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In this article, the authors aim to offer a perspective on self-compassion capable of becoming part of a unified psychology; however not “from scratch”, but based on what Neff (2003a, b) proposed. This is through the analysis and refinement of her theory in two stages. First, they check whether the supposed six factors exist in the constitution of self-compassion using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) technique in a collected sample for this study (249 participants, 69.8% women ranging in age from 18 to 65, median = 22). In the second stage, they analyze and refine Neff’s theory based on the results of the EFA, and in light of an evolutionary perspective and Aristotle’s philosophy, following, respectively, the suggestions proposed by Zagaria et al. (2020); Osmo and Borri (2024a) that aim to unify psychological science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are all used to drawing straight lines to represent time, and above them, we plot historical events or physical or economic data. What to us is a self-evident convention, is however of an astonishingly recent date: it emerged only in the second half of the eighteenth century. To us, this late date seems paradoxical and cries out for an explanation. How else did earlier periods measure change, if not as a function of time? it will be argued that since Antiquity, time was taken to measure change, and change to occur in space. 'Our' idea of representing time as an independent dimension would have seemed aberrant. But then, a second issue arises. Did not medieval natural philosophers employ timelines, Oresme's diagram of the mean speed theorem being the most famous case? However, as will be shown, our interpretation of his diagram is probably wrong. This insight, in turn, takes care of a third paradox, namely Galileo's initial inability to represent the law of free fall correctly. This article will document that the timeline first emerged in the late sixteenth century in works on chronology, made its first appearance in physics in Galileo's diagrams, and had its general breakthrough in the eighteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In secondary literature, especially among orientalists, it is a frequent misperception that Ibn Khaldun was a loyal student of Aristotle and the Greek intellectual heritage at large. But Ibn Khaldun was remarkably selective and critical in his approach to the philosophical paradigm and philosophical models, and, in keeping with the general character of the muteakhhirûn period of Islamic thought, did not see any harm in occasionally benefitting certain concepts and models of philosophical accumulation. One of the places where this criticality and selectivity is manifested is his use of Aristotle's famous expression "Man is political by nature." While for Aristotle, this statement reflects a metaphysical and moral conception of the state as a necessary consequence of a human being's essence (nature), Ibn Khaldun interprets this statement solely in the context of sociality and the need for a division of labor to ensure the material existence and security of human beings. Beyond this, Ibn Khaldun does not ascribe a metaphysical and moral meaning and function either to 'umran, which he uses in the sense of sociality, or to the state/mulk, as Aristotle and his Muslim followers such as al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, and al-Tûsî did. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun criticizes these philosophers for doing so and underlines that the science of 'umran is a different discipline from political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late Ming Dynasty, Jesuit missionary Giulio Aleni introduced Western classical psychology to China, with the theory of the sensitive soul being his core focus. Scholars have conducted in-depth analyses of the textual sources, fundamental theories and pivotal influences of Xingxue cushu concerning Aleni's theory of the sensitive soul. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research in academia on the essence of common sense. In Aleni's Xingxue cushu, common sense not only determines the essence of a sensitive soul but also builds a bridge between a sensitive soul and rational soul. Consequently, common sense is a crux in Aleni's soul theory. As far as the purpose is concerned, this article combines macro and micro perspectives, exploring Aleni's argumentation strategy on the concept of common sense. Although Aleni regards common sense as the internal sense of human beings, he starts from the principle of wholeness in Xingxue cushu and regards common sense as the whole of the five external senses, indicating that the principle of wholeness is not contradictory to the principle of internality in the category of common sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, the great Aristotelian Commentator Ibn Rushd defines "knowledge" (scientific knowledge, epistemē, 'ilm) as one of Aristotle's five intellectual virtues and the faculty of reason, akin to the other virtues, in an Aristotelian way. Ibn Rushd defends the teleological argument, rooted in Aristotle's teleological reading of nature, and supports the modal strong epistemic status of this argument, which is part of the concept of knowledge, in his early work (Short Commentary