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Arlington Stadium in Arlington, Texas, originally opened as a minor-league stadium in 1965, but by 1972, it became home to the Texas Rangers of baseball's American League. Although it was an architecturally undistinguished facility, Arlington Stadium shows how civic leaders in Arlington, alongside boosters in nearby Dallas and Fort Worth, utilized organized baseball's legal doctrine of territorial rights to unify the metro area's baseball market within a centrally located suburb. Quickly growing Arlington thus became home to a stadium that might one day host a big-league team, although in the meantime, it could host a minor-league team. This article tells the story of Arlington Stadium's planning and construction, as well as the Rangers' relocation from Washington, D.C., as a way to understand how a metro area used organized baseball's idiosyncratic rules, based on a longstanding federal antitrust exemption, to build a suburban home for a major-league team. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the remaining options for sport managers to balance the interests of college athletes and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in regulating college athlete name, image, and likeness (NIL). The paper is divided into six substantive sections. The first section, "Background: The NCAA's Defense of NIL Restrictions," provides a brief history of the NCAA's legal defense to challenges against its NIL regulations. The second section, "U.S. Congress Is Unlikely to Regulate College Athletes' NIL Rights," addresses proposed federal legislation and Congress' willingness to regulate the use of NIL by college athletes. The third section, "The Impact of O'Bannon and Alston on NCAA's NIL Restraints," examines controlling case law, specifically O'Bannon v. NCAA and NCAA v. Alston, and how current antitrust law precedent shapes the scope by which the NCAA can regulate college athletes' NIL. The fourth section, "State Laws Regulating the NIL Marketplace," addresses state legislation regulating college athlete NIL use. The fifth section, "The Applicability of Labor Law to Regulating College Athletes' NIL," discusses the current college athlete NIL marketplace and analyzes whether labor law presents an optimal way forward for the NCAA to regulate NIL post-Alston. The sixth section, "College Athletes' Employee Status as a Pathway to Redefine the NCAA's Amateurism," concludes by examining the law's role in regulating NIL and discussing stakeholder implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Court of Justice issued a judgment on the processing of data concerning health in the context of online marketing of pharmacy-only medicinal products. The case involved a dispute between two pharmacy operators regarding the processing of customer data on an online platform. The Court clarified that personal data entered by customers when ordering pharmacy-only medicinal products online constitutes data concerning health, even if the products do not require a prescription. The judgment emphasized the broad interpretation of data concerning health to ensure a high level of protection for individuals' fundamental rights and freedoms. [Extracted from the article]

When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a rule banning noncompete agreements as unfair methods of competition, it reinvigorated debates regarding the purpose of federal antitrust law. At its core, federal antitrust law seeks to preserve a competitive economy and promote new entry into the marketplace, primarily to protect consumer interest. Under President Biden's administration, the FTC has increased its efforts to expand the scope of antitrust protection beyond consumer welfare by applying it to other public policy concerns, such as employee mobility. The FTC points to noncompete agreements as detrimental constraints to employees' economic freedoms. In practice, employment noncompetes have escaped the scrutiny of federal antitrust laws as courts have generally treated such agreements as matters governed under state contract law. This Note contributes to the ongoing discourse regarding the reach of federal antitrust laws and their applicability in regulating noncompete agreements. Foregoing discussions that scrutinize the FTC's rulemaking authority, this Note instead examines the noncompete rule under judicially created antitrust doctrines. Despite the rule's plain language to ban all noncompetes, this Note treats the ban effectively as a per se antitrust violation. This Note argues that the reviewing courts should continue to apply the rule of reason--a three-part inquiry to determine the legality of an activity that may restrict competition--in future antitrust challenges to noncompetes, as vertical restraints between an employer and employee. In conclusion, this Note supplies recommendations for reviewing courts and potential litigants on how to tailor their rule of reason analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Mastering the Digital Regulatory Maze: Strategies for Marketing Success in a Complex Landscape" by Daniel Sokol discusses the pervasive nature of digital regulation, covering areas such as privacy, antitrust, AI, and fintech. Marketers must navigate different levels of regulation, including traditional government regulation, public-private regulation, and purely private regulation through contracts. The article emphasizes the importance of understanding and responding to the complex digital regulatory environment to thrive in the digital age, highlighting the need for transparency, accountability, and proactive engagement with regulators to avoid more severe government regulation. