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The Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluated the XM163 VULCAN Air Defense System to determine its effectiveness in a combat role. The 180 day Department of the Army evaluation began on 26 November 1968. Because of the tactical situation the VULCANs were retained in RVN for an additional 45 days. The evaluation terminated on 20 April 1969. The evaluation was oriented toward a ground role, and the air defense role should targets of opportunity appear. There was no enemy air activity during the evaluation.

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluated the 458th Transportation Company from 1 March 1970 through 30 April 1971. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine adequacy of current company organization, support concepts, and adequacy of presently utilized equipment. Composed of 162 men and officers, the company originally had 39 Patrol Boats, River (PBR's), 18 Boston Whalers (BW's), and was physically located at six outpost detachments, a company headquarters at Di An, and a maintenance detachment at Nha Be. This evaluation revealed that the missions assigned are realistic and techniques utilized at the various detachments are effective.

Volume I of this 3-volume report is a summary of the most significant findings and contains all conclusions and recommendations. As originally conceived, this study was to determine, for stability operations, the optimum mix of organizational elements and equipment in armored units. During the course of the evaluation, which covered every type of armored unit in RVN, it became apparent that the different types of terrain present in RVN, and the differences in the nature of conflict between areas, precluded the preparation of any ideal mix-of-force structure. However, many means of improving armored unit equipment and organization were noted; these are enumerated in this report, and pertinent recommendations are made. This volume contains a detailed discussion of the characteristics of the Vietnam conflict that impact on armor employment. These include the effects of both terrain and climate, and also the political and humanitarian principles that have constrained the employment of combat power. This section is followed by a catalogue of specific areas where improvement can be made in armor materiel or employment or both. The commentaries are categorized according to the five functions of ground combat: intelligence, mobility, firepower, command and control, and support. Conclusions and recommendations are then presented. In the three major annexes contained in this summary volume, organizational and equipment modifications made by armored units in RVN are enumerated, the status of equipment (i.e., overages, shortages) in these units is presented., See also Volume 2, AD516957.

Data on the CV-2B (Caribou) company were collected during counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The ACTIV project officer and evaluators participated as crew members on each type of mission flown in each of the corps zones. Their observations, interviews, and official records form the basis of this report. The CV-2B, under operational control of the corps senior advisors, special forces in Vietnam, or United States Overseas Mission (USOM), provided effective and responsive support to counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. The short takeoff and landing (STOL) characteristics of the CV-2B aided by reversible pitch propellers, its capability to fly in and out of short airstrips under all but the most severe weather conditions, and its maneuverability in restricted terrain, rendered the Caribou exceptionally well- suited for sustained support of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. Reversible pitch propeller modifaction and AN/ANP-158 (WP-103) weather avoidance radar enhanced the effectiveness of the CV-2B in Vietnam. The low-level extraction (LOLEX) technique for aerial delivery of cargo provided flexibility in selection of delivery methods, resulted in a significant reduction in cost of air items (equipment needed to rig for aerial delivery), and reduced rigging and recovery time.

The comparison of the AN/ASC-6 with AN/ARC-122 was conducted to determine if the best features of each set should be recommended to the USACDC as a combination to meet the Small Development Requirement (SDR) for an airborne communication facility. The AN/ASC-6 was developed for use by Vietnamese Army commanders and their American advisors, whereas the AN/ARC-122 was developed to meet the requirements of the 11th Air Assault Division (1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile). It was found during the comparison that variation in command and control concepts of the users was the primary reason for differences in the equipment configurations. Neither current version of the airborne command post, nor a combination of the best features of each, should be type-classified (other than limited production) at this time. The Airborne Communication Facility proposed should be approved and development of the equipment expedited., See also AD359742, final rept. dated 31 Mar 1965.

Conclusions drawn from this study are that the basic MTOEs of armored and mechanized units in RVN are sound, but that, based on the peculiar environment of the RVN conflict and the experience gained therefrom, certain changes should be made to improve the mix of organizational elements and equipment for armored-type units in RVN. This Annex summarizes the study recommendations and includes a number of additional recommendations which pertain to specific type units. The type of unit or units to which each recommendation applies is indicated along with each recommendation. Recommendations are grouped according to the most applicable of the five major functions of ground combat. Most major organizational changes have been listed under 'Command and Control'. Minor personnel adjustments have been categorized under 'Support'. Where applicable, reference is made to Section III, Volume I or to the annex dealing with the type of unit affected. Recommendations which pertain solely to qualitative equipment improvements or modifications are dealt with in Annex O. Study correlation with the MACOV report is contained in Annex D. In many cases, the recommendation has already been locally implemented. Most equipment and personnel requirements can be met through trade-offs and available unit excesses. In some cases, action required is a turn-in of equipment. Many other resource requirements can be met from redeployment assets. While implementation of these recommendations is specifically directed toward armored and mechanized units in RVN, consideration should also be given by appropriate DA agencies for wider application., See also Volume 3, AD516958.

