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Mind wandering is a state in which our mental focus shifts toward task-unrelated thoughts. Although it is known that mind wandering has a detrimental effect on concurrent task performance (e.g., decreased accuracy), its effect on executive functions is poorly studied. Yet the latter question is relevant to many real-world situations, such as rapid stopping during driving. Here, we studied how mind wandering would affect the requirement to subsequently stop an incipient motor response. In healthy adults, we tested whether mind wandering affected stopping and, if so, which component of stopping was affected: the triggering of the inhibitory brake or the implementation of the brake following triggering. We observed that during mind wandering, stopping latency increased, as did the percentage of trials with failed triggering. Indeed, 67% of the variance of the increase in stopping latency was explained by increased trigger failures. Thus, mind wandering primarily affects stopping by affecting the triggering of the brake.

Cutting greenhouse emissions will require less brain and more (collective) brawn.

The capacity to stop impending or ongoing actions contributes to executive control over behavior. Action-stopping, however, is difficult to directly quantify. It is therefore assayed via computational modeling of behavior in the stop signal task to estimate the latency of stopping (stop signal reaction time, SSRT) and, more recently, the reliability of stopping in terms of the distribution of SSRTs (standard deviation, SD-SSRT) and the frequency with which one outright fails to react to a stop signal (trigger failures, TF). Critically, the validity of computational estimates remains unknown because we currently have no direct readouts of behavior against which to compare them. Here, we developed a method for providing single-trial behavioral readouts of SSRT and trigger failures. The method relies on an adaptation of the stop signal task in which participants respond by moving a computer mouse. In two online experiments, we used movement kinematics to quantify stopping performance (SSRT, SD-SSRT, and TF), and then applied the standard Race Model and recent BEESTS model in order to examine the convergent validity of the methods. Overall, we demonstrate good correspondence between kinematics- and model-based estimates of stopping performance at the group and individual level. We conclude that the new method provides valid estimates of stopping performance that, unlike model-based estimates, can be read out at the level of single trials. Our approach might therefore be useful for interrogating single-trial neurophysiological correlates of stopping and for large-scale, online studies of behavioral stopping.

Two decades of cross-species neuroscience research on rapid action-stopping in the laboratory has provided motivation for an underlying prefrontal–basal ganglia circuit. Here we provide an update of key studies from the past few years. We conclude that this basic neural circuit is on increasingly firm ground, and we move on to consider whether the action-stopping function implemented by this circuit applies beyond the simple laboratory stop signal task. We advance through a series of studies of increasing ‘real-worldness’, starting with laboratory tests of stopping of speech, gait and bodily functions, and then going beyond the laboratory to consider neural recordings and stimulation during moments of control presumably required in everyday activities such as walking and driving. We end by asking whether stopping research has clinical relevance, focusing on movement disorders such as stuttering, tics and freezing of gait. Overall, we conclude there are hints that the prefrontal–basal ganglia action-stopping circuit that is engaged by the basic stop signal task is recruited in myriad scenarios; however, truly proving this for real-world scenarios requires a new generation of studies that will need to overcome substantial technical and inferential challenges. Many studies implicate a prefrontal–basal ganglia circuit in the control of action-stopping. Here, Ricci Hannah and Adam Aron provide an update of studies of this circuit, discuss its clinical relevance, and consider whether its action-stopping function applies in real-world scenarios, beyond the laboratory.

Action-stopping in humans involves bursts of beta oscillations in prefrontal-basal ganglia regions. To determine the functional role of these beta bursts we took advantage of the Race Model framework describing action-stopping. We incorporated beta bursts in three race model variants, each implementing a different functional contribution of beta to action-stopping. In these variants, we hypothesized that a transient increase in beta could 1) modulate decision thresholds, 2) change stop accumulation rates, or 3) promote the interaction between the Stop and the Go process. We then tested the model predictions using EEG recordings in humans performing a Stop-signal task. We found that the model variant in which beta increased decision thresholds for a brief period of time best explained the empirical data. The model parameters fitted to the empirical data indicated that beta bursts involve a stronger decision threshold modulation for the Go process than for the Stop process. This suggests that prefrontal beta influences stopping by temporarily holding the response from execution. Our study further suggests that human action-stopping could be multi-staged with the beta acting as a pause, increasing the response threshold for the Stop process to modulate behavior successfully. Our novel approach of introducing transient oscillations into the race model and testing against human neurophysiological data allowed us to discover potential mechanisms of prefrontal beta, possibly generalizing its role in situations requiring executive control over actions.

