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In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.

The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, (1) that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and (2) that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed.

Die vorliegende Monographie ist eine Untersuchung grundlegender Themen aus dem Blickwinkel des logischer Anti-Exzeptionalismus, sowie seiner Beziehung zu einer Klasse nicht-klassischer Logiken, nämlich den parakonsistenten Logiken. Dafür besteht die Arbeit aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil untersucht grundlegende Fragen der anti-exzeptionalistischen Debatte unter Anwendung wissenschaftstheoretischer Methoden und konzeptioneller Werkzeuge. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit widmet sich technischen Aspekten der parakonsistenten Logik. Als Hauptergebnisse sind zu nennen, die Einführung einer neuen Familie nichtmonotoner parakonsistenter Prädikatenlogik erster Stufe, die zentralen Metaeigenschaften der nomonotonen Logik erfüllen., The present monograph is an investigation of foundational topics within logical anti-exceptionalism and its relation to one specific class of non-classical logics, namely paraconsistent logics. For this, the thesis is composed of two parts. The first part explores foundational issues of the anti-exceptionalist debate by applying methods and conceptual tools from the philosophy of science. The second part of the thesis is devoted to technical aspects of paraconsistent logics. The main results are the introduction of a new family of nonmonotonic first-order paraconsistent logics capable of satisfying core metaproperties of nomonotonic logics.

We show the completeness of several Hilbert-style systems resulting from extending the propositional connexive logics C and C3 by the set of Nelsonian quantifiers, both in the varying domain and in the constant domain setting. In doing so, we focus on countable signatures and proceed by variations of the Henkin construction. We compare our work on the first-order extensions of C3 with the results of an earlier paper by Omori and Wansing and answer several open questions naturally arising in this respect. In addition, we consider possible extensions of C and C3 with a non-Nelsonian universal quantifier preserving a specific rapport between the interpretation of conditionals and the interpretation of the universal quantification which is visible in both intuitionistic logic and Nelson’s logic but is lost if one adds the Nelsonian quantifiers on top of the propositional basis provided by C and C3. We briefly explore the completeness of systems resulting from adding this non-Nelsonian quantifier either together with the Nelsonian ones or separately to the two propositional connexive logics.

Diese Dissertation untersucht, wie wir herausfinden können, welche Tierarten bewusste Erlebnisse haben und wie diese Erlebnisse aussehen. Jedoch geht es nicht nur um Tierbewusstsein. Es werden auch verschiedene Folgefragen erörtert, die sich stellen, sobald wir anfangen, ernsthaft über das subjektive Innenleben von Tieren nachzudenken. Diese Fragen sind: Wie verhalten sich empirische Tests tierischen Bewusstseins zu mutmaßlichen Tests von Maschinen-Bewusstsein? Welche Beziehung besteht zwischen der Untersuchung von Tierbewusstsein und der Untersuchung von Tierwohlbefinden? Können wir Bewusstsein als Kriterium für moralische Relevanz verwenden, wenn wir uns hinsichtlich der Verteilung von Bewusstsein unsicher sind? Mithin wirft diese Dissertation ein weites Netz aus, das Fragen der Erforschung nicht-menschlichen Bewusstseins mit den zentralen ethischen Fragen verknüpft, die durch unser Wissen – und unseren Mangel an Wissen – über nicht-menschliches Erleben aufgeworfen werden., This dissertation investigates how we can find out which animal species have conscious experiences and what their experiences are like. However, this dissertation is not only about animal consciousness. It also discusses various follow-up questions: issues which come up once we start to seriously think about the subjective inner life of animals. These issues are: How do empirical tests of animal consciousness relate to putative tests of machine consciousness (chapter 5)? What is the relation between the study of animal consciousness and the study of animal wellbeing (chapter 6)? Can we use consciousness as the criterion for moral relevance if we are uncertain about the distribution of consciousness (chapter 7)? Thus, this dissertation casts a wide net which links issues in the study of non-human consciousness to the central ethical questions raised by our knowledge, and our lack of knowledge, of non-human experience.

In this paper, we discuss J. Michael Dunn's foundational work on the semantics for First Degree Entailment logic (\(\bf FDE\)), also known as Belnap-Dunn logic (or Sanjaya-Belnap-Smiley-Dunn Four-valued Logic, as suggested by Dunn himself). More specifically, by building on the framework due to Dunn, we sketch a broad picture towards a systematic understanding of contra-classicality. Our focus will be on a simple propositional language with negation, conjunction, and disjunction, and we will systematically explore variants of \(\bf FDE\), \(\bf K3\), and \(\bf LP\) by tweaking the falsity condition for negation.