on Metaphysics), middle period work (al-Kashf) and late work (Long Commentary on Metaphysics), all in harmony with each other. Ibn Rushd, constructing the teleological argument based on the definition of knowledge, which fundamentally articulates the necessary or essential qualities inherent in objects in defense of de re modality, takes a step that seems quite radical within the context of the Aristotelian epistemic tradition to which he is affiliated: The teleological argument, strongly associated with the concept of knowledge—one of the five intellectual virtues—is presented as a form of deductive inference accessible not only to philosophers but also to ordinary public. In other words, according to him, the argument is both a philosophical and a religious way. This implies, for instance, that natural theology, typically viewed by Aquinas as an activity reserved for the higher epistemic class with talent and leisure, is seen by Ibn Rushd as a robust epistemic activity accessible to ordinary people. This new element, which can be referred to as common sense natural theology, contends that ordinary public knowledge and philosophers' knowledge differ in details, such as whether it is a simple or complex deductive inference, while remaining the same in terms of their knowledge status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article's goal is to understand innovation factors (e.g., job autonomy and knowledge sharing) through the lens of a neo-Aristotelian theory based on evolutionary science in order to show that this paradigm of analysis provides a richer understanding of this organizational phenomenon, and consequently better support for the deliberation on what measures to implement when the objective is to make the organization prone to innovate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the second half of the 17th century, Perrault’s and Mariotte’s works, followed by Halley’s measures of evaporation, paved the way to the comprehenison of the hydrological cycle as it is currently understood. In Italy the debate was lively and involved a number of scholars, who actively or only cursorily dealt with the theme. They were pure or applied mathematicians, natural scientists, Jesuit scholars and physicians, technicians and connoisseurs of the matter. In this work we reanalyse this complex and multifaceted debate, which, over the course of the century from 1642 to 1741, slowly came to the acceptance of the new paradigm, in the light of the following interpretative keys: (i) the relationship with the coeval international literature, (ii) the legacy of Galilean and Newtonian mechanics, (iii) the attitude towards measurement and experimental practice, (iv) the persistencies of the Aristotelian epistemology and perception of Nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The meaning of the term mimesis when applied to artistic works in Aristotle's Poetics is thought to be extrapolated from its dictionary definition of 'imitation'. I argue that a key word in the single passage directly linking mimesis to imitation has been consistently misunderstood. A correct reading could indicate mimesis has a different definition in this particular text only indirectly related to its colloquial use. I conclude that mimesis in the Poetics may be a narrower technical term that refers to a particular kind of organization or arrangement of individual imitations within an artistic work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses automation from the point of view of the intersection between Aristotle and Marx. First, it was Aristotle's notion of automatous – self-moving tools – that gave rise to the contemporary concept of automation. Marx's historical materialism is important as it puts the ongoing process of automation into a historical perspective. The development of self-moving machines should free us from the slavery of hard work, yet the legal and political superstructure of capitalism means that the growth of automation produces new forms of precarious wage-slavery. Alasdair MacIntyre's Aristotelian notion of practice is discussed vis-à-vis the Marxian notion of alienated labour. Given the conceptual structure – alienated labour (which prevents us from flourishing) versus non-alienated labour (as essential for human flourishing) – the article poses the question of whether we can apply this in our attempt to assess the ongoing process of automation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like other key terms in the medical and health humanities—empathy, creativity, and reflection, to name just a few—wellness has become a weasel word, rife the language of optimization, duty, and self-perception. While alternative vocabularies exist—well-being and quality of life among them—these options usually privilege the objectives of academic (often psychological) research, health institutions, and the economic state apparatus, rather than people themselves. In mind of these concerns, why attempt to make a case for wellness at all? We present a historically informed, theoretically driven, praxis-guided framework for a renewed vision of social wellness (a concept first defined in the late 1950s). While definitions since Bill Hettler's "hexagonal" model (1980) have included mutual respect for others and the assumption of cooperative behaviors, conspicuously absent from contemporary