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Objective: This article examined older adults' performance on two components of a mental rotation task (reaction time and rotation rate) in a home-based intervention study of videogame (Crazy Taxi [CT]) and computerized cognitive training (PositScience InSight). Materials and Methods: Participants were randomized to one of three groups: one group played an off-the-shelf videogame (i.e., CT), the second group engaged in a computerized training program focused on fast perceptual comparisons, visuospatial working memory, rapid scanning of a visual array and pattern recognition, visual discrimination, and selective and divided attention and processing speed (i.e., InSight), and the third (control) group received no training. Training in the two intervention conditions consisted of 60 training sessions of 1 hour each, which were completed in 3 months (5 hours a week). As part of a larger study, participants received mental rotation testing, which was administered immediately before (baseline), after (post-test), and 3 months after (follow-up) training. Results: Although the InSight group showed greater improvements in rotation rate at the immediate post-test, by the 3-month follow-up, the combined treatment groups (CT and InSight) had improved more than controls. Conclusion: The improvements in mental rotation performance found at 3-month follow-up add additional support to previous research, showing visuospatial benefits of both videogame play and cognitive training in older adults. Common elements of both interventions may include expansion of the attentional field of view and faster visual comparison efficiency.

Objective: This study compared older adults' gains in cognitive and everyday functioning after a 60-session home-based videogame intervention with gains seen under formal cognitive training and usual care/no intervention. Materials and Methods: Participants were randomized to one of three groups: one group played an off-the-shelf videogame (i.e., Crazy Taxi), the second group engaged in a computerized training program focused on visual attention and processing speed (i.e., PositScience InSight), and the third group received no training. Training in the two intervention conditions consisted of 60 training sessions of 1 hour each, which were completed in 3 months (5 hours a week). Participants received a broad battery of cognitive and everyday functioning assessments immediately before (pretest), after (post-test), and 3 months after (follow-up) training. Results: Both training conditions improved on direct assessments of trained outcomes. In the InSight-trained group, we found transfer to untrained measures of visual attention and processing speed that were similar to the trained tasks, and these gains endured for up to 3 months. Participants in the videogame condition showed small additional benefits, not emerging until 3 months after intervention completion, on a measure of both attention and mood. No trained groups showed gain on visuospatial skills or memory. Conclusion: Training effects were highly specific to the target of training. Training effects to visual attention and processing speed were, as expected, larger for InSight-trained participants but were also seen for videogame participants. Given that past research has shown that videogame training leads to greater engagement than cognitive training, videogame interventions may represent a choice for more modest gains in a more engaging context.

The overall goal of our current study was to examine older adults' experience of Flow (i.e., subjective engagement) during the course of a home-based cognitive training program.In this study, participants took part in a home-based training program. They were randomized to one of the two training groups. One group played an off-the-shelf videogame (i.e., Crazy Taxi), and the other group played a brain training game (i.e., Insight). Training consisted of 60 training sessions of 1 hour each, which were completed in 3 months (5 hours a week). After each training session, participants completed a Flow questionnaire to measure their engagement with the training.The analysis was performed with a linear growth curve model. The results indicate that on average, there was no change in flow for the Insight group between time points. There was no difference between the initial flow status of the Insight group and the Crazy Taxi group. However, the interaction between group membership and time was statistically significant, indicating that the participants in the Crazy Taxi group increased their scores at each week at a rate that was 0.99 larger than those in the Insight group.The analyses revealed that both groups experienced increase in Flow over the period, but only participants in the Crazy Taxi group significantly improved in Flow. This has long-term implications since we would expect participation to go beyond 12 weeks in a real-world scenario.

