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This paper aims to provide input and reviews related to consumer behavior in Indonesia, from the author’s perspective based on analysis and literature review. This paper will cover the understanding related to consumer behavior, primarily related to how the mechanism and how a consumer to get, meet and seek all forms of wants and needs. In this paper we provide suggestions and inputs for capital analysis of consumer behavior in Indonesia, it is closely related to the field of study and marketing studies in general. From the paper review that has been done, we propose some concepts and ways to study consumer behavior in Indonesia, in the form of a study proposal. This paper uses narrative descriptive analysis techniques to be able to and obtain some suggestions in viewing and studying consumer behavior in Indonesia.

International audience; The amendments made to CERCLA in 1996 reinforced the exemption of lenders that finance ultra-hazardous activities. Then, they become involved in liability only if they manage or own polluting activities. The paper compares strict liability and negligence rule in an agency model of vicarious liability type, and proposes to restore lenders as principal by applying negligence rules to them while operators would resort to a strict liability rule. This scheme leads the lender to propose to the borrower the most favorable loan level that induces the latter to provide the socially optimal security level.

The initial public offering offers the ability to obtain additional capital through the mechanism of the primary capital market and represents an important milestone in the life-cycle of privately-held corporations. The value and the number of realized IPO transactions at the global level are increasing. At the same time, due to IPO underpricing problem, the companies that are going public fail to collect requested amount of capital to fund future growth. Given the limited importance granted to marketing, and especially promotion, in the theory and practice in the process of evaluating and trading securities, the author addresses two subjects in this paper. Firstly, the author emphasizes the importance of defining and implementing appropriate marketing strategies in the initial public offering process, and secondly, discusses the impact of marketing expenditures in various instruments to reduce IPO underpricing and create value for shareholders of the company that is going public through the initial public offering.

This research tests the effect of accrual quality and leverage on corporate cash holding for a sample of manufacturing company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange over the period 2006-2007. This research also tests the role of asymmetric information as a mediating variable on the relation between accrual quality and cash holding. Population of this research is 197 manufacturing companies at the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research uses the purposive sampling method. Hypothesis test of this research em­ploys multiple regression analysis and path analysis. The results show that: accrual quality does not affect asymmetric information; asymmetric information positively affects corporate cash holdings; asymmetric information is not a mediating variable on the relation between accrual quality and cash holding; leverage negatively affects corporate cash holding. Keywords: accrual quality, asymmetric information, leverage, cash holding Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh kualitas akrual dan leverage terhadap cash holding pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2006-2007. Penelitian ini juga menguji peran asimetri informasi sebagai variabel mediasi dalam hubungan antara kualitas akrual dan cash holding perusahaan. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah 197 perusahaan manufaktur di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Sampel didapatkan dengan metode purposive sampling. Hipotesis dalam penelitian ini diuji dengan regresi linier berganda dan analisis jalur. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa: kualitas akrual tidak berpengaruh terhadap asimetri informasi; asimetri informasi berpengaruh positif terhadap cash holding perusahaan; asimetri informasi bukan merupakan variabel mediasi dalam hubungan antara kualitas akrual dan cash holding; leverage berpengaruh negatif terhadap cash holding Kata kunci: kualitas akrual, asimetri informasi, leverage, cash holding

International audience; This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participationconstraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating inturn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign nonnegative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential communication to be as efficient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation rules when the player with unbounded payoffs moves first.; L'article examine la mise en oeuvre de règles d'allocation bayesiennes qui satisfont la contrainte de gains ex post non négatifs pour un joueur dans le cadre d'un modèle de deux joueurs avec information asymétrique bilatérale. Il montre que, sous des conditions générales, ces allocations peuvent être mises en oeuvre par un mécanisme séquentiel dans lequel les joueurs se communiquent leur information l'un après l'autre. De plus, lorsque les règles d'allocation sont négociées ex ante, l'ordre est important : le joueur qui communique le premier doit avoir le pouvoir de négociation ou des gains ex post non bornés.

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's “beta” linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

This paper studies the effect of firm and country reputation on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is determined by expected quality, which is driven by the dynamics of consumer learning through experience and the country of origin's reputation for quality. We show that asymmetric information can result in multiple steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. We identify two types of steady states: a high-quality equilibrium (HQE) and a low-quality equilibrium (LQE). In a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality firms are active; a range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction. Countries with bad quality reputation can therefore be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods. Our model delivers novel insights about the dynamic impact of trade policies. First, an export subsidy increases the steady-state average quality of exports and welfare in a LQE, but decreases both quality and welfare in a HQE. Second, there is a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of export experience that replicates the perfect information outcome. Third, a large reputation shock is self-fulfilling when the economy has multiple steady states. Finally, a minimum quality standard can help an economy initially in a LQE moving to a HQE, but is not necessarily welfare improving.