Mid-frontal theta increases during scenarios when conflicts are successfully resolved. Often considered as a generic signal of cognitive control, its temporal nature has hardly been investigated. Using advanced spatiotemporal techniques, we uncover that mid-frontal theta occurs as a transient oscillation or “event” at single trials with their timing reflecting computationally distinct modes. Single-trial analyses of electrophysiological data from participants performing the Flanker (N = 28) and Simon task (N = 18) were used to probe the relationship between theta and metrics of response conflict. We specifically investigated “partial errors”, in which a small burst of muscle activity in the incorrect response effector occurred, quickly followed by a correction. We found that transient theta events in single trials could be categorized into two distinct theta modes based on their relative timing to different task events. Theta events from the first mode occurred briefly after the task stimulus and might reflect conflict-related processing of the stimulus. In contrast, theta events from the second mode were more likely to occur around the time partial errors were committed, suggesting they were elicited by a potential upcoming error. Importantly, in trials in which a full error was committed, this “error-related theta” occurred too late with respect to the onset of the erroneous muscle response, supporting a role of theta also in error correction. We conclude that different modes of transient mid-frontal theta can be adopted in single trials not only to process stimulus conflict, but also to correct erroneous responses.

The sensorimotor beta rhythm (∼13–30 Hz) is commonly seen in relation to movement. It is important to understand its functional/behavioral significance in both health and disease. Sorting out competing theories of sensorimotor beta is hampered by a paucity of experimental protocols in humans that manipulate/induce beta oscillations and test their putative effects on concurrent behavior. Here, we developed a novel behavioral paradigm to generate beta and then test its functional relevance. In two human experiments with scalp EEG (n = 11 and 15), we show that a movement instruction generates a high beta state (postmovement beta rebound), which then slows down subsequent movements required during that state. We also show that this high initial beta rebound related to reduced mu–beta desynchronization for the subsequent movement and, further, that the temporal features of the beta state, that is, the beta bursts, related to the degree of slowing. These results suggest that increased sensorimotor beta in the postmovement period corresponds to an inhibitory state—insofar as it retards subsequent movement. By demonstrating a behavioral method by which people can proactively create a high beta state, our paradigm provides opportunities to test the effect of this state on sensations and affordances. It also suggests related experiments using motor imagery rather than actual movement, and this could later be clinically relevant, for example, in tic disorder.

We aimed to test the idea that rhythmic transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) entrains cortical oscillations. To do this, we examined oscillatory responses in the electroencephalogram (EEG) to TMS over primary motor cortex. In particular, we contrasted responses to real TMS with those to sham TMS in order to dissociate the contributions of direct (transcranial) activation and indirect activation (via auditory/sensory input) of the brain. We first showed that real single pulse TMS elicited a brief (∼200 ms) increase in sensorimotor beta power whose frequency closely matched that of each individual's post-movement beta rebound (PMBR, ∼18 Hz). Sham TMS triggered minimal oscillatory activity. Together this implies that real TMS interacts with endogenous oscillations via direct brain activation. We then showed that although trains of real rhythmic TMS delivered at each individuals PMBR frequency produced a brief increase in beta power at the same frequency, real arrhythmic TMS also elicited an equivalent increase in beta. The implication is that the oscillatory response is independent of the rhythm of stimulation. By contrast, sham stimulation elicited minimal activity in the beta band, and the responses to rhythmic and arrhythmic sham TMS were broadly similar, showing that sham rhythmic stimulation did not produce entrainment via sensory rhythms. Together, the data demonstrate that the beta oscillatory response of M1 to real TMS predominantly reflects direct activation of the underlying cortex. However, the data do not support the notion of rhythmic TMS enhancing oscillatory activity via entrainment-like mechanisms, at least within the constraints of the current experimental set-up.

