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In the present paper, I relate the Dialogical Self Theory with the philosophy of Taoism. For that purpose, I instance the premises of Taoism such as that human being use open ideograms (signs and symbols) that grow constantly in their meaning, that the meaning of life can be only unraveled if the unity of opposites is integrated in one's worldview and that the human being listens to his natural intuition and does not force himself to do things (wuwei = effortless action which has its origins in Laozi's TaoTeChing). When those premises are applied to the Dialogical Self Theory, psychologists can help people to develop a harmonious self because the self is operationalized as an open system that is constantly in flux of meaning. Hidden I-positions might be shifted to the foreground while helping the human being to listen to a multitude of positions and to not act in a rigid fashion. In order for scientists and practitioners to use the insights of what I call the Dialogical Self of Taoistic Dynamics, I propose an open interview guide that could help people to realize their harmonious pluralistic self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a literary criticism of the book "Central Park Love Song: Wandering beneath the Heaventrees," by Stephen Wolf. Topics include the philosophy of establishing a personal identity, the use of New York City's Central Park as environmental history and urban geography, and the book's hybrid genre of memoir and creative nonfiction.

This essay explores the concept of the self in the philosophies of Nagarjuna and Merleau‐Ponty by examining how it is that, according to them, the self is empty and only conventionally real rather than intrinsically so. By analyzing the similarities between their philosophies, the essay aims to shed light on new ways of understanding perception, ethics, and our relationships with others. It will include an analysis of the no‐self and the emptiness of entities, as well as an analysis of Merleau‐Ponty's writings and philosophy to see how it is that, according to him, in order to better understand ourselves, we must understand the reality of our intersubjectivity and intertwining with the world. It will clearly be shown that Merleau‐Ponty's existential phenomenology and the Madhyamikan school of thought coincide and offer powerful moral philosophies, while seeing the world as being completely separate from the self, distorts both our notions of ourselves and the world we are interconnected with. Virtue must be sought in samsara (perpetually being born into the world) and sunyata (emptiness that is itself empty of inherent existence), for samsara and nirvana (the end of karma) are one. [Correction added on 03 April 2023, after the first online publication: First two sentences of the Abstract have been modified.] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As several historical examples are adduced to show, different theories of self‐knowledge take shape in response to different conceptions of the sort of beings we are. This leads to the question of what underlying notion of the self motivates, in particular, the dominant modern idea that self‐knowledge consists primarily in grasping whatever beliefs, desires, thoughts, and feelings make up our mental life. The answer is that the self‐constitutive relation to itself has been conceived as one of an intimate, pre‐reflective acquaintance with our own minds and that only so can we be understood as being responsible for whatever we think or do. Against this view it is then argued that all our self‐knowledge really rests on reflection of an essentially third‐person kind, since the self's constitutive relation to itself consists instead in our guiding ourselves by what we take to be reasons in all that we think and do and in thereby counting as responsible for our thought and action, whatever may be the extent of our knowledge of our own minds. This alternative account implies, contrary to the modern view and in company with certain ancient views, that self‐knowledge can prove to be the most difficult kind of knowledge to acquire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this autoethnography, I describe my own personal experiences and dealings with a sport-related concussion. In particular, I focus on the (re)negotiation of my student- athlete identity due to the repercussive affects of concussion. Weaving together personal narratives with Erving Goffman's presentation of self theory, I attempt to highlight some of the complexities of the injury in relation to athletic identity, and use the theory as a departure point to further discuss how sport-related concussion can be understood within a socio-cultural context. In doing so, I attempt to move beyond my own personal experiences, as a way to comment on the larger social, cultural, and political forces that affect how athletes come to understand and embody concussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to holistically comprehend the concept of nen 念 in the Zen philosophy of Dōgen (道元 1200–1253), which is one of the origins of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, in relation to his principal concepts. This article specifically investigates its usages in his masterpiece, Treasury of the True Dharma Eye (Shōbōgenzō 正法眼蔵), according