definitions and usage is any mention of the aesthetic realm, which we—alongside philosophers like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum—take as a central human capability. How can the relational possibilities of arts engagement be understood as not just a means of promoting individual wellness, but also as a method and outcome of social wellness? We propose that social wellness is ultimately premised on the interplay between wellness of the collective and the strength of the relational encounters it engenders. We turn to a key practice paradigm—community arts engagement—as both a vehicle for and site of social wellness. With brief reference to a Canadian exemplar, we conclude with concrete recommendations for addressing critical opportunities for advancing arts-led social wellness initiatives involving academic and community partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tension at the heart of Aristotle's understanding of organic activities, created by his appeals to the productive activities of craftsmen and his use of normative language to characterize the goals of such activities. In this paper I discuss two ways of interpreting Aristotle's teleology aimed at resolving this tension, and discuss a closely analogous tension at the heart of a number of contemporary defenses of teleological reasoning in biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regularly invoked but rarely defined, 'the rule of law' has over the last few decades been converted from a legal term of art into one of the most ambiguous slogans of contemporary public policy. Political scientists claim it as a crucial test of a regime's legitimacy. Economists maintain that it provides an essential foundation of a flourishing market economy. Philosophers suggest it captures the essence of the state as a moral association. Historians acknowledge that, even if they might distrust such an abstract notion, the imposition of effective inhibitions on power is an 'unqualified human good'. And lawyers, of course, have treated it as the foundation of their discipline ever since the mid-thirteenth century when Bracton asserted that 'there is no rex where will rules rather than lex'. Those who extend its usage beyond the confines of professional legal discourse commonly give it a positive valence. But the rule of law also has its detractors. These critics assert that it promotes purely formal, individualistic values at the expense of substantive justice, or that it is a smokescreen preventing us from seeing the impact of recent global developments that signal the rule of lawyers. Some anthropologists even denounce it as an imperial ideology that legitimates European conquest and the plunder of the rest of the world. But given the fact that almost every state in the world now claims to act in compliance with the rule of law, these critics seem to have done little to dent its appeal. Yet, the sheer range of views and perspectives that now exist about the meaning, purpose, and value of the rule of law considerably complicates any inquiry into its current standing. In this paper, I will try to bring some clarity to the issue by providing a sketch of the main varieties of ways in which the term is being invoked. The paper comprises five sections, which each address a specific aspect of the term's usage: (1) its coinage in English law, (2) the adoption of a superficially similar terminology in the German concept of the Rechtsstaat, (3) the jurisprudential innovations that complicate its meaning, and finally its most recent invocation (4) first in development work and (5) secondly in constitutional rejuvenation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Elenchos: Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses the debate regarding the terms makarios ("blessed") and eudaimon ("happy") in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. In it, I identify two scholarly conclusions regarding these terms: (1) the distinction thesis: that the words mean different things in the text, and (2) the interchangeability thesis: that the words do not mean different things in the text, and may be substituted for one another. I argue that the theories should both be used as heuristic tools of analysis, rather than only one of them being used as a universal rule to be applied to the text. Additionally, I argue that a third heuristic device is needed: I forward that while makarios and eudaimon are sometimes interchangeable (contra the distinction thesis) they are not synonymous (contra the interchangeability thesis). Rather, in some cases, both terms can be translated as "happy," but they are being used by Aristotle in reference to subjects with distinct natures. In these instances, eudaimonia can sometimes be interpreted as a properly human term, which we cannot apply to the gods. Or, if it is applied to the gods, it must be applied in a distinct, qualified way. Meanwhile, makarios can sometimes be interpreted as a properly divine term, used in reference to the gods or to a god-like status achieved by a human being who has superseded normal human achievement or capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I show that Aristotle's widely criticised exclusion of Platonic efficient causes at Metaph. A 6.988a7–17 is defensible as an interpretation of Plato, and that alternative accounts are unpersuasive. I