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This dissertation investigates how filmmakers use sound to foster the viewer's embodied engagement with fictional characters. Much has been captured on the role of the film image and its affective properties in our engagement with character in academic literature. However, far less has been reported on the role of sound, especially its close relationship with the image in our pre-reflective and embodied engagement with film. This study will tackle this gap in film studies with close reference to films directed by Lynne Ramsay and Darius Marder. These directors place sound design at the centre of the films I have chosen for this study and is used in varying ways to subjectively narrate characters who are psychologically complex due to trauma experiences. To portray character complexity, Ramsay and Marder will often challenge conventional filmmaking methods and narrative structures. Subsequently, on the surface, the internal states of these characters may appear difficult to access but by attending to sound and the affective feeling this may generate, we can begin to comprehend a character's feelings. By way of close film analysis and relevant theory, I will examine how these directors and their sound designers - Paul Davies and Nicolas Becker - utilise the multisensory capacity of sound to engage the viewer in a character's internal state. Theories of subjective narration in film studies such as Edward Branigan (1984) and Murray Smith (1995) examine how communication of character subjectivity does not necessarily adhere to a specific film technique such as point of view. This study examines how Ramsay and Marder draw on the aural equivalent, point of audition to subjectively narrate their protagonist's perceptual experience of trauma through sound. Both Ramsay and Marder draw on diegetic sound effects and ambience rather than the more commonly used dialogue or music soundtrack to subjectively narrate their character's perceptual experiences. This makes their work intriguing but also challenging in the sense that these sound elements simultaneously lure the viewer into a character's psychological state but can also make our access to him or her a challenge. Drawing on composer and film sound theorist Michel Chion's seminal writings on audio-visuality in cinema, I will also discuss how point of audition and other key sound techniques such as acousmatic sound, acoustic close-ups, audio-bridging, and the effects of added value in the sound-image relationship - how the sonic can enhance the visuals and vice versa - help the viewer to embody a character's experience in film. A core finding of this thesis is that Ramsay and Marder demonstrate an acute awareness of for how sound design can portray the perceptual experience of a character's interiority but also for how in the context of the image the viewer can obtain feelings with, or empathy with a character. The films that I have selected for this thesis, therefore, are arguably intended to be experiential for the viewer, where we are encouraged to observe our own perceptual experience through the subjective narration of characters. Consequently, the question of how our cinematic experience connects with our everyday aural perception is significant to this study. Such an investigation paves the way to a bigger, significant area of inquiry: how audio-visual aesthetics are well-matched to tackle important questions of human perception and meaning - specifically hearing - and why sound is particularly effective in the viewer's embodiment of film character. This thesis considers hearing as part of a larger sensory system, where it interconnects with other senses and as a result, concerns the multisensory potential of sound in our pre-reflective experience of cinema. Given the focus of my study and with the aim to illuminate the salience of sound in our sensory experience of film, I draw from a variety of disciplines; - cognitive studies, philosophy (phenomenology), psychology and neuroscience. Consequently, my thesis is grounded in an embodied cognition approach to cinema - a sub-discipline of cognitive film studies, where phenomenological experience and bodily feeling intersects with the study of the mind.

My thesis analyses how and why several different disciplines such as Philosophical Counselling, Philosophy for Children and for Community, Socratic Dialogue, Café Philo and Philosophy for Management, have spread in Italy in the 1990s, after being imported from the countries where they originated. These disciplines, which create a new controversial specialism, can be deployed in numerous and disparate fields, such as education, workplace, private life, and leisure. They are characterised by different methodological approaches and have multiple purposes which have been defined as educational, therapeutic, conciliatory, pragmatic, or simply critical. Despite their differences, they have been grouped in Italy under the general label of 'pratiche filosofiche' (philosophical practices). In my thesis, I consider philosophical practices as a socio-cultural phenomenon, and as a product of a specific environment. Focusing on Philosophical counselling and Philosophy for Children, I assess the extent to which the Italian cultural, political and institutional milieu has influenced the development of a specifically Italian take on philosophical practices compared to their initial tenets. My main argument is that the introduction of these practices in Italy has represented a partially unsuccessful response to the crisis of institutional philosophy and humanistic culture that is raging not only in Italy but also across the globe. I show that the Italian institutional and cultural context has favoured the emergence of these disciplines as a product to be marketed to an audience of aspiring practitioners and potential users, which jeopardizes their innovative drive. Lastly, I acknowledge the potential of philosophical practices in the country by articulating them to the currents of 'Italian Theory', thus highlighting the political value ofsome original applications of these disciplines in the Italian context.

While individual motivations can vary greatly, becoming a teacher is commonly conceptualised as a socially constructive choice. Using the concept of teachers' authenticity, this doctoral work examines that notion in the lived experiences of teachers working in England. This examination occurs in selfemerging stages, as a consequence of pursuing a person-centred understanding of teacher's authenticity as a socially constructive pedagogy and its viability in context of contemporary education. The first part of the literature review begins with an overview of personcentred theory relevant to the concept of authenticity, with its ontological underpinnings, to then expand on how it applied to teachers' authenticity. This is followed by the exploration of teachers' authenticity from other theoretical perspectives. The resources explored are also from different geographical locations to explore the potential unique and universal aspects of authenticity. In the second part, the focus shifts to the educational environments and implicit and explicit values underpinning education in United Kingdom, however some of the issues are discussed in their worldwide context. The methodological approach is explored in context of person-centric research framework, and each next study is an expansion of the previous one, in pursuit of deeper understanding of intrinsic and extrinsic conditions that might facilitate or inhibit teachers' authenticity. This begins with Qualitative Metasynthesis of existing research on teachers' authenticity, identifying themes of shared understanding of teachers' authenticity and external conditions promoting/inhibiting authenticity. This is followed by the Interpretative (Creative) Phenomenological Analysis where three white female teachers explored the complexities of working within the state funded education (SFE) system, where caring for children was experienced as meaningful and energising, while keeping up with increasing demands of standardised and performative education was seen as disempowering and exhausting, having negative impact on teachers psychological wellbeing. The reflective lifeworld case study of one white female teacher examined further the tensions in being a teacher, capturing structural challenges of striving for authenticity. Autoethnographic studies were conducted alongside the IPCA and Reflective Lifeworld study for transparency as well as development of a deeper understanding of self, emerging from the system, and system being co-created by self. First part present findings from focusing on intrinsic, psychological conditions that facilitate or inhibit learner/teacher authenticity. Whereas the second part offers insight into understanding socio environmental conditions and their impact of authenticity as teacher and pedagogue. The processes and challenges in conducting the research are brought forth in the critical reflexivity section. The work culminates with capturing and discussing three main threads, present across all studies; this is where teachers' authenticity is explored as a pathway to experiential safety, a way of relating to learners and as facilitative to transforming educational communities to meet the evolving needs of modern societies.

This thesis is about morality, causation and the connection between the two. Whether there's some causal relation between flicking the switch and turning on the light, between donating blood and saving a life, or between rain falling and puddles on the ground, is typically understood to be a mind-independent, objective, precise matter of fact. It's no surprise given this perspective that for a long time philosophers didn't believe something so ostensibly nebulous as morality could be a determiner of causal relations. However, recent contributions to the literature have begun to pushback against this platitude by using moral considerations, alongside a whole host of other normative notions, to determine what causal facts there are in the world. One aim of this thesis is to contribute to this recent research by arguing that an appeal to moral considerations furnishes a causal account with the resources to meet various desiderata associated with theories of causation. Insofar as this is the case, I argue that causal accounts which incorporate moral considerations are more successful than those which do not. Thus, I argue that facts about causality partly depend upon facts about morality. Causation's effect on morality is much less controversial. Moral philosophers agree that the truth of some moral claims partly depend upon what causal relations there are in the world. This is most noticeably true in the domain of moral responsibility. The thought is that if we are to be morally responsible for some event that is not itself an aspect for our conduct, then there must be some metaphysical relation - some metaphysical glue - that links our conduct to the event in question. As I and most others see it, there is one such relation: causation. Despite this consensus, there has been surprisingly little exploration into what kinds of causal facts determine the truth of moral assessments. I suspect this lacuna has arisen because it is tempting for those working in ethics to remain neutral on questions regarding causation, lest she have to face up to dealing with the thorny issues such questions invite. However, sometimes it is only by getting involved in such issues that progress can be made. With this in mind, the second aim of the thesis is to advance this debate by clarifying and evaluating what kind of causal facts determine moral facts. In particular, I address what kind of causal facts determine whether one is morally responsible for an outcome, and whether and to what extent one is praiseworthy for that outcome. With regards to assessments of moral responsibility, I argue that whether one can be held morally responsible for the effects of an omission depends upon the causal stability of that omission. In regards to praiseworthiness, I argue that whether and to what extent one is praiseworthy for doing the right thing depends upon how causally robust one's motivation was for acting. Thus, I argue that facts about morality are partly determined by facts about causality. In making these arguments, I defend the view that causal facts partly depend upon moral facts, and that moral facts partly depend upon causal facts. This lends support to a novel claim; namely, that morality and causation are interdependent.

