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Amnesty laws are a widespread practice in the transition from war to peace. They often aim at the transformation of violent conflict by making promises about exemptions from liability for war crimes. Critics argue that amnesties are in violation of international law and reproduce impunity in post-war societies, whereas supporters of amnesty laws focus on their peace-promoting features. Previous research has extensively looked into the second aspect, and found that amnesty laws can open the door to negotiations and a short-term termination of civil war. The question of impunity, however, has not been answered extensively. Applying a Historical Institutionalist framework, we assess the impact of the adoption of amnesty laws on societal impunity, defined as any person or group being exempt from punishment or free from the injurious consequences of an action. Case-study evidence from El Salvador shows that amnesty laws are reproducing existing power relations and thus inhibit profound reforms. With the help of amnesty laws, an institutional environment will be created that acts in the favor of involved parties for years, if not decades. We subsequently test these qualitative findings with a newly created dataset on post-war justice sector governance and reform across forty different post-war countries worldwide from 1990 to 2016, and with societal, police, and military impunity as dependent variables. Statistical evidence shows that amnesty laws significantly correlate with higher levels of impunity in a country. A peace agreement, or democracy at the end of war, reduces the risk of impunity even with amnesty laws present.

La reforma al sector seguridad como piedra angular de la construcción de paz y de Estado en la posguerra es considerada una estrategia de aproximación relativamente novedosa. Las reformas al sector seguridad-principalmente en lo que concierne a su control democrático y a la separación del gobierno civil de la regencia militar-fueron sin duda alguna un elemento esencial en la tercera ola de democratización. Pero solo hasta finales de la década de los noventa los primeros países empiezan a reconocer la reforma al sector de la seguridad como un requisito importante para las medidas de construcción de paz en la posguerra. El concepto reforma al sector seguridad (RSS) fue utilizado primeramente por el Gobierno del Reino Unido, con su Department for International Development (DFID) [Ministerio para el Desarrollo Internacional] como una de las organizaciones líderes de desarrollo que se encontraban activas en el campo.

In this chapter, we examine the contributions of feminist scholarship and activism to the discourses and practices of foreign policy and diplomacy. From the changes in the make of foreign policy actors to include more women, to the implications of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the nascent adoption of Feminist Foreign Policy by some countries, we show how feminism has been fundamental to the evolution international politics’ search for peace. We nevertheless highlight persistent blind spots and unintended consequences of the ‘feminist’ turn in foreign policy and diplomatic practice highlighting their challenges to credible ethical practices of states. As we argue, states located in the Global North are more predisposed to branding their foreign policy as ‘feminist’. The implementation of feminist foreign policy for the distant other obscures domestic realities, while reinforcing colonial logics. We conclude that while this feminist turn has given more space for feminist interventions, the adoption of an ethical code is crucial when tackling tensions and contradictions between idealism and pragmatism in feminist foreign policy.

Security sector reform (SSR) is a central pillar of peace strategies, closely linked to but not interchangeable with state-building and democratization. There is a broad consensus that sustainable post-war peace needs a stable security environment and thus institutions that are able to inhibit non-legal manifestations of violence. The main elements of SSR are reforms in the state security institutions (military and police) as well as in the judiciary. The first generation SSR was characterized by Western blueprints and a lack of context sensitivity, with the empirical record being rather weak. As a consequence, programs moved away from “one size fits all” to a greater attention to local contexts. The need to include local, non-state actors has been acknowledged, but designing and implementing new approaches on the ground is neither easy nor going to happen in the immediate future. A further step in the evolvement of post-war SSR can be an approach to decolonize reform aspects: to radically question the origins of knowledge and practice of SSR and to center efforts more in the communities affected by reform than with ideals of the security sector that resemble more those in the Global North.

While many studies dealing with the problem of militarised refugees analyse when and how militarised refugees lead to a diffusion of violence, it is unclear what conditions contribute to the avoidance of it. The present paper tackles this issue by linking securitisation theory to research on militarised refugees and war diffusion and thus offers new insights into the conditions of prevention of conflict diffusion. Specifically, it compares the two cases of former Zaire (now DR Congo) and Tanzania. Both countries faced an influx of refugees and refugee militarisation following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Burundi in the 1990s, though their outcomes varied in terms of regional war diffusion. The article suggests that while certain security strategies such as closure of borders and the repatriation and expulsion of refugees might be successful in preventing conflict diffusion, they often include a breach of international refugee law when preventing bona fide refugees from entering the country. Hence, communicating and cooperating with peaceful members of the refugee communities and confronting those suspected of being responsible for the violence are necessary steps to deal with this issue.

Following the killing of George Floyd in May, ‘Defund the Police’ has become a rallying cry for many protestors in the #BlackLivesMatter movement. Sabine Kurtenbach and Nadine Ansorg look at what lessons can be learned from police reform in the Global South. They write that when searching for such lessons, the context of reform is important, as is the often need for the continuity of personnel, for consensus, and to ensure institutional accountability.

