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Significant advancements in information technologies and precision weapons are providing an unprecedented potential for future warfare and challenging traditional applications of combat power. This monograph discusses one element of combat power--maneuver-and how its application in combat is changing. The monograph begins by defining maneuver and examining its purpose and traditional application. Joint Vision 2010 and Force XXI documents are then analyzed to determine how these new operational concepts are effecting maneuver. The conclusion is that maneuver, enabled by technology and driven by a changing threat, is gaining renewed emphasis and utility. Constraining this new found maneuver capability, however, will be the timeless effects of terrain and weather, the difficulty of changing a large bureaucracy like the US military, and the transient nature of military technological advantages. The monograph closes by summarizing the changing role of maneuver and by describing particular maneuver applications and effects.

This monograph examines the relationship between the United States Army's physical fitness program and the physical combat readiness of the combat arms soldier. Linking together physical fitness standards, physical training, and combat readiness is accomplished using entrance and retention standards, initial entry training (IET), and unit physical training and testing. The actual physical combat task performance depends on the quality of the soldier produced by the physical fitness program.

Securing lodgment at an airfield in an environment where it is uncertain whether the introduction of military forces will be opposed during a military operation other than war poses a difficult problem for planners of military operations. Forcible entry is a combat mission to wrest control of a lodgment site from an opposing force. These operations use the principles of mass, surprise and overwhelming combat power to secure the point of entry and facilitate the rapid introduction of additional military forces. Unopposed entry to an airfield to secure lodgment can be achieved less aggressively with less provocative means. Landing a security force at the airfield appears benign compared to either airborne assault or air assault techniques. However, in an uncertain environment, the tension between security of the force, restraint and legitimacy provides operational planners a problem in risk management. The method selected for insertion of the entry force telegraphs the intent of the mission, whether combat, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping.

This monograph investigates a gap in U.S. Army doctrine on the prevention of terrorist attacks. First, this monograph show that the goals, organization, and tactics of terrorist are a formidable threat to the Army. Second, it uses case studies from Great Britain and France to show that well trained and dedicated terrorists can bypass heightened security; and that terrorism is difficult, if not impossible to deter at the time and point of attack. Third, it uses case studies from Beirut and Saudi Arabia to show how U.S. policy can be affected by, terrorism, and to find what measures could been implemented by military commanders to deter those attacks.

This study examines factors influencing the development of theory and doctrine based on emerging and future technology. It uses the air power theory of Giulio Douhet and the unescorted daylight strategic bombing doctrine of the US Army Air Force to illustrate hazards in projecting into the future as a means of constructing theory and doctrine. This study begins with Douhet's strategic bombing theory. It traces the difficulty in applying the rigor of scientific method to future-based theory as compared to conventional military theory. The analysis focuses on two aspects of the dangers in developing theory based on future or emerging technology along this rational methodology: extrapolation of recent experience into the future and the inherent perishablity of assumptions based on technological advancement. Douhet's theory formed the intellectual foundation for two major US air offensives in World War 2. The evolution of strategic bombing doctrine by the AAF demonstrates the impact of two institutional influences that shaped doctrinal development: internal organizational pressures and a slide from doctrine into dogma. The AAF experience in developing its strategic bombing doctrine from Douhet's air power theory holds lessons for today's effort to in crafting a way to wage war in the next century.

This paper explores the impact that an army's structure has on an its ability to process information and achieve victory on the battlefield. It discusses the following questions. What is information and how is it related to organizations? How does organization structure facilitate or obstruct the flow of information? How does organizational structure affect the ability of the senior leader to make correct decisions? To explore these issues further, they are considered in the context oi the American Civil War Campaign of Second Manassas. Information is a critical organizational resource. Information is a collection of data which has content, meaning and purpose. Organizational structure affects the flow of information within the organization. Organizational structure designates reporting relationships, managerial hierarchy, and the span of control of managers and supervisors. The structure forms the conduits of communication, coordination, and integration of effort among the organization's departments. Communications is the organizational nervous system through which information is transmitted and shared. An organization's structure affects its communications environment. Information may be interpreted, filtered, held, changed, consolidated, delayed or blocked at each level of managerial hierarchy or when moving laterally between organizational subunits. Information may also be misinterpreted or corrupted by mismatched mental models between the sender and receiver of the information. The effects of organizational structure on information flow are examined in the context of the American Civil War Battle of Second Manassas. In August 1862, General John Pope's Army of Virginia opposed General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in Western Virginia.

This monograph discusses the importance of the commander and staff wargaming together. Wargaming is a critical visualization event where the participants develop detailed images of the operation. Wargaming allows the commander and staff to build a common vision and understanding of battle. The monograph first describes the historical development of wargaming. Included is a brief background of the estimate process and the roots of Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Wargaming is traced from the early uses by the Prussian Army to its late introduction in United States Army doctrine. Following this description is an explanation of battle command and its critical dynamic of visualization. Visualization tasks required during the MDMP are discussed. FM 101-5 (1984) and the subsequent drafts are examined to determine the current and proposed doctrine for wargaming. Each document is reviewed for relevant changes to the Military Decision-making Process (MDMP), and wargaming procedures. The role of the commander is investigated in detail. This examination is followed with an analysis of the adequacy of wargaming doctrine to facilitate the development of a common vision between the commander and staff. The monograph concludes that the wargaming doctrine delineated in FM 101-5 does not support the development of common vision. The current FM 101-5 (1984) is outdated and does not incorporate the integrated operations of the staff. Draft manuals (1993 and 1996) have shifted the primary responsibility of wargaming to the staff. Responsibilities and roles are not described for the commander. Consequently, commanders rarely wargame with the staff. Common vision can not be produced without the commander and staff wargaming together.

This monograph compares sea-launched cruise missiles to heavy bomber delivered munitions performing the battlespace dominance mission in the first five days of a major regional contingency (MRC). Battlespace dominance is a Navy doctrinal term. The paper uses the projected year 2006 cruise missile and bomber force structure each attacking the same hypothetical target list. The paper examines two cases. The first case compares both cruise missiles and bombers without sensor fuzed weapons (SFW) and brilliant anti-tank (BAT). The second case posits that SFW and BAT munitions are in the force structure for the two means of delivery. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages. Bombers are better able to deliver a wide variety of munitions against many different targets with persistence. Cruise missiles are particularly well suited for attacking integrated air defense systems and other counterair targets.

