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In the last ten years, the pernicious effects of cash bail--particularly as it relates to poor, Black people accused of crimes--have become increasingly publicized. Calls for reform have followed, and across the country the political branches have responded to public pressure to weaken, or entirely eliminate, cash bail's role in pretrial detention. In 2020, the Missouri Supreme Court promulgated a set of rules intended to de-emphasize cash bail. Shortly thereafter, Missouri's 22nd Judicial Circuit, situated in St. Louis City, initiated additional reforms to supplement the Missouri Supreme Court Rules. Three years later, on the surface, these reforms have largely accomplished what they intended: cash bail is rarely used in the city of St. Louis. But, even after cash bail, significant issues with pretrial detention determinations persist. This Note suggests that, in the absence of cash bail, a new, equally pernicious, system is developing in the 22nd Circuit: where judges once used unaffordably high cash bail to detain pretrial arrestees, they now use "no bond" determinations to do the same. Additionally, this Note explores pre-reform practices in the 22nd Circuit that have remained or re-emerged in new forms. Attention to these concerns provides direction for future efforts to incrementally reform the criminal legal system. Ultimately, this Note asks how St. Louis' pretrial processes might fundamentally shift focus to supporting and reintegrating persons accused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bail reform is an urgent topic in the United States and internationally. but what constitutes reform and how to accomplish reform goals is contested. Jails are a modern epicenter of incarceration. with a stunning growth in American jail populations over the past four decades despite declines in both arrests and crime. As many as sixty percent of the half million people currently in jails have not been convicted but are instead detained pretrial. Prior waves of bail reform produced a system largely reliant on secured bonds, which require up-front cash payments to avoid jail time before trial. More recent reform efforts have adopted divergent approaches towards changing bail practices. Several states have enacted legislation that has abolished the use of cash bail, reduced the use of cash bail, and conversely, required far greater reliance on cash bail. This Article seeks to shed light on key distinctions in bail reform approaches by focusing on six models: (1) the Procedural Due Process Model; (2) the Risk Assessment Model; (3) the Categorical Model; (4) the Community Services Model; (5) the Equal Protection Model; and (6) the Alternatives to Arrest Model. Each reflects a normative vision of the bail process, targets different legal actors, and raises distinct constitutional and legal questions. This Article recommends a composite model adopting elements ofeach model, using a separation of powers-informed approach to target pretrial actors whose often-hidden exercise of discretion can otherwise undermine efforts to consistently reform bail. This Article concludes by discussing a comprehensive vision for bail reform inside and outside of the criminal legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pretrial detention seriously restricts the physical liberty of presumptively innocent people who have yet to be tried and convicted. The Bail Reform Act (BRA) imposes several procedural requirements that must be satisfied before a judge can order the pretrial detention of a federal defendant. At a detention hearing, the BRA allows a judge to order the pretrial detention of an arrestee who poses either a danger to the community or a flight risk. The BRA states unequivocally that a finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, but the statute is silent as to the evidentiary standard for establishing a defendant's flight risk. In the absence of statutory guidance, the courts of appeals have utilized a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. This Comment contends that the preponderance standard for flight risk is unconstitutional and interpretively incorrect. In cases involving similar government restrictions on physical liberty, the Supreme Court has generally required at least a "clear and convincing evidence" standard to comport with due process. Using these cases as a baseline, this Comment applies the Mathews v. Eldridge due process framework to reveal the constitutional infirmity of the preponderance standard for pretrial flight risk. In making the interpretive argument for a clear and convincing evidence standard, this Comment dissects the BRA's legislative history and statutory evolution to show that Congress intended for flight risk and dangerousness to be considered under equivalent standards. This Comment concludes by making a constitutional avoidance argument: there exists (1) a serious question as to the constitutional validity of the preponderance standard for flight risk and (2) a plausible interpretation of the BRA--that flight risk ought to be proven by clear and convincing evidence--that avoids those constitutional concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pretrial detention is affected by many factors. One of those is wealth. While the ability to post bail is a major issue in state systems, the federal system poses a different problem: the ability to pay for mitigating conditions. This has the potential to create a disparate impact between wealthy defendants--who can afford conditions that mitigate findings of flight or danger--and indigent defendants who cannot. There are two solutions: detaining wealthy defendants to avoid disparate release or releasing indigent defendants to avoid disparate detention. This Note argues for the latter. It does so by focusing on the requirement for courts under the Bail Reform Act to release defendants with the "least restrictive" conditions. A framework for release is created by reading "least restrictive" through various lenses. First, reading "least restrictive" through a purposeful lens allows it to become quite expansive, such that almost any set of conditions, as long as they mitigate the necessary findings, allow for release. Second, a practical approach allows "least restrictive" to be read in the context of the Bail Reform Act's language and mandate to argue for a broad range of conditions. Third, "least restrictive," read in light of societal considerations, including who bears the burden of detention, opens up more pathways for release and demonstrates the importance of leveling up release instead of leveling down detention. The overall goal of this Note is to provide various analyses to help inform bail decisionmakers' considerations and to use this new facet of bail reform to advocate for indigent defendants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on COVID-19's impact on prisoners, jail populations, and surrounding communities. It mentions framework for considering defendants' arguments for release based on the COVID-19 pandemic and challenge practitioners and courts to grapple with an additional layer of complexity in applying the Bail Reform Act and the Constitution to federal detention decisions. It also mentions intellectually inquisitive approach, which bases decisions on science and facts.