In the past, shocks comparable to COVID-19 have created windows of opportunity for local and international stakeholders. The German government should seize this chance by investing in online communication for ongoing peace negotiations, increasing incentives for inclusive politics, supporting information campaigns on the virus, and dedicating funding to women entrepreneurs.

In Übergangsphasen zwischen Krieg und Frieden sind UN-Blauhelme häufig ein wirkungsvolles multilaterales Instrument. Doch vor allem in Afrika, wo die meisten Missionen stattfinden, leiden Friedensoperationen unter mehreren Problemen, inklusive einer unzureichend finanzierten Sicherheitsarchitektur in der gesamten afrikanischen Region. Durch diese Defizite werden Friedensmissionen massiv beeinträchtigt und können deshalb ihr Potenzial zur Friedenskonsolidierung in Afrika nicht in vollem Umfang zur Geltung bringen. Unsere Forschungen zeigen, dass Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen die Zivilbevölkerung besser schützen können, wenn die beteiligten Blauhelmtruppen gut ausgebildet und ausgerüstet sind. Aber gerade die Länder, die über hoch qualifizierte Truppen verfügen, wie zum Beispiel europäische oder nordamerikanische Staaten, scheuen eine Beteiligung. Der wachsende Bedarf an Friedenssicherungskräften wird zunehmend durch afrikanische Truppen befriedigt, doch diesen fehlt es häufig an der Ausbildung und den Fähigkeiten, die für eine wirklich erfolgreiche Mission notwendig wären. Häufig werden von Friedenssicherungskräften selbst Straftaten begangen - zum Beispiel sexueller Missbrauch. Aufsehenerregende Fälle wurden aus UN-Missionen in Liberia und der Zentralafrikanischen Republik gemeldet. Solche Straftaten untergraben die Legitimität der Friedenssicherungskräfte und schränken deren Möglichkeiten zur Friedenskonsolidierung ein. Drei Konzepte könnten helfen, diese Probleme zu bewältigen und die Qualität der Friedenssicherung in Afrika und anderswo zu verbessern: Erstens sollten sich europäische Staaten einschließlich Deutschlands regelmäßig an Friedensoperationen der Vereinten Nationen beteiligen. Zweitens sollten Deutschland und seine Verbündeten die afrikanische Infrastruktur zur Friedenssicherung, darunter auch die Afrikanische Union und andere regionale Sicherheitsinitiativen, kontinuierlich stärken. Drittens sollte Deutschland glaubwürdig auf eine regelgestü

Security Sector Reform (SSR) remains a key feature of peacebuilding interventions and is usually undertaken by a state alongside national and international partners. External actors engaged in SSR tend to follow a normative agenda that often has little regard for the context in post-conflict societies. Despite recurrent criticism, SSR practices of international organisations and bilateral donors often remain focused on state institutions, and often do not sufficiently attend to alternative providers of security or existing normative frameworks of security. This article provides a critical overview of existing research and introduces the special issue on "Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform". We explore three aspects that add an important piece to the puzzle of what constitutes effective SSR. First, the variation of norm adoption, norm contestation and norm imposition in post-conflict countries that might explain the mixed results in terms of peacebuilding. Second, the multitude of different security actors within and beyond the state which often leads to multiple patterns of co-operation and contestation within reform programmes. And third, how both the multiplicity of and tension between norms and actors further complicate efforts to build peace or, as complexity theory would posit, influence the complex and non-linear social system that is the conflict-affected environment.

Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.

UN blue helmets have in many cases been an effective multilateral instrument for fostering war-to-peace transitions. But especially in Africa, where the majority of missions are deployed, peace operations suffer from a number of problems, including an underfunded region-wide African security architecture. These shortcomings severely restrict peacekeeping missions from fully realising their peacebuilding potential in Africa. Our research shows that UN peacekeeping missions are better able to protect civilians when well-trained and well-equipped troops participate in blue-helmet missions. But it is particularly those countries with highly qualified troops, such as European or North American countries, which are reluctant to participate. African peacekeepers are increasingly filling the rising demand for peacekeeping contributions, but they often lack the training and the capacity to effectively help missions fully achieve their goals. Peacekeepers themselves often perpetrate crimes - for instance, sexual abuse. High-profile cases have been reported from UN missions in Liberia or the Central African Republic. These crimes undermine peacekeepers' legitimacy and obstruct their peacebuilding potential. Three policies could help to remedy these problems and to improve the quality of peacekeeping in Africa and beyond. First, European countries, including Germany, should continue to participate in UN peace operations. Second, Germany and its allies should keep strengthening Africa's peacekeeping infrastructure, including the African Union and other regional security initiatives. Third, to credibly push for a rules-based international order, Germany should use its position on the United Nations Security Council to press for reforms to the council and to improve the legal accountability of peacekeepers.

After many months of upheaval, the Democratic Republic of Congo is set for yet another year of political struggle and internal conflict. Current President Joseph Kabila remains the main cause of the unrest. He reached the end of his final term in December 2016 yet refuses to step down. His government continues to find reasons to delay elections which ought to have been held shortly after the conclusion of Kabila's term. The latest election date has been set for December 2018, although it is doubtful that the government will hold the poll. It has already pointed to apparent logistical and financial obstacles to a December election. This has become an ongoing excuse to keep Kabila in power. Meanwhile, DRC citizens are increasingly unsatisfied with the government. They have repeatedly taken to the streets of the capital city Kinshasa to call for elections and Kabila's resignation. Security forces continue to quell those protests and crack down on political activists. State operatives have on several occasions shut down the internet.

