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The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act ("the Act") reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are "in restraint of . . . commerce among the several States." This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute's apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had governed most intrastate restraints. Drawing from its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism, the Court initially employed the direct/indirect standard to allocate regulatory authority over intrastate restraints. Effects were direct if a restraint exercised market power to injure out-of-state consumers. The Sherman Act exerted Congress's exclusive authority over such restraints, because state regulation might produce self-interested results contrary to the anti-favoritism principle that animated Commerce Clause jurisprudence. States retained exclusive authority over agreements producing indirect impacts on interstate commerce, and a regime of competitive federalism generated the rules governing such restraints. Because states internalized the full impact of such restraints, interjurisdictional competition likely tended to produce optimal legal rules. Echoing Wickard v. Filburn, the Court jettisoned the direct/indirect standard in 1948, holding that the Act reaches restraints producing a "substantial effect"--even if harmless and indirect--on interstate commerce. This vast expansion of the Act undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had governed most intrastate restraints. This change also enabled application of the statute to local, state-approved restraints, empowering antitrust courts to supervise state regulatory processes, further undermining competitive federalism. The Court has offered three rationales for rejecting the direct/indirect standard. First, the Court has claimed that Congress meant to reach restraints beyond the authority implied by pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. Second, the Court has contended that the Act properly expands whenever the commerce power expands in other contexts. Third, the Court has treated the substantial effects test as a translation of the Act justified by a changed national economy. The Court has invoked the Act's legislative history to bolster the first two contentions. None of these rationales survives scrutiny. First, the phrase "restraint of ... commerce among the several States" was apparently a term of art drawn from pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That case law employed "restraint" of interstate commerce as a synonym for state "regulation" of such commerce deemed invalid because it directly burdened interstate commerce. Given the prior construction canon, Congress's invocation of "restraint of . . . commerce" suggests that the Act should condemn only those private agreements that "directly burden" interstate commerce. The Court read the Act exactly this way in the 1890s, repeatedly holding that agreements only restrained interstate commerce if they imposed direct burdens by producing supracompetitive prices for interstate transactions. These near-contemporaneous readings, themselves probative of original meaning, avoided constitutional difficulties that would have resulted from application of the Act to restraints causing no interstate harm. Second, assertions that Congress chose to exercise whatever power future Courts might grant are speculation. Congress has declined to exercise its entire commerce power when enacting three different post-1890 antitrust statutes. Engrafting the substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act contravened the federal-state balance canon by supplanting traditional state prerogatives over restraints threatening no interstate harm. Third, the substantial effects test is not a faithful translation of the Sherman Act. No court or scholar has identified changed circumstances that justify such a translation. Neither integration of the national economy nor increased scale of enterprises suggests that such restraints generally produce interstate harm or that states are incapable of regulating them. The legislative history actually bolsters this textual analysis. Several Senators endorsed pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. The Senate Judiciary Committee rewrote Sherman's bill, employing the term "restraint of commerce" to narrow its reach. The House passed the Senate bill verbatim, after its Judiciary Committee also embraced dual federalism. No member of Congress suggested that the Act would expand if the Court subsequently enlarged the scope of the commerce power. The conclusion that the Court erred in 1948 does not itself justify return to the pre-1948 allocation of authority over antitrust matters. While stare decisis is weaker in the antitrust context, mere legal error does not suffice to upset longstanding precedent. If, however, the Court attributes the 1948 revision and continued expansion of the Act to changed economic circumstances--such as increased integration of the national economy--stare decisis should yield to post-1948 developments in the theory of competitive federalism. These developments confirmed that states possess appropriate incentives to generate impartial rules with respect to restraints that produce no interstate harm. Reviving the direct/indirect standard would reboot competitive federalism in antitrust. The resulting competition between state "laboratories of democracy" would generate various substantive and institutional solutions to antitrust problems, as states vie for producers and consumers by offering rival packages of antitrust doctrine and enforcement institutions. Restoring the pre-1948 regime would also radically shrink the category of state-approved restraints potentially subject to the Act. Moreover, cases involving such restraints that did reach the Court would look quite different from those that have informed the Court's treatment of these restraints. Instead of state regulation of local billboards and the like, such cases would involve restraints imposing substantial harm on out-of-state consumers. This new framing could force the current Court, which has less faith in regulation than its predecessors, to reconsider its approach to stateapproved restraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court case Wickard versus Filburn and the anti-trust law Sherman Act. Topics covered include the scope of the commerce power before Wickard, the Supreme Court's pre-Wickard approach to the reach of the Sherman Act and the Court's rationale for repudiating five decades of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in favor of the substantial effects test.