to each step of the threefold wisdom (san-e 三慧); for mindfulness is a common thread among them and he presents the concept of "monshishū-shō 聞思修證", of which shō 證 stands for "awakening". It is revealed that Dōgen considers "study" (mon 聞) and "reflection" (shi 思) to be essential on the Buddhist path, as well as "practice" (shū 修), and that nen 念 in Dōgen's philosophy is the self beyond the sense of body-mind or time, which can be attained after long cultivation. Also, the connections among nen 念 and his critical concepts such as "just sitting" (shikan taza 祇管打坐), "dropping off body-mind" (shinjin datsuraku 身心脱落), and "oneness of practice and awakening" (shūshō ittō 修證一等) are elucidated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up a neglected problem for metaethical noncognitivism: the characterization of the acceptance states for agent-centered normative theories like Rational Egoism. If Egoism is a coherent view, the non-cognitivist needs a coherent acceptance state for it. This can be provided, as Dreier (Aust J Philos 74: 409–422, 1996) and Gibbard (Thinking how to live, Harvard University Press, 2003) have shown. But those accounts fail when generalized, assigning the same acceptance state to normative theories that are clearly distinct, or assigning no acceptance state to theories that look to be intelligible. The paper makes the case for this and then asks: What should we conclude if the problem cannot be solved? We might conclude that since Egoism is clearly a coherent (if mistaken) view, the argument amounts to a refutation of noncognitivism. But we suggest another possibility. There is, on reflection, something incoherent, or at least odd, in standard formulations of Egoism; noncognitivism predicts this and so provides an intriguing explanation for this fact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors address the question of the existing individual and what it truly means to be a self. This article discusses the existing individual as depicted by the pseudonymous authors, focusing on motion, activity, and repetition. In particular, this article seeks to pinpoint the motion and activity of the self through Kierkegaard's notion of repetition, contending that repetition is a decisive action brought forward discontinuously through a breach in time's succession. I address the self's movement forward in four sections. In the first I introduce the overarching distinction between the motion of existing individuals and empirical objects, distinguishing the character of my investigation. After clarifying this distinction, the second section focuses on Anti‐Climacus' conception of the self as activity (a positing of the synthesis), revealing that for an existing individual the self is not given but a task to be actualized. The final section first details the positing of the synthesis as repetition and second contends that, through repetition, the inner workings of the self reveal its activity as a discontinuous breach in time that occurs by virtue of the eternal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first person represented as a subject's field of vision, as opposed to first-person language, has only been around for a century and a half. Yet the claims advanced by its philosophical inventor, Ernst Mach, are momentous: nothing less than the dissolution of the self into a world of sensations. A closer look at his images reveals less an elimination of the self than a reflection of the connection between subject, world, and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The latest entry in this philosophical tradition is Kristin Gjesdal's 2020 I The Drama of History: Ibsen, Hegel, Nietzsche i . Henrik Ibsen the philosopher-playwright has a well-established critical history, beginning with the work of contemporaries such as the philosopher Georg Brandes, playwright George Bernard Shaw, and translator William Archer. In her three subsequent chapters, Gjesdal analyzes the Hegelian currents in three of Ibsen's early to midcareer plays. [Extracted from the article]

Bringing gender history, the history of the body and art history into a conversation with material culture studies, this article argues that the sudden fashionability of beards in Renaissance Europe has been intricately linked with a culture of material and visual experimentation. I propose shifting perspectives from a focus on the symbolism of beards towards examining how early modern ways of material engagement with the matter of hair crafted a visual attention to facial hair that made up the sociocultural significance of beards. Focusing on how people made hair matter, I suggest working with the concept of face‐work. In particular, this article maps how the Reformation upheavals and the rise of new visual practices dynamised Renaissance protagonists' creative engagement with facial hair as a means for staging the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether self-knowledge is rationally required is of central importance to how we should understand its nature. It mentions that rationality requires knowledge of beliefs should be prepared to say that it also requires knowledge of other mental states, on pain of arbitrariness, wherein Moore's paradox fails to motivate a wide range of potential requirements, including self-knowledge, higher-order beliefs, and no higher-order errors.