Though political conflict is inevitable in democratic societies, it has garnered little attention in political philosophy as a phenomenon sui generis. In this PhD thesis, I survey the landscape of approaches to conflict and develop a critical-phenomenological basis for a more thorough philosophical understanding of the phenomenon. A key assumption is that the structures of conflict experience manifest in context-relative modalities shaped by power. To bring out these differences, I conducted qualitative interviews with political actors-politicians, civil servants, activists-which I analysed with the tools of phenomenology and critical theory. My dissertation reveals that agents can perceive the same conflict differently, at times drastically so, and explores how this variability impacts the suitability of practical proposals to resolve conflict. The dissertation is organised into five parts: (1) discusses a dominant paradigm in political philosophy, i.e., Rawlsian political liberalism. By uncovering its conflict typology, I show how intractable conflicts remain a problem in Rawls's well-ordered society. (2) addresses Modus Vivendi Theory, i.e., a realist alternative approach. While I argue that the theory can potentially tackle a wider array of conflicts, it still remains too indeterminate to provide normative guidance. (3) marks a shift from immanent critique to a critical phenomenology of conflict. Focusing on the role of space and location in conflict, and combining phenomenology with feminism, the chapter shows how (a) variations relating to spaces matter for the viability of practical solutions to conflict; and (b) how power asymmetrically structures scopes of possible action in these spaces. (4) combines phenomenology and critical philosophy of race to illustrate the role of the body in conflict-both as the vehicle of action and as the object of social perception. (5) elaborates the normativity of the political world, developing a phenomenologically-informed understanding of political conflict missing in the literature.

This dissertation deals with the political uses of anger, focusing on those cases in which anger is mobilized against socially structural forms of injustice (henceforth, "radical anger"). The author provides a philosophical defence of the legitimacy and usefulness of this kind of anger, together with a set of conceptual tools for distinguishing among different instances of anger in the political realm. The text consists of seven chapters, an introduction and a short conclusion. The first chapter offers a genealogy of the pathologization of radical anger, investigating the linguistic and conceptual entanglement of rage and rabies. The following chapter reviews a few cases in which oppressed groups successfully reclaimed radical anger in spite of widespread pathologizing and criminalizing tendencies, drawing mainly from the radical feminist and antiracist traditions. Special attention is also paid to the relationship between anger and violence, as well as to the opportunity for structurally discriminated groups to politically embrace anger. The metaphor of a ballistics of anger is introduced to heuristically distinguish among specific occurrences of political anger. The third chapter outlines the essential features of a political philosophy of radical anger, starting from a re-reading of Michel Foucault's interpretation of ancient Cynicism which emphasises the angry character of the latter. After asking whether radical anger can be considered philosophically true and reactionary anger defined as untrue, three possible arguments in favour of an affirmative answer are considered. Since the first two arguments, based respectively on the works of Rahel Jaeggi and Giorgio Agamben, prove unsuccessful, a third alternative, relying mainly on the works of Foucault and Hannah Arendt, is proposed by the author. Chapters from 4 to 6 look for contemporary reprises of Cynical anger, proposing a philosophical reading of the lives and works of three figures who angrily confronted several kinds of structural injustice: Valerie Solanas, Malcolm X and Audre Lorde. The dissertation shows that each of them can offer useful additions to the political philosophy of radical anger already sketched. In particular, Solanas can help us thinking the connections between anger, negation, utopia and abolition; X testifies to the importance of the link between radical anger and the notion of care of the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ); Lorde allows us to understand the deep implications of the use of radical anger and paves the way for an erotic conception of this feeling. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the international trans-feminist movement Ni Una Menos-Non Una di Meno as an example of the practical and theoretical strengths of radical anger.

In this thesis, I develop a threefold response to the evidential argument from evil. I first raise a new version of skeptical theism, data-based skeptical theism, to defend theism from the evidential argument from evil, but it works only under certain conditions. Data-based skeptical theism needs to be supplemented by other arguments. I then raise the evidential argument from evil against naturalism to reduce the explanatory power of naturalism over evil. Finally, I develop the divine justice theodicy to enhance theism's explanatory power over evil. In this way, theism can defend the attack of the evidential argument from evil. My thesis can be further detailed as the following: First, l develop data-based skeptical theism to protect theism from being directly disproved by the evidential argument from evil while avoiding skeptical theism's two general unwelcomed consequences: global skepticism and moral skepticism. However, data-based skeptical theism works for people who hold no other competing theories to theism. When naturalism is regarded as a competing theory for the existence of evil, the evidential argument from evil can still disconfirm theism indirectly. Because data-based skeptical theism does not offer explanations for evil and naturalism can explain more evil than theism, evil's existence favours naturalism. Therefore, I supplement data-based skeptical theism with the other two arguments: the evidential argument from evil against naturalism and the divine justice theodicy. The former can reduce the explanatory power of naturalism; the latter can increase that of theism. The two arguments render theism's explanatory power over evil stronger than that of naturalism. Hence, theism will not be indirectly disconfirmed by the evidential argument from evil. Instead, theism becomes a more plausible theory than naturalism with respect to evil. In summary, data-based skeptical theism can prevent the evidential argument from evil from directly disconfirming theism; the evidential argument from evil against naturalism and the divine justice theodicy can help theism avoid being indirectly disproved by the evidential argument from evil. The three strategies constitute a solid threefold theistic response to the evidential argument from evil.

This thesis has three aims. Firstly, to make the case for considering disability and enhancement in parallel. There is an ethical need for debates on enhancement to incorporate disability perspectives, concepts of enhancement depend on concepts of disability, and drawing the two together can help us avoid biases. Secondly, to investigate which views on disability are consistent with which views on enhancement. It is difficult to oppose enhancement while holding that it is bad to be disabled. While some accounts that take a more positive view of disability or impairment, such as the strong social model, might imply that we should change society rather than using enhancements, other disability-positive views, such as the value-neutral model, leave room for the possibility that enhancement is beneficial for some people. Support for enhancement can thus be accompanied by a nuanced understanding of the relationship between disability and well-being, and enhancement need not be in conflict with disability justice. Third, to develop a substantive view on disability and enhancement. Disability, understood as socially salient limitation, is somewhat bad in general or on average, but the position defended leaves room for many cases in which disability is neutral or desirable. This view can thus capture what is right in both bad-difference and mere-difference views. Enhancements, understood as capacity-increasing technologies, are likely to be beneficial to many people, and are important to develop and make widely available. Nevertheless, individuals are not obligated to use them. Developments in these technologies should therefore be accompanied by concrete steps to ensure that society remains as accessible as possible for those who do not use them, just as we should promote accessibility for people considered disabled now.

National policy and strategies have emphasised education as a preventative factor of offending and one of the ways to reduce reoffending. However, it is well documented that children and young people (CYP) who offend with Speech, Language and Communication Needs (SLCN) are more likely to not be in education, employment or training (NEET). Thus, this research aims to explore what is needed to support the educational needs of CYP with SLCN who offend. Nine participants with professional links with a Youth Offending Service were recruited from an inner London Local Authority. Semi-structured interviews were used to explore their perspectives, experiences and what support they felt CYP who offend with SLCN needed to access effective education. Interview transcripts were analysed using reflective thematic analysis. Five themes in relation to what the key stakeholders felt is needed to support the educational needs of CYP who offend with SLCN were identified: 1. Better ways of working, 2. Better working with children and young people, 3. Better targeted support, 4. Tackling NEET, and 5. Improving Educational pedagogy. Alongside these key themes, the implications for educational psychology practice and other professionals seeking to support CYP with SLCN who offend were suggested.

A typically Nietzschean reflection on our cognitive capacities assumes the form of an investigation into the genesis of these capacities. Nietzsche is in fact remarkably consistent in his use of this approach. It is first on display in the unpublished essay On Truth and Lies, and it recurs with some frequency throughout the middle- and late-period. In this thesis, I am interested in understanding what Nietzsche aims to accomplish by reflecting on our cognitive capacities in this manner. On a standard interpretation, Nietzsche resorts to this approach in the hope of accomplishing traditional epistemic aims. On this view, Nietzsche is looking to determine whether knowledge is possible at all; and if it is possible, under what conditions, and within which limits. Although the standard view currently appears as doxa in the scholarship, I believe that there is little to no textual evidence in support of it. In this thesis, I therefore propose an alternative. In my view, Nietzsche's enquiries into the origins of our cognitive capacities stand in the service of his interest in the value of knowledge, and not in the service of knowledge's possibility. To make this point I defend two claims. First, I argue that the mature Nietzsche is actually quite hostile to the idea that we can theoretically substantiate either the possibility of knowledge, or a sceptical stance regarding this possibility. If this is true, then certainly the mature Nietzsche could not possibly have intended for his genetic enquiries to contribute to that aim. Second, I offer a novel interpretation of Nietzsche's third essay in The Genealogy to substantiate my claim that, in fact, the aim of these enquiries is to help us reflect on the value of knowledge. This interpretation, coupled with considerable circumstantial evidence, shows my interpretation to be more plausible than the standard view.