In addition to the narratives of M113 operations, report contains a discussion of developments in canal crossing techniques, a photographic record of the use of an A-frame push bar to assist in canal crossing, and a description of terrain in Vietnam.

Changes in corps boundaries place more of the Mekog River complex under control of III Corps. Changes in the II and III Corps boundaries relieved III Corps of responsibility for the major portion of the mountainous region to the north. Reorganization of armor elements saw the creation of two new groups. These new groups provide for the placement of additional armor operating in the delta area and are composed of troops taken from armored cavalry squadrons of the I, II, and IV Corps. In recognition of the larger area of responsibility of II Corps, no change in armor strength was considered advisable as was done after the corps boundary changes. Major activity in armor employment again centered in the areas of III and IV Corps. Summaries of actions observed are contained in sections II through VII, following. The preceding reports remain valid in their observations concerning the increased insurgent attention to means of defeating armor and the escape of insurgent forces because of failure to execute prompt and aggressive assault. Casualties, vehicle damage, and operation successes are directly related to the aggressiveness of the unit in action. Logistical support requirements pertaining to major assembly replacement, including engine rebuild, are contained in annex C. This annex also outlines distribution of cupolas, by type, in ARVN. A description of test troops, discussion of test objectives, and operational plan of test are contained in previous test reports.

The 5th Mechanized Rifle Troop, 2d Armored Cavalry Squadron participated in a search-andclear operation in the vicinity of Ho Phong (WR 4021) in Ba Xuyen Province.

During the reporting period the Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluated the Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT) to determine its combat suitability for stability operations in RVN. The weapons system, which consists of three major subsystems -- the Image Intensifier System, Night Vision (AN/ASQ-132), the UH-1M utility helicopter, and the M21 Armament Subsystem --, was evaluated as a whole. However, emphasis was directed toward the image intensifier system. The general purpose of the evaluation was to assess the military worth of INFANT; specific objectives were to determine the following: system capabilities and limitations, maintainability and reliability, human factors implications, employment methods, impact upon the five functions of land warfare, countermeasures taken against the system, and the effectiveness of US Navy formation lights when used on night attack helicopters.

During the period 16 December 1970 - 7 April 1971, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam conducted a study of aviation field expedients in use by Army aviation units in the Republic of Vietnam. Field expedients are any non-standard devices produced by a field unit for its own use to improve efficiency or mission performance. These range from weapon systems, special tools, and test sets to procedures that save time and manpower, improve mission performance, and provide the unit a capability that was not previously available. The study was conducted to accumulate and document the experience of Army aviation units in the Republic of Vietnam, in the use of field expedients, and make recommendations for formal development or procurement of those items which contribute significantly to mission accomplishment, safety, or efficiency of operation. Field expedients of marginal value are also included in this report for the purpose of emphasizing areas where a deficiency exists in presently available equipment. Conclusions and recommendations are included on individual field expedient reports.

The project was conducted to evaluate water supply and procedures, to determine water requirements and sources and the adequacy of containers and storage facilities, and to evaluate the purification and delivery means to meet the requirements of supporting US Army troops in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Drinking water for troops is not a major problem in Vietnam even though certain areas require improvement. Standard treatment equipment is considered adequate when maintained properly. Medical and engineer personnel need improved test equipment in order to perform the necessary test and evaluations of new raw water sources.

The Cartridge, 40mm, high explosive extended range, XM683, was evaluated by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam from 4 June to 13 July 1971. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the military worth of the XM683 cartridge for use in airborne 40mm weapon systems in the operational environment of RVN.

The OH-13S is presently being used as the aero-scout helicopter. The OH-13S rated capacity is less than the capacity required to carry the present USARV scout helicopter mission load. Consequently, the OH-13S is normally operated above design gross weight, which results in sluggish performance and shortened life of the helicopter components. The OH-6 helicopter is scheduled for deployment to RVN with two of the essential scout helicopter mission items included in its configuration: the XM-27 weapons subsystem and armor protection for crew and critical components. The OH-6, because of its greater power and weight carrying capability, is being provided to replace the OH-13S and satisfy the USARV scout helicopter requirement. USARV directed this present ACTIV study to establish the essential load for scout helicopters in RVN and to provide data basic to succeeding evaluations of the OH-6.