Growing evidence suggests that both the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the subthalamic nucleus (STN) play crucial roles in conflict processing, but how these two structures coordinate their activities remains poorly understood. We simultaneously recorded electroencephalogram from the mPFC and local field potentials from the STN using deep brain stimulation electrodes in 13 Parkinson's disease patients while they performed a Stroop task. Both mPFC and STN showed significant increases in theta activities (2-8 Hz) in incongruent trials compared to the congruent trials. The theta activity in incongruent trials also demonstrated significantly increased phase synchronization between mPFC and STN. Furthermore, the amplitude of gamma oscillation was modulated by the phase of theta activity at the STN in incongruent trials. Such theta-gamma phase-amplitude coupling (PAC) was much stronger for incongruent trials with faster reaction times than those with slower reaction times. Elevated theta-gamma PAC in the STN provides a novel mechanism by which the STN may operationalize its proposed “hold-your-horses” role. The co-occurrence of mPFC-STN theta phase synchronization and STN theta-gamma PAC reflects a neural substrate for fronto-subthalamic communication during conflict processing. More broadly, it may be a general mechanism for neuronal interactions in the cortico-basal ganglia circuits via a combination of long-range, within-frequency phase synchronization and local cross-frequency PAC.

Mind-wandering is a state where our mental focus shifts towards task-unrelated thoughts. While it is known that mind-wandering has a detrimental effect on concurrent task performance, e.g., decreased accuracy, its effect on executive functions is poorly studied. Yet, the latter question is relevant to many real-world situations, e.g., rapid stopping during driving. Here we studied how mind-wandering would affect the requirement to subsequently stop an incipient motor response. We tested, first, whether mind-wandering affected stopping, and second, which component of stopping was affected: the triggering of the inhibitory brake or the implementation of the brake following triggering. We observed that during mind-wandering, stopping-latency increased as did the proportion of trials with failed triggering. Indeed, 67% of the variance of the increase in stopping-latency was explained by the increased trigger failures. Thus, mind-wandering affects stopping, primarily by affecting the triggering of the brake.

We are in a climate emergency. Because governments are reacting too slowly, grassroots collective action is key. Understanding the psychological factors underpinning engagement can facilitate the growth of such collective action. Yet, previous research in psychology rarely provided causal evidence for which factors trigger action, lacked focus on the climate crisis, was mostly self-reported behaviour or intentions rather than objective measures, and was mostly cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Here we conducted a longitudinal study on the effectiveness of a 12-week video intervention designed to increase psychological predictors of collective action. The intervention boosted affective engagement, collective efficacy, and self-efficacy, but did not increase observed attendance of activism events. Interviews suggested that Zoom fatigue and the online study design undercut the social interaction participants wanted in order to join events. However, a smaller in-person replication did not increase activism either. Debriefings suggested that the replication participants were primarily motivated by payment and lacked time or resources for more engagement. These results highlight the crucial importance of going beyond measures of self-reported attitudes or intentions to objectively measuring activism behaviours and showing the difficulty of fostering event attendance.

Stopping action depends on the integrity of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Electrocorticography from the rIFG shows an increase in beta power during action stopping. Scalp EEG shows a similar right frontal beta increase, but it is unknown whether this beta modulation relates to the underlying rIFG network. Demonstrating a causal relationship between the rIFG and right frontal beta in EEG during action stopping is important for putting this electrophysiological marker on a firmer footing. In a double-blind study with a true sham coil, we used fMRI-guided 1-Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to disrupt the rIFG and to test whether this reduced right frontal beta and impaired action stopping. We found that rTMS selectively slowed stop signal reaction time (SSRT) (no effect on Go) and reduced right frontal beta (no effect on sensorimotor mu/beta related to Go); it also reduced the variance of a single-trial muscle marker of stopping. Surprisingly, sham stimulation also slowed SSRTs and reduced beta. Part of this effect, however, resulted from carryover of real stimulation in participants who received real stimulation first. A post hoc between-group comparison of those participants who received real first compared with those who received sham first showed that real stimulation reduced beta significantly more. Thus, real rTMS uniquely affected metrics of stopping in the muscle and resulted in a stronger erosion of beta. We argue that this causal test validates right frontal beta as a functional marker of action stopping. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Action stopping recruits the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) and elicits increases in right frontal beta. The present study now provides causal evidence linking these stopping-related beta oscillations to the integrity of the underlying rIFG network. One-hertz transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the rIFG impaired stopping and reduced right frontal beta during a stop-signal task. Furthermore, the effect on neural oscillations was specific to stopping-related beta, with no change in sensorimotor mu/beta corresponding to the Go response.