This project (unlike most theodical responses or defenses) seeks to respond to the existential problem for theism presented by what I call the problem of present suffering. In short, the problem of present suffering concerns God's relationship to those experiencing evil. I contend God is uninvolved in evil altogether, and (without God's involvement) actual gratuitous evil exists. Additionally, I argue true meaning for the present sufferer must be found, as I understand it, within divine-human communion (i.e., theosis) and ubiquitously available regardless of suffering. Divine blame or anger for one's suffering, and the disseverment of theosis which would likely follow, is avoided by spurning what I call the post-suffering and instrumental approaches to evil. Hence, I believe theosis (not suffering) remains one's greatest source of meaning within theism. This point is clarified through a discussion of God's primordial desire for divine-human communion before sin and the suffering it causes or what I call cosmic theosis. I also adopt a supralapsarian christology, which, as I use the term, says the incarnation would have happened without the fall (and its subsequent suffering) and is ultimately salvific. I argue my interpretation of the incarnation presents the best picture of theosis and represents the final fulfilment of creation through what I call particular theosis (i.e., the working out of salvation in the context of sin and the suffering it causes) into cosmic theosis. In other words, particular theosis is actualized in cosmic theosis, or God's will for created being. I contend, if God's will for cosmic theosis is achieved through the incarnation, and the incarnation was going to occur before sin, then a personal and corporate meaning (not according to divine will) of Jesus's suffering and the suffering of others is possible without suffering. To emphasize this point, I utilize Jesus's cry of forsakenness on the cross and his descent into hell, demonstrating common responses to suffering which can be had analogously by any sufferer for the achievement of personal (as opposed to divine) meaning within evil. I further explore what it might look like for a Christian to endure present suffering through a limited and philosophical use of the writings of Gregory of Nyssa.

This thesis focuses on how theorists should think about perceptual phenomenal character. For the most part, I think theorists should think of it as nonexistent. But in my work in which I suppose it exists, I explore various puzzles for externalist views of perceptual experience. Because many of those puzzles revolve around uncanny color experiences human subjects can have, I also like to think about the metaphysics of color.

This thesis studies one of the significant concepts in Islamic tradition in general and Sufi doctrine in particular, which is the concept of spiritual knowledge (ma`rifa), the knowledge obtained through a direct relationship with God. The task of this study is to address the thought of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī with regard to the origins, development, and intellectual and traditional foundations of this concept. Al-Ghazālī was chosen because in addition to his significant influence within Islamic literature in general, he provided a profound approach to the concept of spiritual knowledge in particular. His theory contributed fundamentally to the development of the concept of knowledge in traditional Sufi literature and within the broader philosophical evolution in the Islamic world. This study shows that al-Ghazālī combined the dualities of soul-body and intellect-heart in his theorising on the concept of spiritual knowledge and the relationship between the human being and God. This thesis suggests that one of al-Ghazālī's significant contributions was to elevate the concept of spiritual knowledge to a higher dimension by establishing its intellectual and traditional foundations and affirming its influence on behaviour. In the rational establishment of this concept, al-Ghazālī proved that it did not contradict rationality, but rather that the illusory contradiction stemmed from a failure to understand the limited capability of the intellect in dealing with spiritual concepts. The research also assumes that al-Ghazālī's methods of acquiring spiritual knowledge prove that the ethical-behavioural aspect plays a key role in obtaining this kind of knowledge. Hence, this study found that al-Ghazālī's theory of spiritual knowledge is intellectually and behaviourally elaborate, and that al-Ghazālī provided a balanced approach to the Sufi theory of knowledge through making the esoteric subjective methods generally rational and clearly ethical.

Death has been called the great leveler, knowing neither race, age, gender, sex, religion, etc. It also knows no time, serving to tie the modern human being to the ancient. Death is an ever present constant, enveloping all human beings, at all periods of time; none can escape. Consequently, human beings have always sought to understand this phenomenon: Why do we die? What is the purpose of death? Does anything happen after? An examination of a society's approach to these questions, reveals a great deal about the basic assumptions, conceptual framework, and values that a society holds. In short, to best formulate why life is worth living, one considers death; in particular what happens after death, if anything. Plato does not speak for all of Athens, but in an examination of Plato's conception of afterlife, we are offered unique insight into how one individual approached these particular issues. To know best how Plato believed one should live, one should investigate the Platonic afterlife. This thesis examines the Platonic conception of the afterlife; beginning with the definitions of 'life' and 'death.' If Plato believes in an afterlife, and it appears he did, how can the afterlife exist if death is the end of life as we know it? Then, this thesis examines Plato's approach to the judgement of the soul, and the subsequent punishment and reward the soul receives as a result. Finally, this thesis considers Plato's conception of reincarnation; which ties back into the definitions of 'life' and 'death' offered at the beginning. Ultimately, Plato offers the individual an opportunity to find truth in an ever-changing, more connected, post-truth world (as he sees it). He does this by offering the individual a wager: (i) believe in the afterlife he presents; live the life he suggests, and you will find what you are looking for in life. Or, (ii) do not believe in the afterlife he presents; live a life of injustice, and fail to achieve meaning in one's life.

There are two important debates in business ethics that centre on the limited liability business corporation (the corporation). The first debate is whether the corporation has a special normative significance because of its legal form, which means that it comes with special moral responsibilities that are different to moral responsibilities in other, non-corporate contexts. The second debate is whether an egalitarian society should normatively regulate the corporation with stakeholder theory or shareholder value maximisation, where stakeholder theory requires that the corporation gives weight to the interests of all the corporation's stakeholders and shareholder value maximisation requires that the corporation maximises profits for shareholders, albeit subject to certain constraints. In this thesis, I contribute to these debates by defending two over-arching claims. First, I claim that there are strong pro tanto reasons for society to regulate the corporation with special moral responsibilities because the corporation has a special governmental provenance and comes with special legal privileges for its shareholders. I defend this claim by developing an argument which I call the Corporate Fair Reciprocity Argument, because it is rooted in a conception of justice as fair reciprocity in which justice requires that citizens fairly benefit from and fairly contribute to society as a system of fair social cooperation. Second, I claim that a social egalitarian society, which is plausibly a more specific version of justice as fair reciprocity in which the primary concern of justice is that citizens relate to one another as social equals, has good reasons to favour stakeholder theory. I justify this claim by developing a refined version of stakeholder theory that is grounded in specific social egalitarian values and by defending this version of stakeholder theory as being superior to shareholder value maximisation.

Understanding the biological basis of consciousness is one of the central challenges for modern science. Is a mature scientific explanation really possible, and if so, how should consciousness science be organized so as to achieve this? This thesis is a collection of four papers which approach these questions via an account of the natural categories or 'kinds', drawn from philosophy of science, to which paradigmatic mental phenomena like consciousness belong. The central claims defended in the thesis are twofold. Firstly, that to facilitate a mature science of consciousness it is crucial to explicitly introduce a new organizing concept of consciousness modelled on the kinds of concepts which underpin previous successful explanations of other natural phenomena - that of a natural kind concept of consciousness . This draws on the general observation that some concepts are better suited to scientific theorizing about the world than others, and thus that progress in scientific and philosophical domains can be (and indeed, has often been) made by working to refine our existing conceptual schemes to reflect this. Secondly, that a mature science of consciousness will be one which recognizes the reality and explanatory importance of a particular category of mental phenomena called 'global states of consciousness' which includes dreaming and wakefulness. Examination of this latter claim leads to a third idea explored and motivated in the thesis which brings consciousness science into closer connection with psychiatry. This is the hypothesis that Major Depressive Disorder involves a change to a subject's global state of consciousness, marking a change from a state of ordinary wakeful consciousness to an altered 'depressive state' of consciousness akin to a dream or psychedelic state.

This thesis is a search for female agency, unrecorded in theory and in history. My enquiry is also a bid to recover, through Shakespeare, the performative presence of the Victorian actress, Ellen Terry, hovering on the threshold of women's emancipation and our modernity. The lost female presence she represents is, I suggest, a gap in our Western social and political narrative, and in the philosophical investigations of personhood that have occupied thinkers since G. W. F. Hegel.

Thought experiments play a prominent role in philosophical inquiry. And yet we lack a good understanding of how they work and how they are supposed to supply evidence or knowledge in inquiry. This dissertation offers a novel account of the epistemology of philosophical thought experiments, namely, the reason-responsiveness view. The view is inspired by a virtue ethical tradition that flowers in John McDowell (1994) and Miranda Fricker (2007). Drawing on this virtue ethical tradition, I argue that knowing in philosophical thought experiments is achieved through the exercise of the virtue of sensibility, which has three distinct features. First, it is social in origin, acquired through our training in a human language and as ordinary members of a community. Second, it is recognitional in the sense that although our sensibility gives us the ability to classify situations, whether real or hypothetical and to resonate with rational considerations for or against a given classificational judgement (i.e., the judgements we form in thought experiments), it does not equip us with a reflective ability to fully articulate those reasons in an infallible way. And third, it allows us to project across various contexts, both in real and in hypothetical situations. And this ability to project, I argue further, does not come from the ability of people to grasp concepts or to have certain mental episodes or phenomenology or to grasp universals or to have mastery of the application conditions of rules or from belonging to some exclusive club or from enjoying a certain superior access to concepts or access to philosophically interesting phenomena not available to ordinary people. On the contrary, that we do comes down to "our sharing routes of interest and feeling, mode of response, senses of humour and of significance, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation-all the while of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life" (Cavell, 1969, p.52). The account is then used to shore up the claim of epistemological continuity, which asserts that the epistemology of thought experiments is an extension of social cognition or social epistemology (Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2015; Williamson 2007), and to offer a claim of epistemological-continuity-style defence of philosophical thought experiments against two major objections in the literature, namely, the negative experimentalist challenge (see Machery, 2017) and the ordinary language challenge (Baz, 2016, 2017).