During the transition from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages, the Roman Empire dissolved in the West and medieval empires were founded. There has been much discussion about the role that migration played in this transition. This is especially true for the formation of the Baiuvariian tribe and the founding of this tribal dukedom, which took place from the 5th to the 6th century in what is now Southern Bavaria (Germany). In this study, we aimed to determine the extent of immigration during the beginning of this transformation and to shed further light on its character. To achieve this goal, we analyzed stable isotope values of strontium, carbon, and nitrogen from the teeth and bones of over 150 human remains from Southern Germany, dating from around 500 AD. This group of individuals included women with cranial modifications (ACD) which can be found sporadically in the burial grounds of this period. Our results showed an above-average migration rate for both men and women in the second half of the 5th century. They also indicate that a foreign background may also be assumed for the women with ACD. The demonstrably different origins of the immigrants from isotopically diverse regions, and the identification of local differences in detectable migration rate, as well as indication for different timing of residential changes, highlight the complexity of immigration processes and the need for more studies at the regional level.

Die Dissertation untersucht anhand von drei ausgewählten Autoren (Peter Forrest, Clark Pinnock, Isaak August Dorner) die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer zeitgemäßen Rede von Gott und versucht eine Richtung vorzugeben, in der metaphysische Anforderungen an den Gottesbegriff zu suchen sind. Als Beispiel wurde dafür die Veränderlichkeit Gottes bzw. sein Werden in den Fokus gerückt. Ein Ergebnis der Arbeit ist, dass neben einer philosophisch formulierten Adäquatheit auch die traditionellen Loci Theoloci eine Berücksichtigung finden müssen., On the basis of three selected authors (Peter Forrest, Clark Pinnock, Isaak August Dorner), this dissertation examines the possibilities and limits of a contemporary discourse on God and attempts to provide a direction in which metaphysical demands on the concept of God are to be sought. As an example, the changeability of God or his becoming was brought into focus. One result of the work is that, in addition to a philosophically formulated adequacy, the traditional loci theoloci must also be taken into account.

Der modallogische Versuch von Kurt Gödel, die (Nicht)Existenz Gottes mit abstrakten ontologischen Argumenten zu beweisen, basiert auf vernünftige (umstrittene) Axiome, deren Geltungsbereich umstritten ist.

Diese Untersuchung wirft einen philosophischen Blick auf das Phänomen Genozid. Einerseits wird gezeigt, wie eine Politik der Vernichtung in sozialphilosophische Begriffe gefasst werden und wie damit der Verlauf von konkreten Fällen vernichtender Gewalt verstanden werden kann. Die Fallstudien thematisieren den Völkermord an den Armenien 1915/16 und den Genozid in Ruanda 1994. Anderseits wird eine Vernichtung des Politischen erörtert, die bisher in der Philosophie vernachlässigte moralphilosophische Dimensionen genozidaler Gewalt thematisiert.

The proliferation of Social Media and Open Web data has provided researchers with a unique opportunity to better understand human behavior at different levels. In this paper, we show how data from Open Street Map and Twitter could be analyzed and used to portray detailed Human Emotions at a city wide level in two cities, San Francisco and London. Neural Network classifiers for fine-grained emotions were developed, tested and used to detect emotions from tweets in the two cites. The detected emotions were then matched to key locations extracted from Open Street Map. Through an analysis of the resulting data set, we highlight the effect different days, locations and POI neighborhoods have on the expression of human emotions in the cities.

The concept of an evidential conditionalIf A then Cthat can be defined by the conjunction of$$A>C$$A>Cand$$\lnot C > \lnot A$$¬C>¬A, where > is a conditional of the kind introduced by Stalnaker and Lewis, has recently been studied in a series of papers by Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona. In this paper I argue that Crupi and Iacona’s central idea that contraposition captures the idea of evidential support cannot be maintained. I give examples showing that contraposition is neither necessary nor sufficient for a conditional’s antecedent supporting its consequent. Crupi and Iacona’s alternative account of evidential conditionals that is based on a probabilistic measure of evidential support cannot add to the credentials of their modal account, because both the theoretical role of contraposition and the resulting logic are different in this account.

Strong dispositional monism (SDM), the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection (CRO) constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis nor a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory.

In a recent article, Mario Günther presented a conditional that is claimed to be connexive. The aim of this short discussion note is to show that Günther’s claim is not without problems.