This article argues that while creative spaces are believed to instigate creative production, their strongest value is in producing new possibilities for self-organizing. By zooming in on short snapshots of resistance against gentrification in creative spaces in Amsterdam, I investigate whether small-scale and grass-roots forms of resistance and self-organizing between independent workers in the creative industries can be understood as examples of the autonomist notions of 'the common' and 'the multitude'. By placing observations of creative workers' self-organizing practices alongside autonomist theory, I suggest that autonomist thought is a promising philosophy for a politicized view of creative production, because it celebrates multiplicity and uniqueness. This is a timely topic in a society with growing numbers of freelancers and increasing flexibilization of labour. This article contributes to research on self-organizing among creative workers and to the literature on work conditions in the creative industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to identify the most important modern trends in the academic accreditation of higher education institutions in order to benefit from these trends in Egypt. Therefore, the theoretical and theoretical framework of accreditation was discussed, represented Its concept, philosophy and procedures. The modern trends in academic accreditation which Supports the independence of universities and calls for innovation like self-accreditation, and Six Sigma, which calls for the application of accurate measures to identify the most important errors that impede the achievement of the objectives of the institution and the establishment of these errors at the minimum, and the trend towards intensification and integration of accreditation standards and This paper recommended that a certain philosophy of accreditation should be established: a suitable reward for accredited institutions, and the use of the self-reliance system to distinguish higher education institutions that meet a certain level of achievement of performance standards For example, more than 80% of all standards), relying on accurate and standardized measures to measure the return of the quality assurance system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the twentieth year of his pontificate, on September 14, 1998, on the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, Pope John Paul II reads the Encyclical Letter on the Relationships between Faith and Reason “Fides et ratio”. The concept of “Christian philosophy” takes on meaning and receives new contributions to the definition of the phrase. Chapter IV of the Encyclical Letter emphasizes the significant stages of the encounter between faith and reason, the drama of the separation between the two, and the eternal novelty of St. Thomas’ thought. Christian philosophy can only be a realistic philosophy, and as philosophy approaches moderate realism, it is Christian. A philosophy of the self has nothing to do with the Christian philosophy. Many consider philosophy to be something indifferent to Christianity and to Christians; they do not want to understand that the meaning and fate of Christianity stands or falls with the philosophy that adopts it; and because apart from Thomism, the other philosophies do not agree with Christianity, without compromise on one side or the other, they say: not only in reality, but also in theory, Thomism is Christian philosophy; the others are more or less philosophical, because they are more or less Christian. The “dark cloud” of mystery that separates believers from unbelievers will help to develop a balanced and communicable level of understanding Christian philosophy, useful to both. In this first part we will focus on: the presence of St. Paul in Athens; the cautious attitude of Christians towards gnosis; the role of Saint Irenaeus and Tertullian. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lay theory interventions instill situation-general ways of thinking, often using short reading and writing exercises, and they have led to lasting changes in behavior and performance in a wide variety of policy domains. Do they work in all contexts? We suggest that lay theory intervention effects depend on psychological affordances, which are defined as cues that allow individuals to view a lay theory as legitimate and adaptive in that context. The present research directly and experimentally tested this hypothesis using the example of a "purpose for learning" lay theory intervention, which taught the lay theory that school is a place to develop skills that allow one to make progress toward self-transcendent aims. A double-blind 2 (student purpose intervention) × 2 (purpose-affording note) field experiment was conducted in a relatively low-performing public middle school in the United States. Students first received a web-based purpose for learning lay theory intervention (or a control activity), and 2 weeks later attended a class in which an assignment was accompanied by a purpose-affording note that was hand-written by a teacher (or a control note). Results showed that the purpose lay theory intervention increased performance on an English class writing assignment, but only when it was accompanied by a purpose-affording note. Exploratory analyses revealed that the effects of the manipulations were apparent among students who were at greater risk for poor performance in the class: nonnative English-speaking students. Thus short, online lay theory interventions may reduce performance gaps, provided that the contexts afford the opportunity for the proffered lay theory to seem legitimate and adaptive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the thought-provoking papers that constitute 'Stranger Races: Reflections on Alterity in Constructions of the Self', the authors make clear that our always already social confrontation with alterity is complex, multifaceted and context sensitive. They also make clear that thinking about alterity is a central, if not the central, element of anthropological study, an endeavour that sheds light on such socially destructive forces as primitivism, essentialism, racism, and ethnic and religious discrimination. In the essays, the authors also stress, albeit indirectly, that the dynamic linkages between self and other cannot be reduced a set of rules or an abstract formula. Indeed, the tangled nature of processes that play out in the construction of identity cry out for ethnographic elaboration. For me, the most important contribution that the authors make devolves from their exploration of the turbulent conceptual space between self and other. It is the space between self and other that is important to explore. As the essays in this special issue demonstrate, in the creative space between self and other, we are able to extend anthropological practice to the public domain in order to showcase alternatives to xenophobia and prejudice and to advocate for social practices that celebrate mutual respect. That is a path that leads to a powerfully productive anthropological future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article the author discusses endurantists, naturalism, and personites. Topics include that personites should reject naturalism; that personites views personal identity as the relation between the body and psychological continuity; and that the identity over time changes as per necessary conditions.