argue that Aristotle is only interested in – what he supposes to be – Plato's first principles and that the usual candidates that are brought forward in scholarship as possible first principles and efficient causes (e.g. from the Timaeus and the Philebus) all fall short in crucial respects according to Aristotle. This reading has the dual benefit of illuminating Aristotle's strategy in book A and of letting him appear as a more trustworthy doxographer of his predecessors' views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the fifth-century comic coinage gnômotupos, which has not otherwise received scholarly attention. Translators of Aristophanes and Aristotle have typically glossed it into English as "maxim-coining" (with equivalents in other languages). This is a sensible inference from a fourth-century use of γνώμη, "maxim", and the verb τύπτειν, "stamping". It also tracks the importance of maxims to Sophistic-era adoption of wisdom-culture and the lore of the Seven Sages. Nevertheless, this typical gloss is incorrect. The term instead emphasizes "idea", as an insight, technique, or view relevant to some matter. "Stamping" (τύπτειν) an idea means coming up with an apt idea and giving it shape and articulacy. In a characteristic use of the adjective, Aristophanes speaks of gnômotupoi andres (Frogs). These are men who are skilled at "fashioning ideas", coming up with their content and their form. My claim is that Aristophanes has captured something crucial about the period we call the Sophistic movement or Greek enlightenment. The formulation, circulation, and competition of ideas is a matter of increasing self-consciousness in Athens. So too are those who formulate, circulate, and compete in them: intellectuals or, as gnômotupoi andres might be translated, "ideas-men." I even contend that those referred to as "sophists", sophistai, may in many ways be understood as gnômotupoi andres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Antik Tanulmanyok is the property of Akademiai Kiado and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

My aim in this paper is to examine Aristotle’s assertion in De Anima 1.3, 406b1-3 that the soul engages in the same motion as the body, focusing particularly on the puzzle and contentious phrase at 406b2, κατὰ τὸ σῶµα. By clarifying Aristotle’s specific notion of sameness and the argument’s context, I will attempt to demonstrate that it is still possible to defend the traditional interpretation of the phrase κατὰ τὸ σῶµα without emending the text. As I shall show, Aristotle’s assertion here is neither a repetition of his previous major premise nor an inappropriate generalization that hinders him from reaching a further conclusion. Instead, it serves as a crucial step in demonstrating the incoherence of the Platonic view, which posits that the soul is essentially a self- moving entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant information about Ibn Bājja's interest in climatology is limited to a few vague anecdotes. This article seeks to expand our understanding of his views on the inhabitable and uninhabitable regions of the earth, drawing primarily on his commentaries on Aristotle's Meteorology (al-Āthār al-ʿulwiyya) and Generation and Corruption (al-Kawn wa-l-fasād). The article presents an attempt to explain why Ibn Bājja believed that some sections of the earth are inhabitable, how climate affects the human character, and how this topic fits into Ibn Bājja's overall framework of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to G.E.M Anscombe's paper 'Modern Moral Philosophy', modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral 'ought' are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe's historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on 'ought' and obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger's Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle's account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strabo, in 10.3.7-23, presents an account of the music performed in initiation rites, according to which such music is used, naturally, to facilitate knowledge of divinity. I argue that, despite appearances, religious music, for Strabo, does not fulfill that function by reflecting the harmonious constitution of the cosmos—a Pythagorean-Platonic (and later, Stoic) idea that Strabo mentions but ultimately rejects. Instead, Strabo's account is clearly influenced by Aristotelian theory, and it stresses the significance of the emotional effect (i.e., awe or astonishment) generated by religious music, which in turn is useful toward gaining knowledge of the gods, most probably because it motivates audiences to learn about them. Indeed, the affinity between Strabo's text and Aristotle seems sufficient for Strabo's 10.3.23, perhaps in addition to parts of 10.3.7 and 10.3.9, to count as Aristotelian 'fragments.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the following close examination of chapter 26 of Aristotle's Poetics it is argued (a) that unlike the main part of the treatise, tragedy and epic are no longer compared in the frame of 'poetic art', i.e. as literary genres, but rather as Gesamtkunstwerke judged by elitist criteria; (b) that the chapter adopts a logical method of argumentation founded on the dialectical method of the Topics ; (c) that, as at the end of Book 8 of the Politics , it mainly reflects disputes in the Academy instigated by the so-called 'New Music'; (d) that for a variety of reasons this chapter of the Poetics and hence the earlier layer of the treatise dates back to Aristotle's first Athenian period (367-347 BCE). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The educational approach known as positive education emerged from positive psychology and frequently attributes its conception of flourishing to Aristotelian eudaimonia. This is a point of contention between scholars who see positive psychology's flourishing as an epithet of Aristotelian virtues and others who have identified critical divergences between the philosophical foundations of positive psychology and Aristotle's normative ethics. Few scholars have examined whether adolescent understandings of flourishing reflect Aristotelian eudaimonia, and whether this is different in positive education students. This paper explores notion of the good life through the writings of 226 adolescents, 93 of whom attend a school that has implemented positive education. These are analysed through an Aristotelian lens, finding more similarities than differences between the groups. Both groups discussed relationships, emotions, and accomplishments, but moral goodness and virtue were not prominent. Conclusions are drawn about the implications of this for 'positive' education and the role it plays in nurturing flourishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara University / Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رسالة البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رسالة الالهیّات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

Porphyry's work titled Isagoge is commonly seen as an analysis of Aristotle's Categories, focusing on universal concepts, with the five predicables considered as different types of universals. Often, the same view is ascribed to Aristotle, but in fact, it is an approach arising from a confusion between universal and whole, as well as a confusion between particular and part by Porphyry in the Isagoge. In Categories, Aristotle does not refer to "whole" and "part" as synonyms for "universal" and "particular. Porphyry, however, in some cases distorting this distinction, uses “whole” and “part” to mean “universal” and “particular”. Moreover, they disagree on the essence of the five predicables and their relation to the universal. Aristotle views genes and species as universals and their connection to individuals as universal to particular, but he distinguishes them from the concept of universal and does not believe every universal is a genes or species. Porphyry, on the other hand, reduces genes and species to mere universal conceptions and consider them as synonyms for universal. It appears that there are two approachs in the philosophical tradition that started with Porphyry. These approachs were perpetuated and broadened by later thinkers. Initially, he altered the understanding of whole and part to universal and particular. Furthermore, he reduced genes and species to mere universal.

Some remarks in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nichomachean Ethics indicate that the voluntariness of actions is significantly related to compulsion and ignorance. According to a plausible interpretation, these remarks suggest that if an agent performs an action under compulsion or due to ignorance of some relevant facts, then she does so involuntarily. An objection to this interpretation with regard to compulsion is that an agent can voluntarily do what she is compelled to do. With regard to ignorance, one might object that it is necessary to clarify the proper range of relevant facts when considering whether an action performed out of ignorance is involuntary. In this paper, I develop two principles that align with the view that compulsion and ignorance are sufficient conditions for involuntary actions, while accommodating potential counterexamples and complications.

One of the influential topics in Islamic philosophy is the issue of "active intellect". This term has entered Islamic philosophy from Aristotle's philosophy and some interpreters of Aristotle's works. Islamic philosophers interpreted this issue in the context of their philosophical system and by expanding its concept from the field of natural and industrial (artistic) phenomena to the field of epistemology; they gave it a significant role. These philosophers have presented two types of arguments to prove the active intellect. Some of these arguments are formulated based on the theory of the nine spheres and according to the principle of causality. These arguments attemt to prove efficient causes for the existence of spheres and introduce ultimate causes for their rotational movements. Arguments of the second category also attempt to prove active intellect by relying on principles such as "every event and contingent needs an efficient cause" and "lacking a thing, it is not given to it". In this article, these arguments have been examined and finally, it has been concluded that the arguments of the first category are vulnerable and invalid due to the invalidity of their basis (planetary theory); and the arguments of the second category can only prove non-material and efficient cause or causes, provided that their premises are true, not the active intellect, i.e., the tenth intellect.