In this paper, I ask about the broader context of the history and philosophy of biology in the German-speaking world as the place in which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger began his work. Three German philosophical traditions—neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie—were interested in the developments and conceptual challenges of the life sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their reflections were taken up by life scientists under the terms theoretische Biologie (theoretical biology) and allgemeine Biologie (general biology), i. e., for theoretical and methodological reflections. They used historical and philosophical perspectives to develop vitalistic, organicist, or holistic approaches to life. In my paper, I argue that the resulting discourse did not come to an end in 1945. Increasingly detached from biological research, it formed an important context for the formation of the field of history and philosophy of biology. In Rheinberger's work, we can see the “Spalten” and “Fugen”—the continuities and discontinuities—that this tradition left there.

The Mexican axolotl (Ambystoma mexicanum) is one of the most important models in contemporary regeneration research and regenerative medicine. This is the result of the long history of the species as an experimental and laboratory bred animal. One of many research questions investigated in the axolotl is regeneration. The species’ astonishing ability to regenerate tissues and entire body parts already became apparent shortly after the first 34 living axolotls had been brought from Mexico to Europe in 1864. In the context of their unclear status as larvae or adults and the mysterious transformation of some animals into an adult form, the Paris zoologist Auguste Duméril cut off the gills of several individuals in an attempt to artificially induce the metamorphosis. This produced the first reports on the animals’ regenerative powers and led to sporadic but continuous investigations. But it remained just one of the many phenomena studied in axolotls. Only at the beginning of the 20th century, regeneration became a more prominent aspect in the experimental investigations of axolotls. In experimental embryology, regeneration in axolotls was used in three different ways: it was studied as a phenomenon in its own right: more importantly, it served as a macroscopic model for normal development and, together with other techniques like grafting, became a technical object in the experimental systems of embryologists. In my paper, I will look into how the axolotl became an experimental animal in regeneration research, the role of practices and infrastructures in this process and the ways in which regeneration in the axolotl oscillated between epistemic thing and technical object.

The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore be morally worse than a corresponding misleading utterance. But, we argue, there are also cases in which the difference in commitment makes lying morally better than misleading, as well as cases in which the difference is not morally relevant. This view conflicts with the two main positions philosophers have defended in the ethics of lying and misleading, which entail either that lying is in virtue of its nature worse than misleading or that there is no morally relevant difference between lying and misleading.

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories.

Wir verwenden unsere Vorstellungskraft (Imagination), um ��berzeugungen zu formen oder zu rechtfertigen. Um unsere Imagination so zu verwenden, muss sie bestimmten Einschr��nkungen unterliegen. Wir argumentieren, dass Imagination unter anderem durch logische Gesetze und durch "aboutness" beschr��nkt ist. Das hei��t, es spielt eine Rolle, wovon unsere Imaginationsepisoden handeln. Diese Position motiviert, dass bestimmte Schlussfolgerungen, die "vorstellen" beinhalten als g��ltig bzw. ung��ltig einzuordnen sind. Wir pr��fen, inwiefern andere Logiken der Imagination diese Einordnung entsprechend unserer Intuitionen vornehmen. Im Anschluss entwickeln wir unsere eigene formale Logik der Imagination, die die Einordnung der Schlussfolgerungen ad��quat vornimmt. Diese Logik umfasst drei Imaginationsoperatoren. Die formale Semantik kombiniert Ideen aus der relationalen Kripke Semantik, "branching time" Semantik f��r stit-Logik und "Neighbourhood" Semantik., We use our imagination to generate or justify beliefs. In order to use our imagination in this way, it must be subject to certain constraints. We argue that imagination is constrained by logical laws and "aboutness", among other things. That is, it matters what our imagination episodes are about. This position motivates that certain inferences that contain "imagine" are to be classified as valid or invalid. We examine to what extent other logics of imagination classify these inferences in line with our intuitions. We then develop our own formal logic of imagination, which adequately classifies these inferences. The logic involves three imagination operators. The formal semantics combines ideas from relational Kripke semantics, "branching time" semantics for stit logic and "neighborhood" semantics.