Drawing on select works of Adorno, we will first rehearse his reasons for a rejuvenation of philosophy and apply them to philosophers working on world philosophical traditions. We will then analyse Adorno's arguments pertaining to the theory–praxis relation to ascertain whether his thought could accommodate a study of world philosophical traditions for the simple reason that they are present in a particular society. Shifting our focus slightly, we reflect upon how current ways of professional philosophizing affect the study of world philosophical traditions. As the example of Māori philosophy demonstrates, current philosophical practices seem to delimit the search for the unconventional in academic philosophy. Through its philosophical appropriation, the so-called unconventional tends to mimic conventional patterns in academic philosophy. We will then attempt to find reasons to critique this process within the Adornoian framework itself. The conclusion draws together different strands of the discussion and delineates some paths to take forward the world philosophies project in an Adornoian spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus supports, the view that there are no objective moral truths. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it "overgeneralises": it implausibly forces its proponents to also deny the existence of objective truths about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. ("companions in guilt" objections) or even about the argument's own conclusion or its own soundness ("self-defeat" objections). My aim in this article is to provide a detailed clarification and assessment of this overgeneralisation charge. Various (mostly empirical) issues relevant to assessing the above objections have so far not been sufficiently investigated. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that realists have exaggerated the significance of their overgeneralisation charge. Both its companions in guilt and its self-defeat versions likely fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maryse Condé, the celebrated Guadeloupean novelist and critic, has produced three separate and distinct autobiographies, Le coeur à rire et à pleurer (1999), La vie sans fards (2012), and Mets et merveilles (2015). These works engage a series of latent paradoxes and contradictions that implicitly subvert claims to autobiographical veracity, but there remain traces of the author's sojourns and encounters that can be unearthed in a number of other texts. If autobiography functions by creating a split between past and present selves, such a division, in temporal and psychological terms, is itself doubled in character, content, and implication, while the typically linear structure of autobiographical narratives assumes that we have access to the truth of the autobiographer's life and experience(s). In Condé's works, both the discernible facts of her life and manner of their representation generate a creative instability, as writing and the invention of subjectivity encounter the presumed infallibility of memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having a self means being able think of myself under a certain profile that that is me: that is who I am, that is how I am. But if I raise the question as to who or how I am, there are three salient profiles in which I can cast myself, three selves with which we can identify. I can see myself just as an agent identified over time by the linkages between my experiences, my attitudes and my actions. I can see myself as the persona that I invite others to rely on and that, if sincere, I internalize. And I can see myself as the figure I cut in other people's eyes, whether or not I welcome that image. Such ambiguities help explain the complexity in philosophical discussion of the self as well as the conflict in everyday exhortations to be ourselves and know ourselves, yet also to forget ourselves and lose ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-biases are well described in adults but remain poorly understood in children. Here, we investigated in 6-10 year-old children (N = 132) the self-prioritization effect (SPE), a self-bias which reflects, in adults, the perceptual advantage for stimuli arbitrarily associated with the self as compared to those associated with other persons. We designed a child-friendly adaptation of a paradigm originally introduced in adults by Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) in order to test whether the SPE also occurs in children and if so, to determine its evolution with age. A robust SPE was obtained from the age of 6, and this effect was similar-sized in our four age groups. These findings are discussed with reference to the development of the self during childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes up the specifically poetic dimension of what Jacques Derrida calls Martin Heidegger's "philosophical nationalism" in the recently published Geschlecht III, arguing that this text doubles as a self-interrogation of Derrida's own practice of reading poetry. Thus reading Geschlecht III alongside the nearly contemporaneous "Shibboleth: For Paul Celan," I claim that Derrida's critical deconstruction of Heidegger's philosophical-poetic nationalism both allows us to read the traces of a more affirmatively deconstructive thinking of literary community in "Shibboleth" and draws attention to the limits and traps of such a project. Further, I demonstrate that Derrida's and Heidegger's respective approaches to the question of literary community cannot be separated from their respective approaches to the question of translation and their respective ways of mobilizing the motif of the "untranslatable." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the set of ethical questions underlying the emergence of the modern politics of security, as articulated, in particular, in the work of Thomas Hobbes. An ethic is here understood – in line with its ancient philosophical use and the interpretation advanced by authors such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot – as a domain of reflections and practices related to the cultivation and conversion of the self (askēsis, metanoia). The article aims to demonstrate that, besides attending to the physical safety of the state and its citizens, modern apparatuses of security are also crucially implicated in the formation of their subjects as ethical and autonomous individuals. To substantiate this thesis, the article first illustrates how, since the first appearance of the term in the vocabulary of Western thought – and in Seneca's work in particular – theories of security have been intimately tied to the cultivation of the self. It thus interprets Hobbes's reflections on the subject as the upshot of a substantive, if implicit, re-articulation of Seneca's ethic of security, by focusing on the two authors' respective understandings of (a) autonomy, (b) the world, (c) ascesis, and (d) politics. Overall, it is suggested that the differences between the two authors testify to a wider political-historical shift: in modern regimes of governmentality, the ethical dimension of security no longer defines the rightful exercise of political power, but rather appears as an object of social and economic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the result of a bibliographic research in which we approached the philosophy as an aesthetic paradigm inserted in the context of contemporary ecological problems. It is a question of carrying out an exercise of thought based on the epistemic support of the philosophy of multiplicity, Deleuze-Guattarian, more specifically with the proposal of the philosopher Félix Guattari around the eco-philosophical paradigm that unfolds in three major ecological perspectives: that of the environment, that of social relations and that of human subjectivity. These constructs reveal socio-educational guidelines that allow for rethinking ways of experiencing man's relations with nature, with others and with himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ghostwriters represent a form of labor aimed at producing someone else's self, or what we label "stand-in labor." This growing workforce sits at the intersection of critical developments in today's neoliberal economy: the rise in self-branding, the growth in outsourcing of the self, and mounting income inequality. This article explores the experience of stand-in workers and its implication on the economy of self. Relying on 72 interviews with ghostwriters and publishing industry insiders, we show that ghostwriters face recognition estrangement because they are often asked to stay out of public view for the crafted selves to prove "authentic." As creative workers with a high degree of investment in their work, ghostwriters are quite sensitive to this form of estrangement. They manage this tension in a unique way: they claim a professional need to disappear in order to properly put forth a subject's "true" voice, yet emphasize their active contribution to the crafting of a subject's public self that differs from the subject's "true" self. In doing so, ghostwriters alter the subjects they impersonate by creating a distance between the subjects' crafted and "actual" selves. Our study therefore uncovers a paradoxical dynamic—namely, taking professional pride in disappearing, yet reappearing in the act of altering others' selves—that we posit might prove inherent to the performance of stand-in labor. More broadly, we suggest that many stand-in workers engaged in this growing economy of self might alter the people they impersonate, thus leading to a situation where calls for authenticity breed adulteration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans continually form and update impressions of each other's identities based on the disclosure of thoughts, feelings, and beliefs. At the same time, individuals also have specific beliefs and knowledge about their own self-concept. Over a decade of social neuroscience research has shown that retrieving information about the self and about other persons recruits similar areas of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), however it remains unclear if an individual's neural representation of self is reflected in the brains of well-known others or if instead the two representations share no common relationship. Here we examined this question in a tight-knit network of friends as they engaged in a round-robin trait evaluation task in which each participant was both perceiver and target for every other participant and in addition also evaluated their self. Using functional MRI and a multilevel modeling approach, we show that multivoxel brain activity patterns in the MPFC during a person's self-referential thought are correlated with those of friends when thinking of that same person. Moreover, the similarity of neural self–other patterns was itself positively associated with the similarity of self–other trait judgments ratings as measured behaviorally in a separate session. These findings suggest that accuracy in person perception may be predicated on the degree to which the brain activity pattern associated with an individual thinking about their own self-concept is similarly reflected in the brains of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jacques Derrida delivered the basis of The Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International as a plenary address at the conference 'Whither Marxism?' hosted by the University of California, Riverside, in 1993. The longer book version was published in French the same year and appeared in English and Portuguese the following year. In the decade after the publication of Specters, Derrida's analyses provoked a large critical literature and invited both consternation and celebration by figures such as Antonio Negri, Wendy Brown