The guiding problem of the thesis is how to reconcile immanence with feminism through the development of the idea of feminist immanent critique. Beginning with Judith Butler's account of the constitution of gender through institutions, and the possibilities of its immanent subversion through a-subjective parodic politics, it is shown that this approach to the problem needs to be augmented by Johanna Oksala's investigation of the way in which the gap between experience and language serves to challenge conceptual schema that organise our experience of the world. However, it is argued that both Butler and Oksala end up reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject, although in different manners, thereby forestalling the search for a fully realised response to the problem of feminist immanent critique. Given the return of a dogmatic image of the critical subject, I turn to the most rigorous account of immanence in contemporary philosophy through a reconstruction of key aspects of the work of Gilles Deleuze, one that places ethics at the centre of his thought. It will be shown that the development of immanence with Deleuze provides an account of the subject that does not rely upon dogmatism or abstract from situated forms of social criticism but rather invites such engagement in ways that generate a fruitful encounter with feminism. As the argument is drawn together, it is concluded that feminist immanent critique is a positive conception of critique that requires careful consideration of the ways in which the subject is continually constituted, undone and reconstituted, without reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject. Feminist immanent critique embraces an asubjective and, therefore, demoralised version of becoming without losing ethical responsiveness to the present, to ourselves, and to others. That said, it is a positive conception of critique that does not reintroduce transcendence by surreptitiously relying upon a presentist view of time and, as such, it frees becoming from a sense of pre-given direction or telos.

This submission contains a novel and a critical essay, each engaging with the philosophical ideals and narrative forms of male friendship within Western storytelling. Mr London, is a literary fantasy fiction novel which charts the tragic adventure of Benjamin Farthing as he travels through worlds and wars to save a friend. Along the way, Benjamin discovers that nobody is immune to the potential atrocities inspired by friendship, including himself. The final part of the novel is provided as a summary. The critical essay, Eight Tropes of Friendship Narratives, explores how fictional friendship seeks to identify and concretise itself within narratives, and how this influenced the writing of Mr London. The essay examines the commonality of the quest plot in friendship narratives and how the structure of the quest plot serves to build and explore friendship, before identifying eight narrative tropes of friendship - cohabitation, feasts, other realms, confessions, oaths, battles, sacrifice and leave-taking. Finally, the essay discusses friendship's tendency to disappear from fiction in order to fully realise itself, and how this process is used to shape the individual.

There are two overarching aims of the five collated papers that make up my thesis. The first is to demonstrate that making sense of an ineffable Islamic God in virtue of classical logic and various truth theories (under the purview of analytic philosophy) motivates a theological contradiction. The second is to offer a solution to this problem. I spend a substantial part of my thesis establishing the first of these aims. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, it is to illustrate the incompatibility between an ineffable God of Islam and various modes of logical and metaphysical inquiry that fall under the purview of analytic philosophy. Although, it becomes increasingly evident that we cannot philosophically make sense of an absolute ineffable God, my inquiry still bears relevance. It offers a comprehensive insight into the logical and metaphysical perspectives that are responsible for motivating the theological contradiction in question. Secondly, fleshing out the various logical and metaphysical perspectives helps lay the theoretical groundwork for the solution. It is not my aim to establish the ineffability of God within the Islamic tradition. That is, I do not engage with Islamic theology beyond referring to, and teasing out, an ineffable view of God from selected Islamic theological sources. The primary focus of my work is to establish that theological contradictions are motivated when assessing them against certain (analytic) philosophical modes. This brings me to the second aim of my thesis, namely, the solution. After having established how an Islamic theological contradiction is motivated, it begs a solution. Prior to offering my solution, I evaluate the recent work on Christian contradictory theology by Jc Beall (2019, 2021). Beall's proposed solution to the fundamental problem of Christology is what he calls 'Contradictory Christology'. Although this may seem like a plausible solution for an Islamic theological contradiction, I argue to the contrary. Finally, I propose my own solution to the problem. I call this 'Islamic Mystical Dialetheism'.

Traditionally, the Christian doctrine of heaven has implied that the human agents that exist there will be exceptionally moral. More than this, there appears to be a consensus that heavenly agents are so morally upright as to be considered morally perfect. However, there has been some kickback to this idea of moral perfection, and whether it is a possibility for contingently existing agents. The primary goal of this thesis is to defend the view that moral perfection in heaven is possible if understood from an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue account. My secondary goals are to show that the process of perfecting agents requires some form of temporal extension, does not require a traditional form of character development to maintain the agent's free will, and allows for the possibility of moral growth after the status of perfection has been attained.

This thesis explores whether delusions are adaptive in the course of six papers. In Paper 1, I review the main philosophical and psychological literature on delusions, concluding that delusions are usually defined as beliefs characterized by high degrees of conviction, low levels of insight and that are not shared by same culture peers. In Paper 2, I review the main literature on the adaptiveness of delusions, delineating the promises and challenges of such literature. In Paper 3, I investigate whether one of the main theories of delusion formation and maintenance - the two-factor theory- is compatible with two contrasting claims: the first, that delusions are pathological, and the second, that delusions are adaptive. In Paper 4, I motivate the need for empirical research to ascertain whether delusions are adaptive. I do so by criticising Fineberg and Corlett's influential predictive coding model of biological adaptiveness of delusions. In Paper 5, I apply a novel empirical methodology to a sample of four people suffering from delusional beliefs and OCD, in the attempt to answer the question: can delusions be adaptive? Finally, in Paper 6, I explore the impact of egodystonicity on perceptions of free will and recovery from OCD.

Lacanian psychoanalysis has received increasing attention in the last few decades for its relevance to thinking about politics, mainly as a result of its key role in the work of the post-Althusserian philosophers of the Ljubljana School. This, however, has resulted in a portrayal of Lacan's position with respect to Marx that can seem obvious and uncomplicated, and that elides the complexities of the historical narrative of psychoanalysis's interaction with Marxist thought. This thesis offers a more complex historical picture of how Lacan relates to Marx. It argues that the political possibilities opened up by psychoanalysis, in particular with respect to its response to Marx, cannot be understood extraneously to this historical dimension. The thesis carries out readings of key texts in twentieth-century philosophy, science, and political theory associated with Marxist thought to construct this intellectual history. It finds that, at each moment of its development, Lacan's work responded to conceptual impasses precipitated by the legacy of this tradition. What also emerges, though, is a view of Lacan that cannot be reduced to a Marxist framework, precisely because of the pressure-points within it that he exploits. There is a history conditioning Lacan's position with respect to Marx that has been forgotten, and that haunts attempts currently being made, in the half-century after his work was completed, to come to terms with it. This thesis begins a study of the contours of this history, in order to register the political possibilities that Lacan opened up.

The famous Jewish thinker Hans Jonas has written extensively across different philosophical topics and is particularly renowned for his work in ethics. Throughout his extensive career he has also published many theological reflections; some of these, however, are not well known given that, up until now, they have never been translated into English. In this dissertation, I will aim to provide a fuller, more comprehensive understanding of Jonas's theological reflections - in particular those concerning cosmogony, theodicy and his argument for God's existence. I will argue that these three areas are strictly related to his ethical project, given their powerful implications for human responsibility in protecting the sacredness of all life and the care of creation. Moreover, I will reveal that Jonas's philosophical-theological reflections on this topic complement his understanding of natural science. Jonas is critical of reductionist/determinist approaches in modern science which have the effect of 'desacralising' the natural world; thus, his philosophical-theological proposal acts as the antidote for this flawed scientific perspective. Given these reasons, I strongly contend that Jonas's philosophical-theological contributions can foster a fruitful dialogue with modern natural science (especially in relation to laws of nature and the emergence of life through cosmic evolution) and can enrich Christian theology. During my analysis of Jonas's theological reflections I will outline the existence of several notable 'dialectical tensions' in his view of God (whom he concomitantly describes as a transcendent and immanent Being). I will therefore also critically evaluate Jonas's theology and explore further some contradictions also found between his teachings and Christian orthodoxy. I shall then attempt (using the correct theological framework) to provide some correctives on these problematic issues, with the aim of remaining faithful to Jonas's perspective, while remaining compatible with Christian theology. Finally, I explore how other scholars (both Jonas's contemporaries and those preceding him) may have influenced and motivated him in his theological reflections: this exercise is key in order to fully understand, appreciate and position Jonas's perspective in relation to other philosophical-theological schools.

This thesis offers an account of safety in the classroom and focuses on the relationship between safety and protection. Using a critical character epistemological lens, I argue that a student's ability to protect themselves from harm may vary in relation to their social positionality or carry significant costs. I demonstrate how a range of epistemic character traits can aid students in protecting themselves from harm in hostile classroom environments. When theorising about epistemic character is done through a critical lens, the relationships between epistemic character and power structures in the social world are emphasised. I argue that the range of protective epistemic character traits available to a student will be affected by a range of factors, including how relationships of power and oppression affect the trajectory of their epistemic character development. Furthermore, the development and exercise of protective epistemic character traits, especially those which are conventionally classified as epistemic vices, can carry significant costs for students. Two such costs are (i) damage to epistemic character - the development of epistemic character in ways that are at odds with epistemic flourishing - and (ii) the constraint of epistemic character. I then illustrate the relationship between protection and safety by presenting the following account of safety: a classroom is safe for some student S if being in and participating in the classroom does not put S at higher than tolerable level of risk of harm without S being required to protect themself in ways that cannot be reasonably expected of them. Means of self-protection which students cannot be expected to adopt include those which cause, or make students vulnerable to further harm, and those which significantly disadvantage them in other ways. I argue that unless educators have detailed knowledge of a student's ability to take on risk, then safety is required to make the classroom accessible to that student.