We study a simple two player dynamic game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault and studied by Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille. We improve the range of parameters for which the optimal startegy is known and provide an unexpected bound on this range.

La literatura no reporta correlaciones directas entre el microfinanciamiento y el bienestar económico de los usuarios. El objetivo de la investigación fue indagar, desde la perspectiva del capital social, sobre la relación del microfinanciamiento y el bienestar económico familiar de los integrantes de los grupos solidarios de la caja de ahorro formal Tosepantomin localizada en una región rural de alta marginación en la Sierra Nororiental del Estado de Puebla, México, así como el impacto de los grupos solidarios en el desempeño de la caja de ahorro. Se utilizó el muestreo aleatorio simple bietápico; se construyó un Índice de Bienestar Económico Familiar que se contrastó con la antigüedad y número de préstamos de los usuarios y se diseñó un modelo para medir la calidad del capital social de los grupos solidarios. Los resultados revelaron que no existe correlación significativa entre el microfinanciamiento y el bienestar económico familiar de los usuarios; en cambio, los grupos solidarios ayudan a evitar o disminuir notablemente el problema de la información asimétrica y en la preservación de un bajo índice de morosidad. Se encontró una alta calidad de capital social en los grupos solidarios. Se concluyó que el microfinanciamiento es útil para la sobrevivencia de los usuarios pero no para incrementar su nivel de bienestar económico. El microfinanciamiento apoya la pluriactividad campesina, ayuda a estabilizar sus flujos de efectivo y resolver eventos de emergencia, entre otros beneficios.____________Literature does not report direct correlations between microfinance and economic welfare of users. The aim of this research was inquire into, from the perspective of social capital, the relationship of microfinance and family economic well-being of members of solidarity groups of the small savings bank named Tosepantomin, wich is located in a rural area of high marginalization in the Northeastern Sierra of the state of Puebla, México, and also how solidarity groups would be impacting the performance of the above savings bank. It was used simple two-stage random sampling; constructed an index of family economic well-being that was contrasted with seniority and numbers of loans of users, and designed a model to measuring the quality of social capital of the solidarity groups.The results revealed there is no significant correlation between microfinance and family economic welfare of users; instead, solidarity groups are helping to preventing or reducing significantly the problem of asymetric information and the preservation of a low nonpayment rate. It was concluded that microfinance is useful for survival of users but not to increase their level of economic welfare. Microfinance supports diversity activities of peasants, helps to stabilize cash flow and resolve emergency events, among others benefits.

