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Terrorist violence has recently led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Yet scholars have only recently begun to examine whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. I test this hypothesis using data on emergency power strength, states of emergency, and the frequency of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Islamic radicalization, delving deeply into a study by sociology professor Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author states the importance of understanding who radicalizes and why they do, noting the 92 people in the U.S. that have been killed by Islamists since July 2015. Other topics discussed include other forms of radicalization including white supremacy, the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Home land Security and insights on the age, religious background and prior criminal history of Islamic terrorists.

This validation study analyses data from a sample of North American terrorist attackers (n = 33) and non-attackers (n = 23) through the lens of the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18; Meloy, 2017) utilizing a multivariate statistical approach - multidimensional scaling - to visualize potential clustering (co-occurrence) of risk factors. Rarely done in terrorism research, the results plotted in two-dimensional space show the clustering and co-occurrence of most of the eight proximal warning behaviors among the attackers, but not among the non-attackers, and less of a clustering and association of distal characteristics, but their presence in both attackers and non-attackers. These findings provide further empirical support for the rational-theoretical model of the TRAP-18, a structured professional judgment instrument for threat assessment of lone actor terrorists. It advances the quantitative analysis of operationally relevant and behaviorally observable indicators for use by law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals and their consultants. Findings are discussed in relation to other research on pre-offense behaviors of lone actor terrorists, and recommendations are made for both operational use and further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deradicalization of terrorists constitutes a critical component of the global “war on terror.” Unfortunately, little is known about deradicalization programs, and evidence for their effectiveness is derived solely from expert impressions and potentially flawed recidivism rates. We present the first empirical assessment of one such program: the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program for former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (a terrorist organization that operated in Sri Lanka until their defeat in 2009). We offer evidence that deradicalization efforts that provided beneficiaries with sustained mechanisms for earning personal significance significantly reduced extremism after 1 year (Study 1). We also found that upon release, beneficiaries expressed lower levels of extremism than their counterparts in the community (Study 2). These findings highlight the critical role of personal significance in deradicalization efforts, offer insights into the workings of deradicalization, and suggest practical methods for improving deradicalization programs worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: To explore the impact of interpersonal versatility on high‐value (terrorist‐related) detainee behaviour and subsequent interview information across distinct interview phases (namely the first and last interviews). Methods: Police interviews with 48 terrorist detainees framework (mean number of interviews per detainee = 2.93) were coded using the ‘ORBIT’ (Observing Rapport‐Based Interpersonal Techniques; Alison et al., 2014, Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 20, 421). This produced scores for adaptive and maladaptive interpersonal behaviours of detainees and interrogators across four categories: authoritative, passive, confrontational, and cooperative. Mean scores for these variables in the first and last interviews were taken allowing us to analyse the associations between (1) interviewer behaviours and detainee educed information and (2) the indirect effect of interviewer behaviour on information educed through the impact of interviewer adaptive behaviour on detainee adaptive behaviour, separately in the first and last interviews. Results: There was a positive association between detainee engagement and information in both the first and last interviews. Specific adaptive interviewer behaviours were associated with adaptive detainee behaviour in different interviews: cooperative and passive predicting improvements in the first interview and cooperative in the final interview. Maladaptive passive and authoritative interviewer behaviours were negatively associated with adaptive detainee behaviour in the first interview, as did maladaptive confrontational in the final interview. Indirect effects of interviewer behaviours on information were also demonstrated. Conclusions: Interpersonal competence (avoiding maladaptive behaviour) and increasing adaptive behaviours are associated with detainee engagement and information. The differences in specific behaviours at different phases that influence information in the two interviews highlight the importance of interpersonal versatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individual, unique motivations played a major role in the acts committed by the three terrorists under discussion. The circumstances leading to the terrorist’s attack