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The article "Our Men in Kabul" in Diplomatic History explores the complex relationship between the United States and Afghanistan from 1919 to the Soviet invasion in 1979. Author Robert B. Rakove delves into US archives to reveal how successive administrations in Washington sought to preserve Afghan independence and nonalignment despite budgetary and geopolitical constraints. The narrative highlights the nuances of US-Afghan diplomacy, showing how human choices, contingency, and policy initiatives shaped the course of events leading up to the Soviet invasion. Rakove's exhaustive research provides a definitive account of this fraught relationship, shedding light on the limits of US power in dealing with countries in the Non-Aligned Movement and those close to Soviet influence. [Extracted from the article]

Since the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, no country, including the United States (US), has yet recognised the former. The US has consistently urged the regime to comply with the Doha agreement that emphasised an inclusive government. Moreover, the Biden administration has repeatedly asked the regime to respect human rights and allow girls education and employment, but in vain. What explains the divergences in US–Afghanistan relations post-withdrawal? What is the trajectory of the US–Taliban ties in the current context? Above all, is there any possibility of the US recognition of the Taliban regime in the foreseeable future? Based on primary data, it is posited that the relations between the US and the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan are divergent and currently antagonistic due to the Taliban's non-compliance with the Doha agreement. Futuristically, the study explores three scenarios to predict US–Afghanistan relations. First, there is a likelihood of US–Afghanistan rapprochement if the Taliban do the US bidding. Second, in cases of non-compliance, the US would get tough on the regime in terms of further sanctions. However, the Taliban would consolidate (informal) ties with China, Russia and other regional countries, including Pakistan. Third, the US has the military capabilities to do regime change in Afghanistan in case of another 9/11-type incident in the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'war on terror' produced discourses, which elevated terrorism as a primary threat to international peace and security and justified the overthrow of regimes that were suspected of supporting terrorism. After two decades, the United States (US) seeks to wind down the war, including through negotiations with groups that it once regarded as terrorist or complicit in terrorism. This article takes a critical approach to examine these shifts in US policy in relation to the Taliban in Afghanistan. It conceives the Taliban as a networked movement that consisted of local roots, transnational jihadist ties and connections to Pakistan's proxy war in Afghanistan. The article then identifies and problematises key assumptions of American discourses by assessing them against local patterns of terrorism and (in)security and the Taliban's violent tactics. Drawing on US sources, it finds that the US discourses shifted over time between various aspects of the Taliban movement as signifiers of its identity to justify shifting Washington's priorities in Afghanistan. These discursive shifts, which reflected US policy priorities, introduced uncertainties and contradictions that contributed to the failure of the war efforts in Afghanistan. Analyse critique des changements survenus dans la politique américaine à l'égard des talibans [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the U.S. war in Afghanistan last so long, and why did it end? In contrast to conventional arguments about partisanship, geopolitics, and elite pressures, a new theory of war duration suggests that strategic narratives best answer these questions. The severity and frequency of attacks by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across most of the 2000s and 2010s generated and sustained a robust collective narrative across the United States focused on combatting terrorism abroad. Audience costs of inaction generated by this narrative pushed President Barack Obama (2009) and President Donald Trump (2017) to not only sustain but increase troops in Afghanistan, against their better judgement. Strategic narratives also explain the end to the war. The defeat of the ISIS caliphate and a significant reduction in the number of attacks on liberal democratic states in the late 2010s caused the severity and frequency of traumatic events to fall below the threshold necessary to sustain a robust anti-terrorism narrative. As the narrative weakened, advocates for war in Afghanistan lost political salience, while those pressing retrenchment gained leverage over policy. Audience costs for inaction declined and President Joe Biden ended the war (2021). As President Biden seeks to rebalance U.S. commitments for an era of new strategic challenges, an active offshore counterterrorism program will be necessary to maintain this balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on protecting the interests of the U.S. in Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover in mid-August 2021. Topics discussed include how the former insurgents, Taliban, who withstood U.S. military, diplomatic and sanctions pressure for two decades, will run Afghanistan; the outside influences on the Taliban regime ruling from Kabul; and the legitimacy and financial help desired by the Taliban regime to restore a semblance of functionality to Afghanistan's devastated economy.