Older adults’ functional outcomes, such as the ability to live independently, psychological well-being (Lawton, 1987; Willis, 1991), health care utilization, and institutionalization (Miller & Weissert, 2000; Wolinsky, et al., 1983, 2007; Wolinsky, Callahan, Fitzgerald, & Johnson, 1993), have been tied to their ability to perform instrumental activities of daily living (IADL, Lawton & Brody, 1969). IADL include meal preparation, telephone use, financial management, and other self- and home-maintenance tasks (Willis & Marsiske, 1991; Willis & Schaie, 1993). Successful IADL performance has physical, emotional, and cognitive components (Willis, 1996). For example, elders’ ability to use public transportation might depend on their physical health (e.g., ambulation), as well as the cognitive capacity to remember a bus schedule. The cognitive aspect of IADL performance has been termed “everyday cognition” and conceptualized as the application of “basic” cognitive skills like reasoning, memory, and processing speed to solving IADL problems (Marsiske, & Margrett, 2006; Willis, 1996; Willis & Marsiske, 1991; Willis & Schaie, 1986). Numerous studies to date have used “everyday cognitive” measures (e.g., Everyday Problems Test, Willis & Marsiske, 1993) as performance-based means of assessing older adults’ cognitive IADL competence (e.g., Allaire et al., 2009; Gross et al., 2011; see Yam & Marsiske, in press, for an analysis of correlated change in performance-based everyday cognition and self-reported IADL). Everyday cognition is assessed objectively by asking older adults to perform everyday-type tasks, such as looking up a phone number in the phone book or reading a nutrition label (Owsley, Sloane, McGwin, & Ball, 2002). With regard to “basic” cognition, the term “basic” is used to reflect an underlying hierarchical model which suggests that acontextual, construct-pure measures assessed via laboratory and experimental techniques represent the cognitive constituents that are compiled to produce complex everyday performances (Cattell, 1987; Salthouse. 1990; Willis & Marsiske, 1991). Everyday cognition is thought to rely on multiple basic cognitive skills like reasoning, memory, and speed of processing (Marsiske & Margrett, 2006; Salthouse, 1990; Willis & Marsiske, 1991; Willis & Schaie, 1986), as well as crystallized and procedural knowledge stemming from prior experience performing IADL (Marsiske & Margrett, 2006). Because crystalized and procedural knowledge is relatively preserved against age-related decline (Ackerman, 2008; Salthouse, 1990; Singer et al., 2003), some authors have speculated that everyday cognition might be “buffered” against the age related decline observed in basic abilities (Cornelius & Caspi, 1987; see also Marsiske & Willis, 1995). The underlying conceptual rationale for why everyday cognition might be relatively buffered against age-associated declines rests in the putatively greater relevance, familiarity (e.g., can of food) and enacted practice (Cornelius & Caspi, 1987) of everyday tasks. At the same time, to the extent that basic information processes are involved in everyday cognitive performance, the general understanding of aging in domains like attention, working memory, episodic memory, speed of processing, and executive functioning is one of normative decline in the later decades of life (Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 2004; Ghisletta, Rabbitt, Lunn, & Lindenberger, 2012; Park, Lautenschlager, Hedden, Davidson, Smith, & Smith, 2002; Ronnlund, Nyberg, Backman, & Nilsson, 2005; Schaie, 2012; Singer, Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2003; Zimprich, Martin, Kliegel, Dellenbach, Rast, & Zeintl, 2008). Given the multidirectionality in the cognitive dimensions underlying everyday cognition (Baltes, 1987), it is not surprising that empirical support has been mixed with regard to the potential preservation of everyday cognitive skills against age-related decline. In a meta-analysis of age differences in everyday cognition, Thornton and Dumke (2005) concluded that results from 28 cross-sectional studies they reviewed do not support theories of the preservation of everyday cognitive abilities. In terms of intraindividual