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Im Folgenden werden die Ergebnisse einer Studie über die Wirkung des nonverbalen Verhaltens des Kommunikationsroboters Nabaztag und deren Implikation für das Nutzererleben dargestellt. 100 Probanden in Deutschland wurden Fotos des Hasen gezeigt, auf denen dieser verschiedene Ohrenpositionen hatte. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass mit den Positionen der Ohren, dem Hasen verschiedene Gefühlszustände zugeschrieben werden. Diese Ergebnisse sind vor dem Hintergrund eines gezielten matchings zwischen verbalen und nonverbalen Kommunikationsinhalten, aber auch für ein stimmiges Nutzererleben, und damit für den Nutzungsspaß, von essentieller Bedeutung.

Im Folgenden werden die Ergebnisse einer Fallstudie zur Evaluation der user experience und Motivationsfunktion eines Vokabeltrainers in Form eines Roboterhasen präsentiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Schüler einer fünften Klasse, die mit dem Hasen lernten, die Anwendung sowohl hinsichtlich des Ease of Use und der Perceived Usefulness als hoch einschätzten, als auch die hedonische und pragmatische Qualität des Roboterhasen Nabaztag als hoch bewertet wurde. Zudem waren die Schüler, die mit dem Roboter lernten anschließend in einer positiveren Stimmung als die, die nach der traditionellen Methode lernten. Nach einer Woche konnte bei den Schülern, die mit dem Nabaztag gelernt hatten, eine durchschnittlich höhere Zahl an erinnerten Vokabeln festgestellt werden als bei der Kontrollgruppe. Die Tatsache, dass die Schüler nicht nur Bereitschaft zeigten, den Nabaztag erneut zu benutzen, sondern ihn auch an Freunde weiterempfehlen würden, zeigt, zusammen mit den Ergebnissen der erfassten Skalen, dass die Applikation eine grundlegende Voraussetzung für die Entstehung von Motivation und Nutzungsspaß erfüllt.

A field study with a simple robotic companion is being undertaken in three iterations in the framework of a EU FP7 research project. The interest of this study lies in its design: the robotic interface setup is installed in the subjects' homes and video data are collected during ten days. This gives the rare opportunity to study the development of human-robot relationships over time, and the integration of companion technologies into everyday life. This paper outlines the qualitative inductive approach to data analysis, and discusses selected results. The focus here is on the interactional mechanisms of bringing conversations to an end. The paper distinguishes between "closing" as the conversational mechanism for doing this, and "closure" as the social norm that motivates it. We argue that this distinction is relevant for interaction designers insofar as they have to be aware of the compelling social norms that are invoked by a companion's conversational behaviour.

Extending Fitts’ law to more than one dimension has been recognized as having important implications for HCI. In spite of the progress made over the years, however, it is still far from a resolved issue. Our work approaches this problem from the viewpoint of a configuration space, which has served as a useful conceptual framework for understanding human preference in perception. Notably, human are found to be biased towards regular configurations. In this work, we ex- tended the configuration space framework to the domain of motor behavior, analyzed 2D pointing, and developed five models to account for the performance. An extensive experiment was conducted to measure the fit of the derived models and that of three previous models. Consistent with our hypothesis, the model reflecting a bias towards regular configuration was found to have the most satisfactory fit with the data. The paper concludes with discussions on improving understanding of Fitts’ law and the implications for HCI.

Companions as interfaces to smart rooms need not only to be easy to interact with, but also to maintain long-term relationships with their users. The FP7-funded project SERA (Social Engagement with Robots and Agents) contributes to knowledge about and modeling of such relationships. One focal activity is an iterative field study to collect real-life long-term interaction data with a robotic interface. The first stage of this study has been completed. This paper reports on the set-up and the first insights.

Increasing dependence of work on technological systems presents operators with various cognitive demands. Just as human work depends on technology, so does the safe and effective functioning of technological systems depend on operators. Operators are often involved in handling multiple tasks which requires prospective memory processes in fulfilling the task demands. Prospective memory failure can lead to serious losses. In the pursuit of future improvement of technology and utilization of human capabilities, researchers need to look at operator characteristics such as monochronic-polychronic task handling behavior and expertise to reveal performance differences of operators.