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This Article uses a massive collection of data to document, for the first time, the interplay between the substantive subject areas, the intensity, and the procedural complexity of federal civil litigation. The results indicate that like substance, intensity and complexity are pivotal features of litigation. These findings suggest that what might be termed "our uniformity"--the de jure uniform applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other procedural law--should be understood as a broader phenomenon than the traditional focus on transsubstantivity. The Article documents extensive variation in measures of intensity and complexity among cases sharing the same broad substantive legal subject matter, such that intensity and complexity may vary more importantly within than across substantive areas. For example, it is true that patent cases have comparatively high average intensity as measured by their numbers of docket entries, but there are also plenty of patent cases that terminate without having enormous docket activity. It is also true that patent cases are much more likely than, say, contract cases to be extremely intense, but because there are so many more contract than patent cases, my data have nearly twice as many highly intense contract cases as highly intense patent cases. The Article's twin key conclusions are, thus: (1) even for cases in areas thought to be especially intense or complex, there are cases with both high and low intensity and complexity, and (2) intensity and complexity are transsubstantive--e.g., there are highly intense and highly complex cases in most substantive areas of litigation, not just the usual suspects such as patents, antitrust, or securities. The Article closes by treading gingerly into normative waters. One unavoidable consequence of our uniformity with respect to formal procedural rules is that judges exercise enormous case-level discretion. Further, in part due to legislative forays in the securities and patent arenas, we have some degree of substance-specificity in our procedure. The Article suggests considering formal procedural tracking as an alternative to each of these approaches. That approach, which has been suggested in the past and is used in some states and other countries, might allow us to break out of some of our ossified debates about matters such as the rancor set off by the pleading revolution the Supreme Court effected a decade and a half ago in Twombly and Iqbal. If the plausibility standard is here to stay because of its role in limiting intense and complex litigation, perhaps it could be revisited in simpler cases that don't pose the challenges the Supreme Court first flagged in Twombly. Whether this is possible depends on our capacity to identify cases' likely intensity and/or complexity early in the litigation life cycle, which is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. Still, we ought to consider the possibility of a certification process for intense, complex cases, like the one we have for class actions, so that procedure might be adjusted where doing so makes sense. The Article's contributions include its use of docket-level data on more than 500,000 cases whose dockets could be followed for at least seven years. In addition, the Article offers a novel approach to measuring procedural complexity by showing how links between entries in docket reports may be viewed as mathematical networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article critically evaluates the controversial technology i.e. geo-blocking, through two related prisms, digital copyright (in particular, audio-visual services) and, EU Competition Law. Two EU Regulations are key to this analysis: the Portability Regulation and the Geo-blocking Regulation. Compellingly, there are both contradictions and tensions between these two Regulations when it comes to copyright-protected services. The discordant legislative provisions are not the sole quandary; the General Court’s ruling in the Groupe Canal + case is generally anti-geoblocking in tone. By ruling against absolute territorial protection in the context of pay-TV licences, the General Court indirectly challenges the geo-blocking clauses in the aforementioned licences. While the CJEU annulled the General Court’s decision on grounds of proportionality, concerns relating to the fate of geo-blocking clauses in licensing agreements still prevail. An analysis of the two contradictory Regulations and the Groupe Canal + judgment suggests an apparent diminishing role for geo-blocking technology in the context of copyright-protected audio-visual services. However, vigorous lobbying efforts by the audio-visual sector introduce an element of uncertainty, meaning that the rescission of the copyright carve-out in the Geo-blocking Regulation is not a foregone conclusion by any means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A coming wave of general-purpose technologies, including artificial intelligence (“AI”), robotics, quantum computing, synthetic biology, energy expansion, and nanotechnology, is likely to fundamentally reshape the economy and erode the assumptions on which the antitrust order is predicated. First, AI-driven systems will vastly improve firms’ ability to detect (and even program) consumer preferences without the benefit of price signals, which will undermine the traditional information-producing benefit of competitive markets. Similarly, these systems will be able to determine comparative producer efficiency without relying on competitive signals. Second, AI systems will invert the salient characteristics of human managers, whose intentions are opaque but actions discernible. An AI’s “intentions”—its programmed objective functions—are easily discernible, but its actions or processing steps are a black box. Third, the near-infinite scalability of the technologies in the coming wave will likely result in extreme market concentration, with a few megafirms dominating. Finally, AI and related