change, however, Willis, Jay, Diehl, and Marsiske (1992) demonstrated that in the presence of overall mean decline with age, 62% of the sample exhibited stability or improvement in everyday cognitive abilities over a 7-year period. In the absence of studies comparing the longitudinal slopes of basic and everyday cognition, it is difficult to conclude whether everyday cognitive abilities are as vulnerable to decline as basic cognitive skills. In line with the idea that everyday cognition is associated with basic cognitive abilities, mostly cross-sectional studies reported correlations ranging from 0.31 to 0.86 between basic and everyday cognitive skills (Allaire & Marsiske, 1999; Burton, Strauss, Hultsch, Hunter, 2006; Diehl et al., 1995; Thornton, Deria, Gelb, Shapiro, Hill, 2007; Weatherbee & Allaire, 2008; Wood et al., 2005; see Marsiske & Margrett, 2006 for a review). Controlling for demographic variables, basic cognitive predictors together explained between 18% and 55% of the variance in everyday cognition (e.g., Gross et al., 2011; Mitchell & Miller, 2008; Thornton et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2005). Overall, between-persons relationships between basic cognitive abilities and everyday cognition have received considerable attention (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 1999; Burton, Strauss, Hultsch, Hunter, 2006; Diehl et al., 1995; Thornton, Deria, Gelb, Shapiro, Hill, 2007; Weatherbee & Allaire, 2008; Wood et al., 2005), while relatively few studies have examined this relationship over time. In one of the few longitudinal investigations, Willis et al. (1992) reported that baseline level of fluid intelligence uniquely explained 52% of total variance in a measure of everyday document literacy assessed seven years later. More recently, using data from the ACTIVE study, Gross et al. (2011) reported that baseline inductive reasoning was a significant unique predictor of baseline everyday cognition (R2=0.18), while baseline memory was a significant predictor of 5-year longitudinal trajectory of everyday cognition (R2=0.06). Also using ACTIVE data, Tucker-Drob (2011) reported significant bivariate associations between 5-year trajectories of basic abilities, and tasks assessing everyday cognitive skills (rs .31 to .94). Both Gross et al. (2011) and Tucker-Drob (2011) modeled only linear trajectories over time, while prior longitudinal work in aging suggests a trajectory of quadratic decline (i.e., inverse-U function) in cognitive abilities (Grady & Craik, 2000; Lindenberger & Ghisletta, 2009; MacDonald et al., 2011; Schaie, 1994; however see Salthouse, 2010). The present study aimed to extend the findings of Gross et al. (2011) and Tucker-Drob (2011) by describing the longitudinal trajectories of everyday cognitive and basic abilities over 10 years of assessment. Results are thought to contribute a fundamental understanding of normative 10-year change in these skills. Unique contributions of the ACTIVE study include, (a) utilization of multiple distinct measures of everyday cognition; (b) inclusion of multiple cognitive factors as time-varying predictors of everyday cognitive growth; and (c) enrollment of a very large, diverse sample of older adults. Specific contributions of the current study include (a) availability of 10-year longitudinal data for basic and everyday cognition; and (b) more careful statistical adjustment for potential confounders of the basic-everyday cognition relationship than previous studies have allowed. Thus, specific aims of the current study were to (a) characterize the 10-year longitudinal growth in a multivariate construct of everyday cognition; (b) to statistically compare longitudinal growth in everyday cognition to that observed in basic laboratory/experimental measures (thereby assessing whether everyday cognition is relatively buffered against age associated decline); and (c) evaluate complex multivariate models that simultaneously investigate how well correlated growth in multiple basic abilities, health, and sensory functioning predict everyday cognition. The fundamental question driving the current study was whether growth in basic cognition over ten years “travelled together” with growth in everyday cognition.

