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This article deals with the contentious issue of the extent to which an intoxicated person, particularly one who has become inebriated of his or her own volition, should be permitted to escape liability on the basis that the degree of inebriation was sufficient to preclude the fact-finder from finding a volitional act or omission on the part of the accused and/or that he or she acted with the requisite mens rea, if any as defined by the common law or statutory definition of the offence. In addressing this issue, the article embarks upon a thorough analysis of the House of Lords seminal decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski [1977] AC 443 which, despite some very harsh criticism of late, continues to be the leading authority on this question in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. /As part of this analysis, the article examines and ultimately attempts to resolve the longstanding controversy over what has proved to be the elusive distinction between crimes of basic or general intent and those of specific intent. The article concludes by rejecting the Majewski principles in favour of those enunciated by the High Court of Australia in R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 54 ALJR 349. In reaching this conclusion, the article notes various legislative and academic proposals for reform as well as statutory reforms in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the exclusion of evidence under the common law and other statutory bodies in the legislation of uniform evidence at various places of Australia including the Commonwealth, Tasmania, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. It discusses the exclusionary rules and the discretions to the exclusion with respect to the poisonous tree doctrine of the U.S. regarding the rejection of fruit. Information on the Australian approach to the doctrine is also presented.