productive systems will be able to avoid traditional prohibitions on both collusion and exclusion, with the consequence that antitrust law’s core prohibitions will become ineffective. The cumulative effect of these tendencies of the coming wave likely will be to retire the economic order based on mandated competition. As in past cases of natural monopoly, some form of regulation will probably replace antitrust, but the forms of regulation are likely to look quite different. Rather than attempting to set a regulated firm’s prices by determining its costs and revenues, the regulatory future is more likely to involve direct regulation of an AI’s objective functions, for example by directing the AI to maximize social welfare and allocate the surplus created among different stakeholders of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1950s, the major American labor unions have pursued a strategy of cooperation rather than competition. Under Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution and similar “no-raid” agreements, unions may not encroach on one another’s established collective bargaining relationships. Some labor scholars have argued that these agreements likely harm unionized workers by diminishing union officials’ incentives to lower dues payments, innovate, or otherwise provide the best possible services for their members. To varying degrees, scholars have also blamed the longterm decline in private-sector union membership on a lack of competitive pressure. This Note analyzes Article XX and similar agreements from an antitrust perspective, analogizing them to anticompetitive market-division agreements. Unlike prior antitrust analyses of labor unions—which focus on the welfare of end consumers—I view workers as consumers of labor unions’ services and consider only their welfare as relevant. Counterarguments based on union democracy and labor history have some merit, but the current status quo of zero antitrust enforcement seems difficult to justify when, in most industries, an agreement like Article XX could be considered illegal per se. The federal antitrust agencies and classes of unionized workers might be able to challenge these agreements under the Sherman Act. Although labor’s statutory exemption from the antitrust laws is sometimes said to generally protect “selfinterest[ed]” union activities, a preliminary reading of the text and legislative history shows that the exemption might not protect activities that demonstrably harm workers. Although courts have not directly confronted the issue, at least some of the case law is compatible with this interpretation. In such cases, courts should balance any evidence of anticompetitive harm against evidence of benefits to workers, including benefits that are not normally cognizable in antitrust such as increased union density. This Note is not intended to downplay the uphill battle that unions currently face nor to argue that interunion rivalry is always desirable. Nonetheless, I am confident that targeted and careful application of the antitrust laws in specific markets could help increase the dynamism of organized labor and make unionization look like a better bet for unorganized workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the role of the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in overseeing medical education programs and the challenges faced by residents. It discusses the potential overlap between the ACGME and resident unions in addressing residents' needs, while acknowledging the limitations imposed by antitrust regulations. The authors express concern about the impact of profit-driven healthcare on patient care and advocate for a transformation of healthcare organizations that prioritize professional values and patient welfare. They call for a shift in organizational structures to support clinicians in delivering personalized and compassionate care, and suggest that institutions refocus on their mission of providing quality care to patients. [Extracted from the article]

Context: The connection between law and political determinants of health is not well understood, but nevertheless it is suggested that the two are inseparable, and this represents an upstream level with scope for influencing other determinants of health (particularly social determinants). Solidarity underpins European health care systems, and given its clear link with redistribution, it can be seen as a means for addressing health inequities. As such, solidarity may be seen as a political determinant of health in the specific context of European Union (EU) competition policy. Methods: A range of EU case law, treaty provisions, and European Commission publications relating to EU competition policy are analyzed. Findings: Solidarity is typically juxtaposed as antithetical to competition and thus as underpinning exceptions to the applicability of prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and state aid. Case law indicates an additional dynamic between definitions of solidarity at the EU and national levels. Conclusions: This analysis leads to two groups of considerations when framing solidarity as a political determinant of health in the EU competition policy context: first, the predominance of solidarity suggests it may shape competition reforms; second, the EU–member state dynamic indicates less EU-level reach into national competition reforms in health care than may be expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the controversy surrounding the Department of Justice's antitrust lawsuit against Apple, which has received both praise and criticism. Topics include the criticism of the DOJ's narrow definition of the relevant market as either "smartphones" or "performance smartphones," the significance of market definition in antitrust cases, and the implications of the DOJ's strategic choice in framing the lawsuit.

