`The Board may decide to offer priority ör special privileges to the employees in the sale of stock. Local residents may also enjoy priority.` in order to enhance the success of the privatization poKcy, measures should be taken to secure the purchase of SEE shares by low-income people. The distribution of national wealth to board segments of the population can be attained by the pursuit of such a `Poh'cy of Social Privatization.` The sale of SEE shares to employees, managers and small inventors means a transfer of income to these segments. By adding a social dimension to privatization; that is, by this `Policy of Social Privatization`, both an increase in productivity and the transfer of this increase in productivity to low-income groups could be achieved. The partnership of the aforementioned groups in SEEs would have a positive effect on income distribution and drastically reduce labor conflicts by merging capital and labor. The policy of social privatization should be based on ESOP (Employee Stock Ovvnership Plan). This plan is finding an ever vvidening area of application in countries hiçe the USA that are seeking to promote economic democracy. ESOP was implemented in the fîrst appHcaiton of privatization, which was the sale of TELETAŞ shares to the public. Several incentives were offered to encourage the company's employees to o/vn stock. The employees ended up with 36.9 % of the 22 % of TELETAŞ stock issued and consequently elected öne representative to the board of directors. Hence, in the privatization of TELETAŞ, the aim of promoting employee participation in management was also partially achieved. There are several reasons for the state assuming the role of entrepreneur, principally among them the need to support and pioneer private enterprise. in regions ör investments hampered by high risk factors ör uncertainty, the state may take the lead as entrepreneur, ör support private enterprise by providing infrastructure, technical assistance and financing. `Enterprise substitution` has been the foremost xiv The first topic concerns the order in /vhich the SEEs /vill be transferred to the private sector. Undoubtedly, the issue of privatization is closety related to the economic stracture of a country; its level of development as well as the general economic and political climate. The following general evaluation sums up the situation for Turkey: Some of the state enterpıises should continue to remain in public hands because of the economic, social and strategjc functions they carry while others have completed their historical mission and no longer serve a useful function either for country ör the state. Morgan Guaranty's master plan anaryzes and prioritizes SEEs in our country on the basis of two criteria : `economic viability` and `investment needs`. Morgan Bank's suggestions have partially determine the order of priorities in the execution of privatization in Turkey. The second topic relates to the question of `to whom the shares of SEEs will be sold fîrst`. The potential buyers in privatization are;.Private investors,.Institutional investors,.Employees of the firm,.Foreign investors,.Turkish citizens working abroad,.People of the region where the firm is located. it is important which öne of the above mentioned groups will be gjven the priority in selling the SEEs. Oa the subject and priorities, article 18 of the Public Participation Fund regulations states the following: xüi`The Board may decide to offer priority ör special privileges to the employees in the sale of stock. Local residents may also enjoy priority.` in order to enhance the success of the privatization poKcy, measures should be taken to secure the purchase of SEE shares by low-income people. The distribution of national wealth to board segments of the population can be attained by the pursuit of such a `Poh'cy of Social Privatization.` The sale of SEE shares to employees, managers and small inventors means a transfer of income to these segments. By adding a social dimension to privatization; that is, by this `Policy of Social Privatization`, both an increase in productivity and the transfer of this increase in productivity to low-income groups could be achieved. The partnership of the aforementioned groups in SEEs would have a positive effect on income distribution and drastically reduce labor conflicts by merging capital and labor. The policy of social privatization should be based on ESOP (Employee Stock Ovvnership Plan). This plan is finding an ever vvidening area of application in countries hiçe the USA that are seeking to promote economic democracy. ESOP was implemented in the fîrst appHcaiton of privatization, which was the sale of TELETAŞ shares to the public. Several incentives were offered to encourage the company's employees to o/vn stock. The employees ended up with 36.9 % of the 22 % of TELETAŞ stock issued and consequently elected öne representative to the board of directors. Hence, in the privatization of TELETAŞ, the aim of promoting employee participation in management was also partially achieved. There are several reasons for the state assuming the role of entrepreneur, principally among them the need to support and pioneer private enterprise. in regions ör investments hampered by high risk factors ör uncertainty, the state may take the lead as entrepreneur, ör support private enterprise by providing infrastructure, technical assistance and financing. `Enterprise substitution` has been the foremost xivThe first topic concerns the order in /vhich the SEEs /vill be transferred to the private sector. Undoubtedly, the issue of privatization is closety related to the economic stracture of a country; its level of development as well as the general economic and political climate. The following general evaluation sums up the situation for Turkey: Some of the state enterpıises should continue to remain in public hands because of the economic, social and strategjc functions they carry while others have completed their historical mission and no longer serve a useful function either for country ör the state. Morgan Guaranty's master plan anaryzes and prioritizes SEEs in our country on the basis of two criteria : `economic viability` and `investment needs`. Morgan Bank's suggestions have partially determine the order of priorities in the execution of privatization in Turkey. The second topic relates to the question of `to whom the shares of SEEs will be sold fîrst`. The potential buyers in privatization are;.Private investors,.Institutional investors,.Employees of the firm,.Foreign investors,.Turkish citizens working abroad,.People of the region where the firm is located. it is important which öne of the above mentioned groups will be gjven the priority in selling the SEEs. Oa the subject and priorities, article 18 of the Public Participation Fund regulations states the following: xüi`The Board may decide to offer priority ör special privileges to the employees in the sale of stock. Local residents may also enjoy priority.` in order to enhance the success of the privatization poKcy, measures should be taken to secure the purchase of SEE shares by low-income people. The distribution of national wealth to board segments of the population can be attained by the pursuit of such a `Poh'cy of Social Privatization.