Quickly preventing the retrieval of (inappropriate) long-term memories might recruit a similar control mechanism as rapid action-stopping. A very specific characteristic of rapid action-stopping is “global motor suppression”: When a single response is rapidly stopped, there is a broad skeletomotor suppression. This is shown by the technique of TMS placed over a task-irrelevant part of the primary motor cortex (M1) to measure motor-evoked potentials. Here, we used this same TMS method to test if rapidly preventing long-term memory retrieval also shows this broad skeletomotor suppression effect. Twenty human participants underwent a Think/No-Think task. In the first phase, they learned word pairs. In the second phase, they received the left-hand word as a cue and had to either retrieve the associated right-hand word (“Think”) or stop retrieval (“No-Think”). At the end of each trial, they reported whether they had experienced an intrusion of the associated memory. Behaviorally, on No-Think trials, they reported fewer intrusions than Think trials, and the reporting of intrusions decreased with practice. Physiologically, we observed that the motor-evoked potential, measured from the hand (which was irrelevant to the task), was reduced on No-Think trials in the time frame of 300–500 msec, especially on trials where they did report an intrusion. This unexpected result contradicted our preregistered prediction that we would find such a decrease on No-Think trials where the intrusion was not reported. These data suggest that one form of executive control over (inappropriate) long-term memory retrieval is a rapid and broad stop, akin to action-stopping, that is triggered by the intrusion itself.

In the stop-signal task, an electrophysiological signature of action-stopping is increased early right frontal beta band power for successful vs. failed stop trials. Here we tested whether the requirement to stop an unwanted thought from coming to mind also elicits this signature. We recorded scalp EEG during a Think/No-Think task and a subsequent stop signal task in 42 participants. In the Think/No-Think task, participants first learned word pairs. In a second phase, they received the left-hand word as a reminder and were cued either to retrieve the associated right-hand word (“Think”) or to stop retrieval (“No-Think”). At the end of each trial, participants reported whether they had experienced an intrusion of the associated memory. Finally, they received the left-hand reminder word and were asked to recall its associated target. Behaviorally, there was worse final recall for items in the No-Think condition, and decreased intrusions with practice for No-Think trials. For EEG, we reproduced increased early right frontal beta power for successful vs. failed action stopping. Critically, No-Think trials also elicited increased early right frontal beta power and this was stronger for trials without intrusion. These results suggest that preventing a thought from coming to mind also recruits fast prefrontal stopping.

Much evidence supports a fundamental role for the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in rapidly stopping behavior when a stop signal or surprising event occurs, but the extent to which the STN may be involved in stopping cognitive processes is less clear. Here, we used an optogenetic approach to control STN activity in a delayed-match-to-position (DMTP) task where mice had to recall a response location after a delay. We first demonstrated that a surprising event impaired performance by both slowing the latency to respond and increasing the rate of errors. We next showed that these effects could be mimicked by brief optogenetic activation of the STN. Further, inhibiting STN during surprise blocked surprise-induced slowing, although without changing surprise-induced errors. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that STN is recruited by surprise to slow responding and that this can also interrupt cognitive processes. Under normal conditions STN-mediated stopping of behavior may slow or stop ongoing cognition to facilitate cognitive reorienting and adaptive responses to unexpected sensory information, but when malfunctioning, it could produce pathologies related to over-rigidity or increased distractibility.

Objective Many lines of evidence suggest that response conflict recruits brain regions in the cortical-basal ganglia system. Within the basal ganglia, deep brain recordings from the subthalamic nucleus (STN) have shown that conflict triggers a transient increase in low-frequency oscillations (LFOs; 2-8Hz). Here, we deployed a new method of delivering short trains of event-related deep brain stimulation (DBS) to the STN to test the causal role of the STN and its associated circuits in conflict-related processing. Methods In a double-blind design, we stimulated the STN in patients with Parkinson disease by locking brief trains of DBS to specific periods of the trial within a Stroop task. Results Stimulation had a specific effect on conflict compared to nonconflict trials by relatively speeding responses on conflict trials (ie, reducing the Stroop effect, defined as the difference in reaction time between conflict and nonconflict trials) when it was delivered in the preresponse period in the preparation phase. Stimulation also increased errors when it was delivered early in the response window. This latter result corresponded to the timing of the conflict-induced increase in LFOs observed in the absence of stimulation but was not directly related to the reduction in the Stroop effect. Interpretation These results support the theory that the time of LFO increase recorded from the STN corresponds to a conflict-processing function. They also provide one of the first demonstrations of event-related DBS of the STN in humans during a cognitive control paradigm. Ann Neurol 2018;84:515-526.