The article discusses the development of the essential facilities doctrine and the right to refuse to deal, and the issues of their application to the digital economy in the 21st century. Topics covered include the doctrine's constitutionality in application, and its constitutionally suspect finding under the First and Fifth Amendments. Also noted are issues of applying the doctrine to the digital economy based on decisions on both Amendments as of 2024.

Chinese courts follow a dual-track approach in cases about nonliteral copying of game mechanics. The courts grant market exclusivity to game developers either under copyright law or under unfair competition law. In recent years, the fact that copyright law and unfair competition law differ in their cognitive efficiency has become clear. Copyright law is cognitively highly efficient. It is able to provide high-quality background information to navigate decision-makers through the complex issues. Unfair competition law, on the other hand, is cognitively inefficient, providing hardly any structural guidance to strike the delicate balance between creators and users of disputed game mechanics. Abundant cases in China help us understand the importance of cognitive efficiency in choosing the proper modularity of law. When it comes to game mechanics, copyright law is the better modularity in comparison to unfair competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation plays a crucial role in defining competitive dynamics. Given this fact, one might expect 'innovation' to play a consistent role in antitrust law. The present article conducts a systematic content analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to test this hypothesis. The findings suggest that EU courts treat innovation inconsistently in competition law cases, often assigning different weight to innovation in similar contexts and neglecting central parameters agreed upon in the literature. To address this inconsistency, the article proposes measures to maintain the predictability of competition law analysis while giving innovation a more central role in the definition of relevant markets, evaluation of market power, and assessment of practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cartel busting often results in the restructuring of boards of directors, presumably to remove individuals (both executive and non-executive members) who may have been involved in the cartel. This study employs 2 exogenous changes—cartel busting and binding board gender quotas policies—to examine their impact on board gender composition using DiD and Staggered DiD methods. In countries with binding quotas, boards are already undergoing restructuring to include more women, even without the shock of cartel busting. Furthermore, boards increase the percentage of women in non-cartelized firms only when countries introduce binding gender quotas. Binding board gender quota regulations are effective in improving gender balance on corporate boards. Additionally, in countries without binding board gender quotas, only firms sanctioned for cartel conduct show an increase in the percentage of women after cartel busting, compared to non-sanctioned firms. Thus, board gender quota regulations and anti-cartel policies interact to influence the gender composition of sanctioned firms: binding gender policies are effective in achieving more balanced board gender composition, and cartel busting drives more balanced boards in sanctioned firms regardless of whether their countries have binding board quota regulations or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

[Purpose] During the post-liberalization era, the Indian legal system introduced multiple laws with the objective of safeguarding the interests of Indian consumers and fostering equitable competition within the telecommunications sector. Notably, the Indian legal system has demonstrated a significant commitment to the resolution of telecommunications-related disputes, exemplified by the enactment of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) Act in 1997 and the Competition Act in 2002. Both legislative measures were designed to advance the cause of fair competition in the telecommunications industry. The primary purpose of this article is to conduct an examination of whether the objectives set forth by these two Acts have been effectively realized over the past decade (2012-2021). Additionally, this article will undertake a comparative analysis of these Acts in relation to legal frameworks in other countries beyond India. [Methodology] The foundational methodology employed in this research centers on the analysis of cases adjudicated by both the Telecom Regulatory Authority and the Competition Regulatory Authority in India, particularly in instances involving disputes within the telecommunications sector. This article offers a concise data analysis concerning the evolution of the Indian telecommunications market over the past decade (2012-2021). The primary aim is to undertake a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the Acts in place for the preservation of fair competition within this industry. [Findings] Based on the legal analysis, this article argues that there is an unresolved territorial dispute between the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) Under section 3 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, the Indian government established the regulatory agency to oversees the telecommunications industry in India and the Competition Act, 2002 establishes the Competition Commission of India being primary national competition regulator in India. It is an official department of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs tasked with upholding the Competition. The findings also suggest that the