I argue that despite certain appearances, Aristotle does not think of ownership as the exclusive right of a person to decide upon the use and alienation of a thing. Rather, in Aristotle, ownership is a relation between a person and a thing such that (1) the thing is instrumental for this person’s life, (2) it is external to the organic body of the person, and (3) the person is protected against being excluded from the relevant kinds of access to the thing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle appeals to the prime mover: an unmoved mover that is the first moving cause of the world. Elsewhere, he calls the science concerned with the prime mover ‘theology’ (Meta. E.1, 1026a19). But what is the point of this science? On a common view, its purpose is to give an account of the prime mover itself, and especially to prove its existence. By contrast, I argue that Aristotle’s theology in Metaphysics Λ is ‘nature-bound’: it ultimately aims at explaining facts about the perceptible world, in particular the motion of heavenly bodies and the cycle of generation of perishable substances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its position in an introductory work to logic, the account of continuity presented by Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories is apparently even less accessible to the beginner than Aristotle’s original. This is in part because Al-Fārābī integrated elements of the accounts of continuity in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics into an account mainly derived from Aristotle’s Categories. While Al-Fārābī’s account chiefly follows Aristotle’s Categories 6 in describing a continuous object that can be divided into parts with a shared boundary, it borrows the terminology of limits from Physics 5 and the notion of quantity as divisible into its parts from Metaphysics 5.13. In doing so, Al-Fārābī defines continuity using a notion of a limit without determining whether or not it was part of the continuous quantity. This definition could also accommodate atomists, since it would work even if the limit were an atom or several atoms that were part of the continuous object. The broadness of this definition is probably intended to allow students of logic who may have atomist tendencies to accept the account of quantity in the categories tradition, even though they may not be ready to reject atomism until after studying physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the ‘same’ action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these ‘agential conditions’ are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I propose that they are instead ‘perfections,’ i.e., constitutive features of virtuous action as such, admitting of degrees. Unlike the alternative interpretation, my proposal fully harmonizes with three important Aristotelian doctrines: that action from virtue is prior to action merely in conformity with virtue; that character virtue is a perfection of human beings; and that practical life is not properly characterized in transitive, productive terms. My proposal still allows for a generic sense of ‘sameness’ in which the ‘same’ action may be virtuously or non-virtuously performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the potential of schools to enhance students' well-being and overall quality of life. The discussion is framed through two distinct perspectives: the Bildung tradition and Aristotelian ethics. In regions where the Bildung tradition is prominent, schools are traditionally viewed as environments conducive to fostering humaneness. However, contemporary educational policies often diverge from the core values of Bildung -oriented education. The article advocates for the continued promotion of Bildung and flourishing within schools. To achieve this, certain foundational conditions must be met. One such condition is acknowledging students' need for a sense of belonging and purpose, which is essential for their flourishing. This flourishing, in turn, equips students with the courage and resilience to face an uncertain future and contribute to societal change. For schools to foster a sense of belonging, they must be meaningful places of interaction and companionship, both physically and socially. This necessitates recognizing that educational environments are situated within specific geographical and cultural contexts. Consequently, education should not be excessively standardized. The Bildung tradition provides insights into why this is important. When combined with Aristotelian ethics, it becomes possible to develop schools that offer students a sense of belonging and purpose, thereby promoting their flourishing. In this framework, Bildung and flourishing are seen as concepts that embody possibilities and optimism, offering hope and empowerment at both individual and collective levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An enduring theory of the jury is that the institution is a tool the people can use against elites. The jury can be a sword, to give elites their just desserts. Or it can be a shield, to protect defendants against elite judges and prosecutors. Another possibility is that elites can use the jury to attack each other. As certain trials in ancient Athens and the trial of Donald Trump suggest, the jury can be weaponized in inter-elite warfare. Juries are especially useful in such battles, as they can help to cloak the power