This monograph discusses heavy division organic SIGINT and its limited ability to aid the commander in the division's fight. Modern weapon system employment demands that intelligence and SIGINT provide precision intelligence at extended ranges. Furthermore, tactical SIGINT system mobility and survivability requires carriers that are as mobile and survivable as the combat systems they support. This monograph examines the range, accuracy of collection, and the mobility and survivability of tactical SIGINT systems. The monograph first determines that the changing nature of the modern battlefield and doctrine require tactical SIGINT assets to adequately range targets, determine precisely their location, move with combat formations yet remain survivable. The monograph uses these three requirements through each section as a guide in determining the value of SIGINT. Next, it evaluates tactical SIGiNT through two case studies. The first is Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the second is at the National Training Center. Both case studies evaluate currently available tactical SIGINT systems. Then, the monograph examines future SIGINT in the form of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Common Sensor System (GBCS-H and AQF), comparing it to both the currently fielded systems and the requirements of the modern battlefield.

This monograph examines a looming gap in the Army's inventory. After April 1997 a strategically deployable airdroppable lightweight armored vehicle to support early entry forces will not exist. The decisions to terminate the Armored Gun System (AGS) and inactivate the 3d Battalion 73d Armor Regiment has resulted in a shortfall in the structure of our rapid deployment forces. In anticipation of a future light armor role, current light armor doctrine is examined. Although doctrine for armor systems is plentiful doctrinal references concerning light armor systems are scarce. Four historical examples (WWII, Vietnam, Just Cause and Haiti) provide insights into the past uses of light armored vehicles, and assault guns. Doctrine and historical examples reinforce the importance of a complimentary tank-infantry force. The operational requirements for a light armored vehicle to support early entry forces are examined. The Required Operational Capabilities for the (now terminated) AGS are used to evaluate various U.S. and foreign manufactured light armored vehicles. The Army's leadership is exploring several near term proposals to compensate for the termination of the AGS and Sheridan phaseout. These proposals include, the Immediate Ready Company (IRC), the Javelin Anti- tank Weapon System, the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOCM), and the Line of Sight Anti-tank (LOSAT).

This monograph examines how the rational and cybernetic decision processes are used in tactical battle command. It explores the decision loop, a cybernetic decision process based on feedback, as a means to connect information directly to action and exploit the time value of information. The rational decision process, the analytical process of choosing an optimum course among alternatives, does not support the rapid use of information. The cybernetic decision model, the use of feedback to regulate action, provides an alternate means of exploiting the time value of information. This model views command as a control problem with the objective of controlling both the enemy and friendly forces on the battlefield. In order to control the battlefield, the variety of the control system must match the system being controlled. The criteria of fast acting, self regulating, and self organizing are applied to analyze the Boyd cycle or observe orient decide act (OODA) loop, the recognition primed decision (RPD) model, and the Lawson loop. The OODA and RPD loops do not provide the framework for self regulation or self organization. The Lawson model differs by providing a regulator that compares feedback to a desired state. This suggests two layers of decision: an execution layer that translates information to action, and a planning layer to design and adapt the regulator. This two layer system when networked to higher and sister echelons provides the basis of a self organizing system that acts around the authority of information. Specifically collective action builds around predetermined decision rules. Decision loops can then exploit the time value of information.

This monograph examines why many commanders continue to have problems writing effective commander's intent statements. Doctrine writers reintroduced 'Commander's intent' to United States Army doctrine with the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations. Fourteen years have passed since then and many commander's intent statements that appear in orders are still meaningless words for staffs and subordinate commanders. The 'Commander's Intent' white Paper describes commander's intent as the cornerstone of mission tactics and critical to Army operations. The commander's intent is probably the most important thing a commander must communicate to his subordinates. Feedback from the combat training centers reveals that many of the intent statements do not reflect a clear vision of how commanders intend to accomplish their mission.

This paper addresses the question, 'what happened to Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)?' and what that question has to do with the development and evolution of Air Force doctrine. The answer goes much deeper than just the simple disappearance of a mission term from warfighting lexicons. The disappearance of the BAI mission represents an evolution of Air Force doctrine--not just a conflict with the Army. It's an unfortunate side-effect that this action also affected Army doctrine. In today's joint environment, service doctrinal changes are prone to affect interservice operations--that should be expected. But BAl's disappearance none-the-less demonstrates a maturing of air power doctrine. This maturing went away from long-held strategic air power only, or tactical air power only doctrinal focuses, to synthesize these approaches--something that was long overdue. As a result, the Air Force combined tactical interdiction doctrine and strategic attack doctrine in the Operation Desert Storm air campaign plan that successfully produced operational shock on the enemy across the entire theater. Using Air Force, Army, and Joint doctrines as a backdrop, and taking a look back at history, this paper addresses the issue of BAI, both as a mission, and as a concept. After defining the terms close air support (CAS), BAl, and air interdiction (AI) as missions of the Air Force role of force application, an examination of BAI is conducted in the historical contexts of previous air wars. This historical look at battlefield interdiction through each of the different wars, and its development through the Army/Air Force 31 Inititatives will demonstrate the transition from a doctrinal mindset of strategic air power, to one favoring tactical air in support of ground maneuver warfare.

The monograph discusses the Army's adoption of information technology to support its Force XXI concept. The central question is: Will the adoption of emerging information technology improve a commander's ability to exercise battle command in future operations. Battle command represents a central theme in emerging US Army doctrine. It links information technology with how the Army intends to conduct operations in the future. The monograph first examines the dynamic world environment and that predicted for the future to understand the conditions under which commanders will operate in the future. It then examines the Force XXI concept to draw the connection between the this environment and how the Army is evolving to remain a capable force in the future. The monograph then analyzes battle command and determines the critical battle command characteristics. It examines the accepted definition and other areas to include command methods and the concept of a shared vision. The analysis aids in the development of criteria in which to evaluate a battle command system that supports the commander. The monograph then examines the Army Battle Command System under development using these criteria. Finally, the monograph suggests alternative approaches to enhance a commander's ability to exercise battle command.