Background A prime objective driving the recent development of human neural prosthetics is to stimulate neural circuits in a manner time-locked to ongoing brain activity. The human supplementary motor area (SMA) is a particularly useful target for this objective because it displays characteristic neural activity just prior to voluntary movement. Objective Here, we tested a method that detected activity in the human SMA related to impending movement and then delivered cortical stimulation with intracranial electrodes to influence the timing of movement. Methods We conducted experiments in nine patients with electrodes implanted for epilepsy localization: five patients with SMA electrodes and four control patients with electrodes outside the SMA. In the first experiment, electrocorticographic (ECoG) recordings were used to localize the electrode of interest during a task involving bimanual finger movements. In the second experiment, a real-time sense-and-stimulate (SAS) system was implemented that delivered an electrical stimulus when pre-movement gamma power exceeded a threshold. Results Stimulation based on real-time detection of this supra-threshold activity resulted in significant slowing of motor behavior in all of the cases where stimulation was carried out in the SMA patients but in none of the patients where stimulation was performed at the control site. Conclusions The neurophysiological correlates of impending movement can be used to trigger a closed loop stimulation device and influence ongoing motor behavior in a manner imperceptible to the subject. This is the first report of a human closed loop system designed to alter movement using direct cortical recordings and direct stimulation.

Stopping incipient action activates both the right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) and the anterior insula (rAI). Controversy has arisen as to whether these comprise a unitary cortical cluster-the rIFC/rAI-or whether rIFC is the primary stopping locus. To address this, we recorded directly from these structures while taking advantage of the high spatiotemporal resolution of closely spaced stereo-electro-encephalographic (SEEG) electrodes. We studied 12 patients performing a stop-signal task. On each trial they initiated a motor response (Go) and tried to stop to an occasional stop signal. Both the rIFC and rAI exhibited an increase in broadband gamma activity (BGA) after the stop signal and within the time of stopping (stop signal reaction time, SSRT), regardless of the success of stopping. The proportion of electrodes with this response was significantly greater in the rIFC than the rAI. Also, the rIFC response preceded that in the rAI. Last, while the BGA increase in rIFC occurred mainly prior to SSRT, the rAI showed a sustained increase in the beta and low gamma bands after the SSRT. In summary, the rIFC was activated soon after the stop signal, prior to and more robustly than the rAI, which on the other hand, showed a more prolonged response after the onset of stopping. Our results are most compatible with the notion that the rIFC is involved in triggering outright stopping in concert with a wider network, while the rAI is likely engaged by other processes, such as arousal, saliency, or behavioral adjustments. Hum Brain Mapp 39:189-203, 2018. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

When an unexpected event, such as a car horn honking, occurs in daily life, it often disrupts our train of thought. In the lab, this effect was recently modeled with a task in which verbal working memory (WM) was disrupted by unexpected auditory events (Wessel et al. in Nature Communications, 7, 11195, 2016). Here we tested whether this effect extends to a different type of WM—namely, visuomotor. We found that unexpected auditory events similarly decremented visuomotor WM. Moreover, this effect persisted for many more trials than had previously been shown for verbal WM, and the effect occurred for two different types of unexpected auditory events. Furthermore, we found that unexpected events decremented WM by decreasing the quantity, but not necessarily the quality, of items stored. These results showed an impact of unexpected events on visuomotor WM that was statistically robust and endured across time. They also showed that the effect was based on an increase in guessing, consistent with a neuroscience-inspired theory that unexpected events “wipe out” WM by stopping the ongoing maintenance of the trace. This new task paradigm is an excellent vehicle for further explorations of distractibility.

The world faces a climate emergency. Humanity must make urgent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to stave off further global heating. In this article, we consider the actions that can be taken by neuroscientists, as individuals and as members of institutions and professional bodies and societies. We discuss flying less, the uncertain merits of carbon offsets, virtual conferencing and how climate justice must apply to questions of travel. We also consider emissions from lab research, and how neuroscientists can shape institutional policy on emissions reductions across myriad aspects of operations, including banking, investment and funding decisions. A radical culture change is needed to address the climate emergency. We encourage neuroscientists to put emissions reductions at the centre of their everyday professional activities.

