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I INTRODUCTION Amid concerns that New Zealand's grocery duopoly is charging unfairly high retail prices, (1) the Commerce Commission (NZCC) released a critical report, illuminating the anti-competitive practices within the [...], New Zealand's retail grocery sector is dominated by a duopoly that impedes opportunities for new entry by lodging restrictive covenants on strategic sites and exclusive covenants in lease agreements. This enables the duopoly to limit competition and artificially raise grocery prices, harming consumers and society as a whole. In response, the Government has recently passed legislation prohibiting the duopoly's covenants. This article applauds action against anti-competitive grocery covenants. However, it argues that enforcement action, rather than legislation, would have been the more appropriate avenue forfour reasons. First, under the new legislation, grocery retailers can apply for an exemption so that certain covenants remain in force, the outcome of which can be appealed. This means cases concerning grocery covenants will likely appear before the courts anyway. Secondly, enforcement action under existing legislation would have captured a key distinction that the new legislation overlooks. That is, while the duopoly's restrictive covenants are overwhelmingly anticompetitive and should all be unenforceable, in limited circumstances exclusive covenants are arguably net pro-competitive and should remain in force. Thirdly, and flowing from this, establishing via the courts that grocery covenants are in fact anti-competitive would have provided a more legitimate basis for prohibiting them. Finally, the Government's position that litigation is inefficient as each covenant must be individually analysed overlooks both the ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New Zealand Ltd collective covenants approach under s 28 and the s 30 cartel provisions in the existing Commerce Act 1986. To this end, this article argues that all of the duopoly's restrictive covenants and the great majority of their exclusive covenants breach existing competition laws, namely ss 28 and 30 of the Commerce Act.

I INTRODUCTION The Government intends to amend New Zealand's monopolisation, provision s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. (1) A reason is that s 36 fails to capture sufficient anticompetitive [...], One of Professor Prebble's many achievements is that he is a fellow of the Law and Economics Association of New Zealand. This achievement recognises his contribution to the economic analysis of law. The first field to which scholars applied economic analysis of law was competition law. This article examines a particularly contentious area of New Zealand's competition law; viz the Efficient Component Pricing Rule and s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. This rule first arose in Clear Communications Ltd's dispute with Telecom Corp of New Zealand Ltd. The Privy Council endorsed charging on the basis of the rule--saying its use did not breach s 36. Many years later New Zealand's Court of Appeal held Telecom's use of it amounted to a breach of s 36 in the context of price squeeze litigation. This article examines how the Court of Appeal concluded this. It looks at the economics of price squeezes and the rationale behind the Efficient Component Pricing Rule. It discusses United States law on price squeezes and shows how that law is hostile to finding competition law liability for price squeezes. It outlines the New Zealand cases and analyses the reasoning of the cases particularly the Court of Appeal price squeeze case. It concludes that in holding use of the rule was a breach of s 36 the Court has eliminated the equally efficient competitor standard test for monopolisation and interred the Efficient Component Pricing Rule. It also argues that proscribing price squeezes is worthwhile.

Introduction 109 I. Innovation and Intellectual Property in Africa 111 A. The Relationship Between Innovation, Intellectual Property and Trade 111 B. Importance of Innovation in Africa 113 C. AfCFTA's Potential [...]

CONTENTS I Introduction II Background III International Jurisdiction A Effects Doctrine B Implementation Test C Nationality Principle D Limits to the Exercise of International Jurisdiction E Bias towards Over-Enforcement because [...]

The article discusses the objectives and principles of the use of settlements in public antitrust enforcement. Two questions, that is, conditions under which the use of settlements gives optimum antitrust enforcement and the conditions under which self-incrimination and waivers of the procedural rights by candidates opting for settlement are agreeable with the fundamental rights of defense are examined.

The need for substantive harmonization of competition laws throughout the world is discussed. Topics include conflicting social objectives, transparency of law review, the problem of combined prosecution and judging, and appeals by independent tribunals.

This Article analyzes the economic incentives countries face in selecting an antitrust policy. It demonstrates that, in the presence of international trade, antitrust policies chosen by national governments will generally not lead to an outcome that is desirable from an international perspective. Professor Guzman identifies the reasons why national policies are different from the optimal global policy and shows how the direction of the deviation from the optimal policy depends on trade patterns and the extent to which national laws are applied extraterritorially. The author concludes that, although international agreement is not impossible, the prospects for substantive cooperation on international antitrust policy are slight. Unlike trade policy, an international agreement on antitrust policy would benefit some countries at the expense of others. The Article identifies the potential winners and losers from such an agreement and points out that because international compensatory transfer payments are unlikely, an agreement will be difficult to achieve. Recognizing that agreement is nevertheless desirable to avoid welfare losses associated with a noncooperative approach to international antitrust policy. Professor Guzman analyzes the fora in which antitrust agreements are most likely to be negotiated and assesses the likelihood of success in each forum. Because concessions in other areas of negotiation may be necessary to compensate countries that will suffer a loss under a cooperative antitrust policy, the analysis suggests that negotiations on antitrust policy should be combined with the negotiations of other issues.