The recent notion of the increasing importance of information as a means of exercising control over ones military forces has come to the forefront of military thought dominating professional discussions and journals alike. This realization of the importance of information as the medium of control for armies on the modern age has led to the formulation of the concept of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). Command and Control Warfare represents the merging of the four previously independent elements (Operations Security, Military Deception, psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare, and physical destruction of targets) in a synergistic union to sever the enemy command from its subordinate units, in effect decapitating him. Critical to this effort is the role of intelligence and the intelligence system. Intelligence serves as the driver for C2W in that it is used to identify enemy vulnerabilities, and measure success of C2W operations. The method used to conduct intelligence operation at the tactical level in the US Army is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process. This is a systematic and continuous process for evaluating the physical aspects of the battlefield, but lends itself, with some modification to the support of C2W. One of the key products in the IPB process is the situation template, also called a 'snapshot in time' of the enemy forces. By modifying the situation template to depict C2W type targets the intelligence staff can contribute significantly to the conduct of C2W operations. With the means of control changing as a result of the availability, velocity and amount of information, the products used for decision making must evolve as well. The situation template must change into a more dynamic product than it currently is. The role of information will become more critical as we move firmly into the Information Age and the manner that w

Global instability has grown substantially following the end of the Cold War. Changes in Army doctrine, incorporating concepts like OOTW and versatility, are a reaction to this increased global instability. The shift in doctrine is driving the need for change in the U.S. Army force structure. The Army is now considering three division design alternatives: The Modernized Heavy Division, the Modular Small-Based Division, and the Brigade Based Division. The purpose of this monograph is to determine which alternative best meets future joint warfighting requirements? The Modernized Heavy Division structure reflects significant tactical flexibility. Similar to the AOE Heavy Division, because it has enough depth to accomplish a wide range of missions, it achieves versatility. The Modernized Heavy Division exceeds the requirements of the most dangerous conventional threat thereby failing to address manpower and budget limitations. The Modular Small-Based Division, with both heavy and light maneuver brigades, achieves greater versatility and modularity than the previous alternative. The heavy-light configuration obtains a better scenario balance. The Brigade Based Division structure is METT-T driven. Brigades are the force building blocks vice the division. With this design, the division becomes more of a command and control echelon. This structure provides a greater degree of versatility and modularity. It is the least flexible tactically, yet achieves the best scenario balance of the three alternatives. End-strength efficiency is enhanced in terms of flattening the organization structure. The Army should adopt the Brigade Based Division in order to better meet the joint warfighting requirements that lay ahead. The Brigade Based Division provides a more versatile modular force that is better capable of meeting the varied missions required of the Army.

This monograph seeks to determine whether Army mechanized infantry and armored divisions are appropriate platforms for force projection operations. To establish a context for answering this question, an overview of the strategic environment is conducted. Army participation in accomplishing the strategic vision of engagement and enlargement is reviewed in context of an army predominantly based within the United States and expected to deploy to various contingencies. Next, the heavy divisions' history, composition, and stationing are presented as background to the analysis of the resources required to strategically move the heavy division. This monograph concludes that the heavy division, though difficult to move, is capable of moving strategically using multiple methods of transportation. The heavy division is also an equipment based force rather than a people based force and in some situations may experience a shortage of dismounted soldiers to accomplish various tasks. Though it may experience some difficulty, the heavy division can successfully conduct operations other than what it is designed for, and allowed some recovery time, be able to provide decisive force in traditional combat missions afterwards. Ultimately, the heavy division is a viable force in the current strategic setting and will likely remain so until advances in weapons technology render heavily armored vehicles obsolete.

This monograph examines US Army doctrine for the conduct of Area Security. It concludes that current doctrine is ineffective and should be changed to prevent needless casualties in future conflicts. The monograph examines the threat to US forces across the spectrum of conflict from MOOTW to High Intensity Conflict. It determines that the most likely threat to US forces will be small groups of light infantry operating against US Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Next the monograph examines the current doctrine for conducting area security. It determines that the doctrine is inadequate in that it does not provide for building the required combat power to defeat the expected threat. The doctrine does not provide adequate mobility, firepower, protection or leadership to either the support units, the response forces or the tactical combat force. The monograph suggests possible methods of correcting these deficiencies. These methods include properly resourcing support units so that they can defend themselves and forming a dedicated Area Security Force. The Area Security Force would provide a single organization and chain of command to replace both the MP units which form the level II response force and the TCF which is the level TTI response force.

This monograph examines the possibility of establishing C2W as Battlefield Operating System (BOS) for Force XXI. It focuses on emerging doctrine for C2W and Force XXI operations in order to evaluate the contribution of C2W in military operations of 2010. The monograph begins with an examination of the BOS concept of BOS and its evolution U.S. Army doctrine. Understanding the systems approach to military operations provides the basis for discussion concerning the need to identify C2W as a critical function for Force XXI operations. At this point, the monograph describes the five elements of C2W: OPSEC; military deception; PSYOP; EW; and physical destruction and their application in the offensive and defensive forms of C2W. With an understanding of the BOS concept and the concept of C2W established, the five battle dynamics of Force XXI operations are discussed. The five dynamics of battle command, battlespace, depth and simultaneous attack early entry, and CSS provide a framework from which the U.S. Army will address expected condition changes for future war. These battle dynamics form the criteria for determining the feasibility of establishing C2W as A BOS for Force XXI. The monograph then studies the application of C2W using two case studies, Operation Desert Storm and the CALL BCTP database to gain insight into the successes and failures. Based on the five battle dynamics of Force XXI and the two case studies, the monograph concludes with a discussion of establishing C2W as a BOS for Force XXI. p3

This monograph begins by reviewing the current status of United States land forces doctrine for military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) with an emphasis on the proposed role of the main battle tank. The monograph next presents four case studies of urban combat involving the use of the main battle tank. The studies used include: (1) Aachen, Germany 1944; (2) Berlin in 1945; (3) Hue City, Vietnam in 1968; and (4) Suez City in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The purpose of these case studies is to determine the role of the modern main battle tank in urban warfare across the continuum of military operations ranging from peace enforcement to high intensity warfare. An analysis of these operations reveals the usefulness of the main battle tank across the entire spectrum urban warfare. The monograph concludes that the current doctrine fails to address the use of the main battle tank on urban terrain. The goal of this paper is to act as a catalyst for the Army to address this doctrinal shortfall. The facts suggest first, that simply avoiding military operations in cities is no longer practical; secondly, Arab states, the United States Marine Corps, and Russia have recently employed heavy tanks to advantage during urban conflict. The United States Army needs to examine ways to utilize the main battle tank, a critical combat power multiplier in urban conflicts, in a new MOUT doctrine.