This thesis is designed to develop an understanding of the problems, limitations and potential uses of Kant's aesthetic deduction. Motivated by an interest in environmental aesthetics, this thesis offers a critical analysis of Kantian aesthetics in order to expand upon the successes and failures of Kant's aesthetic deduction with particular consideration of the implications both of these have for the natural environment. I ask the following questions: firstly, why does Kant's deduction succeed or fail? Secondly, does Kantian aesthetics related to the deduction have a role in environmental aesthetics, and relatedly, in what ways do environmental considerations help deepen our understanding of Kantian aesthetics? I ask these questions in order to determine the success of Kant's aesthetic deduction and promote the importance of nuance in discussions concerning environmentalism and aesthetics. Through a process of exegesis and textual analysis, I demonstrate that, although Kant's aesthetic deduction serves as an excellent jumping-off point for broader environmental discussion, the Deduction itself fails to achieve its aims and even adds problematic dimensions to an ecoaesthetic approach in the case of the role of ugliness. Significantly, this research connects two elements of theory (Kantian aesthetics and ecoaesthetics) in order to understand both more profoundly. In deepening our understanding of these issues, the motivation for and promotion of environmentalism through ecoaesthetics will be more readily achievable in future research.

The problem of evil is possibly the most difficult question facing the theist. How are we to resolve the presence of evil in the world with the belief in an all loving, all powerful, God? For generations Western theists have offered possible solutions via refutations, theodicies and defences that rest upon a dual approach to reality, one that holds God as distinct and separate from the individual who is suffering. Two things are apparent from an analysis of such possible solutions - firstly, that no refutation, defence or theodicy is fully successful, and secondly, that such refutations, defences and theodicies underplay the severity of the problem of horrendous evil. I offer a possible solution to the problem of horrendous evil which considers the issue from a non-dual perspective of reality. This non-dual perspective considers God to be one with the true identity of the individual. I root such a perspective within the Hindu philosophical and religious school of thought - Advaita Vedanta - however, such a non-dual perspective of reality is not exclusive to this school of thought. I argue that by adopting Advaita Vedanta's distinction between two aspects of humanity, The Ego Self and The Self, horrendous evil can have a unique role to play in forcing or driving the individual into self-enquiry. Such self-enquiry can, in turn, lead to the process of awakening to identification as The Self, a process also known as enlightenment, whereby the individual realises their true identity to be one with God/Brahman. In identification as The Self, horrendous evil ceases.

This practice-based research examines the development of the visual culture of British emergency politics between 1997-2017. It cites the first naming and emergence of the British government emergency response committee COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) in 2000 as the beginning of a new condition in the visual culture of emergency politics. This study pinpoints the combination of camera phone images and social media in 2005, with the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as a pivotal moment in who can now claim, and counter-claim, the legitimacy of civil emergency events. This study will show how emergency images have now become a set of standardised visual conventions and modes of habitual participation, normalising the condition of a continual state of emergency. This inquiry identifies a new category of images, namely the emergency image and the emergency response image. I argue that the emergency image and emergency response image have not only altered the public perception of emergency events and the State's response to them, but have opened up a new space for political contestation where the claiming of emergency events is now distributed between the State and the public. This investigation uses a practice-based research methodology to publicly reassemble the COBR Committee by actively collating, curating and documenting its previously siloed visual elements and fragments, and its emergency events between 1997-2017. Four original practice-based research outputs include: Emergency State: The COBR Committee between 1997-2017 held in July 2021, the web archive (www.COBR-Commitee.uk), a formal entry of a dataset of all publicly held COBR meetings between 1997-2017 to the UK Data Archive (dataset ref number: 855344) and an intervention in which images of a restaged COBR meeting are placed within the economy of images.

People often do not follow psychiatric treatments as prescribed. This phenomenon is well known and has been investigated across thousands of population-level studies. The original work of this thesis involves adapting resources from population-level studies, and from other social scientific and philosophical theories, for the purpose of making sense of individual cases of nonadherence. The thesis examines the different concepts that are explicitly used or that are implicitly at work in these studies and theories, and it appropriates them for use in frameworks which can be used to make sense of the nonadherence of individual patients. The thesis employs a rich array of interdisciplinary resources for this purpose, appropriating resources from medicine, psychiatry, social science, philosophy, economics, and law. It begins by examining the ways in which nonadherence is understood in empirical population-level research, supplemented by resources from the philosophy of social science and theories of causation. Later, it examines the ways in which nonadherence may be understood to be rational under different theories of rationality, and the ways in which nonadherence may be understood to shape subjectivity under Foucauldian theories of the subject and subjectivation. In total, four meta-frameworks are articulated that can be employed for the purpose of making sense of individual cases of nonadherence. Under these meta-frameworks, sense can be made of nonadherence as a problem to be solved; as an effect; as an expression of rational agency; and as a practice of subjectivation. Each chapter focuses on one meta-framework and articulates a set of hermeneutic questions that can be used in making sense of individual cases of nonadherence. Although the meta-frameworks are intended to have use for making sense of nonadherence to treatments for a range of psychiatric disorders, the applied analysis in the thesis focuses on a particularly troubling case-study: nonadherence to treatment for anorexia nervosa.

References to social identity feature prominently in the psychoanalytic canon but generally receive little attention or discussion. This qualitative research study aims to examine the role of social identity in the training of child and adolescent psychoanalytic psychotherapists by exploring how it has been experienced and understood, and how this role relates to therapeutic practice. It investigates this topic via a literature review and 12 interviews with psychotherapist members of the Association of Child Psychotherapy (ACP). The literature shows how the exclusion of critical or reflexive approaches to learning about healing creates tension when encountering social identity references harmful to non-normative or non-conforming people. Of the most prominent of these references, females, 'negroes', 'homosexuals', and the religious are all designated as inferior and labelled 'primitive' - terminology still habitually used in UK psychoanalytic contexts. I draw on Black Feminist Care Ethics, Social Anthropological and Sociological epistemologies attentive to forms of symbolic violence and the need for 'participant objectivation'. This provides a historically contextualised, cross-disciplinary review of the above terminology, its accompanying ideologies and existing research. This explores how individuals make sense of particular aspects of identity, accompanied by psychoanalytically focused studies considering the dynamic between trainees' social identities and the task of developing a professional/psychoanalytic identity. The results of Thematic Analysis represented social identity as holding 3 distinct roles: insufficient, sufficient and ambivalent. The first two roles are opposed, correlating distinctly with the degrees that participants' social identifications were normative and conforming. The ambivalent role involved more complexity in that it was experienced across all participants' trainings. This, highlights variation within identity groups and within individuals' understandings and experiences of navigating training, on account of their social identities. These findings suggest that psychoanalytic training and psychotherapeutic practice would benefit, ethically and epistemically, from an authentic reckoning with the legacy of the very particular relation to social identity that has prevailed until now. Such a 'turn' may foster a new relation, less beholden to the uncritical embrace of normative ideologies and disavowal of vulnerability.

Contemporary architects have a philosophical problem: how to justify the value of good design, specifically aesthetics, in an economy which favours the objective and quantifiable. Philosophy, however, has neglected serious engagement with the aesthetics of the built environment, despite widespread agreement within the architectural world that contemporary building is often ugly or bland. This thesis examines key philosophical issues in the crisis of aesthetics in architecture. Part One seeks a better understanding of what we mean by aesthetic value in the built environment, couching discussion within an aesthetics of design rather than of art. Exploring critical foundations for design aesthetics, it rejects both the Kantian judgement aesthetics favoured by Roger Scruton, and the everyday aesthetics of Yuriko Saito, in favour of Gernot Böhme's aesthetics of atmospheres. Finally, it interrogates the common conflation of aesthetic value with beauty, tackling head on the problem of ugliness and negative aesthetics that is crucial to our understanding of contemporary building. Part Two examines the competition of values in corporate and political decision-making, most reductively in cost benefit analysis and value engineering, where aesthetics is often compared unfavourably with the expedient and quantifiable. It argues that buildings cannot be understood naively as the creative product of an architect. Rather, they tangibly exhibit the values of the clients - private and public sector - who commission them. Our treatment of aesthetics here is inherently political, bound to our treatment of equality, efficiency, welfare and the good life. The thesis concludes by arguing, in opposition to Scruton's insistence that our values are objective and rational, that we should cease attempting to justify aesthetic value in these terms. Rather, those arguing for improved, or better distributed, aesthetics in the built environment should turn to Rorty's notion that our social values are constructed for the achievement of an unrealised "dream country".

In the last decade or so, considerable attention has been given by educational theorists to the works of Jacques Rancière. Most commentators on Rancière's educational thought, which is based on the writings of Joseph Jacotot, believe that it provides us with a novel way of thinking about emancipatory forms of education that can serve to confront the forces of oppression, inequality, nihilism, and compliance we find ourselves confronted with today. The general purpose of this study is to assess whether and, if so, to what extent this belief is justified. This task is approached by taking up and testing out Rancière's adventuring method of contingency, which is interpreted to be a form of education and a form of research simultaneously. Style is a central aspect of the argumentative force of Rancière's approach. Following this, a characteristic of the thesis is the development of three stylistic forms of writing: connecting scenes, spiralling, and weaving. The point of departure for the adventure is Rancière's book The Ignorant Schoolmaster. This book then functions as a portal into the world of Rancière's works as a whole, which in turn function as a portal to the world beyond Rancière's works yet implicitly present in those works. In order to test the educational value of the adventuring method, an attempt is made to understand Rancière's works. Reflections on this process further allow for the development of a way of thinking about research adventures as a form of education. The argument made in this thesis lies partly in its aesthetic and stylistic force, but several conceptual claims are also developed. One claim entails the problematisation of the dichotomy between will and intelligence maintained by Rancière. Another claim is that the concept of emancipation - which is fundamentally political in nature - is not applicable to education. As an alternative, a way of thinking about education is developed, infused by a reading of Spinoza's Ethics, as sensible configurations of space and time which urge children to persevere and increase their power to express and to think under the mark of equality. Two notions play a central role in these configurations: fascination and the demand to persevere. The first is developed through the reflections on the thesis' adventure and coupled to Rancière's understanding of the will as a power to be moved. It is a way to think the self, that is, the will, as fundamentally relational in nature. The second relates to Rancière's notions of unconditional exigency and equality of intelligence. A prevalent interpretation of that latter notion is problematised in the observation that understanding Rancière cannot be done without having prior knowledge and understanding. Finally, the concept of the weight of words is developed as a reformulation of Rancière's reading of Aristotle's distinction between expression and noise. Overall, the stance is taken that Rancière's conceptual framework is not without its flaws, but that it does hold powerful potential for developing egalitarian forms of education that allow children to increase their power of understanding, and to confidently assign immanent justification to their will to express and to confront injustice.