can, in each case, be understood with respect to a pattern of reciprocal violations of expectations of living in a safe, predictable world. Seeking help for severe depression, suicidality, coupled with an inability to contain the rage engendered by these experiences, led to an increasing propensity in these men for eruptive aggression. In one case, experiences of feeling dominated by an unpredictable mother who was rejecting and seductive were not accorded central significance. In another case, having profound feelings of his being on the cusp of violence go unrecognized preceded the terrorist act. In a third case, having faint feelings of wanting to live unrecognized, whereas only suicidal impulses were considered to be of significance, failed to stem the violence. To what extent the failure of mental health professionals to assess the precarious psychological organization of these three men, as well as to recognize what resources were still intact, is only open to speculation. Although recognizing the potential for violence more directly may not have prevented their violent act, it also did nothing to diminish the likelihood. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The recent influx of foreign fighters into Syria, particularly those aligning with the Islamic State, has brought renewed attention to the security threat posed by people who cross borders to participate in armed conflict. Although foreign fighters have rarely, if ever, constituted the majority of combatants in a war or insurgency, understanding their role is critical for conflict analysis and prevention. This review focuses on behavioral aspects of the foreign fighter phenomenon. Although other books and articles have focused wholly, or in part, on historical dimensions, the behavioral and social science literature on foreign fighters is much more limited. This review first explores the definitions of “foreign fighter” terminology, then analyzes what is known about their motivations and their pathways toward engaging in armed conflict on foreign soil. It examines recruitment strategies and the role of “radicalization” in feeding the transnational insurgent supply, and finally describes more specifically, the nature of foreign fighter involvement in more recent armed conflicts (e.g., Syria, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan), and speculates about the prospects for their future involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While topologies and key player positions and roles differ across terrorist networks, similar ideological networks share similar structures and topologies, maintaining structural properties of their predecessor groups. In this study, we look at basic ideological waves of terrorism in history, classify terrorist network ideologies, and describe the patterns in network topologies and key player characteristics. We show that ideological differences in terrorist networks in part explain the differences in the structure of links between key players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: For years, many scholars dismissed the possibility that terrorists - including suicide attackers - could be mentally ill or primarily suicidal. However, that view is gradually changing.Aim: Researchers continue to face significant challenges when attempting to detect mental health problems and suicidal motives among terrorists and mass shooters, because many offenders cannot easily be psychologically assessed. This article offers several specific recommendations for how researchers can better understand offenders' mental state by studying their life histories and behaviour.Methods: Research on detection of mental disorders and suicidal intent is reviewed and applied to specific challenges for assessing terrorists and mass shooters.Results: It appears that researchers can improve the accuracy of their assessments by (1) recognising the likelihood of under-diagnosis of mental disorders, (2) prioritising in-depth evaluation and analysis of mental state and (3) considering the role of social and situational factors in suicidal ideation and motivation.Conclusion: More accurate detection of mental health problems and suicidal motives among terrorists and mass shooters could help advance scientific understandings of these individuals and even help prevent lethal attacks. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to provide an in‐depth description of the radicalization process, which is a very important step in terrorist activities. The author proposes a translational analysis that is first based on the author's experience in the psychological evaluation of terrorist behavior and second on an exhaustive review of the current literature. The search terms “terrorism,” “radicalization,” “social psychology,” and “psychopathology” were used to identify relevant studies in the following databases: Scopus, Medline, PubCentral, and Science Direct. Because of its importance, understanding radicalization process should be one of the priorities of behavioral scientists. International studies should be performed with a focus on several aspects, such as radicalization risk factors, brainwashing, the role of the media, and finally, in de‐radicalization programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the psychological aspects in the radicalization of white, far-right wing, male terrorists in the U.S., including the role that masculinity plays in this regard. The impact that conspiracy theories in the mass media have on causing paranoia is discussed. It references the white terrorist Cesar Altieri Sayoc Jr. (Junior), including his activity on social media.