One of the most compelling features of Williams syndrome (WS) is the widely reported excessive sociability, accompanied by a relative proficiency in expressive language, which stands in stark contrast with significant intellectual and nonverbal impairments. It has been proposed that the unique language skills observed in WS are implicated in the strong drive to interact and communicate with others, which has been widely documented in WS. Nevertheless, this proposition has yet to be empirically examined. The present study aimed at investigating the relationship between a brain index of language processing and judgments of approachability of faces, as a proxy for sociability, in individuals with WS as contrasted to typical controls. Results revealed a significant and substantial association between the two in the WS, but not in the control group, supporting the hitherto untested notion that language use in WS might be uniquely related to their excessive social drive.

Williams syndrome is a neurological condition associated with high levels of auditory reactivity and emotional expression combined with impaired perception of prosody. Yet, little is currently known about the neural organization of affective auditory processing in individuals with this disorder. The current study examines auditory emotion processing in individuals with Williams syndrome. Hemispheric organization for positive and negative human non-linguistic sound processing was compared in participants with and without the disorder using a dichotic listening paradigm. While controls exhibited an expected right cerebral hemisphere advantage for processing negative sounds, those with Williams syndrome showed the opposite pattern. No differences between the groups emerged for the positive stimuli. The results suggest aberrant processing of negative auditory information in Williams syndrome.

Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetic disorder caused by a hemizygous microdeletion on chromosome 7q11.23. WS is associated with a compelling neurocognitive profile characterized by relative deficits in visuospatial function, relative strengths in face and language processing, and enhanced drive toward social engagement. We used a combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) approach to examine the neural basis of social responsiveness in WS participants to two types of social stimuli, negative (fearful) and positive (happy) emotional facial expressions. Here, we report a double dissociation consistent across both methods such that WS participants exhibited heightened amygdala reactivity to positive (happy) social stimuli and absent or attenuated amygdala reactivity to negative (fearful) social stimuli, compared with controls. The fMRI findings indicate that atypical social processing in WS may be rooted in altered development of disparate amygdalar nuclei that subserve different social functions. The ERP findings suggest that abnormal amygdala reactivity in WS may possibly function to increase attention to and encoding of happy expressions and to decrease arousal to fearful expressions. This study provides the first evidence that the genetic deletion associated with WS influences the function of the amygdala to be particularly responsive to socially appetitive stimuli.