Cognitive Linguistics as an enterprise provides new theoretical and methodological instruments in understanding the relationship between people’s thoughts and the language they use. Spiritual and religious experiences (particularly the ones involving some type of revelation from or communication with a transcendent being) are especially interesting since they involve some type of external, physically invisible force or agent, contributing an “ineffable” quality to the phenomenon. However, people can and do describe such events, and metaphors and blends pervade the representations of certain concepts of the transcendental when attempting to talk about such abstract ideas. One of the main tenants of Cognitive Linguistics is that people’s views about themselves and the world around them are deeply rooted in their conceptual systems, created by their experiences and their bodily interactions with the world, whether they be physical, psychological or social. People who practice spirituality reach certain states by means of personal or collective rituals, such as prayer, meditation, and bodily procedures involving discipline, as is the case of fasting or re-understanding pain. When they then communicate certain religious and spiritual concepts, they are revealing a great deal about themselves and their world and the way they interact with it. Concepts dealing with people’s system of beliefs are very “meaningful” for the individual, and the more entrenched a frame of mind is, the less plastic it is, a fact confirmed by the neurosciences which claim that it is difficult to break down and reconstruct certain synaptic structures of the brain. But how do people who have had such awesome experiences represent these supernatural encounters and their states of being? What is the relationship between the concepts of body and soul in devotees who torture their bodies, who have out of body experiences or who describe a body possessed by other spirits? What does the language they use say about the individuals’ concept of themselves and their world? I will present some of my own research data containing conceptual metaphors and blends collected in various sacred texts and during a series of interviews of people who claim to have had such supernatural experiences. The data includes linguistic expressions as well as gesture. Moreover, the interviewees were asked to draw on paper certain experiences of spiritual nature and then to describe their pictures. My investigation will try to shed new light on the phenomenology of spiritual experiences and personhood, using cognitive linguistics as a prime tool of analysis.

I will explore some of my conclusions concerning conceptual metaphors collected during a series of interviews, in particular with two Christian street preachers. The data includes speech, gesture, and commented drawings of God, themselves and paradise. Some of the metaphors analyzed are: metaphors for God (FATHER, SHEPHERD, LOVER, etc); GOOD/GOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN; STRICT FATHER vs. NURTURING PARENT; MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY. This data demonstrates that the more entrenched a frame of mind is, the less plastic it is, because the primary source domain of our habitual conceptual metaphor will always motivate any other “laminated domain mappings”, or blends, especially for such meaningful concepts like personhood or belief systems. My investigation will try to shed new light on the phenomenology of religious experiences and personhood, using cognitive linguistics as a prime tool of analysis.

Traditionally, spiritual experiences have been considered "ineffable," but metaphors pervade the representations of certain concepts of the transcendental in an attempt to talk about such abstract ideas. Whether it be during the description of a vision or simply talking about morality, people use conceptual metaphors to reason and talk about these concepts. Many representations of God, spirits, or the afterlife are culturally based, but whereas some may differ based on individual experiences, others seem to have a more universal character. From a phenomenological point of view, it seems that the descriptions are contingent and not necessary, that is, the language a believer is exposed to may influence, but not condition a priori, his or her own spiritual experience as Constructivists have thought. People's views about themselves and the world around them are deeply rooted in their conceptual systems, which are created by their experiences and their bodily interactions with the world, whether it's having to do with gravity in the case of UP and DOWN, or what our individual and social concepts are. When people talk about religious and spiritual concepts, they are revealing a great deal about their world and themselves and the way they interact with it. Concepts dealing with people's system of beliefs are very "meaningful" for the individual, and the more entrenched a frame of mind is, the less plastic it is, a fact confirmed by the neurosciences, which claim that it is difficult to break down and reconstruct certain synaptic structures of the brain. How do today's common "faithful" relate to certain metaphors about spiritual concepts transmitted by their faiths? What do these metaphors say about the individuals' concepts of themselves and their world? I will explore some of my own conclusions concerning conceptual metaphors and figurative language collected in various sacred texts and during a series of interviews of religious people with different backgrounds of religious systems. The data include linguistic expressions as well as gesture. Moreover, the interviewees were asked to draw on paper certain experiences of religious nature and then to describe their pictures. My investigation will try to shed new light on the phenomenology of religious experiences and personhood, using cognitive linguistics as a prime tool of analysis.