Submitted by Aline Batista (alinehb.ufpel@gmail.com) on 2019-11-25T14:43:12Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) 2011_Rodrigo_Fernandez.pdf: 575031 bytes, checksum: 39c46b71100c3e12e6ff10c57eb37441 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-25T14:43:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) 2011_Rodrigo_Fernandez.pdf: 575031 bytes, checksum: 39c46b71100c3e12e6ff10c57eb37441 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-12 Sem bolsa As parcerias público-privadas (PPP ou 3Ps) consistem em um arranjo, formado pelo setor público e privado para a provisão de serviços de infraestrutura, os quais eram previamente providos pelo Estado. Um dos seus aspectos mais relevantes é o compartilhamento de riscos entre esses dois entes e a possibilidade de investimentos em obras de infraestrutura superando as restrições orçamentárias do Estado. No primeiro artigo faz-se uma revisão sobre quais são as principais vantagens e inconvenientes na formação destas parcerias. Destacou-se a possibilidade de ganhos por ambas as partes, pela eficiência nos processos de gestão do setor privado. Em contrapartida, a assimetria de informação e problemas políticos podem ser gerados por grupos de interesses. Dentro deste contexto, o segundo trabalho avalia um modelo teórico de PPPs aplicado a hospitais. Devido ao problema de risco moral, a melhor alternativa para o governo é terceirizar a contratação dos profissionais de saúde. Outro resultado importante é que as PPPs se mostram como uma ferramenta importante de política pública, se o Estado conseguir equilibrar os parâmetros que ajustam sua restrição de orçamento e estabelecer regras contratuais que determinem da melhor forma o nível de qualidade devido a dificuldade de monitoramento. Por fim, os resultados mostram que a formação das PPPs é válida, porém os governos devem estabelecer contratos rígidos, como medida de proteção do risco e da diferença informacional. Essas parcerias podem ser utilizadas como uma alternativa à forma de contrato público convencional e se bem conduzidas, podem apresentar resultados frutíferos e beneficiar ambas as partes envolvidas neste arranjo. The Public-Private Partnerships (PPP or 3Ps) consisted of an arrange formed by public and private sector in order to provide infrastructure services which were before provided by the government. One of its most relevant aspects is the risksharing among both agents and the possibility of investments in infrastructure overcoming the government budget constraint. In the first paper it has done a review about what are the main advantages and inconveniences on the partnerships formations. It has emphasized the possibility of the gains from both parts because of the management process efficiency of private sector. Nevertheless, the asymmetric information and the politic problems could be generated by interests groups. In this contextualization, the second work assesses a theoretical model of PPPs applied to hospitals. Due to, the moral hazard problem the best alternative is to outsourcing the contracting of health professionals. Another important result is that PPPs has shown itself as a relevant public policy tool if the State gets balance the parameters that adjusts its budget constraint and establish contractual rules which define the best way the quality level because the monitoring difficulty. Finally, the results show that PPPs formations are valid and the governments should establish rigid contracts as a protection risk measure and the informational difference. These partnerships might be used as an alternative of public traditional agreement and if were well conducted it may present good results and benefit both involved parts in this arrange.

This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more efficient one, wich conforms with the recommendations of competition policy practitioners. However, since cost savings are private information of merging firms, the Competition Authority will require them to reveal their efficiency gains, so as to tailor the optimal remedy. We propose a revelation mechanism combining the use of divestitures with the regulation of their sale price. We discuss the opportunity of such a merger policy tool, and argue that in practice it may be used to signal the efficiency gains of notified mergers., Cet article propose une analyse normative du contrôle des fusions qui prend en compte les gains d'efficacité potentiels générés par la concentration pour la détermination des remèdes structurels. On montre que la cession d'actifs requise sera supérieure dans le cas d'une fusion générant moins de synergies. En asymétrie d'information, l'autorité de la concurrence doit faire révéler les gains d'efficacité pour pouvoir exiger des transferts d'actifs proportionnels aux dommages concurentiels. Le mécanisme de révélation proposé est basé sur la réglementation du prix de vente des actifs transférés. L'utilité de cet outil de révélation justifie une réflexion approfondie des autorités de la concurrence sur le processus de vente d'actifs lors de l'application des remèdes structurels.