This Article presents a mixed-methods study of misdemeanor bail practice across Georgia in the wake of reform. We observed bail hearings and interviewed system actors in a representative sample of fifty-five counties to assess the extent to which pretrial practice conforms to legal standards clarified in Senate Bill 407 and Walker v. Calhoun. We also analyzed jail population data published by county jails and by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. We found that a handful of counties have made promising headway in adhering to law and best practices, but that the majority have some distance to go. Most counties assessed do not assure a bail hearing within forty-eight hours of arrest, provide counsel at the initial bail hearing, consistently evaluate arrestees' financial circumstances, or guarantee release within forty-eight hours of arrest for those who cannot pay bail. In a combined eighteen counties, 37% of misdemeanor arrestees remained in jail for at least three days after arrest. In DeKalb County, 53% of all those arrested on misdemeanor charges between 2000 and 2019 were jailed for three days or more, but the annual rate has declined from 63% in 2009 to 26.5% in 2019. Per capita pretrial detention rates varied widely by county in 2019, with most of the higher rates in the southern portion of the state. Overall, the qualitative and quantitative data demonstrate both progress and substantial variation by county. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are few issues in criminal law with greater momentum than bail reform. In the last three years, states have passed hundreds of new pretrial release laws, and there are now over 200 bills pending throughout the states. These efforts are rooted in important concerns: Bail reform lies at the heart of broader recent debates about equitable treatment in the criminal justice system. Done right, bail keeps dangerous individuals off the streets; done wrong, it keeps those with less economic means in jail longer. Some jurisdictions are eliminating money bail. Others are adopting risk assessments to determine who to release. Still others are changing state statutes, constitutions, and factors that judges consider in the bail decision. All of these reforms are fundamentally flawed. This is because nearly all of these bail reform efforts fail to distinguish minor and serious crimes. Instead they consider all crimes as interchangeable. This Article is the first to identify this pervasive shortcoming in bail reform, and it makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it distinguishes between minor and serious crimes and proposes systematic changes to bail reform based on the seriousness of the crime. It argues that individuals charged with misdemeanors--accounting for the vast majority of criminal cases--should be released presumptively and not detained except in rare circumstances. This right is rooted in history and constitutional rights and even squares with a plain interpretation of current state laws. Second, it shows how dividing bail will matter in important ways: demonstrating that this modest-seeming proposal can have widespread theoretical and practical impact. Indeed, this change will dramatically alter the landscape of state bail laws, bail schedules, and risk assessments. In addition, it will have serious impact on some of the most important criminal law debates of our time, including equity of application in criminal law, prison overcrowding, and due process protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on bail reform in Missouri, which took effect in 2019, as well as its implications on Missouri public defenders and the indigent defendants they represent. It mentions constitutional protections afforded to indigent defendants under Missouri Public Defender System and consequences of the new bail system and offers suggestions to improve Missouri's bail reform. It also mentions rights afforded to indigent criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment.

This essay discusses bail law in the U.S., risk and conditions of the movement to abolish or limit money bail, and the absence of a consensus on how to reform systems that detain people who cannot afford money bail. Topics tackled are courts' failure to define limits of preventive detention as demonstrated in U.S. v. Salermo, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the preventive detention scheme of the Bail Reform Act, and risk assessment tools that obscure risk tolerance.