This paper presents an iterative model of knowledge acquisition of gender information associated with word endings in French. Gender knowledge is represented as a set of rules containing exceptions. Our model takes noun-gender pairs as input and constantly maintains a list of rules and exceptions which is both coherent with the input data and minimal with respect to a minimum description length criterion. This model was compared to human data at various ages and showed a good fit. We also compared the kind of rules discovered by the model with rules usually extracted by linguists and found interesting discrepancies.

Storicamente il cristianesimo deve molto al giudaismo. Il cristianesimo di San Paolo, tuttavia, ha cambiato il modo di ragionare su concetti come il sé, il corpo, e la cognizione umana. Senza volere trattare certi concetti teologici, mi prefiggo di sottolineare come il punto di vista della scienza moderna è più vicino al giudaismo tradizionale che al cristianesimo, e di spiegare la diffusione dell’“errore” di Paolo nel mondo occidentale, analizzando la semantica dei riferimenti linguistici (e in particolar modo le metafore e le metonimie) dei concetti anima e corpo e del rapporto con la concezione del sé. Cresciuto da “uomo franco” cioè, da cittadino romano in un ambiente cosmopolita, Paolo è considerato il testimone più influente e produttivo del pensiero cristiano nell’Asia Minore e nell’Europa Occidentale. Le sue epistole circolarono durante la sua vita e continuano ad influenzare miliardi di seguaci, i quali spesso interpretano le sue idee in modo contrastante, ma ciononostante attestando una specifica autorevolezza. Erudito greco-romano, inizialmente persecutore dei primi Cristiani, Paolo ha lottato per diffondere la storia di Gesù di Nazareth. La sua ideologia, infatti, è stata vista da molti come un amalgama tra il pensiero greco-romano e ciò che egli stesso ha appreso dai primi cristiani. Queste caratteristiche elleniche, più o meno reali, del sistema religioso introdussero una differenza significativa all’interno del pensiero giudaico tradizionale, dal quale, per mezzo dell’influenza dei suoi scritti, si sarebbe sviluppato il credo cristiano. Di fatti, il cristianesimo ha acquisito una struttura più coerente grazie a Paolo, quasi da inferire che la fede cristiana deve più a Paolo che a Gesù. Quale era l’errore di San Paolo? La domanda vuole essere sia allusiva che provocatoria. L’insegnamento giudaico a proposito del concetto del sé era piuttosto olistico. Per esempio, la parola ebraica nephesh è spesso tradotta come “anima” ma, metaforicamente, significa anche “corpo”, mentre, secondo i suoi interpreti, Paolo chiaramente fa delle distinzioni dualistiche, e parlando della “concupiscenza” predica la necessità di dominare la carne per esaltare lo spirito. Con gli strumenti della linguistica cognitiva, propongo un’analisi della polisemia e degli slittamenti semantici nei concetti di ANIMA e CORPO, e come l’autorità attribuita a Paolo eventualmente ha influenzato il pensiero occidentale sul ragionare di queste rappresentazioni mentali.

During interaction with computer-based 3-D simulations like virtual reality, users may experience a sense of involvement called presence. Presence is commonly defined as the subjective feeling of "being there". We discuss the state of the art in this inno vative research area and introduce a situated cognition perspective on presence. We argue that presence depends on the proper integration of aspects relevant to an agent's movement and perception, to her actions, and to her conception of the overall situ a tion in which she finds herself, as well as on how these aspects mesh with the possibilities for action afforded in the interaction with the artifact. We also aim at showing that studies of presence offer a test-bed for different theories of situated co gnition.›