Finansal krizler ülkemizde ve diğer gelişmekte olan ekonomilerde gelişmiş ülkelere ve önceki dönemlere göre 1990'lardan itibaren daha sık karşılaşılmakta ve daha maliyetli geçmektedir. Ekonominin krize mukavemetinin arttırılması, krize tam zamanında ve etkin müdahale edilmesi finansal krizlerin mahiyetinin teorik ve amprik açıdan iyi kavranmasını gerektirir.Çalışmada ülkemizde 1980 sonrasında tecrübe edilen krizlerin, finansal kriz teorileri zeminine oturtularak kavranması hedeflenmiştir.?Finansal kriz nedir?? sorusu cevaplanmış ve realitede tecrübe edilen finansal kriz türleri ele alınmıştır. Finansal kriz türleri para krizi, bankacılık krizi, sistemik finansal kriz, SS krizi, borç krizi, ikiz para ve bankacılık krizi, ikiz para ve borç krizi şeklinde tasnif edilmiştir.Finansal kriz teorileri birinci ve ikinci nesil para krizi teorileri, monetarist yaklaşım, finansal kırılganlık-aşırı spekülatif ticaret yaklaşımı, dış borç kriz teorisi, üçüncü nesil kriz teorileri, asimetrik bilgi yaklaşımı, SS kriz teorisi şeklinde sınıflandırılmıştır.Kriz yönetimi krize mukavemet ve krize müdahale şeklinde ele alınmıştır. Krize mukavemet gelecekte bir krizin vuku bulması açısından şimdiden kriz zemininin yok edilmesini hedefler. Krize müdahale başlamış veya başlamak üzere olan bir krizin nasıl durdurulacağını ve krizden nasıl çıkılacağını konu alır.?Olay? metodu ve yıllık veriler kullanılarak 1980 sonrasında ülkemizde tecrübe edilen finansal kriz vakaları tanımlanmıştır. Kriz mahiyetindeki finansal istikrarsızlıklar 1978-80, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998-9, 2001 vakaları, kriz mahiyetinde olmayan istikrarsızlıklar 1984, 1986, 1996 (döviz kuru istikrarsızlıkları); 1981, 1984, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2003 (bankacılık sektörü istikrarsızlıkları) olarak tanımlanmıştır. Kriz tecrübelerinden 1978-80, 1988, 1991, 1994 vakalarının pür para krizi, 1998-9 vakasının pür bankacılık krizi, 2001 krizinin ikiz para ve bankacılık krizi, 1994, 2001 krizlerinin SS krizi olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.Anahtar Sözcüklerdış borçfinansal krizasimetrik bilgiTürkiye ekonomisiikiz krizpara krizibankacılıkcari açıkborç krizisistemik risksermaye hareketleri Financial crises in the developping countries are more cost than in the developped countries. And they have been more cost since 1990?s than before. They have more frequently occurred in the EM countries since 1990?s. We have to understand theire natures to perform promt corrective action in the ideal time during intervention the crisis, and to decrease the backround of crisis.In this study we have target to explain the financial crises that have occurred in our country after 1980?s by comparing with the crises in the other EM countries and replacing theoretically to a ground. Financial crisis is a severe disturbence that causes to a serious contraction in the economy.In the first chapter we focused to the question as ?whaat is a financial crisis??. Additionally we classified the financial crises experied in reality as seven types: currency/BOP crises, banking crises, systemic financial crises, debt crises, Sudden Stops (SS) crises, twin currency and banking crises, and twin currency and debt crises.There are the financial crisis theories in second and thirth chapter. It is possible to classify the financial crises theories as that: first and second generation (canonical) currency crisis theories, monetarist approach, financial fragility/overtrading speculatively, foreign debt crisis theory, asymetric information approach, and SS crisis theories.Fourth chapter focused management crisis. The management crisis has been studied as two areas: first preventing or intervention the crises (recovery from crises) during happening., and second resistence to crises before happening.In the final chapter, we studied financial crises experied in our country after 1980 as the ?event?s? method and annual datas are used. The financial disturbence defined as financial crisis are the occurrences in 1978-80, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998-9, and 2001. Those of them are sufficiently sever financial disturbences but non-crises: 1984, 1986, 1996 (that are currency rate instabilities), and 1981, 1984, 1993, 2000, 2002, and 2003 (that are banking instabilities). In this chapter, the financial crises occurred in our country since 1980 were emprically defined as that: 1978-80, 1988, 1991, and 1994 crises are pure currency crises; 1998-9 is a pure banking crisis; 2001 is twin currency and banking crisis; and 1994, 2001 are Sudden Stops (SS) crises.Key Wordssovereign debtfinancial crises, crisiscurrency crisis, crisesTurkey economytwin crisis, crisessystemic riskasymetric informationpanicdebt crises, defaultbankingcapital inflowscurrent deficit 506

This diploma thesis discusses the problem of asymmetrically distributed information between economic agents who interact with each other. It describes the historical development of asymmetric information in economic theory. It mainly focuses on possible emergence of inefficiencies due to asymmetrically distributed information. It describes the model of adverse selection. The thesis also points out how it is possible to apply this model of adverse selection together with knowledge of contract theory to partly overcome these inefficiencies. The aim of the study is to show on concrete examples how to design optimal contract and how these optimal contract can minimize the impact of asymmetric information on economic efficiency.

This paper contributes to the economic analysis of merger control by taking into account the efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies when the competition authorities do not observe the magnitude of efficiency gains. We show that whenever divestitures are necessary, the Competition Authority will need to extract from the merging partners their private information on the merger’s efficiency gains. For this we propose a revelation mechanism combining divestitures with two additional tools, the regulation of the divestitures sale price and a merger fee. We show that an optimal combination of both instruments is effective: the most efficient merged firms are claimed to pay a merger fee while the less efficient divest asets at an upwards distorted sale price.