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel at critical stages of a proceeding. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether initial bail hearings are critical stages of a proceeding, several states have elected to provide greater protection for criminal defendants by holding that bail hearings are critical stages. However, Georgia has avoided this question, as Georgia has held that initial appearance hearings, in which questions of bail are often decided, are "not often" critical stages of a proceeding. Logically, it follows that initial appearance hearings must sometimes be critical stages of a proceeding. This Note argues that initial appearance hearings, insofar as they encompass questions of bail, should be considered critical stages. In so doing, this Note examines Georgia's history of providing greater protection to criminal defendants than the federal government and the implications of bail reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the reform of the bail system in the U.S. with the introduction of laws such as the Bail Reform Act in 1984. It explores the origins and history of English and American bail law and the role and regulation of commercial bail bonding in the U.S. Some of the legal and practical barriers to reform unique to right-to-bail states are discussed, including jurisdictions without the concentration and scale of resources to maintain pretrial services programs.

The article explores the problems associated with Pennsylvania's current monetary bail system. Topics discussed include problems associated with a monetary bail system merit attention; history and purpose of bail in criminal justice system; and enactment of Bail Reform Act of 1984 for addressing bail issues in country. It also mentions about country's mass incarceration.

On March 9, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, in Dawson v. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, that the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt is not a fundamental right. Rather, the court held, it is a non-fundamental liberty interest. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit split with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had held that the right is fundamental. The Tenth Circuit also diverged from the Ninth Circuit in its application of a test to determine whether the government's detention policy constituted unconstitutional punishment. On January 7, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Dawson, declining to address the circuit split. This Comment argues that the most accurate reading of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that the Court has recognized the right to be free from detention absent a determination of guilt as fundamental. This Comment further argues that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Dawson to clarify the Tenth Circuit's application of the law in two key areas. Such clarification is necessary to reduce confusion among the circuits in future pretrial detention cases. Lastly, it argues that the Supreme Court should have taken this opportunity to add additional factors to the test to help courts determine whether a government's detention policy is excessive in relation to the government's interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on laws governing judicial sentencing in the U.S. It informs on intersection of 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. Section 3143(a)(2) of Bail Reform Act which requires that defendants convicted of narcotics and violent offenses must be incarcerated between conviction and sentencing. It also informs on the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Booker on same.

Bail reform is happening. Across the country, jurisdictions are beginning to recognize that contemporary pretrial systems rooted in money bail are discriminatory, ineffective, and (by and large) unconstitutional. A common and substantial component of contemporary reforms is an increased reliance on conditional release as an alternative to pretrial incarceration. In many ways, conditional release represents an improvement over money bail, but the practice of conditional release has its own pitfalls. This Article identifies unforeseen and unplanned harms that can result from a system of conditional release and proposes five principles that jurisdictions can follow to eliminate or mitigate these harms. As the options for pretrial conditions continue to expand, judges may impose more conditions than are necessary, including conditions that are burdensome and ineffective. Because pretrial monitoring is inexpensive-especially when subsidized by user fees for pretrial monitoring-there is a risk that courts will impose monitoring and other conditions on people who would previously have been released without conditions. Taken together, these harms can prolong people's involvement in the criminal justice system, restrict their liberty in profound ways, set them up for pretrial incarceration through technical violations, and saddle them with unaffordable debts. To responsibly use conditional release without replicating the harms of money bail, jurisdictions should adopt the following five principles. One, release on recognizance should be the norm and conditional release the exception. Two, the principle of parsimony should guide decisions over what conditions of release to impose-meaning that burdens placed on defendants and restrictions of their liberty should not exceed the legitimate interests of the government. Three, conditions should be minimal, related to the charged conduct, and proportionate to the risk of flight and pretrial criminal activity. Four, jurisdictions should not charge fees for conditional release, pretrial services, or pretrial monitoring. Five, restrictions on pretrial liberty should be evidence-based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights federal pretrial services initiatives of criminal law committee. Topics discussed include judicial conference in 1922 for making national policy for the administration of the federal courts; talks about pretrial diversion program for traditional criminal justice processing of person; and mention about the Bail Reform Act of 1966 for data-driven strategies to reduce unnecessary pretrial detention.