The pragmatic analysis of cartoons poses numerous difficulties for theoretical pragmatics as well as applied areas. There have been theoretical, pragmatic and experimental studies to uncover the quality of humors, but there is neither a theory specifically designed to account for the source and degree of humorosity in cartoons nor a general theory applicable to the domain of cartoons. Yet three models are prevalent in humor research: the first model (the script-based semantic theory of humor; SSTH) addresses what makes a text humorous and a cognitivistic account mobilizing the notion of scripts and script opposition. The second model (Setup, Incongruity, Resolution; SIR) which dovetails with the former and the third one concerns the stages involved in humor comprehension: three stages are proposed. Finally the third model (the general theory of verbal humor; GTVH) addresses the issue of what makes a text humorous again in a seemingly comprehensive way though it fails to account the nature of cartoons since it is a theory of verbal humors only and since cartoons are not necessarily based on verbal humors to be humorous. In this study, Piyale Madra’s cartoon band ‘Ademler ve Havvalar’ is taken to be cases to investigate. The cartoons that had published at the newspaper ‘Radikal’ since Oct. 1st up until Dec. 17th 2001 are selected for closer scrutiny. Based on the bits and pieces of these cartoons a general overview of a theory of cartoons is presented though such a theory needs cross-validation transcending the idiosyncrasies of a single cartoonist. That is, in order to construct a theory, further studies are necessary in which cartoons by cartoonists of extremely different mentalities are necessary. This is one of the major limitations of this study.

This paper attempts to formulate basic building blocks of an intent-oriented process design theory. Motivated by process engineering literature, this work extends the notion of process to an interactive algorithm that executes relational order according to environmental rules and conditions to satisfy an intention. This generalization of process takes into account physical and metaphysical environments. To classify processes beyond the activity, product, decision, and context oriented categories of process models, process complexity is defined by adopting an object-oriented view of situations and actions. Action-types and situation-types are mathematically formulated. This view of situations and actions concludes that process complexity is caused by group representation of objects and group inter-dynamics as formed by individual representation of objects and individual intra-dynamics then vice versa. An extension of intention theory that considers group and individual representations with inter-dynamics and intra-dynamics is concluded. An extended Nash Equilibrium approach is recommended as a future direction to solve group and individual intention dominance. This work recommends an abstract view of process actors as complex systems consisting of stable and modular subsystems. This abstract view includes human agents, information systems, and organizations – groups of human agents and information systems executing collective actions. This work views process actors as C3I3K complex systems (for Command, Control, Communications, Intention, Information, Intelligence, and Knowledge). A basic argument for the evolution of C3I3K complex systems is outlined. Finally, a model of the environment as distributed multilevel infrastructures (DMLI) is recommended to extend the four world model of process engineering.

Presence is commonly defined as the subjective feeling of "being there". It has been mainly conceived of as deriving from immersion, interaction, and social and narrative involvement with suitable technology. We argue that presence depends on a suitable integration of aspects relevant to an agent's movement and perception, to her actions, and to her conception of the overall situation in which she finds herself, as well as on how these aspects mesh with the possibilities for action afforded in the interaction with the virtual environment.

Schlesinger (in press) recently proposed a model of eye movements as a tool for investigating infants’ visual expectations. In the present study, this gaze-direction model was evaluated by (a) generating a set of predictions concerning how infants distribute their attention during possible and impossible events, and (b) testing these predictions in a replication of Baillargeon’s "car study" (1986; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). We find that the model successfully predicts general features of infants’ gaze direction, but not specific differences obtained during the possible and impossible events. The implications of these results for infant cognition research and theory are discussed.

In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a test case of the interdisciplinary research programme in cognitive science. From the philosopher`s perspective the most pressing problem is how to talk about animal minds. Can we just employ the vocabulary of human psychology? If not, exploring animal minds contains the non-trivial task of introducing a terminology that allows to see the distinctness of animal minds and to see its connection to the human case. The treatment of some topic in cognitive science has to reach a reflective equilibrium between our intuitions, a phenomenological approach, philosophical conceptual analysis, various empirical approaches and model building. Reflective equilibrium means in this context that we have to reach a coherent model which incorporates as much of our intuitions concerning animal consciousness and integrates at the same time the findings of the different co-operating sciences. There can be various trade-offs in case of conflict between, say, philosophical definitions of mental terms as to be applied to animals, neurophysiology, our reflected intuitions and ethological model building based on a computational theory of animal minds. The paper gives an example of reflective equilibrium in discussing the case for awareness in vertebrates. It considers the role of evolutionary reasoning. The main focus lays on two examples of comparing our human notions (chosen here are “having concepts” and “belief”) with corresponding abilities in animals, and how an appropriate conceptual apparatus dealing with the abilities of animals could be introduced.