This monograph is designed to demonstrate the complexity of developing, coordinating and executing a time sensitive, crisis situation campaign under Military Operations Other Than War conditions. Campaign plans are developed to provide a sequential linkage and logical evolution of an operation through from the point of crisis initiation through crisis resolution. However, when available planning time is limited and the operational planner does not have the benefit of a preexisting regional plan either to implement or modify to address the existing situation, the potential that either vital national interests or key factors necessary to achieve the desired regional or strategic end states may be overlooked is significantly increased. Operation RESTORE HOPE provides a recent example of a time sensitive, contingency joint and combined operation. More importantly, the campaign is illustrative of potential future MOOTW conflicts that this nation may be committed to. In little more than two weeks, operational planners developed and implemented a complex regional campaign plan that included all deployment, force employment and crisis termination requirements for the area of operations (AOR). To further complicate the planning effort of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, little was known regarding the AOR and the composition of participating joint forces and coalition nations repeatedly changed over time. A detailed examination of the planning environment at the early stage of the crisis will characterize the difficulty in collecting requisite information and consolidating planning resources to complete the operational planning task. In the initial and potentially most crucial phase in the campaign formulation for Somalia, operational planners believed that their was neither theoretical or doctrinal mechanisms to assist them. What resulted was a dynamic, inconsistent, conce

This monograph analyzes the capability of the US Army to conduct deliberate division river crossing operations today. The Korean Peninsula, Southwest Asia, and the plains of Europe all have major rivers. Combat operations in a major regional contingency in any of these areas would necessarily involve river crossing operations by one or more heavy divisions. The focus of the monograph is on the heavy division involved in mid to high intensity operations. The discussion begins with doctrinal definitions in the area of river crossings, to include the purpose of river crossing operations and definitions of success. The eight conditions that have historically led to success in deliberate river crossings are then identified. Historical examples from World War II and the Yom Kippur War are then examined and analyzed. Each case study is compared to the eight conditions to demonstrate the validity of these factors. Next, today's US Army doctrine, training, and available resources are presented and assessed. The monograph concludes with a comparison of the situation in today's US Army with the conditions required historically for success. This study suggests that the US Army currently has some serious training and resource deficiencies in this area and provides recommendations to improve the Army's stance.

The past decade has witnessed incredible change in the stability of the world. The end of the Cold War completely changed the international equation. The standard Soviet template no longer dominates the threat model. Based on the decreasing potential for conventional war, increasing probability for peace operations, and a shrinking defense budget; military and political leaders must invest in weapon systems capable of operating effectively in both environments. This monograph discusses the importance of including heavy armor in the peace operations force package. The M1A1 tank provides the force commander with an increase in force protection and a psychological advantage over potential threats. Force protection is one of the most important considerations in peace operations. Heavy armor helps minimize the risk by providing a heavily armored platform which contains maximum force protection in any environment. Speed, mobility, potential firepower, and ability to function at night contribute to providing supporting fires for infantry forces in operations often involving urban terrain. An analysis of the Battle of Mogadishu, where the Quick Reaction Force attacked to relieve Task Force Ranger in the Bakara Market, and the mine clearing and lane proofing functions in Bosnia provides the foundation for this analysis. Furthermore, these case studies illustrate the psychological impact armor has on stabilizing situations. The use of the First Armored Division in Bosnia to demonstrate United States resolve and the use of tanks by the 1st Marine Corps Tank Battalion (FWD) during Operation Restore Hope illustrate that the presence of armor can defuse potentially volatile situations without firing a shot. The conclusion uncovers that heavy armor forces should own a position on the peace operations team.

This monograph investigates the results of task force level maneuver exercises conducted with equipment projected for Force XXI fielding. Specifically, the monograph seeks to answer the question of whether digital equipment improves the ability of the heavy task force to generate combat power. The monograph first surveys the professional literature to determine the improvements which senior Army leaders expect will result from fielding digital equipment in heavy units. The author then develops an analytic construct which defines combat power as a combination of firepower, maneuver, force protection and leadership. The major emphasis of the monograph goes toward an empirical inquiry into firepower improvements brought by the presence of digital systems through a three stage inquiry. First, the author investigates vehicle kills by source to gain an understanding of the digital unit's ability integrate fires. The author then investigates the direct fire function through the use of a production model to determine the significance of various factors which influence the task force's ability to produce direct fire vehicle kills. Finally, the author investigates the effectiveness of indirect fires in the digital task force compared to conventional units. The author establishes evidence that indicates digital units have a superior ability to integrate fires among the combat arms. In addition, the author establishes that digital units are more productive direct fire killers.

This monograph examines whether the United States' unilateral ban on conventional anti-personnel mines will significantly impair the effectiveness of US Army countermobility operation. Land mines and mine warfare play critical roles in US countermobility doctrine, and the loss of one entire category of mines could constrain the Army's ability to successfully perform countermobility missions. The prospect of such failure is alarming since successful mine warfare has often been the difference between life and death for hard pressed defenders. This monograph attempts to anticipate both the nature and severity of such consequences. The monograph begins by exploring the origins and nature of the anti-personnel mine ban. It does this by tracing the history of mines and mine warfare, and the global problems that this history has created. Next, the paper covers the current US inventory of anti-personnel mines to determine which mines (and capabilities) the ban eliminates. The monograph then examines the tasks that land mines serve under countermobility doctrine. This section is particularly important since it introduces the concepts that the paper later uses in the analysis. The monograph completes its fact gathering focus with a treatment of the countermine measures available to modem armies. Once the background knowledge set is complete, the monograph turns to analyzing the ban's effects. The monograph's analysis portion begins with a brief discussion of the Second Battle of El Alamein. The monograph uses this action as its historical laboratory because land mines played a central role in the battle, but very few of the mines (only three percent) were of the anti-personnel variety. For this (and other) reasons therefore, Alamein approximates battle under the ban.

