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Defamation is a complex topic, historically lying at the crossroads of tort and criminal law. In the current state of the law, various common law jurisdictions (including England) have abolished criminal defamation. By contrast, civil law jurisdictions approach defamation first and foremost as a criminal offence, although in many countries (including France), the claimant’s right is also civilly actionable. From a comparative perspective, this distinction supports a generally held view that the national particularisms of defamation laws reflect very different approaches to the protection of reputation. This thesis considers and challenges this view by critically examining the extent to which the nature of the regulation, tortious or criminal, influences the substantive content of the rules on defamation in England and France. It argues that the current regulatory features are the result of a haphazard historical development, rather than of a conscious choice. Thus, the distinction between tortious and criminal liability in England and France does not necessarily epitomise fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of reputation. This suggests that the English and the French laws of defamation are comparable despite their different regulatory features. This is confirmed by studying key features of the law of defamation: standards of liability, the defence of truth and remedial aspects of the wrong. At first sight, their apparent differences seem to be justifiable on the basis of each system’s disparate regulatory features. Upon closer analysis of each of these features however, elements of commonality emerge. The English and French rules on fault are comparable and are underlined by a shared concern to promote media accountability, their treatment of truth is becoming analogous, and the remedial aspects of defamation are functionally comparable. The thesis concludes that despite substantive differences owing to the regulatory features of each system, England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach to the wrong of defamation.

This thesis uses a mixed methods approach utilising questionnaires, focus groups and interviews to explore how and why an embedded professional association may act to alter a longstanding trait of its profession. Focussing on the trait of social closure at the English Bar, it uses an access programme (Pegasus Access and Support Scheme - PASS) created by a professional association of the Bar (The Honourable Society of the Inner Temple) as a case study. Social closure occurs through mechanisms controlling access to the profession. Whilst formal and explicit exclusionary strategies existed historically, more informal exclusionary barriers still operate. These indirectly disadvantage those from lower socio-economic backgrounds as they emphasise aspirant entrants’ social capital and habituation to the social norms of the Bar. One way in which these attributes can be assimilated or increased is through mini-pupillage; work experience in barristers’ chambers. PASS provides mini-pupillage opportunities to non-traditional aspirant entrants. More widely, it could be construed as a challenge to exclusionary recruitment practices. However, such a challenge requires that the conceptions of merit underlying exclusionary recruitment practices, as well as the practices themselves, are altered. By maintaining the privilege attached to mini-pupillage, PASS was not as radical as sometimes portrayed. The educational and social contexts of students participating in the programme also influenced its efficacy. A challenge to patterns of social closure requires a collaboration between the professional association’s elite, and salaried staff with specialist knowledge of access and education from other professional backgrounds. This emphasises the role of individuals and agency in such action. Despite the general diminished power of professional associations, there remains potential for innovative action. This is realised when the attributes of the professional association combine with acts of agency by individuals which cause elite influence and alternative institutional logics to mutually reinforce one another.

The development of the legal system in the Lagos colony was primarily influenced by political and economic considerations. Although English-style courts were established, their functioning v/as marred by an inadequate supply of legal personnel and procedures too complicated for the colony's circumstances. By the turn of the century, it was clear that radical changes had to be made in the legal system for Britain to rule effectively the areas coming under its control. For Africans within the colony's jurisdiction, the courts remained alien institutions throughout this period. The courts were established largely for the convenience of European commercial interests, and Africans were not encouraged to make full use of them. Because of the demands of colonial rule, restrictions were placed on the employment of African lawyers and juries, and some fundamental rights were denied persons on trial. The colonial authorities also found it inconvenient to observe the "niceties" of English law. Where larger considerations of policy were involved, especially those pertaining to slavery, debt and land, the law was flagrantly violated by officials. This disregard for legal prescriptions was also evident in the expansion of the colony's jurisdiction to the African states on the mainland. African states were relegated to positions outside the sphere of international law in their relations with the Lagos government. By 1904, the colony's jurisdiction over non-natives was complete throughout Yorubaland, and independent African jurisdiction had been seriously curtailed.