To prevent the devastating consequences of anthropogenic global heating, immediate collective action is needed to reduce fossil fuel emissions. Cognitive scientists are in a special position to facilitate collective action by researching the factors underlying belief and action, and by teaching students how to think about the biggest problem of their lives.

Action-stopping is a canonical executive function thought to involve top-down control over the motor system. Here we aimed to validate this stopping system using high temporal resolution methods in humans. We show that, following the requirement to stop, there was an increase of right frontal beta (∼13 to 30 Hz) at ∼120 ms, likely a proxy of right inferior frontal gyrus; then, at 140 ms, there was a broad skeletomotor suppression, likely reflecting the impact of the subthalamic nucleus on basal ganglia output; then, at ∼160 ms, suppression was detected in the muscle, and, finally, the behavioral time of stopping was ∼220 ms. This temporal cascade confirms a detailed model of action-stopping, and partitions it into subprocesses that are isolable to different nodes and are more precise than the behavioral speed of stopping. Variation in these subprocesses, including at the single-trial level, could better explain individual differences in impulse control.

Highlights • Differences in preHD in one-year MD change in posterior basal ganglia and CC splenium. • Non-monotonic effect driven by MD decrease in FAR group and increase in MID/NEAR. • Only 1 clinical measure shows difference in 1y change between preclinical stages. • Diffusion imaging may detect early signs of inflammation preceding degeneration., Objective To determine whether brain imaging markers of tissue microstructure can detect the effect of disease progression across the preclinical stages of Huntington's disease. Methods Longitudinal microstructural changes in diffusion imaging metrics (mean diffusivity and fractional anisotropy) were investigated in participants with presymptomatic Huntington's disease (N = 35) stratified into three preclinical subgroups according to their estimated time until onset of symptoms, compared with age- and gender-matched healthy controls (N = 19) over a 1y period. Results Significant differences were found over the four groups in change of mean diffusivity in the posterior basal ganglia and the splenium of the corpus callosum. This overall effect was driven by significant differences between the group far-from-onset (FAR) of symptoms and the groups midway- (MID) and near-the-onset (NEAR) of symptoms. In particular, an initial decrease of mean diffusivity in the FAR group was followed by a subsequent increase in groups closer to onset of symptoms. The seemingly counter-intuitive decrease of mean diffusivity in the group furthest from onset of symptoms might be an early indicator of neuroinflammatory process preceding the neurodegenerative phase. In contrast, the only clinical measure that was able to capture a difference in 1y changes between the preclinical stages was the UHDRS confidence in motor score. Conclusions With sensitivity to longitudinal changes in brain microstructure within and between preclinical stages, and potential differential response to distinct pathophysiological mechanisms, diffusion imaging is a promising state marker for monitoring treatment response and identifying the optimal therapeutic window of opportunity in preclinical Huntington's disease.

Being in the state of having both a strong impulse to act and a simultaneous need to withhold is commonly described as an “urge.” Although urges are part of everyday life and also important to several clinical disorders, the components of urge are poorly understood. It has been conjectured that withholding an action during urge involves active response suppression. We tested that idea by designing an urge paradigm that required participants to resist an impulse to press a button and gain relief from heat (one hand was poised to press while the other arm had heat stimulation). We first used paired-pulse TMS over motor cortex (M1) to measure corticospinal excitability of the hand that could press for relief, while participants withheld movement. We observed increased short-interval intracortical inhibition, an index of M1 GABAergic interneuron activity that was maintained across seconds and specific to the task-relevant finger. A second experiment replicated this. We next used EEG to better “image” putative cortical signatures of motor suppression and pain. We found increased sensorimotor beta contralateral to the task-relevant hand while participants withheld the movement during heat. We interpret this as further evidence of a motor suppressive process. Additionally, there was beta desynchronization contralateral to the arm with heat, which could reflect a pain signature. Strikingly, participants who “suppressed” more exhibited less of a putative “pain” response. We speculate that, during urge, a suppressive state may have functional relevance for both resisting a prohibited action and for mitigating discomfort.