The non-identity problem is an intriguing and important problem in moral philosophy, which has considerable implications for our thinking about the morality of some seemingly immoral acts of conception. Suppose, for example, that a prospective parent - Mary - is given two options by her doctor after being told she has a serious illness. She can take medication every day for the next three months to clear her illness and then conceive a healthy child in three months' time or she can take no medication and conceive a child now - but that child will be born with significant health problems. Mary goes ahead and conceives a child now. The child that is born - Mariette - is born with significant health problems and yet, despite a widely held belief that such an act is morally wrong because of what that act has done to Mariette, the non-identity problem presumes to show that this belief is in error: such an act cannot be worse for Mariette, because the alternative for her is not better - she would simply not exist in that alternative; nor does such an act wrong her because her life, although impacted by serious health problems, is still a life worth living - and one does not wrong someone by bringing them into a life worth living. But this means that knowingly conceiving Mariette is not - after all - morally wrong, for we cannot do moral wrong to her without wronging her in the first place. In response to the above case, some philosophers have argued that Mary's act of conception is still wrong because her act violates an impersonal moral principle - such as a utility-maximizing principle - and this would mean that the act of conception can still be wrong without wronging Mariette. However, establishing that Mary's act of conception wrongs Mariette is still desirable because most people's intuitive belief about this case is that Mary's act wrongs her. I argue that, actually, there are some promising person-affecting proposals which show that the act is wrong. I assess three recent proposals; the de-dicto proposal, wherein I develop novel cases to respond to its most challenging objections; as well as the harm and rights-based proposals, wherein I argue that the act of conception is ambiguous and this ambiguity prevents us from appealing to person-affecting proposals. I argue that an alternative understanding of the act is most relevant and this allows person-affecting proposals to overcome their most salient objections. Ultimately, while I do not aim to favour any one person-affecting proposal over another, I aim to have developed several novel arguments that, I argue, allow me to conclude that the prospects for these have not just been underestimated but that there are promising person-affecting proposals that allow us to conclude that Mariette is wronged by the act of conception.

This thesis is a study on the nature of modality in Hegel's Logic and contemporary modal metaphysics. The thesis has two aims: Firstly, it examines Lewisian modal realism, as well as the post-Lewisian modal metaphysical accounts of modal actualism and modal essentialism in order to reveal that each position appeals to a non-modal foundation to make modal concepts explicit. Each position thus falls under what Hegel regards as pre-critical metaphysics by suggesting a modally unaccountable ground for modal concepts. The very idea of a foundation to modality is problematic because (a) as a foundation, it is necessarily assumed without further justification, and (b) it directs our attention away from the nature of modality itself to its supposed foundations. These non-modal foundational take the form of possible worlds for modal realism, the form of properties for modal actualism and the form of essence for modal essentialism. To eschew foundationalism in modal metaphysics and provide a less questionable basis for modality, the thesis suggests Hegel's treatment of modality as a viable alternative in virtue of its being free from the concerns stemming from the pre-critical way of doing metaphysics. The thesis situates Hegel in contemporary modal metaphysics by undertaking two types of exposition. By examining Hegel's treatment of essence and property, the thesis will show negatively that essence and property cannot be a foundation for modality, while by examining Hegel's treatment of modality, the thesis positively proves that modal concepts are analysable and explainable within the domain of actuality, a domain that can only be made explicit by modal determinations. These two expositions provide an idea of a self-sustaining and self-explanatory modal metaphysics without appealing to non-modal foundationalist metaphysical commitments. More precisely, I argue that Hegel's logical derivation of modal concepts constitutes a Hegelian modal metaphysics, which contains a comprehensive account of modal concepts that does not rely on any non-modal primitive.

Much research supports the existence of top-down effects on visual perception. Within this thesis, two accounts which seek to explain top-down effects on perception are investigated: The Action-Specific Account, which asserts that perception is affected by an individual's ability to act, and the Attentional Account, which asserts that perception is affected by attention towards an object. These accounts were investigated because they potentially challenge cognitive impenetrability - the assertion that perception is free from cognitive influences. These accounts therefore have ramifications for the concept of modularity and the current understanding of how the mind is organised. However, no research demonstrating top-down effects on perception has successfully avoided the methodological pitfalls which provide alternative explanations for their results. As such, the central aim of this thesis was to develop a method of measuring one example of these top-down effects - changes in object size perception - whilst avoiding said methodological pitfalls. Perception of food size (relative to perceived non-food size) was selected because previous research suggested that changes in perceived food size may affect subsequent eating behaviours. The central finding of this thesis is that attention, independent of action-specific influences, affects perception. Importantly, although top-down attention affects perceptual experience, it is suspected this occurs indirectly through small changes in visual input (fixation locations) - and therefore may not challenge cognitive impenetrability. To investigate the extent of top-down effects on perception, this thesis also addressed inconsistencies within the broader food perception literature. It was observed that health outcomes related to over-eating were better predicted by food-specific, than domain-general, self-reports. Interestingly, the impulsivity assessed by these food-specific measures (although known to affect attention) did not predict perceived food size. In summary, this thesis addresses methodological issues within the object perception literature and further research is proposed to assess its limitations.

Dissertation outline: I begin my dissertation by charting and assessing two competing approaches to theorise about the nature of knowledge - modalism and explanationism. According to the former, knowledge equates with a belief which is true in a relevant set of possible worlds; according to the latter, knowledge is a matter of believing the truth on the basis of the right explanation. When it comes to the competition between modalism and explanationism in traditional epistemology, I reject explanationism and I endorse modalism: I move novel objections against the most recent explanationist account of knowledge and I develop a novel version of modalism. This new version of modalism consists of a different safety condition which is informed by the etiological theory of functions made popular in the philosophy of biology. I argue that it does better than both extant versions of modalism and extant versions of explanationism. I then move on to the contrast between modalism and explanationism in the context of applied legal epistemology. By emphasising a few structural connections between knowledge and legal proof, epistemologists have moved quite freely from a modalist account of knowledge to a modalist account of legal proof. A case in point is Duncan Pritchard, who proposes a modal condition for knowledge (safety) and then extends it to legal standards of proof. On this second issue, I see things differently: in legal epistemology, I endorse explanationism and I reject modalism. Accordingly, I object to influential modal accounts of legal proof and I offer an alternative explanationist account. I develop an account of legal proof as an inference to the best contrastive explanation: by drawing on up-to-date literature on abductive reasoning in the philosophy of science, I bring into focus hitherto unappreciated connections between the nature of legal proof and the structure of scientific explanation. The final upshot is a well-informed account of legal proof which does away with modal conditions and better captures the nature of juridical proof. My dissertation advances two closely related debates by emphasising a neat separation between modalism and explanationism: while the former is the right approach to theorise about the nature of knowledge, only the latter can provide a satisfactory account of legal proof. Such separation offers a new picture of the relationship between knowledge and legal proof, and it provides new insights into several debates at the intersection of traditional and applied legal epistemology.