and Frederic Jameson. This forum seeks to stimulate new reflections on Derrida, deconstruction and Specters of Marx by considering how the futures past announced by the book have fared after an eventful quarter century. In this fifth group of contributions, three philosophers explore the specters of colonialidade, the specifically Brazilian legacies of Portuguese and European coloniality. Carla Rodrigues opens the dialogue by exploring the haunting and melancholy provoked by colonial forms of violence and shows how confronting Brazilian necropolitics sustains the Derridean legacy; Rafael Haddock-Lobo offers a meditation on the difficulties of being before the law and standing before specters as a means of being justly haunted by the others of European philosophy in Brazil; finally, Marcelo Moraes continues the theme of Europe as a specter-producing machine and invokes specifically the presences of indigenous and Afro-Brazilian political resistances with the aim of deconstructing coloniality. INSETS: Before the Specters - A Task That Is To-Come;Colonial Phantasmagoria: The Return of the Specters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seventeenth-century philosopher Damaris Masham (1658/59-1708) had an intimate and emotional relationship with her friend and companion John Locke (1632-1704), and corresponded with him over many years. Her extensive surviving letters to Locke have been largely overlooked by scholarship on her philosophy. Setting Masham's letters in the context of philosophical and historical scholarship on autobiography, as well as Berel Lang's work on philosophical genre, I argue that her letters to Locke should be read as a form of philosophical autobiography. By doing so, unrecognized aspects of Masham's philosophical position on selfhood and sociability are made visible. Furthermore, I show how the personal and the philosophical are inextricable in the letters and argue that lived emotional experience is of philosophical value. This point is of particular import in the project of retrieval of women philosophers throughout history, but should also be taken into account in the context of a modern philosophical milieu that often privileges "arguing that" as the only legitimate mode of philosophical practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore what Lady Mary Shepherd means by 'mind,' 'soul,' and 'self,' arguing that, for Shepherd, these terms are interchangeable, although they have a broader and a narrower sense. For Shepherd, mind/soul/self (in the narrow sense) is an enduring capacity that causes conscious perceptions; we know its existence through reasoning (rather than direct introspection), using an argument analogous to Shepherd's argument for the existence of the external world. In the broader sense, mind/soul/self is the capacity to cause sensations, as well as the train of sensations actually produced by that capacity. I end by pointing out a problem Shepherd faces in individuating minds/souls/selves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article departs from the hypothesis that Nietzsche's Ecce Homo is framed within a tradition that conceives philosophy as "spirituality" and "techne tou biou", in the way Foucault understands these two notions. To prove this hypothesis, an analysis of the Pindaric-inspired phrase of the oeuvre's subtitle is undertaken. Also, an inventory of the technologies of the self as indicated in the book is presented, and, lastly, the concepts of amor fati and the eternal return are examined in the text as well as the place of Cynicism in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the phenomenon entitled as "(non)recording medium", the phenomenological experience of which and the subjective relation with the mirror image of the Self are reflected on from the perspectives of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, philosophy, and media theory. By interpreting the works of visual art that use reflexive surfaces, the paper analyses the representational-mimetic function of reflection in the contemporary culture of visual over-abundance. By using the notions of 'the Real' and 'illusion' as the key parameters, the paper analyses the introspective state that emerges in front of the non-recording surface, the viewer as the Other self and their experience of the Real. Here psychoanalysis acts through the Other self the image of which is reflected on the surface, phenomenology-- through the sensual and temporal experience of the subjective reality, while the image itself is but a mimetic copy of the experienced object inscribed in the consciousness of the viewer. The paper introduces the definition of the ephemeral, transformed and ever-changing act of mimesis where the spontaneous--and volatile--nature of an image unfolds. By questioning the similarity and representation, the paper rethinks the shift of mimesis from the classical understanding of the imitation of reality to the modern understanding of the Real as volatile and temporal. Here the mimetic experience manifests through the combination of impermanence and temporality in art which, through the interaction between the subject's consciousness, memory and imagination, turns imago into a non-recordable mask of the subject. The ephemerality of the image implies the essential experience of the present where the Real is reduced to an appearance, while a constantly self-positing consciousness shapes the individual experience and thus affects the visuality itself. Therefore a visual reflection should be regarded as one of the categories of contemporaneity which functions as a radical form of reductive mimesis which exists beyond the limits of representative acts--it condenses the perceived Real and is strengthened through temporal dimension and the over-abundance of the images of fleeting presence. The paper aims to specify the notion of mimesis which, while still imprisoned in antiquity, is now often