of judges, prosecutors, and other elites in instigating and driving the case. Montesquieu pointed to the ability of juries to cloak the power of elite judges, although he hoped judges would use their power to promote liberty. The legal system in the United States is particularly suited for the weaponization of juries; that of England and Wales, less so. An even better system may be the mixed panel of professional judges and lay jurors sitting together, in effect a microcosm of the Aristotelian mixed regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers often rely on sciences of their own time. This is especially true for scientists writing philosophical works. In the case of Ernst Mach, the scientific references are mainly to physics, physiology, evolutionary biology and—in a somewhat different manner—the new discipline of psychology. Like so many authors in the late 19th century, Mach had extreme confidence in the methods of the natural sciences. However, this trait, often called scientism or positivism, can easily be used in polemical accounts that obscure other aspects of Mach's thought. Mach is well-known for both his analysis of sensations and his evolutionary conception of perception and knowledge. The tension between the ambition to clarify the empirical basis of perception on the one hand and the focus on the natural origins of human perception on the other hand is, however, considerable. A comparison of these two perspectives can contribute to an ontological understanding of experience that sheds new light on the much-discussed topic of sense data and at the same time clarifies the difference between experience and observation and the role of experimental science in this context. In some respects, Mach seems closer to William James than to his followers in the Vienna circle. The accusation of idealism made by Lenin in his influential critique of positivism overlooks the implications of this naturalist approach but offers the occasion to dwell on the ontological implications of something that can be called natural historicity. Comparisons with Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Kant situate the empiricist theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘Unity of virtues’ (UV) in Aristotle is the claim that the ethical virtues are mutually entailing. But commentators typically focus on the fact that wisdom implies all the ethical virtues, without explaining how the ethical virtues themselves are mutually entailing. I argue that the so-called ‘Grand End’ view, understood as applying to both wisdom (φρόνησις) and political expertise (πολιτική), allows us to give an account of UV at the level of the ethical virtues. By discussing the ethical virtues individually, I show how all the ethical virtues can be seen as different aspects of the philosopher-statesman’s multifaceted character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a novel analysis of the relations between Aristotle's three species of desire – appetite, temper, and wish – and the three things he says in EN 2.3 lead to pursuit – the pleasant, the beneficial, and the noble. It has long been tempting to think that these trios line up with one another in some way, ideally relating their members in one-to-one fashion. One account, by John Cooper, has gathered prominent adherents, but other authors, notably Giles Pearson, have argued we should give up on even trying to correlate the two trios. I attempt to show that the two trios do relate in interesting ways, but not in a way that correlates their members in a one-to-one fashion. Instead, I argue that both appetite and temper are ultimately for the pleasant, while all things that an agent takes as objects of wish are conceived of as either pleasant, beneficial, or noble. This account conflicts with a dominant understanding of the species of desire as differentiated by their objects. I defend the view by showing that there is a second criterion for differentiating the species of desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is prima facie evidence that Theophrastus naturalized nous to the extent that he spoke of it in naturalizing terms. But our evidence also suggests that Theophrastus accepted the reasons Aristotle had for excluding nous from the reach of natural philosophy. We show that, far from revealing an inconsistency on Theophrastus' part, this apparent tension results from a consciously adopted strategy. Theophrastus is developing one aspect of Aristotle's account of nous he found underdeveloped and feared might be misunderstood, namely the infrangible organic unity of the whole human being, including its nous. That is why he insists that nous , although 'from outside,' is 'grown together' with us, why he speaks of it as a nature (phusis), and why he insists that thought is a motion (kinêsis). We show how these striking claims can be understood against the broader background of Theophrastus' natural philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our 'best state' and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the 'human' kind (ho anthrōpinos nous , 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a 'by-product' (en parergōi , 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs , I contend, equally applies to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the 'divine life' of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevailing narrative in