A key concept in the gerontological literature is the instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). IADL, as originally delineated by Lawton & Brody (1969) include everyday tasks such as food preparation, medication use, transportation, and financial management (Depp & Jeste, 2009; Willis, 1996) and are most commonly assessed with self- and/or proxy-report measures. Older adults’ IADL function is of substantial interest given the prominent role of functional IADL independence in “successful” aging (Depp & Jeste, 2009). Furthermore, impairment in IADL has been associated with adverse outcomes such as dementia (Barberger-Gateau, Fabrigoule, Helmer, Rouch, Dartigues, 1999; Barberger-Gateau, Fabrigoule, Rouch, Letenneur, & Dartigues 1999; Peres et al., 2008), reduced psychological well-being (Lawton, 1987; Willis, 1991), greater health care utilization, increased rates of institutionalization (Miller & Weissert, 2000; Wolinsky, et al., 1983, 2007; Wolinsky, Callahan, Fitzgerald, & Johnson, 1993) and higher mortality (Ferrucci, et al., 1991; Miller & Weissert, 2000; Naeim, Keeler, & Reuben, 2007; Wolinsky et al., 1993, 2007). IADL functioning in daily life has many components, including physical, emotional, and cognitive (Willis, 1996) that interact to affect the individual over time (Verbrugge & Jette, 1994). Thus, any explanatory model with IADL as an outcome would ideally take into account these many factors. The present study focused particularly on cognitive predictors of self-reported IADL function in late life. Among studies examining cognitive predictors of IADL function, most have focused on the role of “basic” cognitive abilities (i.e., psychometrically assessed neuropsychological and experimental measures). Areas of basic cognition assessed have included aspects of memory, executive function, reasoning, and processing speed, all of which are known to decline with increasing age (Grady & Craik, 2000; Lindenberger & Ghisletta, 2009; MacDonald, Hultsch, & Dixon, 2011; Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2005b; Schaie, 1994). Across studies, measures, and populations of older adults assessed, cross-sectional studies have most frequently reported a significant moderate (.48 to .61) relationship between basic cognitive abilities and IADL function (e.g., Bennett et al., 2006; Farmer & Eakman, 1995; Jefferson, Paul, Ozonoff, & Cohen, 2006; Tan, Hultsch, & Strauss, 2009). Longitudinal studies have reported moderate to large relationships (r = −.57 to −.72), with changes in IADL function related to changes in memory and executive function (e.g., Tomaszewski Farias et al., 2009; however see Tucker-Drob, 2011). This is consistent with the idea that IADL, such as meal preparation and financial management, might rely on traditionally assessed cognitive skills, such as memory. Psychometric measures of cognitive and intellectual ability are generally designed to be context-free measures of performance under optimal conditions. Responding to critiques regarding the ecological validity of such measures (e.g., Wagner & Sternberg, 1986; Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2003), investigators have developed measures of “everyday cognition” (Poon, Rubin, & Wilson, 1989). These measures are administered in similar fashion to those of basic cognition (i.e., paper and pencil), are novel in content, and have only one correct response per item (Allaire & Marsiske, 2002). As such, these measures are sensitive to a wide range of individual differences in performance. Everyday cognitive measures utilize stimuli from everyday life, such as nutrition labels, resemble familiar and relevant everyday IADL challenges, and encourage examinees to incorporate past experience and accumulated knowledge (Salthouse, 1990). Furthermore, everyday cognitive measures are distinct from performance-based assessments of IADL, which are commonly administered in the elder’s home by occupational therapists, have a significant physical functioning focus, and are typically assessed on a pass-fail level (e.g., Occupational Therapy Assessment of Performance and Support, see Cahn-Weiner et al., 2000). Everyday cognitive abilities are conceptualized as “hierarchical” in that they rely on basic cognitive abilities, in addition to domain specific knowledge (Marsiske & Margrett, 2006). For example, an everyday cognitive assessment might require examinees to look up a phone number in the phone book, for which they employ memory and processing speed skills, coupled with domain specific knowledge gained from prior experience using a phone book. Given their presumed closer proximity to “real world” cognition, everyday cognitive measures ought to be better predictors of functioning than basic, context-free measures of intelligence and problem solving. In support of the idea that everyday and basic cognition are related, there is evidence that everyday cognitive tasks share 50–80% of their variance with basic cognitive tasks (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 1999; Burton, Strauss, Hultsch, Hunter, 2006; Diehl, Willis, & Schaie, 1995; Marsiske & Margrett, 2006; Thornton, Deria, Gelb, Shapiro, Hill, 2007; Weatherbee & Allaire, 2008; Wood et al., 2005). Longitudinally, Willis, Jay, Diehl, & Marsiske (1992) found that fluid reasoning was a significant predictor of everyday cognitive skills 7 years post-baseline assessment, accounting for 52% of the variance. Two previous papers from the ACTIVE study (Gross, Rebok, Unverzagt, Willis, & Brandt, 2011; Tucker-Drob, 2011) have reported that baseline basic abilities predict level (Covariate adjusted R2 = .009 to .139) and trajectory (Covariate adjusted R2 = .013 to .051) of everyday cognition (Gross et al., 2011) as well as significant associations between trajectories of change in basic and everyday cognitive skills (rs .31 to .94; Tucker-Drob, 2011). In addition, consistent with the view that everyday cognition represents the cognitive component of IADL function, several studies have reported associations in the moderate range (r =/0.36–0.69/) between everyday cognition and self-reported IADL (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 2002; Diehl et al., 1995; Tan et al., 2009; Willis et al., 1998). Drawing on these previous findings, the current study examined the extent to which everyday cognition predicts self-reported IADL over time, above and beyond traditionally assessed basic cognitive abilities. Innovations of the current study include the examination of the way in which basic and everyday cognitive skills and self-reported IADL “travel together” as older adults move, on average, from young-old to old-old age. These relationships were examined in the context of an extensively-specified model with multiple predictors of attrition, re-sampling, self-reported physical health, mood, and multiple basic cognitive abilities, consistent with the conceptualization of IADL skills as contextualized and multidimensional. This model, in effect, represents a strict test of the time-varying relationship between everyday cognition and self-reported IADL. Furthermore, the everyday cognition variable examined is unique in being comprised of three measures, resulting in a multidimensional construct with psychometric variance exceeding single measure designs. Everyday cognitive measures’ capacity to capture the variance of basic abilities in self-reported IADL, as well as any unique variance exceeding these skills would support the utility of everyday cognitive measures as parsimonious clinical tools for the assessment of older adults’ IADL competence, as well as a potential endpoint for intervention efforts.