Government of India should overhaul its institutional framework in order to insert the "collective dominance" concept in the Competition Act. This concept/amendment was about to be passed in the India Congress by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in 2014. However, it failed due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India's bicameral Parliament. Consequently, numerous disputes and concerns remained unresolved. Lastly, Reliance JIO Infocomm Limited is a Public Company that was established on February 15, 2007, is categorized as a Non-Government Company, and is registered with the Registrar of Companies in Mumbai, India. It applied a "zero pricing" strategy which created market distortion which reduced most of the rivals from the telecom market. This kind of strategy was previously ordered void in the NSE1 case but the same was allowed to the JIO on the premises that it was a new entrant and not dominant. The Competition laws mostly address "predatory pricing", however, in the matter of "penetrative pricing" they have remained silent. The "penetrative pricing" is allowed for the promotion, but the benchmark of promotion has not yet been regulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

General-purpose AI models have emerged as a disruptive technology with paramount spillover economic effects across industries. The owners of such models, namely big tech enterprises, can leverage their dominance in general-purpose AI models to expand into existing or new downstream markets. However, competition law is poised to constrain this expansion effectively. Nevertheless, there is uncertainty about the legal standard when assessing a refusal to deal in the case of access to general-purpose AI models. While EU competition law judicial practice reveals an adversary tendency against big tech enterprises leveraging in downstream markets, there is a case for adopting a narrower standard regarding access to general-purpose AI models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We construct a vertical product differentiation duopoly model incorporating managerial delegation and cross-ownership. By exploring the interplay of these factors, we find a U-shaped relationship between endogenous managerial delegation coefficients and cross-ownership. The difference in managerial delegation coefficients between the two firms decreases as the cross-ownership proportion increases. In an ownership structure involving cross-ownership of firms producing different quality products, managerial delegation improves firms' profits while reducing consumer surplus and social welfare in a vertical product differentiation market. Moreover, cross-ownership intensifies the positive impact of managerial delegation on joint profits and the negative effects on consumer surplus and social welfare. Consequently, regulating cross-ownership among firms in vertically differentiated product markets is an important policy issue for competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation is transformative and key to future prosperity. It is therefore of no surprise that antitrust laws seek to promote it. What is surprising, however, is that despite the central role that innovation occupies in competition cases, its actual treatment by the courts is far from nuanced. In this paper, we reflect on the D.C. Circuit's 2023 ruling in New York v. Meta to illustrate the prevailing monocular vision adopted by the court in its treatment of innovation. That vision, we argue, reflects simplistic assumptions as to innovation dynamics and mistaken beliefs about the digital economy. It is further compounded by jurisprudential problems that characterize U.S. antitrust laws. The result is troublesome. While "everyone talks about innovation," the courts do little to inquire on its scope, nature, and value. Nor do courts recognize the impact of anticompetitive strategies deployed by the dominant platforms on disruptive innovations and their heterogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a theoretical model to set up the conditions for a country to attain monetary stability by allowing for two freely tradable currencies to circulate in parallel. For this parallel system to function properly, confidence in the good behavior of the monetary authorities in charge of the two currencies is key. Our model shows how a floating exchange rate between the two can keep the issuers of the local currency in check. The results from our model show the conditions under which a parallel currency system disciplines the issuers of the currencies and thus maintains their purchasing power. In non-volatile economies, it also discourages governments (or private issuers) from inflating one of the currencies as a means to raise seigniorage, as this policy results in the displacement of the currency from the market. When foreign payments shortfall—such as in Greece and Cyprus during the 'euro crisis' in the mid-2010s, or intractable hyperinflation—leave the country without a medium of exchange, our model shows how currency choice can restore monetary circulation and offer a path to achieving and maintaining monetary stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neo‐Brandeisian legal scholars have recently revived the ideas of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who championed state regulation that preserved market competition and economic liberty in the face of concentrated private power. Yet ultimately and perhaps paradoxically, it has been Europe and not the United States that has proved more hospitable to accommodating key features of the Brandeisian approach. We explain this outcome by tracing the evolution of EU competition law to gain insight into the social learning processes through which such regimes change