Die Hauptziele dieser Arbeit bestehen, erstens, darin, zu untersuchen, was Kant unter Subjektivität versteht, wenn er Maximen als subjektive praktische Prinzipien definiert, und, zweitens, wie sich Maximen und praktische Gesetze (objektive praktische Prinzipien) nach Kant zueinander verhalten. Unter Berücksichtigung der Sekundärliteratur differenziere ich vier mögliche Subjektivitätsbegriffe und vier mögliche Objektivitätsbegriffe. Ich zeige dann, dass der den Maximen zuzuschreibende Subjektivitätsbegriff und der den praktischen Gesetzen zuzuschreibende Objektivitätsbegriff keine einander ausschließende Begriffe sind. Maximen (in der genauen kantischen Bedeutung des Wortes) sind nur in dem Sinne subjektiv zu verstehen, dass sie das Moment der individuellen Selbstbestimmung im Handeln ausdrücken. Anschließend überprüfe ich diese Interpretation durch eine Analyse von Kants konkreten Anwendungen des Maximenbegriffs. Ich zeige auch, dass diese Interpretation zu einigen wichtigen Schlüssen bezüglich Kants Handlungstheorie führt, nämlich: dass jeder freiwilligen Handlung eine Maxime zu Grunde liegt, dass Maximen nicht immer ausdrücklich bzw. bewusst formuliert werden und dass Maximen keine präskriptiven Prinzipien sind. Schließlich gehe ich auf Kants Bild des praktischen Syllogismus in der zweiten Kritik ein und widme mich dessen Rekonstruktion. Ich zeige dann, dass diese Rekonstruktion ein neues Licht auf das Verhältnis von Maximen zu praktischen Gesetzen werfen kann., The main purposes of this work are to examine (1) what Kant means by subjectivity when he defines maxims as subjective practical principles and (2) how maxims and practical laws relate to each other according to Kant. Taking into account the secondary literature, I distinguish four possible concepts of subjectivity and four possible concepts of objectivity. I then show that the concept of subjectivity ascribed to maxims and the concept of objectivity ascribed to practical laws are not mutually exclusive concepts. Maxims (in the strict Kantian sense) are subjective only in the sense that they express the element of individual self-determination in acting. I then test those conclusions by analysing Kant’s concrete use of the concept of maxim in his main moral writings. I also show that this interpretation leads to some important conclusions concerning Kant’s theory of action, namely: that every freely performed action presupposes a maxim, that the moral agent may never formulate in his mind some of his maxims and that maxims are not prescriptive principles. Finally, I explore Kant’s image of a practical syllogism formulated in a passage of the second Critique and give a reconstruction of its form. I then argue that this reconstruction can shed new light on the relation between maxims and practical laws.

This paper presents a uniform semantic treatment of nonmonotonic inference operations that allow for inferences from infinite sets of premisses. The semantics is formulated in terms of selection functions and is a generalisation of the preferential semantics of Shoham, Kraus et al., and Makinson. A selection function picks out from a given set of possible states (worlds, situations, models) a subset consisting of those states that are, in some sense, the most preferred ones. A proposition α is a nonmonotonic consequence of a set of propositions Γ iff α holds in all the most preferred Γ-states. In the literature on revealed preference theory, there are a number of well-known theorems concerning the representability of selection functions, satisfying certain properties, in terms of underlying preference relations. Such theorems are utilised here to give corresponding representation theorems for nonmonotonic inference operations. At the end of the paper, the connection between nonmonotonic inference and belief revision, in the sense of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, is explored. In this connection, infinitary belief revision operations, that allow for the revision of a theory with a possibly infinite set of propositions, are introduced and characterised axiomatically. Several semantic representation theorems are proved for operations of this kind. This paper has existed in its present form since August 1991. It was presented at the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science , 7–14 August 1991, Uppsala and at a conference on Recent Advances in Philosophy of Science at the University of Amsterdam in August 1991.The text of this paper is taken from the publication in Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy 1994:10. It was typeset anew and minimally edited to correct typos and punctuation. The references were updated.

Das Manual bietet in Form von 10 Einsätzen einen Zugang zur Methodologie in den mittleren Schriften und im Spätwerk Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sowohl Hintergründe, Zitate im Kontext, als auch weiterreichende Fragen und Hinweise werden übersichtlich präsentiert. Dadurch wird eine erste Orientierung hinsichtlich der wesentlichen Eckpunkte einer praxeologisch orientierten Sprachphilosophie ermöglicht. Zentrale Theoreme wie grammatische Untersuchung, Beschreibung, Sprachspiel, Familienähnlichkeit werden vertiefend und in ihrem gedanklichen Zusammenhang dargestellt. In seiner überblickshaften Form zielt dieses Manual auf ein theoretisches und praktisches Verständnis von Wittgensteinschen Philosophie als Arbeitsform und damit auf eine Erschließung von Wittgensteins Philosophie als eine ebenso praktikable wie durchgreifende Vorgehensweise im Spektrum wissenschaftlich-kritischer Methodologien., The manual offers access to the methodology in Ludwig Wittgenstein's middle writings and late work in the form of 10 issues. Backgrounds, quotations in context, as well as more far-reaching questions and references are clearly presented. This provides an initial orientation with regard to the essential cornerstones of a praxeologically oriented philosophy of language. Central theorems such as grammatical investigation, description, language play, family resemblance are presented in depth and in their intellectual context. In its survey-like form, this manual aims at a theoretical and practical understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a form of work and thus at an opening up of Wittgenstein's philosophy as an equally practicable and thoroughgoing approach in the spectrum of scientific-critical methodologies.

