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Copyright of Politische Vierteljahresschrift is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the evolving narratives of the German political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its potential as a hybrid threat. Through narrative manipulation, the AfD has demonstrated its ability to influence public discourse and distort reality via disinformation dissemination. The AfD established in 2013 in response to the financial crisis and dissatisfaction with the European Union, has transitioned into a populist party, and along with this change, it has also changed its narrative. This shift was notably evident during the migrant crisis in 2015, showcasing the party's adeptness at evoking fear and animosity among German voters. The AfD's narratives have been for years similar to those of the Russian Federation, which has used almost identical narratives on some topics. The German party is consequently working with Russian politicians to reshape democratic politics within Europe, and the AfD is accordingly acting as a hybrid threat to the entire European Union. The study is based on a discourse analysis of interviews conducted with German experts on the topic as well as a content analysis of selected German media to explore these narrative dynamics and their broader implications.

This article examines the evolving narratives of the German political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its potential as a hybrid threat. Through narrative manipulation, the AfD has demonstrated its ability to influence public discourse and distort reality via disinformation dissemination. The AfD established in 2013 in response to the financial crisis and dissatisfaction with the European Union, has transitioned into a populist party, and along with this change, it has also changed its narrative. This shift was notably evident during the migrant crisis in 2015, showcasing the party's adeptness at evoking fear and animosity among German voters. The AfD's narratives have been for years similar to those of the Russian Federation, which has used almost identical narratives on some topics. The German party is consequently working with Russian politicians to reshape democratic politics within Europe, and the AfD is accordingly acting as a hybrid threat to the entire European Union. The study is based on a discourse analysis of interviews conducted with German experts on the topic as well as a content analysis of selected German media to explore these narrative dynamics and their broader implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past twenty-five years, Germany has seen substantial shifts towards more robust and expansive migration and integration policies addressing immigration primarily as a socio-economic resource and an irreversible reality defining contemporary German society. Yet, the idea of Germany as a 'country of immigration' has remained contested and polarizing in electoral politics particularly on the political right: While the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under Chancellor Merkel's leadership has gradually endorsed immigration as an integral part of its socio-economic modernization agenda, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has embarked on a nativist rejection of all forms of immigration and cultural diversity. Based on a frame analysis, the article argues that the idea of middle-class nation-building through immigration has allowed the Christian Democratic Union to move away from its traditional anti-immigrant stand and integrate related issues into its market-driven political agenda. The key hypothesis is that the Christian Democrats have been able to modernize the party's middle-class nation-building ambition by adopting its basic rationale to the recruitment and integration of immigrants into German society. In contrast, the AfD has embarked on an opposing trajectory as the political advocate for identity-driven, anti-immigrant sentiments and an exclusionary nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The normalization of radical right (RR) politics fosters opportunities for RR parties, but can also facilitate intra-party conflicts over the 'true' version of the shared party ideology. Previous research has highlighted two factors that influence ideational change within RR parties: contextual conditions and the formal power of intra-party factions. Yet, surprisingly, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) progressively radicalized to the right and witnessed the increased influence of its extremist grouping Der Flügel, despite contextual normalization pressures and the grouping's lower formal power. Analysing three crucial conflicts within the AfD between 2013 and 2021, we show how intra-party competition additionally plays into nativist party radicalization. Flügel balanced contextual and 'hard' power disadvantages by fostering its 'soft' power as 'the true party within the party'. Simultaneously, this power was cemented by more established AfD actors who used Flügel's ideas against other competitors for office. Our conclusions have important implications for comparative research on competition within and between RR parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Germany is often conceived as the "ideal type" militant democracy, until the emergence of the AfD in 2013, the absence of a successful right-wing populist party made it an exceptional case in Europe. Unlike most former targets of militant democracy, the AfD accepts rules of the liberal democracy. This raises the central question addressed in the article: How does the emergence of a populist right-wing party affect practices of German militant democracy? I argue that AfD opponents have developed an adapted militancy towards the right-wing populist party. Data on initiatives opposing the AfD between 2013 and 2021 show that AfD opponents use a full range of initiatives spanning both tolerant and intolerant modes of engagement. If the proportion of tolerant initiatives is somewhat unexpected, intolerant responses were progressively introduced. With the help of semi-structured interviews conducted with the authors of initiatives opposing the AfD, I argue that four factors help explain the developments of initiatives against the right-wing populist party: the radicalization of the AfD; the militant democratic legacy in Germany; the distribution of power among AfD opponents; and learning dynamics affecting political actors, public authorities, and civil society groups differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its emphasis on anti-immigration rhetoric and actions, protectionism, as well as populism, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that closely resembles populist radical right-wing parties in Europe. In this article, we first illustrate how the Republican Party has transformed into a radical right-wing party. Second, we examine the degree to which the Trump voter has the same or similar characteristics as the prototypical radical right-wing voter. To do so, we compare some key features of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Trump voters. Through original survey research, we find that the two voter types are alike. Both AfD and Trump voters espouse anti-immigrant sentiment, reject globalization, and position themselves on the right on a left-right ideological scale. This implies that, both from a supply and demand side perspective, the Trump Republican Party has become a prototypical radical right-wing party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politische Vierteljahresschrift is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since its formation in 2013, Alternative for Germany (AfD) has achieved a rapid success which is rather uncommon in politics. Within ten years of its operation, its political profile has undergone a considerable transition. From a Eurosceptic organization, it has evolved into a party of social protest, bringing together citizens who are critical of the functioning of the federal government. In terms of its political platform, it has gone sharply to the right, but it has also done so literally as its area of interest has migrated to the east of the country. The aim of this article is to discuss the phenomenon of AfD on the German political scene. The main hypothesis states that AfD finds favourable conditions for its political activity in the new Lands due to the residents’ declining spirits. The reasons for this situation stem from the disappointment of citizens with the political, economic and social development of this part of Germany following the reunification in 1990. This is also the result of the recent events (including the war in Ukraine, rising costs and inflation, the mass influx of refugees) and underlying concerns about the situation getting worse in the future. According to the research, AfD leaders skilfully prey on the uncertainty and lack of self-efficacy of East Germans, effectively handle their discontent, and turn it into another electoral success. This article examines the factors influencing East German voters’ support for AfD. The study, for the most part German-language based, in addition to the source literature refers to documents, statistical data, opinion poll results, experts and politicians’ commentaries, as well as press articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since late 2020, protests against government measures to contain the Covid‐19 pandemic have swept across Germany. At the forefront of these protests was the Querdenker Movement, a heterogeneous alliance of ordinary citizens, hippies, esotericists, opponents of conventional medicine, Christian fundamentalists, and right‐wing extremists bonded by their shared belief in conspiracy myths. This contribution draws upon the theoretical framework of the studies on the authoritarian personality to dissect the nature of this heterogeneous alliance and the democracy‐endangering potential of conspiracy myths. We present three key insights based on an analysis of representative public opinion surveys conducted by the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study. First, we demonstrate that susceptibility to conspiracy myths in the public mood occurs in waves that coincide with times of crisis. In this regard, the Covid‐19 pandemic is a catalyst of conspiracy myths as it has induced existential and epistemic insecurities amongst many citizens. Second, it is shown that there is an elective affinity between superstition, esotericism, and a conspiracy mentality, which can be cited as one explanation for the heterogeneous alliance during the protests. On the other hand, the nexus between religion and the conspiracy mentality depends on an individual’s interpretation of religion. It is literalist fundamentalism that fosters susceptibility to conspiracy myths. Third, we highlight the democracy‐endangering consequences of a conspiracy mentality. Its manifestations include resentment and hostility toward minorities, an alienation from democracy, an increased likelihood of voting for right‐wing authoritarian parties, and an affinity for violence.