over time. We argue that the EU's administrative system, which provides the European Commission with significant bureaucratic discretion, has facilitated processes of ongoing deliberative adjustment to policy and practice, which over time has resulted in a system of "regulated competition" with striking similarities to the Brandeisian vision. The analysis highlights how administrative law institutions condition how regulatory regimes evolve in response to acquired experience and knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses why EU economic (competition and internal market) law is hospitable to and can be enriched by socio-legal and critical insights about the instability of the economic/non-economic distinction, the unavoidable plurality of market arrangements as shaped by legal regulation, as well as the distributive effects of the said arrangements. The proneness of EU economic law to critical insights can be ascribed to: its subject matter, as law in this area maps upon everyday market experiences; the casuistic development of EU law; the wide scope of EU economic law, which interferes with arrangements understood as non-economic; the non-outcome-determinative character of EU law. Through discussion of two CJEU decisions - a competition decision dealing with selective distribution (Coty) and an internal market decision on the regulation of AirBnb (Cali Apartments) - I illustrate how more explicit deployments of socio-legal and critical approaches can enrich EU economic law and specifically its teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on the intersection of competition law and privacy constitutes a major challenge for the existing competition law framework. This article considers the intersection between competition law and privacy and argues that it is possible to recognise a positive relation between these legal areas. However, with the rise of digital platforms that provide free products and services to consumers while generating revenue through data collection, the discussion has intensified regarding whether non-price elements, such as privacy, should be considered as a factor in competition law analysis. The author argues that it is possible to demonstrate a dogmatic link between these legal sources, as a coherent and consistent interpretation of competition law and data protection is adequate. The article finds that dogmatic approach corresponds to recent development in competition law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commercial activities are at the forefront of human relationships with other people and with society. For this reason, trade has a long history, as long as the history of mankind. Human beings, as a socio-cultural beings, meet a significant part of their needs through commercial activities, and thus, make achieves an important step towards achieving peace. In other words, the individual who cannot meet his needs becomes unhappy and uncomfortable. This leads to a society consisting of unhappy and restless individuals who also do not create a peaceful and secure environment. Trade therefore, plays a significant role in ensuring peace and security in society. For this reason, all ruling systems have given importance to trade, and they have introduced certain sets of rules which ensure the efficiency and order of commercial activities. Aiming at the happiness of human beings both in this world and in the hereafter, Islam has also laid down certain rules in the relations between man and society and their commercial activities, as well as in the fields of faith, worship, and morality. It is a fact that the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which are the main references to Islam, have important regulations and provisions in the field of trade. These rules and regulations, which represent the basic rules of trade, have over time been transformed into a voluminous accumulation that we can call "Islamic commercial law," in the corpus of fiqh over time. When Islamic precepts and their accumulated interpretation are examined, it is seen that market economy is adopted in Islamic commercial law. One of the important conditions that the market economy naturally requires is undoubtedly the existence of free competition throughout all commercial activities. Although in the classical fiqh corpus, or in modern terms, the subject of commercial competition in Islamic law has not been dealt with separately, the existence of this competition in Islamic commercial law is understood by inductive methods. All of the steps, precautions, and prohibitions focusing on the stability of the market in commercial activities from the beginning lead to this conclusion. In this study, the issue of competition in Islamic commercial law is discussed in general, based on the nass (divine decree) and principles. Based on the analytical method, the study concludes that Islam's understanding of trade is dominated by the free market economy and therefore free competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with competition law disputes between doctors and presents three cases in which the Supreme Court has made clarifications. The first case concerns permissible competition among elective doctors, where no pricing regulation can be derived. The second case concerns improper advertising of dental treatments abroad. The third case deals with unfair competition in connection with a dental clinic and the tourism representative. It is emphasized that unfair competition law also provides effective legal protection in cross-border medical matters. [Extracted from the article]