` The sale of SEE shares to employees, managers and small inventors means a transfer of income to these segments. By adding a social dimension to privatization; that is, by this `Policy of Social Privatization`, both an increase in productivity and the transfer of this increase in productivity to low-income groups could be achieved. The partnership of the aforementioned groups in SEEs would have a positive effect on income distribution and drastically reduce labor conflicts by merging capital and labor. The policy of social privatization should be based on ESOP (Employee Stock Ovvnership Plan). This plan is finding an ever vvidening area of application in countries hiçe the USA that are seeking to promote economic democracy. ESOP was implemented in the fîrst appHcaiton of privatization, which was the sale of TELETAŞ shares to the public. Several incentives were offered to encourage the company's employees to o/vn stock. The employees ended up with 36.9 % of the 22 % of TELETAŞ stock issued and consequently elected öne representative to the board of directors. Hence, in the privatization of TELETAŞ, the aim of promoting employee participation in management was also partially achieved. There are several reasons for the state assuming the role of entrepreneur, principally among them the need to support and pioneer private enterprise. in regions ör investments hampered by high risk factors ör uncertainty, the state may take the lead as entrepreneur, ör support private enterprise by providing infrastructure, technical assistance and financing. `Enterprise substitution` has been the foremost xivThe first topic concerns the order in /vhich the SEEs /vill be transferred to the private sector. Undoubtedly, the issue of privatization is closety related to the economic stracture of a country; its level of development as well as the general economic and political climate. The following general evaluation sums up the situation for Turkey: Some of the state enterpıises should continue to remain in public hands because of the economic, social and strategjc functions they carry while others have completed their historical mission and no longer serve a useful function either for country ör the state. Morgan Guaranty's master plan anaryzes and prioritizes SEEs in our country on the basis of two criteria : `economic viability` and `investment needs`. Morgan Bank's suggestions have partially determine the order of priorities in the execution of privatization in Turkey. The second topic relates to the question of `to whom the shares of SEEs will be sold fîrst`. The potential buyers in privatization are;.Private investors,.Institutional investors,.Employees of the firm,.Foreign investors,.Turkish citizens working abroad,.People of the region where the firm is located. it is important which öne of the above mentioned groups will be gjven the priority in selling the SEEs. Oa the subject and priorities, article 18 of the Public Participation Fund regulations states the following: xüi`The Board may decide to offer priority ör special privileges to the employees in the sale of stock. Local residents may also enjoy priority.` in order to enhance the success of the privatization poKcy, measures should be taken to secure the purchase of SEE shares by low-income people. The distribution of national wealth to board segments of the population can be attained by the pursuit of such a `Poh'cy of Social Privatization.` The sale of SEE shares to employees, managers and small inventors means a transfer of income to these segments. By adding a social dimension to privatization; that is, by this `Policy of Social Privatization`, both an increase in productivity and the transfer of this increase in productivity to low-income groups could be achieved. The partnership of the aforementioned groups in SEEs would have a positive effect on income distribution and drastically reduce labor conflicts by merging capital and labor. The policy of social privatization should be based on ESOP (Employee Stock Ovvnership Plan). This plan is finding an ever vvidening area of application in countries hiçe the USA that are seeking to promote economic democracy. ESOP was implemented in the fîrst appHcaiton of privatization, which was the sale of TELETAŞ shares to the public. Several incentives were offered to encourage the company's employees to o/vn stock. The employees ended up with 36.9 % of the 22 % of TELETAŞ stock issued and consequently elected öne representative to the board of directors. Hence, in the privatization of TELETAŞ, the aim of promoting employee participation in management was also partially achieved. There are several reasons for the state assuming the role of entrepreneur, principally among them the need to support and pioneer private enterprise. in regions ör investments hampered by high risk factors ör uncertainty, the state may take the lead as entrepreneur, ör support private enterprise by providing infrastructure, technical assistance and financing. `Enterprise substitution` has been the foremost xivjustification for the establishment of Turkey's state corporations. Investments with a low profit margin but high benefits in social terms which do not attract private enterprise, have been undertaken by the state. This is a particularly important function in economically backward regions, where SEEs have played a supportive and pioneering role for private enterprise. In some regions of Turkey, this role remains a valid one. Despite the comprehensive incentive policy introduced in the 1980s, private sector investment in the country's eastern regions has still not attained the desired level Although this is partly attributable to the failure to implement the incentive policy effectively, Turkey's underdeveloped regions are nevertheless an issue which must be faced squarely. In these regions the state is justified in investing in those sectors where private enterprise cannot be persuaded to invest despite all available incentives can be justified. Here the SEEs can engage in new investment, playing a pioneering role for private enterprise. Opportunities for joint ventures in these areas between private and state companies should also be investigated. In cases where the privatization of existing SEEs in underdeveloped regions is feasible, public share offerings should be made first of all employees and local people, or the company transferred entirely to private buyers. Block sales have undermined public confidence in privatization. Care should be taken to set more realistic prices for block sales, and experts from various organizations, such as the State Planning Organization, the Treasury and universities, should be consulted when determining prices. Hurriedly concluded block sales could shake public confidence in the privatization program to an irretrievable degree. SEEs which have been singled out for privatization, but then left for a long time without any action being taken, face various operational problems. The lack of clarity and limited powers of those responsible for preparing financial and investment XVprograms, asset procurement and labour recruitment obstruct company operations. Therefore, only companies which can be privatized immediately should be included in the program, and responsibility for company activities not relating to privatization should be clearly allocated without delay. XVI 111