Sustainable food policies strive for environmental, healthy, economically just, and humane food production. Their success has ignited legal debates about the Constitution. This is not new. Iconic constitutional law cases examine sustainable food, such as meat in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), bread in Lochner v. New York (1905), and wheat in Wickard v. Filburn (1942). Currently, as eaters, cooks, growers, and policymakers seek sustainable food, food-and-Constitution debates continue. For recent examples, this Article analyzes disputes about pork, foie gras, shark fins, eggs, and ag-gag policies. It uses food studies approaches to identify what motivates food-and-Constitution jurisprudence. For advocates and courts, this illuminates what is at stake, when analyzing sustainable food sourcing, production means, and menu offerings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relation of the 1942 U.S. Supreme Court case Wickard v. Filburn in relation to the aggregation principle of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Topics include the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the role of the U.S. federal government in regulating intrastate commerce, and the impact of the wheat industry on the case Wickard v. Filburn.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays a dominant role in setting national policy and standards for the biomedical industry. Yet there are significant statutory constraints on the agency's power. The FDA's main implementing statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), bounds the scope of the FDA's regulatory authority. The FDCA cabins FDA power in two important ways: (1) with a few notable exceptions, the FDA lacks power to regulate local activities that are not directly connected to interstate commerce, and (2) the agency may regulate product manufacturers, but not service providers. The FDA has long grappled with the limits of its authority to regulate conduct that encompasses the practice of medicine or the practice of pharmacy, such as physician off-label prescribing and drug compounding. These tensions will intensify as the life science industry evolves from a mass-market distribution scheme to a more customized, service-oriented business model. Autologous stem cell therapies and 3D-printed drugs and devices are two prominent examples of medical innovation that may evade the FDA's purview. Sophisticated, organized patient advocacy groups that develop and share individualized treatments further expose the limits of the FDA's statutory authority. These technological and social changes in medical product development and dissemination raise profound questions about the FDA's future place within our contemporary healthcare regulatory system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The characteristics and capabilities of civilian drones have proliferated in recent years, giving rise to a burgeoning industry. The popular media and academic literature have predominantly focused on privacy concerns, devoting considerably less attention to the regulatory challenges created by the new technology. Congress instructed the FAA to integrate drones into the National Airspace System in 2012, but rulemaking delays and a moratorium on commercial uses hampered the industry and withheld benefits from the public. Final regulations are now in place, but the new rules revive legal uncertainty over the constitutional limits of federal authority and the ambiguous vertical bounds of private property rights. Low-altitude local drone use is one of the most promising aspects of the technology, and lies at the outer edge of federal authority. Much of the current debate gets key questions exactly backwards. Under current Supreme Court precedent, the proper legal question is not whether federal airspace authority can extend lower to govern virtually all drone use, but whether drone use pushes private property rights in airspace higher, limiting federal authority. Therefore, this Issue Brief joins the scholarly criticism of FAA efforts to date and calls for a greater focus on clear property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case of Wickard v. Roscoe Filburn, related to federal government's decision on growing wheat in the U.S. It mentions that the U.S. Department of Agriculture fined Filburn, farmer for growing more wheat, as mentioned under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. It mentions that under the Tenth Amendment of Constitution, the powers not belonging to federal government are granted to state or people.

The article focuses on health care reforms of the U.S., which helps to protect those who are uninsured under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). It provides information that the individual mandate provision of the PPACA is necessary to regulate uninsured citizens and requiring them to purchase health insurance. It discusses the U.S. congressional actions in several court cases including Mead v. Holder, Wickard v. Filburn, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.