Einleitend wird in dieser Arbeit ein historischer Abriss ��ber wichtige Paradigmen und Theorien der Zeitwahrnehmung dargeboten. Der Empirische Teil umfasst drei Arbeiten zum Zusammenhang von Erinnerungen und Urteilen zur Schnelligkeit des Zeitempfindens (Passage of Time Judgments) f��r mehrj��hrige Intervalle. Im ersten Artikel wird untersucht ob Varianz in objektiven und subjektiven Lebensereignissen mit unterschiedlichen POTJs assoziiert ist, im zweiten ob diese Ereignisse salient (d.h. zuvor aktiviert) sein m��ssen und im dritten ob die Valenz der aktivierten Erinnerungen f��r nachfolgende POTJs relevant ist. Die Befunde werden abschlie��end im Kontext von vorhandener Literatur diskutiert., This thesis opens with a historical outline of important paradigms and theories of time perception. The empirical part comprises three papers on the relationship between memories and Passage of Time Judgments (POTJs, judgments of the experienced velocitiy of time) for multannual intervals. The first article examines whether variance in objective and subjective life events is associated with different POTJs, the second whether these events must be salient (i.e. previously activated), and the third whether the valence of activated memories is relevant for subsequent POTJs. The findings are then discussed in the context of preexisting literature.

Nomination for gifted identification is the first step toward admission to gifted programs in most countries. However, despite its importance, little is known about predictors of nomination (McBee et al., 2016) and whether they also relate to students’ performance during gifted identification. Thus, this dissertation investigates the two-step gifted identification approach used by many countries, which consists of (a) nomination for gifted identification and (b) a gifted identification test. Based on a systemic conception of giftedness (Ziegler et al., 2019), both individual and environmental aspects that play a role in talent development are considered as predictors. For this, the educational and learning capital approach is used. It covers the essential resources for talent development, differentiating among five resources within the environment (educational capital) and five resources within the individual (learning capital; Ziegler & Baker, 2013). This dissertation has three aims. First, it seeks to validate a student and a parent questionnaire to assess students’ educational and learning capital (ELCQ; Vladut et al., 2013) for use in Saudi Arabia. Second, it investigates the predictive power of educational capital and learning capital for nomination in Saudi Arabia, above and beyond academic achievement and socioeconomic status, the most commonly used predictors for nomination (e.g., Kornmann et al., 2015; McBee, 2006). Third, it investigates the predictive power of educational capital and learning capital for students’ performance in the test used for gifted identification, above and beyond academic achievement and socioeconomic status. The participants were 2,685 ninth-grade students and 900 parents from Saudi Arabia. The Student and the Parent ELCQ demonstrated an acceptable factorial validity as well as good concurrent, predictive, and incremental validity. Educational capital and learning capital predicted (a) teacher nomination, (b) parent nomination, and (c) nomination by both parent and teacher simultaneously. Further, educational capital and learning capital improved the prediction for each of the three types of nomination above and beyond academic achievement and students’ socioeconomic status. However, the results showed that educational capital and learning capital were not positively related to giftedness assessment performance., Die Nominierung zur Identifizierung von Hochbegabten ist in den meisten Ländern der erste Schritt zur Aufnahme in Hochbegabtenprogramme. Trotz deren Bedeutung ist jedoch wenig zu den Prädiktoren für Nominierung bekannt (McBee et al., 2016), sowie dazu, ob diese auch mit der Leistung von Schülerinnen und Schülern im Rahmen der Hochbegabtenerkennung zusammenhängen. Daher untersucht diese Dissertation den in vielen Ländern verwendeten zweistufigen Ansatz zur Hochbegabtenidentifikation, der aus (a) der Nominierung zur Identifizierung von Hochbegabten und (b) einem Hochbegabten-Erkennungstest besteht. Basierend auf einer systemischen Auffassung von Hochbegabung (Ziegler et al., 2019) werden sowohl individuelle als auch umweltbezogene Aspekte, die bei der Talententwicklung eine Rolle spielen, als Prädiktoren betrachtet. Hierfür wird der Bildungs- und Lernkapitalansatz verwendet. Er umfasst die für die Talententwicklung entscheidenden Ressourcen, wobei zwischen fünf Ressourcen in der Umwelt (Bildungskapital) und fünf Ressourcen im Individuum (Lernkapital; Ziegler & Baker, 2013) unterschieden wird. Diese Dissertation hat drei Ziele. Erstens sollen ein Fragebogen für Schüler/-innen sowie ein Fragebogen für Eltern (ELCQ; Vladut et al., 2013) für den Einsatz in Saudi-Arabien validiert werden, die das Bildungs- und Lernkapital von Schülerinnen und Schülern erfassen. Zweitens wird untersucht, ob Bildungskapital und Lernkapital Vorhersagekraft für die Nominierung in Saudi-Arabien besitzen, und zwar über Schulleistungen und sozioökonomischen Status hinaus, welche die am häufigsten untersuchten Prädiktoren für Nominierung darstellen (z. B. Kornmann et al., 2015; McBee, 2006). Drittens wird untersucht, inwieweit Bildungskapital und Lernkapital die Leistung von Schülerinnen und Schülern im Hochbegabten-Erkennungstest vorhersagen, und zwar über deren Schulleistungen und sozioökonomischen Status hinaus. Es nahmen 2.685 Schüler/-innen der neunten Klasse und 900 Eltern aus Saudi-Arabien teil. Der Schüler- und der Eltern-ELCQ wiesen eine akzeptable faktorielle Validität sowie eine gute konvergente, prädiktive und inkrementelle Validität auf. Bildungskapital und Lernkapital sagten (a) Nominierung durch Lehrkräfte, (b) Nominierung durch Eltern sowie (c) gleichzeitige Nominierung durch Eltern und Lehrkräfte vorher. Darüber hinaus verbesserten Bildungskapital und Lernkapital die Vorhersagekraft für jede der drei Nominierungsarten über die Schulleistungen und den sozioökonomischen Status der Schüler/-innen hinaus. Die Ergebnisse zeigten jedoch, dass Bildungskapital und Lernkapital nicht positiv mit der Leistung im Hochbegabungstest korrelierten.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance.