In an effort to rethink how the Army fights, the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations, recognizes the fact that the Cold War has ended and the strategy of the United States has changed. The Army's doctrine reflects a shift to stronger joint operations and incorporates a myriad of changes to include a new Army tenet - Versatility. The versatility of the Longbow attack helicopter battalion is inherent in its ability to deploy from naval vessels, ingress landfall with the purpose of destroying a priority target or group of targets and return to that vessel. This adds a new dimension to Apache warfighting. This monograph takes a look at old facts through new glasses, then makes use of those facts in order to become more innovative and effective in the employment of a Longbow attack helicopter battalion. An unclassified independent deep attack scenario in Korea against a moving second echelon armor brigade is the focus of this monograph. The deep attack scenario provides a basis for original analysis to evaluate whether or not a Longbow attack helicopter battalion can conduct successful independent deep operations in the Korean context, using naval vessels as a force projection platform. This monograph examines three separate but related areas necessary for a Longbow attack helicopter battalion to execute successfully one type of deep attack, the ambush. It looks at the type of naval vessels that can support a Longbow attack helicopter battalion, the availability of those vessels, as well as what a CINC gains or loses by using these vessels as launch and/or pickup platforms.

This monograph discusses the use of the U.S. Southern Command Small Wars Operational Research Directorate (SWORD) model along with traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to forecast the direction of intra-state conflicts at the operational level. Enabling factors for forecasting are: the information input to the model, the command and control structure, and selection and training of personnel and organizations. The monograph first examines the current national security environment, especially the increase in the number of stability and support operations. Next, the foundation and pitfalls of forecasting military affairs are examined. The theory of revolutionary conflict is introduced, and the SWORD model is provided as a means to forecast these conflicts. IPB at the strategic and operational level is discussed, with its application to the SWORD model. Enabling factors and their impact on the ability to conduct forecasting is followed by a dialogue of the forecasting system in totality. The synergy of the various enablers on the IPB/SWORD model system provides insights into the issues operational planners need to consider during stability and support operations in a low intensity conflict environment. Degradation of the enabling factors impairs the ability to conduct forecasts.

This monograph examines the U.S. Navy's proposed arsenal ship and its potential for support to land forces operating in littoral regions. The undisputed platform of choice for naval surface fire support was the now deactivated Iowa class battleships. The arsenal ship will attempt to replace the battleships, while adding a new deep strike capability. The paper addresses the genesis of the arsenal ship program by tracing the history of its predecessors. From the 'long ship' of the Phoenicians, through the various ships-of-the-line, and finally to the Iowas. It examines the improvements in armor and armament along the way, and it culminates with the operational history of the Iowas. The monograph then introduces the arsenal ship program as the logical descendant of the battleship. It highlights the arsenal ship's required capabilities and concept of operations, and it attempts to compare battleship and arsenal ship capabilities. This monograph concludes with the decision that comparing the battleship and the arsenal ship is difficult at best. Their purposes are too different, and the intervening sixty years make objective assessments questionable. The arsenal ship is clearly the future of naval surface fire support, just as the battleship is clearly the past.

This monograph discusses an often overlooked and much maligned source of information and potential force multiplier--Public Affairs. While reporting activities on the battlefield is not a recent development, technological advances in the past decade have moved war correspondents from the realm of recent historians to current events reporters. Although the origins of war reporting date back to ancient times, this paper focuses on American experiences. Journalists reported widely our revolution. During the Civil War, the U. S. press and military made their first attempts to cooperate. By World War II, motion picture films replayed scenes of great devastation in theaters throughout America. Vietnam is considered by many a watershed for military media relations. Now, nearly instantaneous satellite communications links have all but removed the military's ability to conduct security reviews on media products, other than at the source. The INTERNET and other worldwide communications systems have opened new channels of horizontal information distribution that only herald things to come in the next quarter century. Today's Army Public Affairs structure in our divisions and corps falls markedly short of meeting the challenges of dealing effectively with the news media and completing its other missions (command information and community relations, for example). Significant personnel plus-ups are not likely, but state of the art technology, readily available, can lessen the burdens on the public affairs professionals in tactical units.

This monograph investigates the US Army's preparedness to execute tactical exploitation during conventional symmetrical offensive operations between heavy forces. Exploitation is a critical tactical operation. Successful offensive operations impart significant, but temporary, physical and psychological benefits to the attacker. Given the time to reconstitute or regenerate forces, the defender will likely recover and force his opponent into another costly and resource-intensive attack. However, when the victor promptly and properly exploits these benefits, he is able to maintain offensive pressure. Immediate, aggressive, and continuous tactical exploitation can keep the enemy off balance and create opportunities for the attacker's operational success. This paper examines and evaluates the US Army's present preparedness for tactical exploitation and then compares it to future requirements. The paper addresses preparedness using the organizing framework of doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development. Operations other than war, operations in an NBC environment, and organizations outside the heavy division are outside the scope of this paper. This study begins with a survey of classic and contemporary military thought to establish the theoretical and practical foundations for exploitation. Next, it presents a comprehensive analysis of current US Army exploitation readiness. Third, the study examines the potential future tactical value of, and opportunity for, successful exploitation. Then the monograph assesses the impact of the difference between present capability and future requirements for exploitation.