The planned hospital reform in Germany is an urgent reform project due to price increases and staff shortages. The reform leads to a disempowerment of the G-BA (Federal Joint Committee) and a fundamental realignment of quality assurance in hospitals. Minimum staffing levels (MVHZ) are being introduced to ensure high-quality care. There are discussions about the competition between hospitals and general practitioners as well as the financing of the reform. The reform offers the opportunity to improve the provision of innovative medicine, but it requires honesty towards the insured. [Extracted from the article]

• China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) has a positive impact on average labor wage. • Labor income share increases more in local state-owned and nonstate-owned enterprises. • AML effectively promotes industry competition and boosts the labor income share. • AML reduces market power, curbs monopoly profit, and increases the average labor wage. This study examines the impact of increased market competition on labor income share. We use the enactment of China's Anti-Monopoly Law as a quasi-natural experiment. The results reveal that the Anti-Monopoly Law has a significant positive effect on the labor income share of firms with higher market power. This is because the rising market competition, effected by the Anti-Monopoly Law, inhibits market power and increases average labor wages. Our findings are relevant for firms in provinces with higher administrative monopolies, with less competition, and under industries with less competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of University of Sharjah Journal of Law Sciences (JLS) is the property of University of Sharjah - Scientific Publishing Unit and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses novel challenges for competition law, as it can both promote and undermine competition. The complexity of AI technologies, coupled with their potential to disrupt markets, has prompted competition authorities particularly in the EU and the US to strengthen cooperation in addressing these issues and reevaluate their current instruments. This paper explores the interplay between the recently published EU AI Act and competition law, with a focus on key provisions relevant to competition law enforcement. It begins by outlining the structure of the AI Act, highlighting sections particularly relevant to competition law. It next evaluates how effectively EU competition law can tackle anticompetitive practices involving AI-driven algorithms, with particular attention to killer acquisitions and tacit collusion. Additionally, it explores how the AI Act impacts the information-gathering capabilities of competition authorities in the EU. By identifying enforcement gaps and exploring ongoing challenges, this paper sheds a light on the evolving role of competition law in an AI-driven market landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the EU antitrust enforcement framework to determine if updates are needed. The evaluation found that the current procedural rules have generally led to effective and efficient application of antitrust laws. However, there is a need for faster decision-making and improved coordination within the European Competition Network (ECN) to avoid unnecessary parallel investigations by multiple national competition authorities (NCAs). The report suggests that parallel antitrust enforcement is likely to increase, and proposes exploring coordinated actions by multiple NCAs as a more effective and efficient approach. [Extracted from the article]

In the context of competition law, the concept of an enterprise includes any entity engaged in economic activity, irrespective of the legal status of that entity and how it is financed. From this definition of the company, we can see its characteristics, which are essentially the economic activity of this entity on the one hand and its legal independence on the other. Any conduct in the market can only be considered if the undertaking concerned carries out an economic activity, i.e., an activity of production, distribution or import and export. It must also be independent of other companies in the same market. In other words, each company must be in a position to compete with the other to create perfect competition in the market. Therefore, competition law prohibits anti-competitive practices only if economic and independent entities commit them. Through this study, we will highlight the concept of the institution in competition law, whether from a legal or economic perspective, and we will learn about the conditions for applying competition rules to the institution as a key element in the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits how private cross-ownership affects cost-reducing R&D, production quantities, consumer surplus, firms' profits and social welfare in a mixed oligopoly with a convex cost function. We show that increasing cross-ownership reduces private firms' R&D but increases the semi-public firm's R&D. Further, both consumer surplus and social welfare could be enhanced through cross-ownership when the convexity of cost function is small. However, increasing cross-ownership could hurt consumers and social welfare when the convexity of cost function is large. Our finding highlights that the convexity of cost function is very important to the welfare implications of cross-ownership. Hence, antitrust authorities should be more careful when assessing the welfare effects of partial ownership in different industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview of national competition law developments from April 1 to June 30, 2024, highlighting significant cases and regulatory changes across various countries. Topics discussed include penalties for bid rigging in Australia, merger approvals and fines in Austria, and the Belgian Competition Authority's (BCA) new powers under the European Union (EU) regulations, among other key updates.