This article begins with an assessment of the similarities and differences between terrorists and criminals, including profiles, methods, systems of organization and motives. Notably, the article identifies seven categories of crimes committed by terrorists: 1) Inherent/violent, 2) Preparation/facilitation, 3) Funding, 4) Specialized terrorism offenses, 5) Vigilantism/public relations, 6) Miscellaneous/Spontaneous/Unrelated Offences, and 7) Previous criminal records. Next, the crime-terror nexus is discussed and four types of relationships between terrorists and criminals are identified: 1) Interaction, 2) Appropriation, 3) Assimilation, and 4) Transformation. The article concludes with a discussion of the concept of convergence between terrorism and organized crime, and implications for counter-terrorism and law-enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite widespread recognition that the use of counternarratives is an important strategic component of countering violent extremism, to date, there are no comprehensive guidelines on how to develop and distribute counternarratives to effectively reduce support for terrorism. To redress this, we offer communication and psychology theory-based procedures for (1) analyzing terrorist narratives, (2) constructing counternarratives that challenge terrorist narratives, and (3) disseminating the counternarratives to overcome barriers to persuasion. Analysts and practitioners can use such guidelines in developing counternarratives to reduce support for violent extremism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note presents a dynamic risk assessment model of homegrown terrorists. The model was tested in a study of convicted “homegrown” American terrorism offenders inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology. The New York Police Department model developed by Silber and Bhatt was chosen as the basis for creating a typology of overt and detectable indicators of individual behaviors widely thought to be associated with extremism. Twenty-four specific cues associated with each stage of radicalization were used to code and estimate the sequencing of behaviors and the duration of the average radicalization trajectory. Sixty-eight cases have been analyzed thus far. A decision was made to publish the initial results when it became apparent that the model was an effective tool for the evaluation of terrorist offenders. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article contests the affirmation—based on common sense—according to which terrorists simply need courage. The typical terrorist act can be considered part of the sociological category known as “vile violence” that is the act of striking out at a victim after having placed him or her in a desperate situation that does not allow for any escape. This article is based on primary and secondary sources, such as the analysis of thirty-five homicides committed in Italy by six terrorist units of the extreme left; interviews with extreme left terrorists; interviews with victims of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of victims of extreme left terrorists; video interviews of extreme left terrorists; and written statements of the investigating magistrates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We test whether significant differences in mental illness exist in a matched sample of lone- and group-based terrorists. We then test whether there are distinct behavioral differences between lone-actor terrorists with and without mental illness. We then stratify our sample across a range of diagnoses and again test whether significant differences exist. We conduct a series of bivariate, multivariate, and multinomial statistical tests using a unique dataset of 119 lone-actor terrorists and a matched sample of group-based terrorists. The odds of a lone-actor terrorist having a mental illness is 13.49 times higher than the odds of a group actor having a mental illness. Lone actors who were mentally ill were 18.07 times more likely to have a spouse or partner who was involved in a wider movement than those without a history of mental illness. Those with a mental illness were more likely to have a proximate upcoming life change, more likely to have been a recent victim of prejudice, and experienced proximate and chronic stress. The results identify behaviors and traits that security agencies can utilize to monitor and prevent lone-actor terrorism events. The correlated behaviors provide an image of how risk can crystalize within the individual offender and that our understanding of lone-actor terrorism should be multivariate in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Martyrdom is defined as the psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one's life for a cause. An integrative set of 8 studies investigated the concept of martyrdom by creating a new tool to quantitatively assess individuals' propensity toward self-sacrifice. Studies 1A-1C consisted of psychometric work attesting to the scale's unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability while examining its nomological network. Studies 2A-2B focused on the scale's predictive validity, especially as it relates to extreme behaviors and suicidal terrorism. Studies 3-5 focused on the influence of self-sacrifice on automatic decision making, costly and altruistic behaviors, and morality judgments. Results involving more than 2,900 participants from different populations, including a terrorist sample, supported the proposed conceptualization of martyrdom and demonstrated its importance for a vast repertoire of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena. Implications and future directions for the psychology of terrorism are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers proposes that suicide terrorists are psychologically and behaviorally similar to other people who commit suicide, due to a range of individual, social, and situational factors. Some commentators agree, while others are skeptical, given the lack of information about many attackers' lives. However, the book's position is not simply based on individual case studies; it is also supported by other independent assessments, the confirmation of empirical predictions, the paucity of contradictory evidence, and new applications of evolutionary theory. It is undisputed that human beings behave as the author suggests; it is unknown if they behave as the conventional wisdom suggests. Those who argue that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and altruistically sacrificing their lives for an ideological cause should bear the burden of proof for those claims. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Anders Behring Breivik carried out a massacre in Norway on July 22, 2011, killing a total 77 persons and leaving 42 others severely wounded. He detonated a bomb in Oslo and then drove to the island of Utøya, where he shot and killed youngsters gathered at a youth camp. The authors performed an analysis of Breivik's writing style in his extensive manifesto which he published hours before the attacks, and also referred to the two psychiatrists' reports. The first report concluded that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The authors concurred with the second report. Breivik seemed to be a person with narcissistic personality disorder, whose grandiosity might have caused him to be regarded initially as mentally deranged; however, closer examination revealed his deliberate attempt to methodically indoctrinate and deceive potential readers, to alarm potential targets and to terrorize a nation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this project was to assess the detecting deception efficacy of three well-validated 'detecting deception' methods - i.e., forced choice testing (FCT), modified cognitive interviewing (MCI) and autobiographical implicit association testing (aIAT) - when applied to the issue of bio-threat. The detecting deception accuracies of FCT and MCI were 81% and 75%, respectively. Although the aIAT mean response times in block 5 differed significantly between deceptive and truthful persons, the classification accuracy was low. FCT alone reduced the group of 64 persons to 11 and detected 50% of the liars; the false positive rate was 9%. MCI alone reduced the group of 64 to 24 and detected 92% of the liars; the false positive rate was 54%. When FCT was paired with MCI, 75% of liars were detected and the false positive rate was 13%. Forced choice testing and MCI show promise as methods for detecting deception related to bio-threat under low-base-rate conditions. These methods took little time, enhanced the odds of detecting deceptive individuals and exhibited high positive likelihood ratios, suggesting that they have merit as screening tools. The aIAT required more time and was less accurate but may still serve as a useful screening tool. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are no psychological characteristics or psychopathology separating terrorists from the general population. Rather, it is group dynamics, with a particular emphasis on collective identity, that helps to explain terrorist psychology. Just as there is a diverse spectrum of kinds of terrorism, so too is there a spectrum of terrorist psychologies. Some terrorists, those in nationalist-separatist groups, such as Fatah and the IRA, are continuing with the mission of their parents who are dissident to the regime. The opposite generational provenance is seen among social-revolutionary terrorists, such as the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction in Germany, who are rebelling against their parents' generation, which is loyal to the regime. Four waves of terrorism can be distinguished: the 'anarchist wave'; the 'anti-colonial wave' (nationalist-separatist), with minority groups seeking to be liberated from their colonial masters or from the majority in their country; the 'new left' wave (social-revolutionary); and now the 'religious' wave. With the communications revolution, a new phenomenon is emerging which may presage a fifth wave: lone wolf terrorists who through the Internet are radicalized and feel they belong to the virtual community of hatred. A typology of lone wolf terrorism is proposed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing research on lone wolf terrorists and case experience are reviewed and interpreted through the lens of psychoanalytic theory. A number of characteristics of the lone wolf are enumerated: a personal grievance and moral outrage; the framing of an ideology; failure to affiliate with an extremist group; dependence on a virtual community found on the Internet; the thwarting of occupational goals; radicalization fueled by changes in thinking and emotion - including cognitive rigidity, clandestine excitement, contempt, and disgust - regardless of the particular ideology; the failure of sexual pair bonding and the sexualization of violence; the nexus of psychopathology and ideology; greater creativity and innovation than terrorist groups; and predatory violence sanctioned by moral (superego) authority. A concluding psychoanalytic formulation is offered. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clinicians and clinical administrators should have a basic understanding of physical and financial risk to mental health facilities related to external physical threat, including actions usually viewed as 'terrorism' and much more common sources of violence. This article refers to threats from mentally ill persons and those acting out of bizarre or misguided 'revenge,' extortionists and other outright criminals, and perpetrators usually identified as domestic or international terrorists. The principles apply both to relatively small and contained acts (such as a patient or ex-patient attacking a staff member) and to much larger events (such as bombings and armed attack), and are relevant to facilities both within and outside the U.S. Patient care and accessibility to mental health services rest not only on clinical skills, but also on a place to practice them and an organized system supported by staff, physical facilities, and funding. Clinicians who have some familiarity with the non-clinical requirements for care are in a position to support non-clinical staff in preventing care from being interrupted by external threats or events such as terrorist activity, and/or to serve at the interface of facility operations and direct clinical care. Readers should note that this article is an introduction to the topic and cannot address all local, state and national standards for hospital safety, or insurance providers' individual facility requirements. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a case study on the radicalization of Omar al-Hammami, aka Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, an American who joined al-Shabaab, a Somali terrorist group. There are a limited number of in-depth case studies that help to inform the fragmented discussions in the literature about the radicalization process of Islamic terrorists. Hammami received quite a bit of attention from the government and media due to his 'homegrown' status, as well as his prolific use of social media to inform the world of his views and exploits. Hammami did not fully commit to the group, his sense of self-importance taking precedent over the norms of the group. He left al-Shabaab, was publicly critical of the group, and was ultimately killed by them. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radicalization and its culmination in terrorism represent a grave threat to the security and stability of the world. A related challenge is effective management of extremists who are detained in prison facilities. The major aim of this article is to review the significance quest model of radicalization and its implications for management of terrorist detainees. First, we review the significance quest model, which elaborates on the roles of motivation, ideology, and social processes in radicalization. Secondly, we explore the implications of the model in relation to the risks of prison radicalization. Finally, we analyze the model's implications for deradicalization strategies and review preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of a rehabilitation program targeting components of the significance quest. Based on this evidence, we argue that the psychology of radicalization provides compelling reason for the inclusion of deradicalization efforts as an essential component of the management of terrorist detainees. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the behavioral science perspectives of terrorism in Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan has gained worldwide attention for 'terrorism' and its role in the 'war against terrorism'. The region is well placed geopolitically for economic successes but has been plagued by terrorism in various shapes and forms. A behavioral sciences perspective of terrorism is an attempt to explain it in this part of the world as a complex interplay of historical, geopolitical, anthropological and psychosocial factors and forces. Drawing from theories by Western scholars to explain the behavioral and cognitive underpinnings of a terrorist mind, the authors highlight the peculiarities of similar operatives at individual and group levels. Thorny issues related to the ethical and human right dimensions of the topic are visited from the unique perspective of a society challenged by schisms and divergence of opinions at individual, family, and community levels. The authors have attempted to minimize the political descriptions, although this cannot be avoided entirely, because of the nature of terrorism. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has called for additional research into the role of charismatic authority in terrorist groups and the process of radicalization. However, the sociological concepts of charisma and charismatic authority are being widely misused in terrorism studies. Current radicalization research often indirectly flirts with core concepts of charismatic authority, but fails to properly tap into its analytical utility. This article proposes to begin addressing this gap in knowledge in three ways, with: (1) a synthesis of social scientific research on charismatic authority, (2) a critical analysis of how charismatic authority is being misused and overlooked in the terrorist radicalization literature, and (3) an exploration of challenges and opportunities for future research concerning charismatic authority and terrorist radicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is hypothesized that individuals who play different roles in terrorist organizations will have different psychological processes underlying their activities. An innovative examination of the personal construct systems of terrorists explored this. As part of a larger study, three individuals convicted of Islamic-related terrorist violence in India were interviewed using a semi-structured life narrative procedure enhanced by a Repertory Grid (Kelly, 1955/1991). One was a senior leader of a terrorist group, one a subordinate, the third a person who planted a bomb without full knowledge of the larger design he was part of. Principal component analyses of these grids informed by comments from the life narratives were used to elaborate each man's conceptual system and how it related to his commitment to violence. Important differences among the three individuals' in their construct systems were found. This demonstrated that the forms of Jihadi commitment is embedded in the individual's personal construct system. So, although these three case studies can only be taken as providing indicative results, they do point to aspects of construct systems that reveal the potential for disengagement, being most likely present in the lower echelons of terrorist organizations. Those who are unable to reconstrue themselves as having a non-terrorist future are unlikely to disengage. This is probably typical of those who lead these organizations. The results therefore contribute to the growing literature arguing for significant differences in terrorists' understanding of themselves and their roles and provide an original methodology for assessing a person's potential for deradicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a model of radicalization and deradicalization based on the notion that the quest for personal significance constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals toward violent extremism. Radicalization is defined as the process of supporting or engaging in activities deemed (by others) as in violation of important social norms (e.g., the killing of civilians). In these terms, radicalization (1) is a matter of degree (in which mere attitudinal support for violence reflects a lower degree of radicalization than actual engagement in violence); (2) represents a subjective judgment proffered by those for whom the violated norms seem important but not by those who have devalued or suppressed the norms in question. Our radicalization/deradicalization model contains three crucial components: (1) the motivational component (the quest for personal significance) that defines a goal to which one may be committed, (2) the ideological component that in addition identifies the means of violence as appropriate for this goal's pursuit, and (3) the social process of networking and group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in the violence-justifying ideology and proceeds to implement it as a means of significance gain. We present empirical evidence consistent with our model's assumptions and discuss its implications for policies of preventing radicalization and effecting deradicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about the nature of far-right lone wolf terrorism and how this form of violence varies across different types of suspects. Relying on data from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), we comparatively examine characteristics of far-right homicides in the United States perpetrated by suspects with no evident affiliations with domestic terrorist organizations. Surprisingly, we found that this form of lone wolf terrorism has generally not increased during the past decade. We also found important differences, such as in suspects’ mental health, in statuses of homicide offenders who operate alone compared to those who associate or act with others. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A number of Western countries are currently adding exit programs targeting militant Islamists to their counterterrorism efforts. Drawing on research into voluntary exit from violent extremism, this article identifies themes and issues that seem to cause doubt, leading to exit. It then provides a perspective on how these natural sources of doubt might best be brought to bear in connection with an exit program by drawing on social psychology and research into persuasion and attitude change. It is argued that an external intervention should stay close to the potential exiter's own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the psychological aspects of Islamic terrorists and the role that prevalent child abuse in Islamic countries plays in the psychological development of Islamic children, with a focus on Iran. The author briefly discusses Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's plans to produce a global apocalypse in the early 21st century, while emphasizing the influence of former Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khomeini on Ahmadinejad's sociopolitical ideology. The author explores the history of the abuse of children in Islamic countries, including the beating, torture and sexual abuse of children by mothers and fathers. The author emphasizes that the abuse has contributed to the borderline personality traits characteristic in many terrorists.

