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Relative to studying alone, guessing the meanings of unknown words can improve later recognition of their meanings, even if those guesses were incorrect – the pretesting effect (PTE). The error-correction hypothesis suggests that incorrect guesses produce error signals that promote memory for the meanings when they are revealed. The current research sought to test the error-correction explanation of the PTE. In three experiments, participants studied unfamiliar Finnish-English word pairs by either studying each complete pair or by guessing the English translation before its presentation. In the latter case, the participants also guessed which of two categories the word belonged to. Hence, guesses from the correct category were semantically closer to the true translation than guesses from the incorrect category. In Experiment 1, guessing increased subsequent recognition of the English translations, especially for translations that were presented on trials in which the participants’ guesses were from the correct category. Experiment 2 replicated these target recognition effects while also demonstrating that they do not extend to associative recognition performance. Experiment 3 again replicated the target recognition pattern, while also examining participants’ metacognitive recognition judgments. Participants correctly judged that their memory would be better after small than after large errors, but incorrectly believed that making any errors would be detrimental, relative to study-only. Overall, the data are inconsistent with the error-correction hypothesis; small, within-category errors produced better recognition than large, cross-category errors. Alternative theories, based on elaborative encoding and motivated learning, are considered.

Analogical transfer has been previously reported to occur between rule-based, but not information-integration, perceptual category structures (Casale, Roeder, & Ashby, 2012). The current study investigated whether a similar pattern of results would be observed in cross-modality transfer. Participants were trained on either a rule-based structure, or an information-integration structure, using visual stimuli. They were then tested on auditory stimuli that had the same underlying abstract category structure. Transfer performance was assessed relative to a control group who did not receive training on the visual stimuli. No cross-modality transfer was found, irrespective of the category structure employed.

The Inverse Base Rate effect (IBRE; Medin & Edelson, 1988) is a non-rational behavioural phenomenon in predictive learning. Canonically, participants learn that the AB stimulus compound leads to one outcome and that AC leads to another outcome, with AB being presented three times as often as AC. When subsequently presented with BC, the outcome associated with AC is preferentially selected, in opposition to the underlying base rates of the outcomes. An error-driven learning account (Kruschke, 2001b) is the leading current explanation of the IBRE. A key component of this account is prediction error, a concept previously linked to a number of brain areas including the anterior cingulate, the striatum and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The present work is the first fMRI study to directly examine the IBRE. Activations were noted in brain areas linked to prediction error, including the caudate body, the anterior cingulate, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Analysing the difference in activations for singular key stimuli (B and C), as well as frequency matched controls, supports the predictions made by the error-driven learning account.

The Inverse Base Rate Effect (IBRE; Medin and Edelson (1988)) is a non-rational behavioural phenomenon in predictive learning. In the IBRE, participants learn that a stimulus compound AB leads to one outcome and that another compound AC leads to a different outcome. Importantly, AB and its outcome are presented three times as often as AC (and its outcome). On test, when asked which outcome to expect on presentation of the novel compound BC, participants preferentially select the rarer outcome, previously associated with AC. This is irrational because, objectively, the common outcome is more likely. Usually, the IBRE is attributed to greater attention paid to cue C than to cue B, and so is an excellent test for attentional learning models. The current experiment tested a simple model of attentional learning proposed by Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, and Wills (2016) where attention paid to a stimulus is determined by its associative strength. This model struggles to capture the IBRE, but a potential solution suggested by the authors appeals to the role of experimental context. In the present paper, we derive three predictions from their account concerning the effect of changing to a novel experimental context at test, and examine these predictions empirically. Only one of the predictions was supported, concerning the effect of a context shift on responding to a novel cue, was supported. In contrast, Kruschke (2001b)’s EXIT model, in which attention and associative strength can vary independently, captured the data with a high degree of quantitative accuracy.

Does cognition begin with an undifferentiated stimulus whole, which can be divided into distinct attributes if time and cognitive resources allow (Differentiation Theory)? Or does it begin with the attributes, which are combined if time and cognitive resources allow (Combination Theory)? Across psychology, use of the terms analytic and non-analytic imply that Differentiation Theory is correct—if cognition begins with the attributes, then synthesis, rather than analysis, is the more appropriate chemical analogy. We re-examined four classic studies of the effects of time pressure, incidental training, and concurrent load on classification and category learning (Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Shapiro, 1989; Ward, 1983). These studies are typically interpreted as supporting Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory, while more recent work in classification (Milton et al., 2008, et seq.) supports the opposite conclusion. Across seven experiments, replication and re-analysis of the four classic studies revealed that they do not support Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory—two experiments support Combination Theory over Differentiation Theory, and the remainder are compatible with both accounts. We conclude that Combination Theory provides a parsimonious account of both classic and more recent work in this area. The presented data do not require Differentiation Theory, nor a Combination–Differentiation hybrid account.

Formal modeling in psychology is failing to live up to its potential due to a lack of effective collaboration. As a first step towards solving this problem, we have produced a set of freely available tools for distributed collaboration. This article describes those tools and the conceptual framework behind them. We also provide concrete examples of how these tools can be used. The approach we propose enhances, rather than supplants, more traditional forms of publication. All the resources for this project are freely available from the catlearn website http://catlearn.r-forge.r-project.org/ .

Humans can spontaneously create rules that allow them to efficiently generalize what they have learned to novel situations. An enduring question is whether rule-based generalization is uniquely human or whether other animals can also abstract rules and apply them to novel situations. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile claims that animals such as rats can learn rules. Most of those claims are quite weak because it is possible to demonstrate that simple associative systems (which do not learn rules) can account for the behavior in those tasks. Using a procedure that allows us to clearly distinguish feature-based from rule-based generalization (the Shanks–Darby procedure), we demonstrate that adult humans show rule-based generalization in this task, while generalization in rats and pigeons was based on featural overlap between stimuli. In brief, when learning that a stimulus made of two components (“AB”) predicts a different outcome than its elements (“A” and “B”), people spontaneously abstract an opposites rule and apply it to new stimuli (e.g., knowing that “C” and “D” predict one outcome, they will predict that “CD” predicts the opposite outcome). Rats and pigeons show the reverse behavior—they generalize what they have learned, but on the basis of similarity (e.g., “CD” is similar to “C” and “D”, so the same outcome is predicted for the compound stimulus as for the components). Genuinely rule-based behavior is observed in humans, but not in rats and pigeons, in the current procedure. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10071-015-0895-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.