This thesis seeks to advance our comprehension of musical ontology as it pertains to realism from a platonist vantagepoint. Similar to other areas of ontological inquiry, such as fictional and mathematical objects, musical ontology is a specific field in philosophy of art that disputes the categorical nature and identity of musical objects. Much like its fictional and mathematical counterparts, categorizing works of music has been amply discussed by realists. In order to advance our understanding in this field, I will examine the categorical nature of such objects and the consequences realists face upon application. My dissertation will be separated in two distinct parts: one developing and one applying my platonist account. The first three chapters develop a certain stripe of musical realism that has previously been unexplored in the literature. In order to achieve this aim, Chapter One lays out a taxonomy of ontologies that catalogs realists, non-realists (nominalism and anti-realism), and arealist accounts. Chapters Two and Three provide two realist accounts hitherto undiscussed in the taxonomy. What makes both accounts enticing to the musical realist is that they endorse a property theory of musical works, which stands in contrast to its popular cousin, type/token theory. In particular, Chapter Two unpacks the property theory from an aristotelian perspective, while Chapter Three does so from a platonist perspective. Chapter Three provides the account that I develop and endorse. The purpose of application-contained in the last three chapters-is meant to not only show my account's implications, but also exhibit how these can render the account advantageous. Chapter Four will explain how realists should approach and contemplate the role of the musical score. Chapter Five will provide a realist response to the role of artificial intelligence in musical composition, and Chapter Four will provide a realist's modest definition of music. My goal is to showcase my account's fruitfulness in these applications, as well as to demonstrate how it can facilitate further questions about the nature of musical works and the categories to which they belong.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic interpretation of the influence of Kant's theoretical philosophy on Heidegger's early project of 'fundamental ontology'. Beginning from Heidegger's early neo-Kantianism, I trace the development of his engagement with Kant through to his post-transcendental thinking of the 1930s. However, my particular focus concerns Being and Time. Here, I argue that there is a structural analogy between Kant's conception of the imagination and Heidegger's conception of disclosedness, both of which define their respective ontological approaches. Moreover, I argue that making such an analogy allows us to draw out a single, clear line of argument in Being and Time that should guide our interpretation of the text. Through this, I argue that the question of transcendence is the key explanandum for Heidegger's early project, and that a rethinking of Kantian schematism is Heidegger's answer for this. Consequently, a further strategic aim is to critically examine Heidegger's conception of schematism: to what extent can we defend and develop further the notion of schematism in considering the grounds of ontology? The thesis is divided into three parts. The first traces the development of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology and attempts to locate Kant's place within it. I argue that Heidegger's conception of phenomenology as method develops from his critical engagements with his contemporaries (in particular, Rickert, Husserl, and Dilthey), whereas the terms of his project as defined by the Seinsfrage derives from his interpretation of the history of philosophy (in particular, Aristotle and the Scholastics). My claim is that Heidegger consequently develops an ontological interpretation of Kant to connect the two: the Copernican Revolution provides a way to think a phenomenological ontology that does not reduce to anthropology, whilst Kant's notion of the imagination provides a formal structure through which to think Dasein's ontologically disclosive abilities. The second part provides an extended comparative analysis of the first Critique with Being and Time, aiming to show how Heidegger's concept of worldhood is a phenomenological reconsideration of the key themes of the Transcendental Deduction, and that Heidegger's notoriously difficult account of ecstatic temporality becomes comprehensible when read alongside the Schematism. Through this, I aim to demonstrate the imagination/disclosedness analogy in practice, whilst also clarifying the problematic of transcendence that underlies their respective accounts. The final part then takes up the notion of transcendence as an explicit theme, firstly attempting to retrieve a positive signification for transcendence despite the later Heidegger's retrospective criticisms. Then I return to the question of the relationship between transcendence and schematism in the final chapter, providing an interpretation and defence of Heidegger's concept of 'praesens' as a proof of concept for further inquiry into this rich philosophical field.

This thesis argues that contrary to the dominant anglophone approach to interpreting Hegel, his social philosophy ought to be understood as breaking with Kant's conception of freedom. I develop this argument first by showing that Hegel denies the distinction, central to Kant's moral philosophy, between is and ought. In the second chapter I turn to the work of Robert Pippin, who offers the most wide ranging and systematic defence of the view that Hegel maintains an essentially Kantian theory of freedom. Through my discussion of Pippin, I conclude that his attempt to ground the objectivity of social structures in the reflective endorsement of individual subjects is ultimately unsuccessful. I then turn to the work of Terry Pinkard and Christoph Menke who I see as correctly recognising that there is a tension between Kant's subjectivist conception of freedom and Hegel's socially integrated theory. Both theorists do not, however, see this tension as indicating that the Kantian model of freedom is inadequate to providing an account of agency that could be reconciled with a modern social conception of freedom. Instead, they see the tension as a productive one. For Pinkard it indicates the maturity of the consciousness of modern subjects who cannot be fully integrated into social structures. For Menke the tension reveals an alternative form of freedom as liberation from the constraints of rigid and habitual social practices. In the final chapter of this thesis, I argue that in the anthropology Hegel develops an alternative model of freedom as a pre-social self-formation. This alternative model of freedom provides an account of how the subject comes to be the kind of being capable of integrating into social structures by making themselves into a coherent self. The manifestation of this alternative model of freedom is habit. Habit is a form of freedom which, in our overly intellectualised conceptions of agency, we often dismiss.

The concept of "dissociation" describes a variety of phenomena that involve a divided or disunified experience, ranging from everyday experiences such as daydreaming to the fascinating and controversial phenomenon of dissociative identity disorder (DID)-formerly called multiple personality disorder. Because of the wide assortment of phenomena, theoretical unity has been difficult to achieve, and there is no received consensus of what dissociation is, with many arguing the concept is imprecise, confusing and/or ambiguous. The aim of the thesis is to use resources from Heidegger's existential-hermeneutic phenomenology to articulate core structures of dissociative experiences. In pursuing this aim, I identify three problems that any satisfactory theory of dissociation must confront: the motleyness problem, the ontological problem, and the normative problem. Before developing the Heideggerian account, I first track the development of these three problems over a two-part philosophical history of dissociation. After identifying consciousness as one of the ontological commitments that run through the history of consciousness, I then situate dissociation within the philosophy of mind by critically evaluating Tim Bayne's unity of consciousness thesis with reference to whether it can satisfactorily accommodate dissociative phenomena. After showing that the three problems remain a significant challenge to theorizing dissociative phenomena, I move to articulate dissociative experiences using the Heideggerian ontological structures of Jemeinigkeit ("mineness") and Unheimlichkeit ("uncanniness"). I conclude by evaluating this Heideggerian account of dissociation against the three problems.

The future of work is one of increasing precarity and uncertainty. The continued implementation of automation has been further problematised by the difficulties brought about by Covid-19 and its resultant lockdowns, the growing popular desire for better work/life balance, and continued economic upheaval. Accounts of the future of work vary across the academic literature and mainstream media: for some, increasing automation is an emancipatory political moment that promises more free time and social justice; for others it is an insidious social force that will bring more harm than good to society. However, although these opposing accounts of automation might appear to employ the same unproblematic terms and concepts, I argue that they are reified through a focus on specific limited examples which scholars attach to those terms without explicit acknowledgement. As a result, accounts of automation make generic claims regarding the nature of automation by narrowly focusing on one of its given contingent functions, and rely on common sense and incomplete conceptions of work. There is a need to reduce the tension between opposing accounts, and to avoid overtly dystopian and utopian narratives about futures of work, in order to develop an accurate picture of automation and work that reflects the reality of automation today. This thesis performs a phenomenological reduction of automation, and redefines intuitive notions of 'work' as two distinct modes of activity, labour and work. I will develop three ideal type definitions of automation, labour, and work, which can then be applied to make better sense of real-life case studies. While discussions of automation and the future of work can naturally tend towards emotional or polemic predictions of thoroughly technologised societies, both positive and negative, offering such predictions in advance of a rigorous analysis of each term results in incomplete accounts of the phenomena at stake. I will strip back these reified notions, and offer a novel evaluative framework for considering the automation of work, using novel definitions of automation as the enclosure of tasks from further human intervention, and labour and work as distinct modes of activity, comparing these ideal definitions to real and proposed case studies to ensure their practical applicability. In the first chapter I offer a definition of automation as a means of enclosing a task from further mediation, and in the second I compare this definition to those found across the literature, paying particular attention to the reified accounts of automation offered by scholars, including Aaron Bastani, Nick Srnicek, Martin Ford, and Erik Brynjolfsson. In Chapter 3 I define labour as a mode of activity primarily intended towards biological necessity, and discuss potential Marxist critiques to this conception. Chapter 4 sees the introduction of a number of case studies, including self-driving cars and sex work, which will serve to test my definitions of labour and automation in practice. Chapter 5 introduces the correlate definition of work, and considers a comparable notion of work offered by Hannah Arendt, before Chapter 6 concludes by returning to the case studies offered in Chapter 4, comparing them to the mode of work rather than labour. I will conclude that while pressing, questions surrounding automation and the future of work cannot be fully or accurately answered with a narrow and reified understanding of either term, and will instead offer a novel evaluative framework in response. The future of work may well be an automated one, but at this early stage it is vital to properly define and understand the dominant notions at play, and to not get lost in emotive speculative predictions of the future that are not aligned with the reality of work today.

Despite having received a recent resurgence of interest, Panpsychism remains a worldview afflicted by various explanatory shortfalls. Chiefly, the literature is yet to provide a 'proper' panpsychist theory of consciousness with the potential to explain precisely how we have transitioned from a myriad of rudimentary, entropic instantiations of phenomenality to unified and bounded macro-level conscious subjects replete with an awareness of their ontology. This work recognises this particular shortfall and attempts to remedy it by offering a 'complete micropsychist theory of consciousness' that is capable of overcoming the various iterations of the combination problem, and explaining how the sort of minimal phenomenality associated with bottom-level physical entities might be reconciled with the sort of cognitive phenomenology we undergo as higher-level subjects, by advancing a new take on the nature of what a phenomenal property is that might very well lead us to both reanalyse our understanding of the natural world and rethink our own nature.

Comparing the centre to the periphery is a well-established trope in the history of ideas as in other fields of enquiry. This thesis adopts a different approach. It examines the work of two intellectuals from parts of the world deemed 'peripheral' whose intellectual contribution sought to transcend their condition of peripherality by bypassing the centre: the Haitian historian, anthropologist, and public intellectual Joseph Anténor Firmin (1850-1911) and the Georgian philologist, archaeologist, and philosopher of language Nikolai Marr (1865-1934). By comparing writers from such far-removed parts of the world who inhabited the same historical period, I intend to offer an alternative to the diffusionist model of intellectual history, in which concepts are traced from their emergence in Europe to their application in the rest of the world. The comparison undertaken in this thesis follows different vectors in the communication of philosophical ideas. This is highly fitting because Firmin and Marr devoted themselves to studying evolution and historical development in a manner designed to challenge the belief that certain peoples and cultures are the driving force of history while others are destined to languish behind. Strikingly, they framed their respective projects in the spirit of universalism, which is to say they were committed to the universal action of evolutionary law common to all societies. Through the uniform application of developmental law, Firmin and Marr sought to incorporate all societies as equal parties in global development, irrespective of the racial (Firmin) and linguistic (Marr) exclusion they may have been subject to. I begin by examining the parallel and overlapping ways in which Firmin and Marr constructed their respective world-historical schemes and how they attempted to reconcile the existence of multiple developmental trajectories within a single evolutionary masterplan. I then examine how changing political circumstances in both their lives challenged and modified these commitments.