replaced with other terms, and is largely ignored by the art theoretical discourse. The paper discusses the examples where it unfolds via different artistic means: Asukas (2018) by Beatričė Mockevičiūtė, Pre-consciousness (2017) by Paulius Rainys, and The Continuity of Presence in the Past (1974) by Dan Graham. By temporarily capturing the parameters of the ever-changing Real, these experiential installations are positioned as visual screens that transmit the fleeting present. The paper actualises the question of (un)reality of an image--just like an artwork, a mirror posits a false--fictional--replica of the subjective Real: in other words, it is an imitation, or mimetic reality. The paper concludes that we are both what we see and how we are seen by others: we no longer reflect on the images, but rather are images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the hallmarks of the Japanese psychiatrist and philosopher Kimura Bin's (b. 1931) philosophical approach is the conversion of ordinary words into philosophical concepts. Here we focus on the way he appropriates the Japanese words onozukara and mizukara , ordinary terms associated, respectively, with things that occur naturally, spontaneously, or by themselves, and those that come from oneself. This re-reading of these terms as philosophical concepts furnishes an interpretive frame that brings together and makes sense of large and important concepts in philosophy and psychology such as self and nature, perception and sensation, collective subjectivity and individual subject, schizophrenia and self-realization. His appropriation of these two Japanese terms also uncovers a general and impersonal form of subjectivity that underlies our experience of ourselves as individuated subjects and stands at the center of his philosophical and psychological investigations into these phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the extent to which comparative philosophy can assist decolonial struggle. In order to accomplish this task, I offer not only a description of philosophy's colonization but also an account of how this discipline remains subject to the coloniality of knowledge. In short, insofar as race, gender, class, and sexuality are considered irrelevant or accidental to the production of philosophical knowledge, professional philosophy replicates, if not continues, what Rajeev Bhargava terms the epistemic injustice of colonialism. One response to the colonization of philosophy is "diversification" by means of putting into conversation philosophers, systems, and ideas from differing cultures or regions throughout the world. While a step forward, insofar as philosophical comparisons occur primarily on an East–West axis, philosophers are not necessarily addressing the biases, prejudices, racism, and exceptionalism endemic to their discipline. In fact, such a directionality typically reinforces the sense of historical development that undergirds Western philosophy's self‐understanding. This essay, therefore, offers a series of recommendations for how to radicalize comparative philosophical efforts so as to address global epistemic injustice and aid in the process of decolonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capoeira could be defined as a Brazilian martial art and game to be played. This research explored how capoeira play might be considered to facilitate connectedness amongst newly-recruited persons, plus any other ramifications of capoeira involvement. A beginners' course of capoeira was provided to participants, free of charge, in an English city in the West Midlands—new capoeiristas in a new venue for capoeira. Researchers attended classes to collect/construct overt non-participant observation data. In addition, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the new capoeiristas post-course. This article explores researchers' observation fieldnotes and interviewees' narratives. These qualitative data-driven debates include the concepts: self, identity, escapism, multiparty endeavour, community, temporality, enjoyment, and transcending boundaries. Capoeira is theorised in a fresh manner that highlights social benefits of capoeira—for example as an enjoyable and supportive group endeavour which includes elements of social play and community-building—plus benefits for self that can transcend the boundaries of the class. Findings highlight how capoeira can be considered an inherently multiparty endeavour whereby social actors form, and experience, a community in order to embrace capoeira play. Data suggest capoeira can facilitate group playfulness, joviality, and laughter. Further, capoeiristas can enact and experience—some mode of—escapism via capoeira, whereby new place and pursuit can facilitate hedonistic diversion from the mundane. Capoeira appears to provide adventure and liberation into a relatively unburdened part of, or place in, social life. Corporeal and discursive boundary-empowerment can also be experienced by capoeiristas, fostering positive identity work in the wider world. Capoeira can be argued to facilitate mutuality (e.g. community experience and group work) and egoism (e.g. an individual's identity work) concurrently. This research suggests that modified capoeira for beginners can be beneficial for both the new capoeiristas themselves and for positive community action during and beyond class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Benign and malicious envy are a consequence of an unfavorable upward comparison to another individual (i.e. a negative self-other discrepancy). Benign (malicious) envy occurs when people believe the envied individual deserves (does not deserve) his/her advantage. Prior research has shown that benign envy motivates a person to address the self-other discrepancy via self-improvement, whereas malicious envy does not. This research shows that both types of envy, not just benign envy, can motivate