This monograph presents a new concept of division deep battle characterized by decentralized planning and execution by task organized, combined arms brigades instead of the current Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) method. The study first argues that current division deep battle doctrine does not support the Army's doctrinal tenets of agility or initiative. The absence of these tenets significantly reduces the likelihood of success in the deep battle. The doctrine fails these tenets by ignoring the fundamentals of combined arms operations, by over-centralizing execution and planning in the DOCC, and by not establishing unity of command. This monograph next examines similarities and contradictions in Army deep, close, and rear battle doctrine. Both close and rear battle doctrine emphasize decentralized execution of combat operations by task organized, combined arms units. On the other hand, deep battle doctrine relies on centralized execution using pure, non-task organized, units. Finally, four historical case studies show the weaknesses in current division deep battle doctrine and demonstrate the potential of decentralization and task organization. A case study from World War 1 and one from the US Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) clearly demonstrate the capability of task organized deep battle units. A battle study from World War 2 and a second BCTP example illuminate the problems of over-centralization, failure to task organize, and lack of unity of command. The study concludes that the best concept for division deep battle is a decentralized approach using task organized brigades. The division should task organize a brigade with all the necessary assets for successful completion of the deep attack. The division should provide a mission, intent, and desired end-state and decentralize further planning and execution to the deep task force comma

This monograph discusses the role and appropriateness of operations other than war (OOTW) doctrine during the planning and conduct of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1993 through 1995 in Haiti. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY involved both special operations and conventional forces in the application of OOTW doctrine. The monograph provides a brief historic review leading up to the operation and describes OOTW doctrine, emphasizing the principles of OOTW. The monograph describes the organizations involved in the operation and analyzes specific events where special operations and conventional forces worked together. Examples of some associated problems are force protection and the cooperation between the two types of forces at the tactical level. This monograph shows that the principles of OOTW and the integration of conventional and special operations forces are directly related to the success or failure of specific events in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The study concludes that the principles of OOTW are the basis for success in operations like UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in terms of force integration and inter-relationships. Military operations in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY confirm the doctrinal requirement for close cooperation between conventional and special operations forces in OOTW environments. p2

Protection of worldwide interests requires a capability to project power across a hostile shore. During World War II, a wide array of amphibious ships and landing craft provided this capability for the United States. However, do current Marine Corps' organizations provide the deployable organizations capable of littoral maneuver and expeditionary power projection? Meeting expeditionary requirements to operate across the spectrum of conflict requires synergistic combined arms organizations tailored to meet a varied threat. However, reduced infrastructures, airlift, and sealift require a force capable of littoral maneuver. The monograph argues for a Marine Corps organization based on littoral maneuver and combined arms that includes increased amphibious maneuver capability to provide the deployability, flexibility and maneuverability for worldwide crisis response. Developing a family of amphibious vehicles and combat systems designed for amphibious shipping increases deployability and littoral maneuverability. Increased amphibious capability speeds the transition from sea to land maneuver, frees landing craft for other combat or supporting capabilities, and increases operational flexibility.

Throughout the history of warfare, there have been periods when technological developments have dramatically; albeit temporarily, affected the balance between firepower and maneuver on the tactical battlefield. Recent advances in information age technology have stimulated a renewal of the argument for an 'ascendancy of fires.' This idea envisions military forces that would rely primarily upon long range precision fires to defeat an enemy before ground maneuver forces make contact. The military has entered a new period of dialogue focusing on the proper balance between firepower and maneuver. The time is right for the United States Army to reexamine these new capabilities and determine the optimum balance between firepower and maneuver for the ground force of the next century. This monograph examines historical tactics and doctrine from World War I and the U.S. Army's Pentomic Era to determine why these previous attempts to rely primarily on firepower failed. The monograph then explores current concepts that seek to employ information age technology to enable long range precision fires to destroy enemy forces while using maneuver forces to exploit firepower's success. A survey of potential vulnerabilities within this type of tactic assists in ascertaining the viability of an ascendancy of fires. Finally, this monograph determines if any of the historical reasons for failure of firepower ascendancy are still relevant for future information age, high intensity warfare. This monograph concludes that emerging technology may indeed enable America's Army to effectively employ long range precision fires. However, historical situations, wherein dominating firepower occurred without effective ground maneuver, indicate that firepower alone is insufficient to lead to decisive victory.

The battlefield's rapidly changing environment requires soldiers to make decisions and use initiative to defeat the enemy. This monograph's intent is to explain why training for uncertainty is imperative in cultivating a unit able to adapt to the changing conditions in combat. The primary research question is: How does training for uncertainty enhance a soldier's ability to display initiative on the battlefield? This monograph explains complexity theory and then relates the theory's applications to the battlefield. The author discusses the requirements for a complex, adaptive system and how a system adapts to changing conditions to remain viable in its environment. Emergent behaviors within the system enable the whole system to adapt and survive. However, this emergence can retard the growth of a system if no overarching goal or unifying concept is present. On the battlefield, this unifying concept is the commander's intent and the emergent property is initiative. Only by knowing the commander's overall purpose can soldiers make judgments which further the goals of the commander and the unit. However, soldiers cannot be expected to employ initiative on the battlefield if they have not been required to practice it in training. Training for uncertainty will produce soldiers better able to apply initiative on the battlefield.

Today's Army faces an environment much different from that which it prepared for in the Cold War. Massed armor battles, for which the Army was trained and equipped, have become much less likely while involvement in smaller and more limited conflict has become more probable. Future conflict is more likely to resemble Grenada, Panama, or Somalia than Desert Storm. As world demographics shift from rural to urban areas, cities can not be avoided as a likely battlefield, and have already played a prominent part in Army combat operations in the last decade. To keep pace in this changing environment, the Army must look to the cities when developing doctrine, technology, and force structure. Attack helicopters are inextricably woven into the fabric of combined arms operations. But for the Army to operate effectively as a combined arms team in an urban environment, both aviators and the ground units they support must understand the capabilities and limitations attack helicopters bring to the battle. To avoid the high casualties and collateral damage likely in an urban fight against a determined opponent they must train and prepare before they fight. This paper presents a historical perspective of how attack helicopters have already been used in this environment. It also discusses the factors that make city fighting unique, and the advantages and disadvantages for attack helicopter employment in an urban environment, as well as implications for future urban conflicts.

This monograph discusses tactical ground reconnaissance at the National Training Center. Two previous studies of this subject revealed that the U.S. Army had a major weakness in this area. Both studies recommended changes in doctrine which would reduce the problem. The monograph analyses current doctrine to determine if reconnaissance is integrated into all facets of tactical operations. The monograph then reveals the results of a study of Take Home Packages from units rotating to the National Training Center. The monograph then recommends doctrinal changes which should increase the current reconnaissance success rate.