Das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zu untersuchen, wie reich unsere Wahrnehmungserfahrungen sind, indem wir uns mit zwei verwandten Fragen befassen: Können Eigenschaften auf hoher Ebene Teil von Wahrnehmungserfahrungen sein? Können Vertrauensniveaus Teil von Wahrnehmungserfahrungen sein? Das übergeordnete Ziel der Arbeit ist es zu zeigen, dass eine geometrische Darstellung von Wahrnehmungserfahrung auf der Grundlage früherer Arbeiten von Broessel (2017, ms) eine neue Antwort auf beide Fragen geben kann

The goal of the TRESSPASS project is to develop, demonstrate and validate a single cohesive risk-based border management concept for air, maritime and land border crossing points. As part of this goal, the project follows an Ethics and Data Protection by Design (EDPbD) approach that builds on previous ethical research (Volkmann 2017). Based on the typology of ethical, legal and societal issues of risk-based border management presented in TRESSPASS’s deliverable D9.6, this report is a preliminary and partial definition of a framework for impact assessment. The framework aims at allowing a comparative assessment of different procedural designs for border checks. It aims at allowing a better understanding of the trade-offs involved in introducing especially risk-based border checks as part of a future border management regime. This is done by comparing the effects of the procedural designs of border crossing points along with the twelve types of relevant impact specified in the typology. The present report describes the adaptation of the method that will be used for comparative impact assessment of border checks along with four-point ordinal scales ("normative measurement"). It then continues to analyse how each of the twelve types of ELSA related impact relates to the TRESSPASS developed enabling technologies for risk-based border management. This way, it is ensured that the framework can adequately reflect the impact of risk-based checks. As part of this analysis, options for value-sensitive design during technology design become apparent (cf. also deliverable D3.1 and D4.3) and preliminary findings on the ethical trade-offs implied by different forms of traveller risk assessment were established. For two of the twelve types of impact, modes of impact and observable indicators for impact assessment were already defined in this report. In deliverable D9.8, this will also be done for the rest of types of impact defined in the typology along with the definition of the coding and aggregation rules for qualitative evaluation of the impact along four-point ordinal scales. Furthermore, a preliminary outline was presented on how WP6’s collaboration between the TRESSPASS and PERSONA projects on traveller acceptance data could be used in relation to the ethical framework. Lastly, the ethical frameworks integration with WP6’s overall CONOPS framework and WP7’s simulation and evaluation platform has been described in more detail. The framework presented in this report aims at allowing a better, comparative understanding of the positive as well as of the negative effects of introducing risk-based border checks as part of a future border management regime. We hope that this will allow ethically informed and well-balanced decisions about the kind of border checks desired for Europe’s external borders (Ethics and Data Protection by design).