This evaluation consists of a detailed examination of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) airmobile forces employing US Army helicopters while operating independently and in conjunction with ARVN ground forces in counterinsurgency operations. Case studies of airmobile operations conducted by the ARVN 9th, 21st, and 22nd Divisions were prepared by evalutators who observed all phases of the operations, interviewed key participating personnel, and studied documents pertaining to the operation. Successful airmobile operations require secrecy in planning, surprise in execution, centralized control of fire support, adequate reserves, judicious choice of landing zones, and adequate command and control during the critical troop debarkation phase.

The AN/TVS-3 30-inch xenon searchlight was studied in Vietnam to describe and evaluate the tactical employment of the searchlight and to determine its maintenance requirements. The 30-inch xenon searchlight is mounted on a two-wheel trailer; it is both liquid- and air-cooled.

The purpose of this project was to evaluate employment of the Polan P-155 infrared night vision weapon sight by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). During the evaluation, Vietnamese soldiers were instructed in the use of weapon sights. Following this, use of the sights by selected RVNAF units was observed and analyzed. The evaluation was conducted under actual combat conditions. Although well-trained RVNAF units were capable of using IR weapon sights, most units did not use them enough to justify issue. Reasons given for not using the sights were: (1) RVNAF units did not often operate at night; (2) the sights were too heavy and bulky for the average Vietnamese soldier; (3) RVNAF unit commanders feared loss of the sights to the Viet Cong (VC). No RVNAF unit had electrical facilities for charging batteries. It is recommended that infrared night vision weapon sights not be issued to RVNAF.

The purpose of the project was to evaluate first generation night vision devices (Starlight Scope, Small, Hand-Held or Individual Weapon Mounted and Crew-Served Weapon Night Vision Sight) used by US Army units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to obtain data on tactical employment, system performance, maintenance experience, and suitability of the Department of the Army basis of issue. The evaluation disclosed that the NVD was effectively employed in both offensive and defensive operations, and that its operational limitations were primarily those imposed by weather, terrain, and vegetation, rather than design. It was concluded that the NVD are of significant value to the combat soldier in Vietnam. Adoption of the recommended Department of the Army basis of issue and introduction of additional NVD into Vietnam before conclusion of the field evaluation were fully justified by the findings and conclusions of the study.

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the suitability of the AN/PRC-64 radio set for use in the high atmospheric noise level existing in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and for use by US Special Forces patrols in the counterinsurgency environment of the RVN. Two geographically different areas were chosen for the evaluation. Phase I was conducted in the Mekong Delta and phase II in the Central Highlands. The radios were used by US Special Forces 'A' detachments during patrol operations and at forward operational base stations in lieu of radio set AN/GRC109. Data were collected from personal observations, discussions with Special Forces advisors and signal officers, and operators' logs. The principal result of this evaluation was the determination that the AN/ PRC-64 radio set provides reliable continuous wave (CW) communication at distances between 60 and 500 kilometers. It provides reliable voice communication only at distances between 0 and 20 kilometers and then only in the Mekong Delta. The whisper capability of the radio set is reliable and just as effective as a normal voice transmission. User reaction to the AN/PRC-64 was excellent and they recommend its adoption for counterinsurgency operations.

The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the suitability of the Night Hawk system for combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and, if acceptable, to recommend a basis of issue (BOI). The Night Hawk system was evaluated during night operations by three units located in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Analysis of evaluation data resulted in the following recommendations: that the Night Hawk system, consisting of three basic components (a AN/VSS-3 Searchlight, a Night Observation device, AN/TVS-4 or a Big Screen Night Observation device, and a pintal mounted 7.62 minigun) be adopted as an interim system for use by units throughout RVN; that the Night Hawk system be distributed to meet unit requirements based upon area of operations, unit mission, and availability of aircraft and system components as recommended in the proposed BOI; that the development of a standardized Night Hawk mounting kit be initiated under the VLAPA program; that a foot-operated microphone switch for the gunner's and observer's stations be installed; and that the Big Screen Night Observation device be incorporated in the Night Hawk system to replace the AN/TVS-4.

The field tests are being conducted in SVN to support actual counter- insurgency operations as specified by COMUSMAG-V. During the period covered by this report the test unit has been in support of two ARVN Corps. Two Corps has ordered the test unit to provide direct support to the following units in the priority listed: (a) 9th Division, Qui Nhon; (b) 47th Regiment, Tuy Hoa; and (c) Railway Security Agency, II Zone.

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluated the Tunnel/Cache Detector - Portable Differential Magnetometer (PDM) to determine its suitability as a tunnel and cache locator in the combat environment of Vietnam. The PDM consists of three subsystems - a sensor and staff assembly, an audio readout, and a rechargeable battery pack. The complete system also includes manuals, spare battery pack, battery charger, spare cables, earphones, and target recording materials. Total weight of the system including the 60-pound storage case was 106 pounds. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 25th Infantry Division, and 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operated seven PDM from 25 March to 25 May 1970. The PDM provided a limited capability to detect and trace tunnels and to detect caches. It was recommended that the PDM not be deployed to Vietnam and that future development efforts on tunnel and cache detection equipment be directed toward light weight and rugged equipment that can operate effectively in dense vegetation.