self-improvement, provided that the opportunities to do so occur outside the envy-eliciting domain. Benign envy increases the accessibility of the belief that effort determines whether people are rewarded; hence, it motivates process-focused goal pursuit and the use of products that emphasize effort-dependent self-improvement. Malicious envy increases the accessibility of the belief that the effort does not determine whether people are rewarded; hence, it motivates outcome-focused goal pursuit and the use of products that emphasize effort-independent self-improvement. Implications and potential extensions in the areas of envy, self-conscious emotions, and goals are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hartmut Rosa classifies modernity and late modernity in terms of the "speeding up" or "acceleration" of society. External institutions require constant development in order to maintain themselves, including material growth, technological acceleration, and cultural innovation. As has been widely noted, this is reflected internally by subjects whose thoughts and attitudes revolve around obsessive calculation, teleological thinking, and desires for Promethean-like control over nature, themselves, and their social environments. Coupled with an increase in functional differentiation, which has fragmented and shrunk once stabilizing and meaning-conferring social roles, Rosa argues that the logic of growth results in subjects whose identity is "situationally" determined. These subjects continually jockey between disparate role-based identities according to whatever situation they happen to be in at a given moment. Drawing on Erving Goffman's research on self-presentation and the philosophy of genuine pretending as developed by Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul D'Ambrosio, I will argue that situational identity is even more complex than Rosa has demonstrated. People living in late modern societies construct identities that are multifarious and incongruent in terms of not only roles, but also the very "paradigms of identity"—e.g. sincerity, individualism, authenticity, irony—through which roles are adopted. Problematically, outdated models of identity, based largely on the sincerity and its associated conceptions of the "self" and ethics, continue to dominate, leading to insoluble tensions between various socially-established identities. I will present "profilicity," the understanding of identity based on profile construction with an acute awareness of the second-order observation, as a paradigm that is increasingly important in today's world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented in which the author reflects on the philosophical concept of "I" and how it forms his response to the essay "Remixing the 'I'" by Mark Amerika. He discusses the philosophical history of the concept, with reference to the work of French philosopher René Descartes as well as German philosopher Immanuel Kant and his book "The Critique of Judgment." Particular attention is given to the phrase "cogito ergo sum," meaning "I think, I am," used by Descartes to prove a person, and the "I," exists. Other topics covered include modernism, identity, and language.

An essay is presented in which the author reflects on the concept of outsourcing the "I," or self, to identifying what has been recreated rather than invented. Particular attention is given to the character Father Karras from the novel "The Exorcist" by William Peter Blatty and Karras' recording of a demon's voice as an example that recreates, or remixes, an identity. American music composer John Cage is also discussed in terms of his experimental productions and reinterpretations of both music and literary works. Other topics covered include depictions of authors by writer Jorge Luis Borges, post-structuralism, and the philosophical concept of voice.

An interview is presented with writer Lia Purpura. When asked how her perception on the subjectivity of writers and herself has changed since her essay collection "On Looking" was published, Purpura discusses becoming more conscious of new movements and debased attitudes, appreciating language, and attempting to reflect on the concept of human identity through literature. She also addresses topics such as aesthetics, the philosophical concept of self, and the reading experience.

An essay is presented in response to "Puzzling out the Self: Some Initial Reflections," an essay by Frederick Luis Aldama and Patrick Colm Hogan. Based on Aldama and Hogan's views on poetry, the author describes a poetic genre entitled "the greater Romantic lyric," which consists of first person poems that focus on the "self" of the speaker or poet. Specific works mentioned include "Frost at Midnight" by Samuel Coleridge, "The Geese" by Jorie Graham, and "Tintern Abbey" by William Wordsworth.

A literary criticism of the essay "Puzzling out the Self: Some Initial Reflections" by Frederick Luis Aldama and Patrick Colm Hogan is presented. The author expands the discussion on various aspects of the essay concerned with areas such as cognitive mechanisms, writing narratives, and the philosophy of the self. She describes the difficulty in comprehending concepts such as emotions, subjectivity, and the connection between behavior and biology.

An essay is presented which discusses fictional memoirs in terms of a reflection of the author's "self." He states that this form of fabricated literature represents another facet of the author's personae that is shared publicly and can reveal desires, fears, and hopes. The essay "In Praise of the Fake Memoir" by Robin Hemley is also mentioned, as the author connects the discussion on deceptive perceptions to dreams and states that dreams provide unfiltered access to the self despite lacking "realness." Other topics covered include authors' visions of deceased relatives, hermit crabs as metaphors for borrowing literary form, and authorship.