This monograph discusses the role of the air assault raid as a tactical mission in the twenty-first century. It centers on the air assault brigade task force directed air assault raid employed across the full spectrum of conflict. This monograph assesses the current state of the air assault raid in U.S. Army training and doctrine, its weaknesses, and its potential for the future. The monograph first examines current air assault raid doctrine and FORCE XXI objectives to establish the fundamentals of the air assault raid and the goals of the twenty-first century Army. Next, the anticipated nature of twenty-first century warfare by Army futurists is discussed. Then, the paper summarizes air assault raid training results from National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center rotations to provide a basis for determining doctrinal and training weaknesses with the air assault raid. Each of these elements is then analyzed to determine whether the air assault raid has a role to play in tactical operations of the next century. The principal findings of this study indicate that the air assault raid is conducted rarely at the training centers and few units understand air assault raid doctrine. Additionally, loss of surprise and poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield surfaced as key weaknesses in air assault raid training, resulting in prohibitively high casualties. An assessment of emerging technologies offers hope in correcting these weaknesses. The monograph calls for an increased interest by the Army in training and developing the air assault raid as a tactical mission for the next century.

This monograph proposes an alternative design concept for the future divisional Armored Engineer Battalion. The research hypothesis is that an Armored Engineer Battalion organized around core battlefield missions would be more effective in supporting the armored or mechanized brigade in full-dimensional operations than the Current Armored Engineer Battalion. The two Armored Engineer Battalion organizations were evaluated to determine which organizational structure would be most effective on the twenty first century battlefield. The two organizations were analyzed in terms of organizational frifrom the analysis and evaluation indicates that an Armored Engineer Battalion organized around core battlefield missions will be more effective on the twenty-first century battlefield than the Current Armored Engineer Battalion. The findings fully support the research hypothesis.

Since the end of the Cold War, the world seeurity environment has been characterized by ethnic and regional turbulence. Consequently, the number and frequency of operations other than war (00TW) requiring the deployment of the U.S. Army have increased. The majority of these 00TW missions have been conducted by light force units. Light force U.S. Army units are defined as airborne and light infantry units. With the advent of these operations, a debate has arisen over whether light forces should train on OOTW tasks. Many military officers argue that units trained for war can quickly adapt to 00TW. While other soldiers and leaders believe that OOTW requires unique considerations which war fighting training alone does not provide. This monograph examines whether current training conducted by light forces prepares soldiers for the full spectrum of conflict. The monograph examines selected light forces operations over the last thirty years to demonstrate operational patterns. The historical survey includes operations in the Dominican Republic from 1965-66, in Grenada during 1983, in Panama from 1989-90, in Somalia from 1992-94, and in Haiti during 1995. The historical examples confirm that these operations oscillate between traditional combat and 00TW and they provide data for analysis to determine if their training adequately prepared units for operations in fluid environments. Examination of these actions includes comparisons between the unit's war fighting training, the actual tactics the units used to accomplish their mission, and the changes to their normal training in preparation for or during the operations. The monograph then examines infantry training manuals to determine whether the tasks, conditions, and standards are appropriate for preparing light forces for these 00TW environments.

This monograph examines the U.S. Army's decision to eliminate Echo companies from the Heavy Division force structure. Since the introduction of the tank onto the modern battlefield the struggle between tank and anti-armor weapon has dominated the thinking of maneuver warfare. Three important elements have had significant impact on anti-armor warfare; technology or new equipment, organizational structure, and doctrine. Framing these elements is the evolving threat and the proliferation of advanced weaponry through new equipment and retrofitting of new technology on existing equipment in third world nations.

This monograph discusses the ability of the current civil affairs force structure to adequately support divisions and corps when they are deployed in contingency operations. Over 95 percent of all civil affairs units are found in the reserves. The active force is composed of only one battalion. Therefore, when a division or corps is deployed in a contingency operation, there is typically inadequate support available until a reserve unit can be mobilized. The monograph outlines the current force structure in terms of its capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Then it examines the effectiveness of the support it provided during Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY. Finally, it contrasts various considerations and concerns involved with force structure capability shortcomings and examines a possible remedy for those shortcomings.

This monograph discusses the necessity for conducting humanitarian demining during the initial stages of a peace operation in a region contaminated with landmines. The removal of landmines will be an essential task as part of a peace operation in order to return a region to peace and stability. This monograph explores how landmines affect all aspects life within a region and demonstrates that for a peace operation to be successful removal of mines must be planned for early. The monograph first examines the nature of the mine threat in regions that have emerged from conflict, and how the landmine has affected the economic life, repatriation of refugees, protection of humanitarian aid, and protection of peace forces. Next, the doctrine of peace operations was examined in light of this landmine threat. From this an essential task early in peace operations was determined to be demining. Next, landmine removal policy and doctrine, for the U.S. military, and U.S. Army specifically, was examined. A possible demining doctrine for U.S. Forces was proposed as a result of this examination. The role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) involved in demining was explored. Finally, a case study was examined from Somalia. The criteria that was used to examine the case was that developed in the previous sections. Somalia demonstrated that peace operations, conducted in a region contaminated with landmines, will have to remove landmines as an essential task to ensure the success in the early stages.

Commander's have perennially used light infantry forces during the initial stages of strategic, operational, and tactical scenarios to quickly insert a credible combat force into the applicable area of operations. With the growing complexity of the threat spectrum, it is difficult for these units to maintain proficiency in the multitude of environments in which they may operate. The purpose of this dictum is to propose an organizational structure and doctrinally based tactics for the Force 21 Light Infantry unit. It is the author's contention that Light Infantry units, exploiting the advantages of highly dispersed formations, will emerge as an effective and lethal force of the 21st Century. Following several simple concepts that have been discussed and analyzed in the last 100 years, these forces will become the flagships of the US Army. They will emerge as the critical arm in mid and high intensity, armored conflicts. In addition, they will retain their ability to operate skillfully in lower intensity conflicts and operations other than war.