The main objects of this diploma thesis are basic trends in the mortgage market in the United States and their role in the current mortgage crisis. As a theoretical background in the first part of this work are mentioned asymetric information with the optimal consumer choice regarding mortgage product and the general theory of the securitization. Practical part continues from the description of the main characteristics of the mortgage to the whole mortgage market and the role of government agencies. Following analysis is concerning the significant tendencies in the past years, which dominates in the mortgage market in the USA. The focus is mainly aimed at the growth of alternative mortgage products in connection with strong home price apreciation. Then the position of mortgage brokers and their role in the subprime sector are discusssed. Subprime sector is analysed as well and then the securitization of mortgages as the main trend in the past years is investigated. The development of the current crisis is the object of the last chapter.

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best. N/A

Transnational families where one or more members are employed abroad while others remain back home are likely be characterized by a higher degree of private information relative to households where members are co-resident. Consequently, international migrants, who can only imperfectly monitor and control uses of remittances by family members left behind, may remit less money home if intra-household preferences differ. On the other hand, a sending household's inability to monitor the migrant's financial choices may enable him to privately spend more, thereby remitting less. Using a novel dataset of married male Indian migrants working in Qatar and their wives back home that were interviewed simultaneously but separately, the extent of information asymmetry with respect to overseas earnings is measured by the discrepancy between migrant's report of his earnings and his wife's account. We find that the greater the under-reporting of overseas income by the wife, expressed as a ratio of her account to his own, the lower the annual remittances sent home. The finding demonstrates how remittance flows can be affected by the presence of information gaps arising from imperfect monitoring of intra-household allocations. It also shows the mechanism by which remitters may vary the amount transferred home by exploiting the incomplete information recipients have of foreign earnings. Interventions that improve monitoring of intra-household allocations could potentially enhance the amount of remittances sent.

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.

En mercados competitivos como los que caracterizan a los productos de la ganadería (carne vacuna, carne ovina y lana), existen oportunidades para las estrategias de valorización basadas en la diferenciación de productos. En tanto que la calidad es un concepto, hablar de buena o mala calidad supone un juicio de valor que depende de la percepción del cliente. Esto significa que la diferenciación deberá abarcar, no solamente los aspectos físicos del producto, sino también los intangibles. El mayor énfasis deberá ponerse en aquellas características que representan valores que el cliente aprecia y que se dan por efecto de una demanda que proviene del consumidor final. La asimetría de información entre los diversos agentes que participan en la cadena sitúa a la información como un punto neurálgico. Las acciones a desarrollar deberán basarse en un sistema de señales eficaz y efectivo que disminuya, en la medida de lo posible, las divergencias informativas. El éxito de cualquier iniciativa de este tipo dependerá en gran medida del esfuerzo coordinado de los protagonistas principales (productores e industriales), a distintos niveles. El resto de la sociedad, a través del sector público, estará dispuesta a sumarse al esfuerzo para fortalecer la estrategia con una visión de país, siempre que parte de los beneficios incrementales se trasladen también, en última instancia, a toda la comunidad. In competitive markets, such as those that characterize the livestock products (beef, sheep meat, and wool), there exist opportunities for adding-value strategies based on product differentiation. Because quality is a concept, speaking about good or bad quality involves a value judgment that depends on the perception of the client. This means that concept of differentiation should cover not only the physical aspects of the product, but also the intangible ones. The main emphasis should be on those features that represent values that customers appreciate because they reflect the demand of the final consumer. The information asymmetry faced by the various actors involved in the chain puts this issue as a neuralgic point. The actions to be developed must rely on a system of efficient and effective signals, in order to diminish informative divergences as much as possible. The success of any initiative of this type will depend, in a large extent, on the coordinated effort of the main actors of the industry (producers and manufacturers), at different levels. The rest of the society, through the public sector, will be ready to join the effort of strengthening the strategy with a country vision, if part of the incremental benefits are transferred to the whole community.

Assimilating the management of managerial corporations to the governing of a nation, some researchers have focused their studies on developing their research and then recommending the mechanisms of internal and external control as remedies to limit the opportunistic behaviours of agents. After introducing the limits of these mechanisms, the first part of the thesis will focus on considering the internal control and audit as two mechanisms capable of regulating the behaviours of different stakeholders in their relations with the corporations. The contribution of the internal control and audit to the management of a corporation is considered through agency theory and transactions costs.In the second part, the analysis of data collected during a field study validates the hypotheses put forward according to which the internal control and audit contribute towards resolving conflicts in corporate governance., Assimilant la direction des sociétés managériales notamment au gouvernement d’une nation, un courant de recherche s’est attaché à réfléchir puis à préconiser les mécanismes de contrôle interne et externe comme remèdes pour limiter les comportements opportunistes des agents. Après avoir présenté les limites de ces mécanismes, la première partie de la thèse s’attache à considérer le contrôle interne et l’audit comme deux mécanismes de régulation des comportements des différents stakeholders dans leurs relations avec l’entreprise. La contribution du contrôle interne et de l’audit au gouvernement d’entreprise est examinée à la lumière de la théorie de l’agence et des coûts de transaction. Dans la deuxième partie, l’analyse des données recueillies, à partir d’une étude terrain, vient valider les hypothèses émises selon lesquelles, le contrôle interne et l’audit contribuent au règlement des conflits dans un gouvernement d’entreprise.