This article is devoted to the environmental agenda of the national party Alternative for Germany. The main features of this agenda’s development are being analyzed through its federal and European election programmes from 2013 to 2021. First of all, the author defines the specifics of the party’s evolution outside the environmental context to demonstrate the gradual enlargement of the spheres of party interests and the transition from an exclusively economically oriented liberal conservative Eurosceptic course to far-right and populist, anti-immigration and Islamophobic tendencies. Then the article illustrates the important role of the common European environmental context, where actions to combat climate change are getting more prioritized. This is reflected in the new course for the Alternative for Germany, aimed at denying the advisability of climate measures in Germany and the European Union. The latter has leadership ambitions in the global political arena in the fight against climate change and the high popularity of this environmental topic is among voters. It’s the reason why climate change was coming to the fore in the party’s populist rhetoric. At the same time, the author questions the possibility of near-term environmental and, above all, climate or even anti-climate coordination between the Alternative for Germany and ideologically similar partner parties in the Identity and Democracy group of the European Parliament.

There is an ongoing political debate on whether certain groups can be considered the electoral backbone of right-wing populist parties. On the one hand, it is argued that there is no concept of a “typical voter” for right-wing populists; on the other hand, some studies of election campaigns in different countries show that it is possible to define electoral support groups for such political parties based on the social, professional, and demographic characteristics. The cases of the “Alternative for Germany” and the “Austrian Freedom Party” analyzed in the article demonstrate that the latter statement is more likely to be true. Those support groups can be identified within the framework of the sociological theory of electoral behavior, as well as the theories of the losers of globalization by H. G. Betz and the cultural backlash of P. Norris and R. Inglehart, using the analysis of existing relevant statistics, mainly sociological surveys. The examples of Germany and Austria prove the assumptions that men, workers, people with no higher education and the unemployed are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.