I review the literature on eCommerce platforms with particular emphasis on the antitrust debate on Amazon. The business model of hybrid marketplaces is based on monetization through fees on third party sellers hosted on the platform and direct margins on own products. Recent theoretical and empirical work on endogenous marketplace structures has analyzed the welfare impact of the dual mode and of recommendation algorithms that have been associated with self‐preferencing strategies. The trade offs are complex and one cannot easily conclude that Amazon entry is biased to expropriate third party sellers or that a ban on dual mode, self‐preferencing or copycatting would benefit consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organization theorists and innovation economists have been arguing for the past few decades that the locus of research and development activities has gradually moved away from vertically integrated firms to inter-firm alliances. In industries as diverse as construction and biotechnology, cooperation for innovation has given rise to collaborative forms of industrial organization varying from bilateral alliances to networks. Nonetheless, the EU competition law framework opens up limited space for inter-firm collaborations, cabined by the efficiency test of Article 101(3) TFEU and the requirements of the horizontal block exemption regulations. Building on this misfit, this article makes two contributions. First, a theoretical one, arguing that the law's cautious approach to inter-firm collaboration is rooted in a binary vision of industrial organization which recognizes only firms and markets as modes of organizing production. Second, an explanatory one, showing how the 2023 Research & Development Block Exemption Regulation falls short of facilitating inter-firm collaborations for innovation and proposing fine-tuning suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American healthcare is known for insufficient competition, high prices, and porous quality. This landscape seems to have not only degraded consumer welfare in general terms but also harmed marginalized communities. As examples, high prices levy greater costs on uninsured people who are more likely to forego treatment while medical bills constitute a primary reason why Americans declare bankruptcy. Helping to explain this state of affairs, hospitals, providers, and doctors adhere to a curious type of practice about prices: there are no prices. By preventing comparison shopping, opacity seems to restrict competition, erect barriers to entry, and enable firms to charge supracompetitive prices. So why hasn't antitrust law scrutinized one of the most anomalous, unique, and perhaps anticompetitive practices in healthcare?. One theory has surfaced that opaque pricing is procompetitive. The assertion is that providers and hospitals would collude (even more) if prices were known; absent knowledge of each other's rates, hospitals cannot supposedly fix them. Put differently, opacity appears to satisfy antitrust law because it is ostensibly the presence of visible prices that enables collusion. Helping to explain this argument's success, some authorities have treated healthcare with an antithetical approach to antitrust's conventional principles in that competition is said to harm patients and consumers. Antitrust courts have even called hospitals "good citizens" who wouldn't abuse their monopoly power. As a result, pricing opacity has largely evaded antitrust scrutiny even though U.S. healthcare bears the traits of an uncompetitive market. This Article argues that opaque pricing must, in many instances, incur antitrust review. It shows that healthcare markets can seldom support more than a few firms, making collusion more sustainable and achievable. Further, people can rarely avoid buying critical care, which prevents markets from self-correcting and enables providers to charge supracompetitive premiums. And since most patients make decisions based upon their doctor's guidance, opacity creates informational asymmetries whereby providers can dictate prices and prescribe unnecessary treatments. In essence, this Article sheds light on how pricing opacity impedes competition, helping to explain the high prices, waste, and inequities plaguing U.S. healthcare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]