The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans issued to new ventures. The analysis finds a convex U-shaped relationship. The results indicate that while provision of collateral initially reduces bank exposure to risk (through security, more optimal levels of capital and lower moral hazard among entrepreneurs) that beyond a point the positive risk-wealth association gives rise to greater risk taking propensity among entrepreneurs and ultimately higher interest rates. This indicates that a lender's pricing policy may even somewhat help to level the competitive playing field between ventures launched by higher and moderately wealthy entrepreneurs

International audience; This article is an attempt to shed light on the specification and identification of inefficiency in stochastic frontiers. We consider the case of a regulated firm or industry. Applying a simple principal-agent framework that accounts for informational asymmetries to this context, we derive the associated production and cost frontiers. Noticeably this approach yields a decomposition of inefficiency into two components: The first component is a pure random term while the second component depends on the unobservable actions taken by the agent (the firm). This result provides a theoretical foundation to the usual specification applied in the literature on stochastic frontiers. An application to a panel data set of French urban transport networks serves as an illustration.

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individual self-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the goods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility focusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We show that when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information, the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although in the optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal.; La conception de la politique agricole et de l'investissement public dans l'agriculture en présence d'une asymétrie d'information entre le gouvernement et les agriculteurs est étudiée. Il est démontré qu'une combinaison de paiements compensatoires plafonnés et de jachère des terres permet de mettre en œuvre la politique optimale. La politique optimale suppose que les grands agriculteurs exploitent toutes leurs terres tandis que les petits agriculteurs peuvent ou non mettre leur exploitation en jachère. Les politiques découplées ne sont jamais optimales.

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

As pointed out by Sexton, a cooperative's pricing rule can be affected by divergent interests of heterogeneous members. When such competing interests are present, production decisions may depart from the first-best optimum, and the marginal cost pricing rule cum fee/rebate may no longer be implementable. In a recent article, Vercammen, Fulton, and Hyde study such departures assuming a con- tinuum of producers' types and a nondiscri- minating management board. While their sim- ulation analysis indicates that the first-best is sometimes attainable in such instances, their theoretical analysis seems to suggest it is not. This article extends the analysis of the in- centive problems faced in producers' orga- nization by assuming that the different farmer types constitute different groups with differ- ent bargaining powers. Departures from an equal sharing of the oligopolistic gain appear as long as the bargaining power of a group does not correspond to its relative importance in the farm population. However, when bargaining disparities are small enough, the quantities produced will still correspond to first-best levels, and incentive-compatible sharing of the oligopolistic gain can be effected by a mixture of two-part pricing and nonlinear cost recovery. When the less (more) cost-efficient farmers have sufficiently high bargaining power, the redistributive objective conflicts with efficiency and the organization overproduces (underproduces) compared to the first-best level. Moreover, the nonlinear scheme may be implemented by offering two two-part schedules, one with a unit price equal to the marginal revenue that members of the less powerful group choose, and the other with a unit price greater or lower than this level depending on the productivity of the most influential group.; Nous dérivons les règles de tarification d'une coopérative agricole composée de producteurs qui se distinguent par leur rentabilité et leur pouvoir de négociation au sein de la l'organisation. La règle de tarification optimale est un système non linéaire qui peut être mis en œuvre par un de prix en deux parties dépendant de la quantité ou par une combinaison d'une tarification en deux parties avec remboursement des coûts.

We study the relationship between the rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex -post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information.

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: the agents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot be monitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In this set-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive-constrained inefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity is that the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimal action. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts do implement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits and equilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definition of third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture the non-exclusivity of contracts).

This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). We consider economies where non-exclusive contracts (securities) with payoffs dependent on the agents' private information are traded on competitive markets. It is shown that the existence of competitive equilibria is not guaranteed under the dame set of assumptions as with symmetric information.