This thesis is comprised of four papers that explore the nature and practical implications of moral doubt. It starts from the observation that the appropriate way to understand and handle moral doubt will depend on the nature of our moral judgements themselves. The first and second papers take a cognitivist view of moral judgements and analyse moral doubt in terms of partial degrees of belief in moral propositions. The first, The Relevance of Belief: Subjective Norms Under Empirical and Moral Uncertainty, argues that this form of moral uncertainty is relevant to our choices and that the norms most directly relevant to choice under moral uncertainty are the action-guiding subjective norms of instrumental rationality. The second, Preference and Commitment Under Moral Uncertainty, proposes a particular way of accommodating moral uncertainty within a decision theoretic model of rational choice, and shows that this has substantial advantages over existing alternatives. The third paper, Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-cognitivists, provides an account of moral doubt that is consistent with non-cognitivism, by analysing the phenomenon in terms of ambivalence in one's moral attitudes. The fourth and final paper, The Balance and Weight of Reasons, draws out some implications of ambivalence, by exploring the way in which the overall weight of reasons are reflected in the preferences of rational agents.

This thesis explores the restoration and cultivation of mutually constitutive relationships between technique and identity. I begin by establishing the framework of practice that will be used throughout the thesis, in which I define practice by the methodological conditions of open-endedness, repeatability, intuition, situatedness and autonomy. I critique the practices of classical vocal pedagogy, the field of my own training and one about which critical scholarship is distinctly lacking. I argue that these practices effect a violentseparation between technique and identity by means of the fetishisation of technique, ideologies of transcendence, structural whiteness and the reification that structures spaces of training and practice. I establish a theoretical framework, grounded in the work of Ben Spatz, for understanding the relationships between the repetition and sedimentation of technical knowledge and the always ongoing formation of identity, and explore the defetishisation of technique and the objects and practices in which it is encoded both in the university's practice-as-research context and in the work of two artists and collaborators, Ragnar Kjartansson and Monia Sander Haj-Mohammed. Grounded in an intertextual reading of philosophies of immanence, philosophical pragmatism and feminist epistemology, I articulate the notion of situational emergence in processes of technical development and explore the broader scope and significance of lifelong transformation through technique. With this basis, I give an account of the works in the portfolio, exploring methodologies of defetishisation and situated making, and highlighting the ways that forms emerge in and through durational processes that are always specifically situated in time and place.

This thesis develops an ecclesiology of participation in Pentecostalism by utilizing the concept of the prophethood of all believers as a theological and hermeneutical device to articulate how the laity can fully take part in the ritual life of the church. Pentecostalism as a liturgically diverse tradition composed of hierarchical and democratic types of churches that reflect both episcopal and non-episcopal ecclesiological models has created ambiguity in how the doctrine of the prophethood of all believers and the egalitarian nature of the church should be understood. Based on a perspective informed by pneumatology and Pentecost, this project provides a means to theologically convey how greater participation can take place in Pentecostal communities of worship through every believer's empowerment with the Holy Spirit. The idea of the prophethood of all believers is projected onto the dominant rituals of the Pentecostal liturgy through an altar hermeneutic that allows for all members of the worshipping community to have a transformative encounter with God in dynamic fellowship with others. What results is a truly egalitarian view of church that directs entire communities of faith towards participation in Pentecost through the Spirit. Through critical analysis of and constructive theological engagement with the Pentecostal liturgy, the chapters of this thesis contribute to a better understanding of what is meant by "the altar" in the rites of Pentecostal worship.

As political crises and social unrest proliferate worldwide, the appeal of populism grows steadily in various fora, including academic fora. In this respect, an abundance of scholarly publications has sought, through the study of populism, to unravel important aspects of contemporary political and social dynamics. Discourse theory scholars, in particular, have played an important role in pushing the boundaries of populism studies forward. They have challenged objectivist perspectives in the (social) sciences by foregrounding the role of meaning-making and by treating populism as a discursive logic that better characterises the political (dis)articulation of social reality. In situating its analytical focus at the frontier of populism studies, this paper-based dissertation contributes to this literature from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view. Through the four papers which make up this thesis, I contribute to discourse theory by presenting three main lines of analysis in the study of populism in Brazil, a case that is frequently referenced but which remains under-explored. Firstly, by exploring Brazil's fourth republican period (1946-1964), this thesis shows how populism is best understood as both a concept and a signifier, revealing the way the dynamic interplay of populism discourses shape our sense of social reality. Secondly, by studying a leading magazine with an upmarket readership in Brazil (Veja), I explore the affective force running through anti-populist discursive articulations, affirming the value of the category of fantasy from an empirical and analytical point of view. Thirdly, by focusing on the collective candidacy of the Bancada Ativista in the Sao Paulo State elections, I explore the potential of the concept of populism, conceived as a logic, to shed light on aspects of political life beyond populist phenomena. Finally, in recognising a gap in the literature in relation to the constitutive role of desire in social meaning-making processes, the fourth paper constructs, through the psychoanalytic category of hysteria, an approach to knowledge production informed by desire, which constitutes the main theoretical contribution to the discourse theory tradition. By paying close attention to Brazilian politics, this thesis explores some of the distinctive virtues of a discourse theoretical approach to populism by drawing out the normative, ideological, and politico-strategic implications of complex political dynamics and social meaning-making processes within and beyond the study of populist phenomena.

This study deals with an enfant terrible of nineteenth-century German philosophy, Max Stirner, and seeks for the first time to chronicle and appraise the frequent assertions, and less frequent denials, of his being a nihilist. The thesis is that the stark polarisation of opinion on this subject is indicative of an ideological and critical divide, which inhibits any attempt to answer the question of whether Stirner was a nihilist in a balanced and objective manner. Although Stirner is not known ever to have used the word 'nihilism', or any of its derivatives, in his published writings or elsewhere, he was first accused of nihilism within a few weeks of the publication of his magnum opus, 'Der Einzige und sein Eigentum', in 1844. Since then, the allegation has been repeated by well over a hundred writers and critics, resulting in its almost becoming a truism. My research aims, firstly, to establish a clear understanding of the multifarious meanings of the term 'nihilism', secondly, to examine the accusations of nihilism levelled at Stirner in the light of this analysis, and, thirdly, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. The significance of this thesis is that it provides new insights into the nature of Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of Stirner as a philosophical pariah, and proposes a re-evaluation of his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy.

Completed suicide in schizophrenia remains a significant unanswered challenge, requiring new perspectives and novel investigation. This thesis examines how previously under-investigated symptoms, including blunted affect and social withdrawal, may be associated with suicidal behaviour in people with schizophrenia. For this study, a multidisciplinary approach was used incorporating philosophy, psychiatry, and neuroimaging. I begin with Chapter 1, in which I give a philosophical consideration of why we should not regard suicide as an irrational action in schizophrenia. My arguments are based on the idea that overwhelming feelings and suffering such as isolation and of not belonging, which relate to negative symptoms including blunted affect, could be sufficient reasons for someone to end their life and therefore could be considered as rational acts. In chapter two, I present a systematic review on the negative symptom of blunted affect in suicide in schizophrenia, aiming to show the gaps in existing evidence and current knowledge. In summary, this highlights that blunted affect is likely to influence suicidal behaviour in the presence of depression, anxiety, or hopelessness. Following the systematic review's findings, a primary data chapter then focuses on quantitative examination of suicidal behaviour in first-episode psychosis (FEP) patients examining the associations between blunted affect, social withdrawal, and suicidal behaviour in FEP. Specifically, a mediational analysis demonstrated that blunted affect and social withdrawal are associated with suicidal behaviour when hopelessness acts as a mediator. To further enhance our understanding of suicidal behaviour in people with schizophrenia, I present a second data chapter conducting a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study, which compared brain function in patients with FEP and high vs low suicidal behaviour during an emotional face response task, aiming to explore whether there are any differences in brain function between the two groups. Findings demonstrate that patients with high suicidal behaviour reported reduced activation in the prefrontal cortex: specifically, the Medial Frontal Gyrus and Anterior Cingulate Gyrus, in response to presentation of emotional faces; areas related to decision making and executive function. The summary and discussion chapter includes implications such the mechanisms of blunted affect and social withdrawal and how high scores on such symptoms might impact patient's brain function, as well as early identification of suicide risk, and implications for treatment that focus on social connectedness and recovery. The novelty this thesis presents, focuses on the multidimensional examination of under-examined factors such as blunted affect and social withdrawal, that might play an indirect role to the development of suicidal behaviour. The symptoms of blunted affect and social withdrawal might lead to suicide when risk factors such as hopelessness act as mediator. Lastly, high scores on these symptoms might potentially be related to underlying brain dysfunction; however, this in itself does not automatically equate to suicide being irrational. Findings in this thesis could be seen as evidence which might lead to better identification of risk, and prevention of suicidal behaviour in people with schizophrenia.