The article offers information about federal pretrial release and detention reduction outreach program (DROP). Topics include development of DROP program by Probation and Pretrial Services Office (PPSO) of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; talks about risk-based recommendations and appropriate recommendations are findings of DROP; and highlights cause of facing detention crisis to follow the Bail Reform Act of 1984.

Bail reform is gaining momentum nationwide. Reformers aspire to untether pretrial detention from wealth (the ability to post money bail) and condition it instead on statistical risk, particularly the risk that a defendant will commit crime if he remains at liberty pending trial. The bail reform movement holds tremendous promise, but it also forces the criminal justice system to confront a difficult question: what statistical risk that a person will commit future crime justifies short-term detention-if any does? What about lesser restraints on liberty, like GPS monitoring? Although the turn to actuarial risk assessment in the pretrial context has raised concern in some quarters, the debate so far has largely ignored this foundational question. One way of thinking about what level of crime risk justifies restraint is to ask whether the answer is different for defendants than for anyone else. It is generally assumed that defendants are a special case, exempt by virtue of pending charges from otherwise applicable protections against preventive interference. This Article challenges that assumption. It argues that, for purposes of restraint for general dangerousness, there is no clear constitutional, moral, or practical basis for distinguishing defendants from non-defendants who are equally dangerous. There is thus no basis to conclude that the risk standard for such restraint should be different for defendants than for anyone else. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on analysis of the legislative history, combined with consideration of the quasi-constitutional ramifications of the majority position, indicates that pretrial detention should not toll supervised release. It mentions passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created the indeterminacy and federal judiciary dealt with criminal defendants in criminal justice process. It also mentions logistics of pretrial detention under Bail Reform Act.

The article discusses the legal aspects of bail in America as of 2017, and it mentions the reasons why various U.S. states have not implemented reforms similar to those included in America's Bail Reform Act of 1984. A presumption of innocence and wrongful convictions are examined, along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and a comparison of the federal and state systems of pretrial detention in the U.S. Surety bonds and pretrial release programs are assessed.

The article focuses on how justice system enforces poverty employing bail, fines and fees, and access to counsel in civil cases. It mentions Bail Reform Act which adopted that constitutionally mandated approach to bail may not impose a financial condition that results in pretrial detention of the person. It also mentions increase in fines and fees is a cause of mass incarceration. It also mentions barriers conspire to limit access to justice for low- and middle-income people.

Every day in the United States, thousands of people are waiting in jail postarrest prior to any trial or conviction. Once arrested, these individuals frequently face harsh conditions while they are held for their first appearance to be assigned bail. Thousands of individuals wait more than forty-eight hours to first appear in front of a judicial officer who determines their bail conditions. Innocent people-people who have committed no offense except that of being underprivileged-are pressured into accepting plea bargains because they cannot pay bail. Thousands remain in jail unwilling to accept plea bargains or admit guilt but are detained nevertheless because they are unable to afford their excessive bail amounts. These people are often the country,s most vulnerable, most poor, and most undereducated-and often minorities. These individuals are often arrested for crimes of vice, such as being intoxicated in public, or for petty crimes, such as driving with a suspended license. Bail is assigned through algebraic expressions that are hard to understand and in amounts even harder to pay. In an attempt at judicial efficiency and standardization, courts have overly relied on bail schedules while making those assignments. This frequently arbitrary reliance on bail schedules has resulted in a failure to make individualized bail determinations and has caused a rise in pretrial detention. Overreliance on these schedules coupled with a lack of guiding precedent from the Supreme Court has resulted in an excessive bail epidemic. Arbitrary bail procedures in the United States are now so perverse that they have vitiated due process and a presumption of innocence and have defeated the purpose of having an excessive bail clause in the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court should take clear action to restore this fundamental right and help end the United States, e(cessive bail epidemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arguably the most important decision at an arraignment is whether to release an offender until the date of his or her next scheduled court appearance. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, threats to public safety can be a key factor in that decision. Implicitly, a forecast of 'future dangerousness' is required. In this article, we consider in particular whether usefully accurate forecasts of domestic violence can be obtained. We apply machine learning to data on over 28,000 arraignment cases from a major metropolitan area in which an offender faces domestic violence charges. One of three possible post-arraignment outcomes is forecasted within two years: (1) a domestic violence arrest associated with a physical injury, (2) a domestic violence arrest not associated with a physical injury, and (3) no arrests for domestic violence. We incorporate asymmetric costs for different kinds of forecasting errors so that very strong statistical evidence is required before an offender is forecasted to be a good risk. When an out-of-sample forecast of no post-arraignment domestic violence arrests within two years is made, it is correct about 90 percent of the time. Under current practice within the jurisdiction studied, approximately 20 percent of those released after an arraignment for domestic violence are arrested within two years for a new domestic violence offense. If magistrates used the methods we have developed and released only offenders forecasted not to be arrested for domestic violence within two years after an arraignment, as few as 10 percent might be arrested. The failure rate could be cut nearly in half. Over a typical 24-month period in the jurisdiction studied, well over 2,000 post-arraignment arrests for domestic violence perhaps could be averted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the burgeoning practice of subjecting convicted sex offenders to indefinite civil commitment in the U.S. Topics discussed include failure of registering a sex crime under the U.S. Bail Reform Act, impact of Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (MSDPA) on convicted sex offenders and the condition of confinement at sex offenders treatment facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota violate inmate-patients' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The article discusses the claim that American courts' incorporation of the Excessive Bail Clause in the U.S. Constitution's (USC's) Eighth Amendment imposes limits on the nation's government, and it mentions several U.S. Supreme Court cases which deal with the American Constitution's Bill of Rights including McDonald v. City of Chicago, United States v. Salerno, and Stack v. Boyle. The U.S. Bail Reform Act of 1984 is examined, along with bail schedules and the USC's Due Process Clause.