A personal narrative is presented which explores the author's experience of living in Kabul, Afghanistan, when it fell to the Taliban, after twenty years of U.S.-led military occupation.

The article discusses the outcomes of the decision of U.S. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. to withdraw U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, declaring the end of war in Afghanistan.

The article focuses on retreat of U.S. from Afghanistan as event and dynamic developments in aftermath and mentions challenges of Covid-19 pandemic, energy crises and global warming. Topic discussed include diminished importance of hydrocarbons, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and depletion of resources.

The article discusses issues related to the abrupt end of 20-year old presence of the U.S.-led state-building venture in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021 and how Taliban leadership has outlined the contours of a very different Afghan state and society. Topics discussed include regular development aid as a much more difficult issue for the international donor community and principal rationale for past international involvement in Afghanistan led by the U.S.

In the wake of the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan and the US withdrawal, this article provides an overview of India's evolving policy towards Afghanistan to understand its future trajectories. Focusing on India's testing ties with the US in relation to Afghanistan, the changing regional dynamics, and Delhi's security-related apprehensions of the Taliban, the article will look at India's engagements in and on Afghanistan since 2001. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion on the possible options for Delhi as it confronts a new bilateral reality wherein the Taliban will play a critical role in determining the nature of Afghanistan's foreign policies towards India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der erfolgreiche Einsatz nachrichtendienstlicher Mittel und Luftstreitkräfte bei der Invasion Afghanistans 2001 wurde zum Muster für die künftigen Operationen der US-geführten Koalition in diesem Land. Diese konzentrierten sich auf die Terrorismusbekämpfung, nicht nur wegen des Etiketts „Krieg gegen den Terror", sondern auch, weil es bald keinen leicht erkennbaren Feind mehr zu bekämpfen gab. Die konventionelle Phase des Krieges war vorbei, bevor die meisten Koalitionstruppen jemals afghanischen Boden betreten hatten. Die nachrichtendienstlichen Bemühungen konzentrierten sich folglich auf die Beschaffung konkreter Daten über einzelne Aufständische und nicht auf grundlegende Fragen über das Umfeld, in dem die Koalition operierte. In der Zwischenzeit ermöglichten die USA die Rückkehr der alten Allianz zwischen Sufi-Orden und radikalen Islamisten des Nahen Ostens an die Macht. Von Anfang 2002, als sich die Taliban vorübergehend aufgelöst hatten, bis Ende 2004, als die ersten afghanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen stattfanden, gab es ein Zeitfenster, in dem die Struktur des afghanischen Staates vollständig umgestaltet werden konnte. Ein föderales System hätte eingeführt werden können, die Macht des Klerus hätte zurückgedrängt statt gestärkt werden können, und es hätte eine rechenschaftspflichtige Regierung gebildet werden können. Stattdessen ließ die Koalition weiterhin Geld nach Afghanistan fließen. Ende 2014 hatten die USA inflationsbereinigt bereits mehr Mittel für den Wiederaufbau Afghanistans bereitgestellt, als sie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg im Rahmen des Marshall-Plans für 16 europäische Länder ausgaben. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has been at war in Afghanistan for nearly twenty years, with arguably no discernible end in sight. Yet there has been no public accounting of the costs of the on-going conflict, either for Afghanistan or America. While the war's destruction is readily visible throughout much of the Afghan countryside, it is no less profoundly damaging to the social and political fabric of the United States. As the costs for this conflict come due, the U.S. will be faced with a bill it may be ill-equipped to pay – not only financially, but socially and politically as well. Indeed, Afghanistan may be the war that ultimately destroys American democracy as we know it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the USA and its Western allies have misused 'Just War' narratives to legitimise an external intervention in Afghanistan and their use of force during the War on Terror. It explores the extent to which such external interventions, military strategies, narratives and justifications by the USA may have contributed to state failure in Afghanistan. As the legitimacy of earlier external interventions is called into question, while the road ahead for Afghanistan remains precarious, thinking about a new paradigm of post-war reconstruction becomes important for the country and its people in years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]