Railway security reports.

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) has assembled and evaluated a heliborne public address system for use in the psywar and civic action aspects of counterinsurgency warfare. The vertical take-off and landing characteristics of the helicopter permit the use of local personages in making pertinent and timely broadcasts of propaganda flavored with local details. In addition, the slow flight characteristics of the helicopter permit longer and clearer broadcasts. By combining these characteristics with a powerful public address system, an effective tool for waging counterinsurgency warfare at the grassroots level has been produced.

The evaluation of US Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachment operations was conducted by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) during the period 1 October 1971 through 15 November 1971. The purpose of the evaluation was to document and analyze US Army explosive ordnance disposal operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and to recommend changes, if necessary, in the organization, mission, doctrine and support of US Army EOD detachments during stability operations.

Tables are presented on selected mission data, mission summary, 1-30 June 1963, target engagements, 1-30 June 1963, Ground fire damage report summary, 1-30 June 1963, UH-1 availability, 1-30 June 1963, and ammunition expenditure., Suppl. no. 2 to AD0343707.

Contents: Tactics and techniques, Armed helicopter effectiveness, Command control, communications, Formations, Communications procedures, Suppressive fire effectiveness, Insurgent identification, Optimum organization, Logistical problems, Ammunition day of supply, Daily mission statistics, Aircraft and armament systems, Aircraft status report, Ground fire damage reports.

Tabular data are presented from a second armed helicopter test which was started by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. It is entitled "Armed Helicopter Escort of Transport Helicopters." The purpose of the test is to determine whether the findings and conclusions of previous testing of armed escort helicopters are applicable to operations conducted in different terrain, under different weather conditions, and employing a different transport helicopter. The new test, requiring four months, will be completed on 30 November 1963., Suppl. no. 3 to AD0343707.

Contents: Tactics and techniques; Armed helicopter effectiveness; Command control, communications; Formations; Communications procedures; Suppressive fire effectiveness; Insurgent identification; Optimum organization; Logistical problems; Ammunition day of supply; Definitions; Daily mission statistics; Aircraft armament systems; Aircraft status report; Ground fire damage report.

This project is to determine if the tunnel exploration kit satisfies the requirement for tunnel exploration in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), recommend changes as appropriate, and recommend basis of issue.

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluated the Marginal Terrain Assault Bridge Launcher (MTAB-L) to determine its suitability in the combat environment of RVN. The MTAB-L has two basic items, a bridge and a launcher both mounted on an M113A1 APC. The bridge consists of two extruded flat aluminum treadway sections which fold at the center. It is designed to support class 12 loads and has a span of 33 feet. The launcher is welded to the hull of the APC and hydraulically emplaces and retracts the bridge.

Graphic reports of certain M113 armored personnel carriers destroyed by mines in the Republic of Vietnam are presented. A careful examination of the vehicles shown in each report reveals evidence of a lack of weld penetration at the juncture of the hull plates. A clean separation of the hull plates at the welded joints has been characteristic of each of the mine incidents.

Bolt-on kits constructed of iron bars strung on iron frames were produced to uparmor the M113 armored personnel carrier to defeat 57 and 75 mm HEAT rounds in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The kits were not struck by HEAT rounds during the evaluation. Even though armoring capability of the kits was not obtained, it was determined that the kits were not suitable for combat operations in Vietnam because they were not durable enough.

The conclusions and recommendations of the report are substantiated by the operational documentation and are concurred in by this headquarters. The report provides a valid assessment of the armed helicopter when performing aerial reconnaissance and area surveillance in the insurgent environment of Vietnam. The armed helicopter provided the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with an effective means of collecting and reporting combat information in time to permit appropriate combat action. Though this mission required considerable exposure to enemy ground fire, the armed helicopters received few hits. Late arrival of camera equipment precluded an evaluation of the capability of the armed helicopter to provide photographic intelligence. The excellent photography which was obtained on a limited number of missions, however, gives strong indication of a potential in this area. The concept of obtaining photographic reconnaissance by armed helicopters, including the photographic processing, developing and extracting of combat intelligence from the resulting photographs should be further evaluated.

The report covers an operational evaluation of armed helicopters employed as escorts for transport helicopters engaged in support of counter insurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 16 October 1962 through 15 March 1963. The report discusses tactics and techniques, effect on insurgents, command control, formations, communications procedures, Suppressive fire, insurgent identification, optimum organization, logistical problems, ammunition day of supply, aircraft and armament, mission statistics, analysis of terrain, weather, and enemy.