Recent work by Ariel Merari argues that, while certain contextual factors increase the probability of suicide attacks, they do not explain why particular individuals become suicide bombers. Merari seeks to demonstrate that suicide bombers are motivated by an unusually high prevalence of depression and suicidal tendencies. This article questions the representativeness of Merari's sample. It raises the possibility that interviewer and contextual effects contaminated his findings. Finally, it presents evidence that challenges Merari's conclusions. This evidence is drawn from interviews with immediate family members and close friends of a 25 percent random sample of Palestinian suicide bombers who conducted attacks between 2000 and 2005. Based on their analysis, the authors question the value of a psychological approach to the study of suicide bombers and assert the importance of focusing on the political and social roots of the phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, I focus on the politics of terrorism, the causes of terrorist behavior, and the nature of the political purposes behind terrorist violence. I am specifically interested in how previous research investigated counterterrorism planning, the propensity toward terrorism in democracies, and state characteristics in fomenting terrorist activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human social systems are the most complex systems that we can conceive of, as interaction among their members is by messages that have to interpreted before they can take any effect – and the interpretation of identical messages sent and received in identical situations can have divergent effects as human actors have long-term memories, which makes the effects highly path dependent. The emergent phenomena in human social systems are therefore even more difficult to understand than related phenomena in anthills or chemical systems. This paper introduces models of immergence and second-order emergence to explain the innovation of norms in human groups of moderate size – as opposed to the emergent phenomena in human crowds, which are quite similar to the phenomena that can be observed in physical and animal systems. Modeling the innovation of norms and norm systems makes it necessary for interactions between model agents to be manifold and path dependent, that is agents have a long memory and deliberation capabilities. This is shown with an example from modeling criminal or terrorist behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article describes a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Three in particular are identified: (1) the desire for excitement, (2) the desire for ultimate meaning, and (3) the desire for glory. Terrorism, according to the argument set out here, is as much a site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention as a tactical instrument for pursuing the political goals of small groups. The conclusion explores the concept of “existential frustration,” and suggests that terrorist activity may provide an outlet for basic existential desires that cannot find expression through legitimate channels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to analyze the life histories of two former members, Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis, of the defunct terrorist group, the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (1975-2002) in order to look for causes of disengagement, dissociation, and repentance. Analyzing the life histories of Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis offers valuable insights into the development of complex processes of involvement in and disengagement from 17 November terrorism. The detail stemming from their testimonies provides a more complete picture of the group's internal dynamics and challenges a range of simplistic stereotypes, not only about the individuals involved in terrorism but also about the ways in which they make decisions and reflect on their experiences of being part of a terrorist organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bioterrorism has been a growing security concern even though this topic does not receive as much attention as other topics such as nuclear proliferation. In order to understand the bioterrorist threat, this article will try to address the reasons behind the lack of bioterrorist attacks in recent years and the factors that are eroding these same restrictions. Finally, it is also important to know which terrorist groups are more willing to perform bioterrorist attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consequences of states' reactions to terrorist attacks can far outweigh the effects of the attacks themselves. Yet risk analysis, widely accepted as the proper analytical basis for assessing terrorist threats, largely ignores the consequences from potential reactions to attacks. It also generally fails to consider how the anticipation of these reactions may influence terrorists' attack preferences. Policymakers should therefore be wary of the limitations of risk analysis as currently practiced. Further, states should strive to avoid reactions to attacks that unwittingly further their adversaries' agendas, a goal that may be aided by strengthening public resilience to terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The approach to the influence of the global terrorist danger at national level, the understanding of the mechanism of development and social dissemination of this type of danger became a research theme necessary in Romania as well, in the last decade, especially in the situation in which the Balkan area and that of the Black Sea are in one of the matrices of terrorism regional development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an attempt to examine the point of view of a potential terrorist looking for fissile materials to construct a nuclear explosive. A system of discounting to model the impatience of a terrorist in terms of fundamental concept that is the time that the terrorist anticipates the survival of the project is also devised. It notes that it is essential to quantify the fear of failure of the terrorist in terms of a negative utility.