the history of science maintains that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of a 'law of nature'. This paper overturns that narrative and shows that some ancient Greek philosophers did have an idea of laws of nature and, moreover, they referred to them as 'laws of nature'. This paper analyzes specific examples of laws of nature in texts by Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Galen. These examples emerged out of the closely intertwined Platonic and Pythagorean traditions, and these philosophers' texts make reference to laws of nature when describing arithmetical methods, arithmological doctrines, or medical theories. Nicomachus' laws of nature are especially noteworthy, because they have features that historians look for in the search for the origin of the modern concept of laws of nature. Nicomachus' laws of nature are mathematical, universal, and necessary. This paper raises the possibility that the ancient Platonic and Pythagorean traditions influenced the subsequent development of the idea of laws of nature in medieval and early modern Europe, including the conception of laws of nature deployed by Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Willowbrook Hepatitis Study is one of the best-known examples of unethical medical research, but the research has always had defenders. One of the more intriguing defenses continually used was that critics did not know the researchers on the study and, therefore, could not assess their ethics. This essay traces the appeal to the researchers' characters across published research and archival sources from the 1960s through today. These appeals reflect the observation as old as Aristotle that one of the most potent modes of persuasion is ethos or character. The specific types of character in these appeals develop out of the paternalistic nature of clinical and research practice in the mid-twentieth century. If the individual physician is the locus of medical judgment, then the physician's character becomes a key concern for bioethics. These appeals still appear and have implications for bioethics in the present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intuitively right answer to the question 'What am I?' is not 'an incorporeal spirit', but 'a human being'. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that 'the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.' And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our 'compound' nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions - the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicomachean Ethics 6.8 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. One dispute involves Aristotle's remarks about the relationship of phronēsis to politics: does Aristotle claim that phronēsis is foremost applicable to an individual's private life, to the political realm, or to some combination of the two? Two features of this dispute make it worthy of closer attention. First, the conflict of interpretations has not been documented as such. Second, I argue this contemporary conflict is a repetition of an ancient conflict about phronēsis that was being waged in 5th/4th century Athens. Phronēsis was a contested term alongside two related terms, apragmosynē (quietism) and polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness), and the construction of lines 1141b23–1142a12 enters into this historical debate to create a productive tension between two rival views. Aristotle heightens the tension between views represented by quietists and busybodies for his own purposes. In section 1, I surface the neglected historical frame of Nicomachean Ethics 6.8. In section 2, I turn to the contemporary conflict of interpretations, showing how it repeats the historical frame in many ways, and I provide a basic taxonomy of the views typically offered. In section 3, I bring the two debates – historical and contemporary – together and offer my own view of what Aristotle is up to in the passage. I argue that centering the historical frame in this passage highlights Aristotle's use of Isocratean-style phronēsis , while also transforming the concept by connecting it to a series of questions that go beyond Isocrates' view, thus preparing for a later exploration of the best forms of human living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that despite Aristotle's criticism of him, Isocrates does not actually hold the belief that political science, or universal knowledge of practical affairs, is impossible. When he appears to express this view, he is using hyperbole to distinguish himself from his adversaries. In reality, while he certainly underscores the significance of particular cases and doxa , he also claims to possess insights into universal principles concerning politics. He does so on the ground of philosophical arguments characterized by their consistency, sophistication, and substantive nature. These arguments are robust enough to be structured into a coherent system of principles akin to a political science in the Aristotelian sense of the term – although Isocrates himself never elaborated this science in a clear and systematic manner. The objective of this article is twofold: first, to defend this unconventional interpretation of Isocrates' political speeches, and second, to offer a systematic analysis of the implicit political science within them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]