1. Don't Forget to Lock the Front Door! Inferring the Deployment of Source Address Validation of Inbound Traffic
- Author
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Qasim Lone, Marcin Skwarek, Andrzej Duda, Baptiste Jonglez, Maciej Korczynski, Yevheniya Nosyk, Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble (LIG), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP ), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Drakkar, Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP ), Initiative de Recherche Scientifique IRS, ANR-15-IDEX-0002,UGA,IDEX UGA(2015), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble (INPG)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble (INPG)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble (INPG)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), ANR-15-IDEX-02,CYBER@ALPS,Grenoble Alpes Cybersecurity Institute(2017), and ANR: IRS,Initiative de Recherche Scientifique
- Subjects
Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) ,FOS: Computer and information sciences ,050101 languages & linguistics ,Spoofing attack ,Record locking ,Ingress filtering ,Edge device ,Network security ,business.industry ,Computer science ,Network packet ,05 social sciences ,ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS ,02 engineering and technology ,IP address spoofing ,Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture ,[INFO.INFO-NI]Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI] ,Border Gateway Protocol ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,020201 artificial intelligence & image processing ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,business ,Computer network - Abstract
International audience; This paper concerns the problem of the absence of ingress filtering at the network edge, one of the main causes of important network security issues. Numerous network operators do not deploy the best current practice - Source Address Validation (SAV) that aims at mitigating these issues. We perform the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks not filtering incoming packets by their source address. The measurement method consists of identifying closed and open DNS resolvers handling requests coming from the outside of the network with the source address from the range assigned inside the network under the test. The proposed method provides the most complete picture of the inbound SAV deployment state at network providers. We reveal that 32 673 Autonomous Systems (ASes) and 197 641 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefixes are vulnerable to spoofing of inbound traffic. Finally, using the data from the Spoofer project and performing an open resolver scan, we compare the filtering policies in both directions.
- Published
- 2020
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