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Two chapters on the theoretical underpinnings of the transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Community, along with three case-studies that detail specific instances of divergence between these actors indicate, a number of hypotheses concerning the Realist-oriented conventional wisdom concerning EC-US relations. These hypotheses question the ability of the Realist to explain allied divergences. These same truths suggest the possible directions one may lean towards with respect to being able to comprehensively understand the case-studies presented in this book, as well providing an original vantage point for observations within the realm of security studies. Nevertheless, the question that remains is how should one examine transatlantic relations through the 1990s and into the next century?

Before launching into the first case-study, which concerns the actions, reactions and policies of the European Community and the United States regarding the Arab-Israeli crisis from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the Venice Declaration of 1980, a number of criteria regarding the selection of this topic have to be established from the outset. These are important as they establish the framework of reference for this case-study, and the two that follow, the peculiarities of each, considered on their own merit. First, one must understand the selection of this case-study, in preference to any other. As will be true of all of the case-studies, selection is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic. Selection depends on one’s research interests and depth of knowledge of a variety of issues and events. Thus one selects those case-studies with which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are less idiosyncratic reasons for the singling out of the Arab-Israeli crisis. One of these reasons can be derived from the objectives of the 1969 European Community summit in The Hague. At this gathering the six member states agreed that ‘Europe’ should strive to begin to ‘speak with one voice’ on issues deemed to be of ‘importance’. Of the many international occurrences at that time only two were selected, and the first of these two topics was the Arab-Israeli situation.

The preceding chapters have set out the nature of this work, its aims, goals, questions and interests. These chapters have also staked out a certain amount of territory for the Realist paradigm of International Relations. Chapter 2 brought to light the strengths and weaknesses of this paradigm, as well as some of the reasons — its parsimony for one — why this theory is as dominant as it is within the discipline. However, recent theoretical developments and the various limitations apparent within Political Realism give hope to those scholars seeking to challenge this so-called ‘conventional wisdom’.

Before launching into the second case-study, a study concerned with the actions, reactions and policies of the European Community and the United States to the imposition of martial law in Poland and the Siberian Pipeline Project between various EC member states and the Soviet Union, a number of criteria regarding this event have to be established from the outset. First, one must explain why this case-study has been selected rather than any other. As was true for the first study and will be so for the third, the selection of the second study is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic. Depending on one’s research interests and one’s depth of knowledge on a variety of issues and events, one selects those studies with which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are other less idiosyncratic reasons for the singling out of the Polish issues. The first of these can best be understood in the context of the objectives of the 1969 European Community summit in The Hague. At this gathering the six member states agreed that ‘Europe’ should strive to ‘speak with one voice’ on issues deemed to be of ‘importance’. Of the many international events at that time only two were selected, one being the Arab-Israeli crisis which has been examined in the preceding chapter. The second topic chosen by the member states was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe since the end of World War Two has been marked by numerous great achievements, not the least being the establishment of a community of peace and security between these actors. From this vantage point the similarities and shared assumptions concerning world order between these allies might appear to overshadow the differences and divergences that exist between them. This belief, combined with the tremendous amount of scholarly work already written on this transatlantic relationship, may at the outset render a study such as this one redundant. But it is not self-evident that the nature of this alliance has been, to date, adequately explored. To this end the search for a comprehensive explanation of transatlantic differences remains the primary task and objective of this book.

Before launching into the last case, examining the reactions, actions and policies of the European Community and the United States concerning the Kurdish crisis of 1991, criteria pertaining to the selection of this event have to be elaborated. These criteria establish the operational framework for this case-study. First, it is important to understand why this incident has been chosen in preference to any one of numerous other possibilities, namely the Balkans crisis since 1992. The selection of any case-study will be idiosyncratic to a certain extent, depending on one’s research interests and depth of knowledge on a variety of issues prior to selection; one is more likely to select those case-studies with which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for singling out the Kurdish crisis.