Präsident Kabila stemmt sich trotz gegenteiliger Zusagen gegen Neuwahlen. Er und sein Umfeld wollen weiter den Staat ausplündern. Wie wichtig eine handlungsfähige und legitime Regierung ist, verdeutlichen die Kämpfe zwischen Regierungseinheiten und der Rebellengruppe Kamuina Nsapu in den beiden Kasai-Provinzen.

In the flood of debate and opinion which followed the UK's Brexit referendum, journalists and scholars alike have focused on the economic impact on Britain, the future of trade agreements and the effect on the rest of the EU. With a few exceptions, implications outside of Europe are often ignored. Africa barely gets a look in, but the shockwaves here could be deeply damaging. Clearly, the economic and aid implications matter, as we and others have pointed out. Here, however, we want to examine the socio-political and diplomatic dimensions beyond Europe of what is a seemingly European decision. This is especially important given the broad range and nature of Africa-EU relations. Both in the trade negotiations that have led to EU economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with Africa, but especially in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the UK has often played the role of an advocate, at least rhetorically. For example, although the British government always supported the controversial EPAs, it also argued that the EU should give compensation to those countries that lose out due to new modes of cooperation. Similarly, the UK has in recent years been the strongest voice for reform of the CAP. As European fisheries and farmers have been subsidised through the CAP, to the disadvantage of African farmers, reform is essential. Other European countries have been reluctant to commit to it. There is legitimate concern that with the UK gone, certain diplomatic avenues will be closed. For African countries, the UK's departure from the EU signals the loss of an advocate within the EU.

When studying violence and its consequences, it is necessary to conduct fieldwork in affected countries and communicate with the people on the ground. However, traveling and working within conflict and post-conflict countries comes with a particular set of challenges. This contribution discusses potential challenges that might arise when planning for and conducting fieldwork in a security-sensitive environment. It discusses unexpected instances that can occur before or during your fieldwork and what to do in a case of emergency. This article also stresses the importance of ethical responsibility before, during, and after fieldwork. Additional components of such responsibilities include respect toward the local culture, rules, and traditions as well as questions of race and power. Consistent awareness of such issues also stresses the significance of repeatedly reflecting on questions of who you as a researcher are, where you come from, how you are situated in the world, and what drives you. Successively, ethical responsibility does not end after your fieldwork but continues throughout the publication and dissemination of work. The article also discusses how to ensure confidentiality of interviews and privacy of respondents during publication and dissemination. Ultimately, this is helpful for students who are preparing for fieldwork in security-sensitive environments and encourages further reflection regarding necessary questions for such research endeavors.

Präsident Kabila stemmt sich trotz gegenteiliger Zusagen gegen Neuwahlen. Er und sein Umfeld wollen weiter den Staat ausplündern. Wie wichtig eine handlungsfähige und legitime Regierung ist, verdeutlichen die Kämpfe zwischen Regierungseinheiten und der Rebellengruppe Kamuina Nsapu in den beiden Kasai-Provinzen.

Die Menschen im nördlichen Afrika leiden unter gewaltsamen Konflikten sowie sozialen Spannungen und wirtschaftlicher Schwäche. Die Ursachen der aktuellen Probleme finden sich in der Vergangenheit, in der muslimisch-arabischen Expansion, in der Kolonialzeit sowie in den Jahren nach der Unabhängigkeit.

This article presents new data on provisions for police reform in peace agreements (PRPA) between 1975 and 2011. The PRPA dataset complements past research on the determinants and effects of specific terms in agreements with detailed data on police reform provisions. The PRPA dataset also adds a quantitative dimension to the thus far largely qualitative literature on post-conflict security sector reform (SSR). It includes information on six subtypes of police reform: capacity, training, human rights standards, accountability, force composition and international training and monitoring. We show that there is currently a high global demand for the regulation of police reform through peace agreements: police reform provisions are now more regularly included in agreements than settlement terms that call for power-sharing or elections. We observe interesting variations in the inclusion of police reform provisions in relation to past human rights violations, regime type, or the scope of international peacekeeping prior to negotiations, and illustrate the implications of police reform provisions for the duration of post-conflict peace. Finally, we stimulate ideas on how scholars and policymakers can use the PRPA dataset in future to study new questions on post-conflict police reform.

Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. These are often internationally funded. But how do such programs account for previously existing security institutions and the security needs of local communities? This article examines SSR all over Africa to assess local ownership and path dependency from a New Institutionalist perspective. It finds that SSR, particularly in post-conflict countries, tends to be driven by ideas and perceptions of international donors promoting generalized blueprints. Often, such programs only account in a very limited way for path-dependent aspects of security institutions or the local context. Hence the reforms often lack local participation and are thus not accepted by the local community eventually.