In Williams Syndrome (WS), a known genetic deletion results in atypical brain function with strengths in face and language processing. We examined how genetic influences on brain activity change with development. In three studies, event-related potentials (ERPs) from large samples of children, adolescents, and adults with the full genetic deletion for WS were compared to typically developing controls, and two adults with partial deletions for WS. Studies 1 and 2 identified ERP markers of brain plasticity in WS across development. Study 3 suggested that, in adults with partial deletions for WS, specific genes may be differentially implicated in face and language processing.

The current study investigated older adults' level of engagement with a video game training program. Engagement was measured using the concept of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Forty-five older adults were randomized to receive practice with an action game (Medal of Honor), a puzzle-like game (Tetris), or a gold-standard useful field of view (UFOV) training program. Both Medal of Honor and Tetris participants reported significantly higher flow ratings at the conclusion, relative to the onset of training. Participants are more engaged in games that can be adjusted to their skill levels and that provide incremental levels of difficulty. This finding was consistent with flow theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).

Two neurodevelopmental disorders, Williams syndrome (WS) and autism, are both commonly described as having opposite social profiles: social avoidance in autism vs hypersociability in individuals with WS. The goal of this study was to contrast the brain activity associated with language processing in these two populations, in order to understand the very likely interplay between the use of language and the sociability dimension, on which these disorders diverge. Towards this aim, the N400 component of the event-related potentials was used to quantify the processing of semantic integration in these two populations. Results revealed that individuals with WS showed a significantly larger N400 effect, as compared to both typical controls and individuals with autism, while the latter group demonstrated the smallest N400 effect. The findings demonstrate quite opposite profiles of neural correlates of language processing in WS and autism, mirroring their contrasting social phenotypes.

A frequently noted but largely anecdotal behavioral observation in Williams syndrome (WS) is an increased tendency to approach strangers, yet the basis for this behavior remains unknown. We examined the relationship between affect identification ability and affiliative behavior in participants with WS relative to a neurotypical comparison group. We quantified social behavior from self-judgments of approachability for faces, and from parent/other evaluations of real life. Relative to typical individuals, participants with WS were perceived as more sociable by others, exhibited perceptual deficits in affect identification, and judged faces of strangers as more approachable. In WS, high self-rated willingness to approach strangers was correlated with poor affect identification ability, suggesting that these two findings may be causally related. We suggest that the real-life hypersociability in WS may arise at least in part from abnormal perceptual processing of other people's faces, rather than from an overall bias at the level of behavior. While this did not achieve statistical significance, it provides preliminary evidence to suggest that impaired social-perceptual ability may play a role in increased approachability in WS.

The Williams syndrome (WS) cognitive profile is characterized by relative strengths in face processing, an attentional bias towards social stimuli, and an increased affinity and emotional reactivity to music. An audio-visual integration study examined the effects of auditory emotion on visual (social/non-social) affect identification in individuals with WS and typically developing (TD) and developmentally delayed (DD) controls. The social bias in WS was hypothesized to manifest as an increased ability to process social than non-social affect, and a reduced auditory influence in social contexts. The control groups were hypothesized to perform similarly across conditions. The results showed that while participants with WS exhibited indistinguishable performance to TD controls in identifying facial affect, DD controls performed significantly more poorly. The TD group outperformed the WS and DD groups in identifying non-social affect. The results suggest that emotionally evocative music facilitated the ability of participants with WS to process emotional facial expressions. These surprisingly strong facial-processing skills in individuals with WS may have been due to the effects of combining social and music stimuli and to a reduction in anxiety due to the music in particular. Several directions for future research are suggested.