This article argues that the citizens of Hegel's state cannot maintain themselves as politically free because they are susceptible to mutual enslavement. I demonstrate this by focusing on the Roman republican background of Hegel's constitution, the potential trajectory of its dissolution and the accompanying means of its cyclical fortification through courage. Hegel, by integrating aspects of the Roman mixed constitution also adopts the idea of decadence within his conception of civil society. After locating the source of decadence in the contractual relations of peace and the bourgeois inability to overcome the fear of death, I go on to argue that war for Hegel provides a theatre where freedom may be regenerated through courage. However, I also show that modern wars do not provide sufficient means of perpetuating Hegel's constitution. To demonstrate this, I distinguish three forms of war: colonial, limited and total war, arguing that only the latter offers a solution to decay of political disposition and loss of freedom, but that—by being itself susceptible to decadence—it cannot salvage Hegel's state from dissolution and reduction to contractual relations.

The goal of the TRESSPASS project is to develop, demonstrate and validate a single cohesive risk-based border management concept for air, maritime and land border crossing points. As part of this goal, the project follows an Ethics and Data Protection by Design (EDPbD) approach that builds on the author's previous ethical research. In this report, we identify those ethical, legal and societal aspects (ELSAs) that become relevant as unintended negative effects of implementing risk based border checks as part of a future border management regime. Twelve types of such ELSA related negative impact have been identified as part of a structured typology that addresses three main categories of ELSAs. This typology will form the basis for an evaluation framework that will be developed as part of TRESSPASS deliverables D9.7 and D9.8 (due in M18 and M36). The framework will allow a comparative assessment of introducing risk based screening concepts for border checks. It aims at allowing a better understanding of the positive as well as of the negative effects of introducing risk- based border checks as part of a future border management regime – and it will do so by comparing the effects of the procedural designs of border crossing points along the twelve types of potential impact specified in the present report’s typology. The types of impact identified in this typology have been conceptualized in such a way to allow the formulation of qualitative scales for assessment. These scales will be used as part of the ethical evaluation framework. By focusing specifically on risk-based approaches, we ultimately aim at enabling designers and decision makers – as well as, to a certain level of detail, the interested public – to evaluate the impact of introducing risk-based border checks. We hope that this will allow ethically informed and well-balanced decisions about the kind of checks at Europe’s external borders. The evaluation framework complements D1.4’s analysis of the current legal framework for border checks (which does not allow for risk based approaches), by addressing ELSAs beyond the question of current legal permissibility.

According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either.

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ZusammenfassungObwohl die Bedeutung medienethischer Reflexion und der Status der Medienethik als einer angewandten und damit normativen Ethik weithin anerkannt sind, bleiben die vorliegenden Beiträge oft unbefriedigend: Sie liefern kaum Antworten auf konkrete moralische Probleme, enthalten aber auch nur selten Theorieangebote, die das Potenzial hätten, derartige Antworten zu generieren. Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, anhand von vier Beispielen theoretische Engführungen und Fehlstellungen der gegenwärtigen Debatte zu beschreiben, die einer fruchtbaren multidisziplinären Diskussion medienethischer Fragestellungen und einer genuin normativen Medienethik im Wege stehen.

Während Thomas Nisters eine Parallele zwischen Dankbarkeit und Ärger zu ziehen versucht, könnte die Pointe der Geschichte in einer mehrfachen Verdoppelung zu sehen sein: der schenkenden Handlung, der Gabe, der beschenkten Person, des Schenkenden. Der Umschlag von Dankbarkeit zu Ärger ist weniger verwunderlich, wenn wir uns an die Lehre von Thomas von Aquin erinnern, dass „die Vergeltung einer Gunst mehr vom affectus des Gebenden als vom effectus [der Gabe] abhängt.“

The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of the phenomena of pretend play, that is, of the very explanandum of theories of pretense. To do so, we suggest combining the turn to action and embodiment in the cognitive sciences with the practice turn in the humanities. From our point of view, pretend play has to be seen in its role in human life as a whole, which is to help children to learn to master the complex sociocultural contingencies of the manifold social practices that make up social reality. Pretend play should therefore be conceived as alternative sense-making that is always related, in varying ways, to ordinary social practices. Pretenders do not need to project mental representations onto reality, but make sense of their surroundings in different ways than encultured adults in ordinary practices. In the paper, we spell out this view and show how it enables an enactivist reconceptualization of imagination, intentions and knowledge, which are usually thought of as being available only to representationalist accounts of pretense.