Politicians, the media, and some academics are getting it wrong about radicalization. Relying on simple narratives to explain how an individual departs from point a (‘a good Muslim boy’) to point b (‘a suicide bomber’), too many recent contributions to academia rely on assumptions and ‘conventional wisdom’ rather than testable and falsifiable empirical research and methods. Through specific cases, this article seeks to demonstrate how the over-simplification of ‘conventional wisdom’ privileges convenient political narratives over the complex realities of such situations. In light of this failure to account for reality, this article seeks to challenge current thinking on radicalization by exposing its limitations, as currently being used, as a meaningful basis and departure point for rigorous social science research. The article concludes by showing how the current persistence of this ‘conventional wisdom’ approach to radicalization ultimately betrays the normative political assumptions of those who insist on using this term, and how this adherence to ‘conventional wisdom’ now deprives radicalization from being a relevant and useful academic or policy discourse. This is because radicalization as an area for study has been corrupted by its instrumental political application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study is to provide through an in-depth investigation of the Fatah Al-Islam organization, emergence, programs, and external links, and the inner operation of this underground Salafi-jihadi group. By divulging secret confession statements to the public, it has uncovered many of the mysteries that surrounded the evolution and goals of the group. On the other hand, and more important, it has examined the application of certain conventional approaches to the study of terrorist behavior. The findings, based on the biographies of FI terrorists, seem to negate much of the advanced explanation about political violence. Economic destitution, poverty, lack of education, young age, and marital disruption for instances do not determine adherence to the group. Members of the jihadi group of FI stem from a diversified occupational background, not lacking in education, mature, married, and influenced by various motivations, specifically religious dogma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the authors describe procedures used in the development of a new scale of militant extremist mindset. A 2-step approach consisted of (a) linguistic analysis of the texts produced by known terrorist organizations and selection of statements from these texts that reflect the mindset of those belonging to these organizations and (b) analyses of the structural properties of the scales based on 132 selected statements. Factor analysis of militant extremist statements with participants (N = 452) from Australia, Serbia, and the United States produced 3 dimensions: (a) justification and advocacy of violence (War factor), (b) violence in the name of God (God factor), and (c) blaming Western nations for the problems in the world today (West factor). We also report the distributions of scores for the 3 subscales, mean differences among the 3 national samples, and correlations with a measure of dogmatism (M. Rokeach, 1956). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper offers a critical review of the role of group processes in terrorist behavior. It draws on a fundamental distinction between terrorist ‘involvement’ and terrorist ‘events’ to explore what group phenomena might contribute to our understanding of actual terrorist behavior, as opposed to the context to terrorism. It does this through the use of a number of case studies of terrorist incidents, and explores how generalizations that might be made about potential group-focused causal accounts fail to offer sufficient explanations of the behaviors identified. These case studies include The Jewel of Medina arson attack, and the PIRA attack that led to the death of Garda Jerry McCabe. The paper concludes by suggesting a need for a greater focus on individual activity in its immediate context, through empirical research into terrorist behavior, rather than its extensive hinterland. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Existing literature is weak in explaining strategic change among terrorist movements, especially regarding the question of why these organizations often switch between contesting the external enemy, usually the government or the occupying power, and the internal arena in which they compete against fellow rebel groups. A rebel force facing diminishing returns from a formerly successful tactic with no equally effective tactical substitute in sight is likely to switch from conflict against a government to achieve dominance in the rebel camp. The terrorist movement will switch from the external to the internal arena even if such substitution compromises the overall goals of the rebel camp. The following article explores these dynamics in Hamas's strategy in the latest round of conflict between the movement and Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]