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In the present article, we articulate three assumptions underlying theories proposing that restructuring processes play a key role in insightful problem solving: representational difficulty, representational change, and discontinuity in solution processes. We argue that these assumptions need empirical validation to justify the proposition of restructuring mechanisms that are unique from those involved in classic information-processing theories of problem solving. To this end, we review some theoretical and methodological obstacles that are inherent in the investigation of the existence and nature of restructuring processes. We then offer some recommendations on how to overcome or avoid these obstacles in future studies. Finally, we discuss some questions to help motivate new research.

Within the literature, there are two opposing views regarding the influencing role of emotions on the creative process. The most commonly held view contends that positive emotions enhance creativity and negative emotions stifle it; yet, some studies show an opposite trend. These contradictory findings can be explained by examining two aspects of the emotions: attention and creativity relationship. First, emotional valence and arousal levels interact to affect attention. Second, creativity is not a unitary cognitive process and some stages rely more on focused attention but others are aided by diffused or broad attention. To test this proposition, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, valence (positive vs. negative) and arousal (high vs. low) were manipulated and participants completed a series of attention and creativity tasks. Experiment 2 employed similar emotion induction procedure, but a different set of creative problems was used. The results of both experiments were consistent with the proposed explanation of the effects of emotions on creativity.

This study investigated the effects of working in dyads and their associated gender composition on performance (solution rate and time) and process variables (number of impasses, number of passed solutions, and number of problem solving suggestions and interactions) in a set of classic insight problem solving tasks. Two types of insight problems were used: multiple moves available (MMA) and few moves available (FMA) problems. The results showed no effects on number of problems solved or solving time, but group and gender composition effects emerged when looking at process variables such as number of impasses, time to impasse, number of passed solutions, number of problem solving suggestions, and number of interactions between dyad members. Results support prior evidence that process loss in creative problem solving may be due to differences in interpersonal interactions during group problem solving that do not necessarily affect overall problem solving success.

Gestalt psychologists proposed two distinct learning mechanisms. Associative learning occurs gradually through the repeated co-occurrence of external stimuli or memories. Insight learning occurs suddenly when people discover new relationships within their prior knowledge as a result of reasoning or problem solving processes that re-organize or restructure that knowledge. While there has been a considerable amount of research on the type of problem solving processes described by the Gestalt psychologists, less has focused on the learning that results from these processes. This paper begins with a historical review of the Gestalt theory of insight learning. Next, the core assumptions of Gestalt insight learning theory are empirically tested with a study that investigated the relationships among problem difficulty, impasse, initial problem representations, and resolution effects. Finally, Gestalt insight learning theory is discussed in relation to modern information processing theories of comprehension and memory formation.

Hindsight bias has been shown to be a pervasive and potentially harmful decision-making bias. A review of 4 competing cognitive reconstruction theories of hindsight bias revealed conflicting predictions about the role and effect of expectation or surprise in retrospective judgment formation. Two experiments tested these predictions examining the effects of manipulating the information presented in a text-based scenario and its congruency with the given outcome on surprise, hindsight bias, and recall. The results of Experiment 1 revealed evidence of hindsight bias after exposure to incongruent and ambivalent outcomes but not after exposure to congruent outcomes. Experiment 2 replicated the hindsight bias results and found that the ratio of outcome consistent information recalled was higher than expected in the incongruent and ambivalent conditions but equaled the ratio presented to participants in the congruent condition. The results were interpreted as supporting the general predictions of sense-making models of the hindsight bias. A refined version of this model is discussed. (Contains 2 tables and 2 figures.)

In two experiments, undergraduates' evaluation and use of multiple Internet sources during a science inquiry task were examined. In Experiment 1, undergraduates had the task of explaining what caused the eruption of Mt. St. Helens using the results of an Internet search. Multiple regression analyses indicated that source evaluation significantly predicted learning outcomes, with more successful learners better able to discriminate scientifically reliable from unreliable information. In Experiment 2, an instructional unit (SEEK) taught undergraduates how to evaluate the reliability of information sources. Undergraduates who used SEEK while working on an inquiry task about the Atkins low-carbohydrate diet displayed greater differentiation in their reliability judgments of information sources than a comparison group. Both groups then participated in the Mt. St. Helens task. Undergraduates in the SEEK conditions demonstrated better learning from the volcano task. The current studies indicate that the evaluation of information sources is critical to successful learning from Internet-based inquiry and amenable to improvement through instruction. (Contains 2 figures and 7 tables.)

Hindsight bias has been shown to be a pervasive and potentially harmful decision-making bias. A review of 4 competing cognitive reconstruction theories of hindsight bias revealed conflicting predictions about the role and effect of expectation or surprise in retrospective judgment formation. Two experiments tested these predictions examining the effects of manipulating the information presented in a text-based scenario and its congruency with the given outcome on surprise, hindsight bias, and recall. The results of Experiment 1 revealed evidence of hindsight bias after exposure to incongruent and ambivalent outcomes but not after exposure to congruent outcomes. Experiment 2 replicated the hindsight bias results and found that the ratio of outcome consistent information recalled was higher than expected in the incongruent and ambivalent conditions but equaled the ratio presented to participants in the congruent condition. The results were interpreted as supporting the general predictions of sense-making models of the hindsight bias. A refined version of this model is discussed. Keywords: hindsight bias, surprise, judgment, memory, sense making

The authors used a novel dual-component training procedure that combined a serial reaction time task and an artificial grammar learning task to investigate the role of instructional focus in incidental pattern learning. In Experiment 1, participants either memorized letter strings as a primary task and reacted to the stimuli locations as a secondary task or vice versa. In Experiment 2, participants were given the same dual-component stimuli but performed only one of the two training tasks. Instructional focus affected the amount of learning and the likelihood of acquiring explicit knowledge of the underlying pattern. However, the effect of instructional focus varied for the different types of stimuli. These results are discussed in terms of the role of focused attention in incidental learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been little policy effort to address sea level rise in coastal states in the US. It is important to examine, at the state level, how the multitude of different (and changing) actors with different preferences and perspectives contribute to such inertia. This study examines state-level legislative inaction with regards to sea level rise. Using Kingdon's multiple streams framework, we draw a picture of the policy landscape in Virginia as one where the problem of sea level rise is perceived as a low priority, with little consensus on achievable policy solutions, and is politically controversial. We find that policy inertia in Virginia is a result of (1) fractious viewpoints regarding sea level rise as a problem, (2) a lack of clear consensus on policy solutions, and (3) conflicting perspectives of the role of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]