Conceptual Engineering zielt darauf ab, unsere Begriffe zu verbessern anstatt sie bloß zu beschreiben. In dieser (kumulativen) Dissertation biete ich sowohl eine Theorie als auch eine Verteidigung des Conceptual Engineering an. Dabei werden Antworten auf drei grundlegende Herausforderungen des Conceptual Engineering vorgeschlagen: die Bootstrapping-Herausforderung zu definieren, auf welche Arten von Repräsentationen diese Methode abzielt und was es bedeutet, diese zu "engineeren"; die Implementierungsherausforderung einen realisierbaren Handlungsablauf zu skizzieren, durch den Vorschläge des Conceptual Engineering umgesetzt werden können; und die Kontinuitätsherausforderung die Grenzen akzeptabler begrifflicher Revisionen festzulegen., Conceptual engineering aims to revise rather than describe our current conceptual apparatus. Many philosophers believe this to be an underexplored but very fruitful approach to doing philosophy. In this (cumulative) dissertation, I offer a theory as well as a defense of conceptual engineering. Along the way, I provide answers to three fundamental challenges to conceptual engineering: the bootstrapping challenge to define what types of representations are targeted by this method and what engineering them amounts to; the implementation challenge to sketch a feasible course of actions by which conceptual engineering proposals can be implemented; and the continuity challenge to account for the limits of acceptable conceptual revisions.

In this thesis I aim to achieve two objectives. The first is to show that we are required to intervene in nature to assist suffering wild animals. The second is to offer some morally permissible ways of carrying out such intervention. After presenting an extensive critical analysis of the laissez-faire view, according to which we have no general obligation to assist wild animals, I challenge various arguments commonly put forward against intervention in nature and show that they fail to defend the non-interventionist view. Next, I propose general principles of a successful and morally permissible form of intervention in nature, which I collectively label as moral supervision on nature. Then I provide a critical assessment of various forms of intervention in nature that have been put forward in the relevant literature in order to determine whether they should be granted a moral approval. Most importantly, I address the notorious problem of predation. I show that all existing responses to the predation problem are inadequate and misguided. Then I present what I believe to be the most adequate approach to that problem.

Diese Dissertation situiert bewusste Erfahrung innerhalb des kürzlich populären Erklärungsrahmens der prädiktiven Verarbeitung und formuliert eine Theorie über die Art und Weise, wie dieser theoretische Rahmen Aufschluss über die Natur dieses schwer fassbaren Phänomens geben kann. Zunächst wird der Erklärungsstatus des prädiktiven Verarbeitungsrahmens aufgeklärt, gefolgt von der Verteidigung der These, dass er eine repräsentationalistische Auffassung von Kognition postuliert. Auf der Basis dieser Grundlagen werden diverse spezifische Ansätze der prädiktiven Verarbeitung kritisch diskutiert und ein neuer Vorschlag entwickelt, der als höherstufiges Modell der Erfahrung bezeichnet wird., This dissertation is concerned with elucidating the place of conscious experience within the recently popular predictive processing framework and the way that this theoretical framework can shed light on the nature of this elusive phenomenon. The work carried in this dissertation begins with the task of elucidating the explanatory status of the predictive processing framework, followed by a defense of the claim that it postulates a representational account of cognition. With this groundwork in place, a critique of the available predictive processing accounts of experience is carried out and a new proposal, called the higher-order model of experience, is proposed.

In einer „Wissensgesellschaft“ erwartet man für den privaten und gesellschaftlichen Alltag von Wissenschaftlern Orientierung, um gute Entscheidungen treffen zu können. Da Wissenschaften der Objektivität und der Wahrheit verpflichtet sind, erhofft man sich Gewissheit über die Richtigkeit einer Entscheidung. Eine solche Gewissheit ist aber in der Vielfalt wissenschaftlicher Auffassungen nicht so einfach zu haben. So stellt man sich früher oder später die Frage: „Wem soll ich nun glauben?“ Die Suche nach Antworten auf diese Frage führt wiederum über die Wissenschaften hinaus in andere Bereiche der persönlichen Wirklichkeitserfahrung im persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Alltag und in eine Vielfalt von Aspekten, Begriffsbedeutungen und Positionen. Was meint man eigentlich mit den Begriffen „Erfahrung“ und „Gewissheit“? Welcher Anspruch wird mit der Größe „Erfahrung“ und einer darauf beruhenden oder ihr widersprechenden „Gewissheit“ geltend gemacht? Das vierte transdisziplinäre Regensburger Symposium erörterte diese Fragen im Blick auf verschiedene Wissenschaften, auf Domänen der religiösen und areligiösen Alltags- und Lebenserfahrung sowie schließlich auch im Blick auf ein Fallbeispiel eines gesellschaftlich kontroversen Themas, die Klimawandel-Diskussion. Der Tagungsband dokumentiert Vorträge aus Sprachwissenschaft, Theologie, Philosophie, Physik, Informatik und Theoretischer Chemie und fasst Diskussionen zwischen Vortragenden und geladenen Diskutanten aus Soziologie, Physik, Germanistischer Mediävistik, Philosophie, Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Mathematik und Sprachwissenschaft zusammen.