used product (in Model R and Model C), with a complementary profit sharing mechanism can effectively coordinate dual-channel CLSCs under different recycling channel structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the overlooked area of growing items through a two-echelon supply chain with a hybrid-price-stock-dependent demand under trade credit policy. A supplier–retailer scenario is studied where the supplier breeds newborn animals with respect to a biological growth pattern and then slaughters them. The items are sent to the retailer where experiencing deterioration during the inventory cycle. The demand in the retail end is assumed to be multivariate function of unit selling price and the level of on-hand inventory. The model is analyzed under decentralized and centralized chain structures. An analytic solution approach and an algorithm are developed to solve the problem. The proposed structure is illustrated through experimental results with factual growth patent. Sensitivity analysis and graphical illustrations are carried out to investigate the impact of different input parameters. The results support the claim that centralized chain structure can provide the partners with more benefits if an appropriate coordination mechanism is applied. Moreover, it is shown that the unit purchasing cost of each echelon has a significant effect on the profit in comparison with the other cost factors. Finally, the results reveal that the supplier's inventory cycle is more dependent on the growth pattern rather than external cost factors which is the basic insight of this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The regulator in Europe calls for the market-consistent valuation of the insurance liabilities that usually are not (fully) tradable. An example of such liabilities is the participating pension contract that is generally long-dated and vulnerable to the medium-time dynamics of the underlying risk drivers. Dealing with these characteristics requires time-consistent pricing. However, the well-known non-linear premium principles, often used as pricing operators, are not time-consistent. Based on this motivation, we study the time-consistent and market- consistent (TCMC) actuarial valuation of the participating pension contracts with hybrid payoff. We use a standard profit-sharing mechanism with guaranteed interest rate, and generalize it to a hybrid profit-sharing mechanism with the actuarial and hedgeable financial risks, over the course of the contract. Market-consistency is maintained by "two-step actuarial valuation" in a one-period setting. Time-consistency is obtained by a "backward iteration" of these one-period two-step valuations over the predetermined sub-intervals of the valuation period. We use the Least-Square Monte-Carlo method to implement the conditional operators in the backward iteration. We compare the results of TCMC price to the expected value of the discounted payoff and measure the relative risk loading and time-consistency risk premium. Besides, we investigate the effect of the stochastic interest rate as compared to the deterministic one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking government environmental regulation and consumer's green preference into a unified analytical framework, this study constructed a differential game model. With the joint effect of supplier and manufacturer green innovation efforts on the dynamic change of the product's green level, it compared and analyzed the long-term dynamic equilibrium strategies of green innovation cooperation in a supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making situations. Accordingly, a scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract was then proposed. On this basis, it further carried out a numerical simulation analysis on the dual-driving effects of the government and market. The results showed that the scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract under the centralized decision-making situation, which was designed by using the Rubinstein bargaining game model, could effectively ensure that the supply chain members' sharing profits would realize "Dual Pareto Improvements." With the increase of the environmental regulation's intensity, the product's green level kept rising and tended to be stable. However, the overall equilibrium profit of the supply chain was characterized by "U" fluctuation, which first descended and then ascended. In addition, the product's green level, the green innovation investment and equilibrium (distributed) profits of supply chain members, and the overall profits of supply chain all increased with the consumers' green preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutional Court has issued a verdict No. 93/PUUX/2012 that repeal and declare the provisions of Article 55 paragraph 2 of the law No. 21 year 2008 on Sharia banking null and void. The method used in drafting this article is normative research using a conceptual and statutory approach, which results in the conclusion that due to the principle of Sharia banking operations differ from conventional banking, the procedure for the settlement of the dispute must also be different, which in this case is the religious court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We study micro credit contracts that are based on profit sharing and hence compliant with the Islamic (i.e. Shari'ah) injunction regarding not charging interest. • Profit sharing loans provide borrowers better insurance for borrowers but also exacerbate the problem of strategic default. • We then consider a peer monitoring mechanism that harnesses locally available information to mitigate the problem of strategic default. • With peer monitoring, under certain conditions we show that the Shari'ah compliant loans can yield greater borrower welfare than interest bearing loans. Many Muslims, abiding by injunctions of Shari'ah law, avoid using credit market institutions that charge interest. Due to this constraint, current best estimates suggest that in some Muslim majority countries, around 20% of the poor opt not to participate in microcredit programs. This paper is a theoretical contribution towards increasing financial inclusion of the Muslim poor. We study methods to make micro lending Shari'ah compliant, based on profit sharing in which there is a possibility of strategic default. We show that introducing a new peer-monitoring mechanism, whereby agents are incentivized to report on each other's profits, can be used along with profit sharing, and in so doing, improve upon the individual borrower, profit-sharing contracts. We then compare interest-based lending with profit-sharing lending in both individual and peer-monitoring settings and show conditions under which profit-sharing contracts with peer monitoring, outperform interest-based contracts in terms of borrower welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the performance effects of two profit sharing schemes in a simplified representation of an organization with high task interdependence. The production process involves three stages such that output of earlier stages is the necessary input for subsequent stages. Work at earlier stages is easier than at later stages and the product is only final if it goes successfully through the highest stage. We compare the effects on the performance of the organization of a payment scheme in which profits are equally shared by all those involved in the production process with one where the participation in profits is strongly increasing in the production stage. The comparison is made for two ways of assigning individuals to the production stage: randomly or by merit. We also study the distinction between sharing schemes that are exogenously imposed and those that are chosen by the person at the top of the hierarchy. We find that overall the type of payment scheme has no effect on profits. We also find that profits increase over time and more so with the equal than with the unequal sharing scheme. The high interdependence in production that we study makes steep incentives ineffective and even counter-productive. These changes in profits over time can be explained by changes in production performance over time. We also find that merit-based assignment to positions in the hierarchy leads to significantly higher profits than random assignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]