In discussions of the ontogenetic origins of numerical abilities to date, most of the research suggests that infants establish representations of numbers of objects presented visually, auditorily, and haptically. The question is not whether babies are sensitive to differences in number. The focus lies on what models can better account for the wealth of data. Some have suggested that the infant number capacity is in the format of object file representations, and is characterized by a small set size - ones, twos, threes, perhaps fours, predicted by limitations of short-term storage of an object file model (Uller et al., 1999). Others have proposed that the infant counting abilities are in the format of analog representations, roughly in a format comparable to that of rats and pigeons (Xu & Spelke 2000), where limit is not a concern. The task is to bring data to bear on this question to help decide between the two alternative models. Uller and Leslie (2000) began to address this issue. Utilizing the looking time technique, they showed 12- month-olds 2+1 and 2+0 event where two objects go behind a screen, then either 1 is added or 0 is added. The outcome is always 2. Another group of 12-month-olds see parallel events with 3, namely, 3+1 and 3+0. Babies are able to understand 'exactly 2', but not 'exactly 3', which provides support for an object file model. More recently, Uller (2001) investigated whether 12-month-olds understand exactly two using reaching and searching time as dependent measures. Twelve-month-old infants were shown 2 objects go into a box, then either a third one being added (2+1) or nothing being added (2+0) into the box. The outcome was always 2. In this study, she confirmed Uller and Leslie's (2000) looking time findings that 12-month-olds understand what 'exactly two' means. Parallel results were found by Feigenson, Carey & Hauser (in press) in a forced choice experiment testing 10- and 12-month-old infants. Here, babies had to choose between different numbers of graham crackers, namely, 2 vs 3, 3 vs 4, and 3 vs 6. The researchers found that babies only chose the bigger number in the small discrimination cases. When they saw 3 vs 6 and 4 vs 6, they randomly picked one or the other. In the current paper, I make the case for focusing on the young infant capacity for small number representation. I will argue that this is a capacity that can be found spontaneously in humans, nonhuman primates, avians and even lower vertebrates. I will also argue that this is a capacity that should be considered primitive and foundational, perhaps at the core of cognition. I will review the proposals available to date on the young infant representation of small number, and examine possible implementations that can be derived from these considerations.

While computational models are playing an increasingly important role in developmental psychology, at least one lesson from robotics is still being learned: modeling epigenetic processes often requires simulating an embodied, autonomous organism. This paper first contrasts prevailing models of infant cognition with an agent-based approach. A series of infant studies by Baillargeon (1986; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991) is described, and an eye-movement model is then used to simulate infants' visual activity in this study. I conclude by describing three behavioral predictions of the eyemovement model, and discussing the implications of this work for infant cognition research.

In this paper we expose the theoretical background underlying our current research. This consists in the development of behaviour-based knowledge systems, for closing the gaps between behaviour-based and knowledge-based systems, and also between the understandings of the phenomena they model. We expose the requirements and stages for developing behaviour-based knowledge systems and discuss their limits. We believe that these are necessary conditions for the development of higher order cognitive capacities, in artificial and natural cognitive systems.

Learning can be considered as a conjunction of a number of factors, both of internal and external origins. This paper offers a reconcilement of these factors in an interdependent unity, building a “total learning environment”, adding up emotional, sensorial, motivational and intellectual aspects. It also approaches the use of this reconcilement in virtual learning environments, seeking for technological tools for a permanent and renewing quest of knowledge, in contrast with the behaviorist model of repetition of content and stimulus-response conditioning.

Unfamiliar, large-scale virtual environments are difficult to navigate. This paper presents design guidelines to ease navigation in such virtual environments. The guidelines presented here focus on the design and placement of landmarks in virtual environments. Moreover, the guidelines are based primarily on the extensive empirical literature on navigation in the real world. A rationale for this approach is provided by the similarities between navigational behavior in real and virtual environments.