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We analyze the natural experiment of ghost games in the 2019/2020 season of the German football Bundesliga and confirm previous studies showing that the home advantage diminishes if the stadium is empty. However, our paper is the first that distinguishes between effort- and skill-based tasks in this setting. In line with behavioral economics, we observe that a supportive audience has a positive effect on effort-based performance but a negative effect on some offensive skill-based performance measures.

In alpine skiing competitions, one of the coaches of the participating countries sets the course. This may provide an advantage, but it may also exert higher pressure on the racers. We analyze 40,150 men's and 36,968 women's performances from all competitions in alpine skiing's Slalom, Giant Slalom, and Super Giant disciplines that took place in the World Cups, World Championships, and Olympic Games between the 2001-02 and 2017-2018 seasons. We compare the performance of racers when competing on a course that was set by their compatriot to the performance of the same racers in the same season when the course was set by a coach from another country. Having a compatriot course setter only has an effect in the second (and decisive) run of the most technical discipline Slalom. We find that men fail significantly more often to complete their run when their compatriots set the course, whereas women fail significantly less in the same situation. The most likely drivers of our results relate to gender differences in response to feedback and choking under pressure in skill-based tasks.

We analyze the impact of psychological pressure on individual performance with handball penalties thrown in the decisive stage vs. the rest of the game. Contrary to the phenomenon of choking under pressure, we observe that most of the analyzed players perform best when it matters the most. The positive effect of pressure on performance is especially pronounced when the score is level or when the thrower's team is lagging. We control for gender and psychological traits assessed with a survey. Female players score with a higher probability than male players in our sample. The positive impact of pressure is not significantly higher for female players.

The replicability and credibility crisis in psychology and economics sparked the debate on underpowered experiments, publication biases, and p-hacking. Analyzing the number of independent observations of experiments published in Experimental Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, we observe that we did not learn much from this debate. The median experiment in our sample has too few independent observations and, thus, is underpowered. Moreover, we find indications for biases in reporting highly significant results. We investigate for which papers and experiments it is more likely to find reporting biases, and we suggest remedies that could help to overcome the replicability crisis.

We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts.

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is particularly large when members know about the composition of their group. The experimental results confirm these hypotheses. However, the information about the composition of the group turns out to be even more important than we expected. It helps cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to recognize the need for punishment early on and not to follow an uncooperative path that produces a persistently competitive attitude. These findings highlight the role of group composition and information for institution formation and that lessons learned by one group cannot be readily transferred to other groups.

Our handball penalty field experiment analyses the influence of psychological traits and pressure on individual performance in sequential tournaments. We use a short ABBA-sequence with four throws for each subject and observe an average score rate of 60% in our sample of amateur league players. On game level, we find a weak and insignificant first-mover advantage that becomes stronger and significant if we control for psychological traits and pressure. On shot level, we also find no significant first-mover advantage on average. However, confident individuals have a higher scoring rate in the role of player A and less confident individuals in the role of player B. Moreover, ceteris paribus, player A scores more goals than player B under tournament incentives. Whereas self-esteem increases the probability to throw a goal in our experiment, risk-taking reduces it.

Aggression is displaced when provocations cannot be directly retaliated against and when it is redirected towards a target innocent of any wrongdoing. While this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been widely explored in experimental economics. We fill this gap and find that a sizeable proportion of subjects (37%), when treated unfairly, punish co-players who are not at all responsible for the unfairness. When in a disadvantaged position, inequity-aversion seems to be the driving force of punishment, yet when treated fairly, some subjects (17%) exhibit status-seeking behavior. Moreover, students affiliated with an armed forces university are much more likely than regular students to engage in displaced aggression.

The goal of this paper is to show how adding behavioral components to micro-foundated models of macroeconomics may contribute to a better understanding of real world phenomena. The authors introduce the reader to variations of the Keynesian Beauty Contest (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 1936), theoretically and experimentally with a descriptive model of behavior. They bridge the discrepancies of (benchmark) solution concepts and bounded rationality through step-level reasoning, the so-called level-k or cognitive hierarchy models. These models have been recently used as building blocks for new behavioral macro theories to understand puzzles like the lacking rise of inflation after the financial crisis, the effectiveness of quantitative easing, the forward guidance puzzle and the effectiveness of temporary fiscal expansion.

In order to analyze if heterogeneity in psychological traits affects individual performance in sequential tournaments, we conducted a tennis field experiment. In the experiment, we also varied the payment schemes (individual, team, competition) to control for moderating effects of different incentives. Team incentives, risk taking, and self-esteem reduced performance whereas a preference towards competition enhanced it. On average, we observe a second mover advantage. However, individuals' psychological traits, such as self-esteem or self-efficacy, can turn a second mover into a first mover advantage. Our results shed new light on the discussion of first vs. second mover advantages and performance under pressure. Study findings have implications for psychological requirements of competitive and team tasks in business settings.