This monograph examines battalion commander and staff performance in conducting the tactical decision making process. The National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center continue to report battalion commanders and staff have difficulty in executing the tactical decision making process in a time constrained environment. A trained commander and staff are an essential combat multiplier in the rapidly changing, chaotic battlefield of today and the future. This monograph, using Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline, investigates the five disciplines and their application to the infantry battalion commander and his staff. It will determine if the battalion commander can apply the five disciplines to create a higher performing command and staff system and achieve the necessary leverage to consistently succeed in the tactical decision making process. It will provide a framework for the commander and staff to understand how they think about themselves and their organization; how it affects the commander's decision making and the staff's performance. Finally, this monograph offers recommendations to enable battalions to become a learning organization. Establishing a climate of openness, creating a mini-learning organization within the battalion staff, subordinate leader empowerment in decision making, and microworlds are all means to create the conditions for establishing a learning environment. The battalion as a learning organization is essential to improving the quality of commander and battalion staff decision making.

This study investigates the concept of the Artillery Strike Force as a means of accomplishing tactical tasks assigned to the field artillery. Currently the field artillery is assigned a tactical mission (direct support, reinforcing, general support reinforcing or general support). Traditionally these missions have placed the artillery in the role of providing support to maneuver forces. The increased capabilities of artillery now allow artillery to accomplish tactical tasks, yet this is not recognized by current doctrine. This monograph reviews the tenets of Army operations and the elements of combat power. The author analyzes the Artillery Strike Force by these tenets and elements. The capabilities of current artillery weapons and munitions are examined along with the concepts of asymmetrical engagement and the ascendancy of fires. The employment of artillery in the Vietnam War and the Gulf War are reviewed for insights for the employment of artillery. The study concludes that the Artillery Strike Force is a valid concept. The Artillery Strike Force not only supports the tenets of Army operations but increases a commanders agility and versatility. The author recommends that the Army develop doctrine that incorporates the assignment of tactical tasks to artillery organizations.

This paper analyzes the combat service support concept for the redesigned Force XXI Division to determine if the concept improves the efficiency and effectiveness of support to the maneuver battalions and division as a whole. The paper begins with a analysis of the proposed support concept as it differs with current structure and procedures. The author critiques the support concept's ability to satisfy current logistics doctrine from FM 100-5. The concept is then analyzed against the goals and objectives for the future found in TRADOC Pam 525-200-6. Following the doctrinal and future expectations for combat service support the concept's technological initiatives are evaluated to determine dependency on technology enablers. Finally, the paper discusses the last major reorganization of the U.S. Army from the Army Of Excellence Study to determine lessons learned that can support the current Force XXI reorganization. This paper will argue that the reorganization of the DISCOM will support the current divisional force structure and the future Force XXI structure. The DISCOM restructuring makes a great deal of sense given adequate manpower levels. Personnel saving will result over time with the incremental application of successful technology enhancements and procedures.

Using Force XXI operational concepts, the US Military expects to overwhelm both high and low technology opponents. If history is any indication, however, apparently low tech forces have the potential at least to tie 'modern,' conventional militaries. This monograph will assess Force XXI operations against these apparently limited threats. Although they may not have modernized their military to compete directly with the Force XXI Army, by focusing on certain aspects of conflict, they may be able to survive and therefore succeed. The comparison of a Force XXI military and a regional opponent must encompass more than quantitative measures of military effectiveness. The analogy this monograph employs is that of the improvisational theater. The militaries are actors on stage, performing under the direction of their governments and to achieve national objectives. A watchful world audience is provided with real time coverage of the action through the media. The construction of the stage may impose limitations on the combatants in a modern conflict. Significantly, actors of varying ability on stage sometimes perform equally well in theater. This analogy allows militaries of different abilities to compete on stage with the apparently weaker side occasionally capable of victory. The Force XXI requirement for rapid and decisive operations, at minimum cost, may result in a force incapable of sustained combat or effective use against certain threats. Not all opponents will collapse when overwhelming force is applied to their command and control facilities. U.S. political objectives might call for more than military defeat. The smaller, more lethal Force XXI Army may have difficulty controlling terrain against a determined enemy. Only one operational concept is described in TRADOC Pam 525-5 although a spectrum of threats is identified.

This report examines the operational concept of Force XXI, the U.S. Army of the 21st Century, to determine if it will be applicable against an enemy employing an unconventional warfare strategy. The study suggests that the concept, as it is outlined in TRADOC PAM 525-5, will be ill suited to defeating an enemy who shuns conventional force-oriented combat and instead seeks to defeat the U.S. by exhausting its will to continue the conflict. The study examines the nature of future conflict and the likelihood of U.S. involvement in it, in order to establish that the probability of the U.S. Army facing an opponent employing an unconventional strategy necessitates that its Force XXI concept account for this type of conflict. The study then summarizes the Force XXI operational concept using TRADOC PAM 525-5's framework of five battle dynamics: battle command, battlespace, depth and simultaneous attack, early entry, and combat service support. It then establishes likely characteristics of a UW opponent, considering the areas of operations, organization, weaponry, communications, and logistics. Finally, the study compares Force XXI's operational concept against the UW force characteristics to assess whether it is suited to combatting an unconventional opponent. The study concludes that much of the Force XXI operational concept is based on the ability of technical systems to provide the commander with a timely and accurate picture of the situation that allows him to orchestrate the effects of precision weapons to deliver a paralyzing blow to the enemy. The characteristics of a UW force seem to negate the collection capabilities of Force XXI, as well as providing little susceptibility to precision attack.

This monograph examines the problem of decoupling between the commander and joint battle staff of a joint task force, and its antidote, networking. Effective networking between the commander and staff enables both the commander and joint staff to appraise the current operational theater and forecast the future theater for the command. Effective networking of the commander and joint battle staff is achieved through a shared image of the joint area of operations. This shared image is achieved by the integration of the staff through teamwork and an interactive flow of information within the joint command post. The achievement of mutual situational awareness of the joint area of operations reduces the amount of uncertainty confronting both the commander and staff when making decisions in the execution of joint operations. As a result, the JTF commander and staff can then focus combat power effectively to accomplish assigned missions. Interactive information flow, teamwork and team decision making offer a solution to the problem of decoupling between the commander and battle staff of a joint task force. Through the use of teamwork and interactive information flow, an ad hoc organization like a JTF can avoid operational failure and missed opportunities as the commander and staff become networked through a shared image of the operational theater.