Der Bericht zum Forschungsvorhaben "Weiterentwicklung des umweltökonomischen Instrumentariums - Innovative Ansätze zur Verbesserung der Anreizwirkung umweltpolitischer Instrumente - Teilvorhaben II" (INCENT II) widmet sich folgender zentraler Fragestellung: Wie können umweltökonomische Instrumente verhaltensbasiert so gestaltet werden, dass sie effektiver als bisher wirken und die Bürger zu einem umweltfreundlicheren Verhalten anregen? Die vorliegenden Arbeiten verknüpfen Theorieentwicklung und eine Systematisierung des Standes der empirischen Befunde mit eigenen, umfassenden empirischen Untersuchungen zum Anwendungsfeld Energiesparen. Die verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Befunde bieten eine Reihe von Ansatzpunkten für die Ausgestaltung neuer Instrumente und damit auch für die Spezifikation beziehungsweise Weiterentwicklung der bestehenden Instrumente. Im Rahmen des Projekts INCENT II wurde hierzu eine Systematisierung von Instrumenten entwickelt, die zwischen kognitionsbezogenen, interaktionsbezogenen, anreizorientierten und vorschreibenden Instrumenten unterscheidet. In einer Auswertung von 30 Praxisbeispielen und Feldstudien wurde die Wirkung der genannten Arten von Instrumenten untersucht; Hier zeigte sich unter anderem, dass in der Praxis häufig ein Mix von Instrumenten angewandt wird. Kognitionsbezogene Instrumente kamen besonders häufig zum Einsatz. Im Rahmen von eigenen empirischen Untersuchungen wurde eine Reihe von Instrumenten bei der Gestaltung von Stromrechnung und bei der Auszeichnung von Verbrauchskosten von Weißer Ware in Elektromärkten erprobt. Die Analysen zur Gestaltung Stromrechnungen erfolgten über eine Befragung im Vignettendesign und ein Laborexperiment. Die Untersuchung zur Weißen Ware geschah als Feldexperiment über sechs Monate in zwei Elektronikmärkten in Berlin. The report on the research project "Enhancing environmental economic instruments - Innovative approaches to improving the incentives for environmental policy instruments - part II" (INCENT II) focuses on the following central question: How can environmental economic instruments be designed in a way that they are more effective for encouraging citizens to act more environmentally conscious? The research combines theory development and systematisation of prior empirical findings with new empirical studies applied to the field of energy saving. The behavioural economic findings offer a number of starting points for the design of new instruments as well as for the specification or development of existing instruments. Within the framework of the INCENT II project, a systematisation of instruments was developed that distinguishes between cognitive, interactive, incentive and prescriptive instruments. In an analysis of 30 practical examples and field studies, the effect of these types of instruments was analysed; the results show that often a mix of instruments is applied and cognitive instruments were most frequently used. As part of the empirical work of the project, a number of instruments were tested on the design of electricity bills and for labelling running costs of white goods in electronic stores. The analysis for designing electricity bills was done using a survey in vignette style and a laboratory experiment. The investigation for white goods was conducted in form of a field experiment over six months in two electronics stores in Berlin.

We examine the effects of money priming and solidarity on individual behavior in three simple experiments: dictator game, ultimatum game, and prisoner's dilemma. Our study comprises two money treatments and two neutral (control) treatments. Additionally, we control for the strength of social ties between experimental participants. Although our priming procedure is sufficient to remind people of the concept of money, it is not sufficient to induce systematically different behavior of the treatment groups compared to the control groups. Moreover, we do not find any significant differences between groups with strong vs. weak social ties. Since our findings contradict previous research, it calls for further investigation on the topic of how money priming influences economic behavior.

The main goal of our study is to analyze how success and failure in crucial situations affect subsequent individual performance. Our study is based on evidence from a natural experiment of NBA (National Basketball Association) players: Based on play-by-play statistics of NBA games in 10 seasons (1818 observations of 345 sportsmen), we identify players who are responsible for the overtime by taking the last shot of the game. Players who miss the shot when the game is tied perform better in overtime than in the last quarter (within-subject comparison) but not significantly different to their game and season averages. Players who score the equalizer in the last shot of the regular game perform substantially worse in overtime compared to their 4th quarter performance as well as compared to their game and season averages. Yet the average performances in overtime of both groups do not differ significantly (between-subject comparison). We conclude that success in crucial situations leads to lower subsequent individual performance. Psychological explanations for this phenomenon, e.g. the role of overconfidence, are discussed. We argue that our findings can be transferred to behavior after success or failure in business settings since we have distinct identifications of performance and responsibility: the observed overtimes are clear and immediate outcomes of the last shots of our analyzed players; without their success or failure, the game would have been over after regular time.