The federal executive branch's zealous enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act is, at times, in conflict with the Bail Reform Act which requires that, absent exceptional circumstances, federal criminal defendants be released from federal custody pending trial. That conflict has resulted in a pattern of improper pretrial detention of alien defendants accused of federal crimes. That trend is fueled in part by a legislative detention quota and enabled by a judiciary that is too often unduly reluctant to afford alien defendants the full protection of their statutory right to pretrial release. Part I of this Comment considers the law and policy that has led to an increasing number of alien defendants being unjustly detained while they await criminal trial. Next, Part II considers the impact of improper pretrial detention on its immediate victims and American society as a whole. Finally, Part III proposes solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 lays out the rules and procedures for federal pretrial release and detention. In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Congress amended the Bail Reform Act. Before the Adam Walsh Act Amendments (AWA Amendments) were passed, a judicial officer decided whether to release a defendant, whether to impose pretrial release conditions, and what pretrial release conditions to impose on a case-by-case basis. The AWA Amendments, in contrast, impose mandatory pretrial release conditions, including electronic monitoring and curfew, on all defendants charged with certain enumerated sexual offenses against children. Many district courts have found mandatory imposition of pretrial release conditions unconstitutional and refuse to apply the AWA Amendments when setting bail. This Comment argues that Congress must repeal or revise the AWA Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 because they are unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses, are completely inconsistent with the Bail Reform Act's core principle of individualized judicial determination of bail, and come at a great cost to the defendant at little or no additional benefit to the public. This Comment proposes that the AWA Amendments be revised so that certain pretrial release conditions are imposed based on a rebuttable presumption instead of mandatorily, as in, a judge will impose them unless a defendant can rebut their imposition with evidence that the conditions are unnecessary to ensure the public's safety. This proposed revision not only fulfills Congress's original purpose of increased safety in enacting the AWA Amendments, but it is also constitutional and consistent with the rest of the Bail Reform Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Bail Reform Act and argues that a convicted person should be detained pending sentencing unless he satisfies the exception under the Act's mandatory detention provision. It contends that a section in federal statute 18 U.S.C. titled "Appeal from a release or detention order" is limited for use only by appellate courts in reviewing the district courts' bail orders.

The article discusses the history of bail in the U.S. and its contribution to the creation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. It details how to craft incapacitation-based statutes and the importance of amending the law to treat possession of child pornography offenses the same way that the law treats other federal sex crimes against children. It also addresses possible oppositions to the proposed amendments to the said law.

This article discusses the extraordinary conditions of release afforded white collar criminals Bernard Madoff and Marc Dreier under the U.S. Bail Reform Act of 1984. Madoff and Dreier were released to their homes with special conditions that limited their movements and restricted them to their homes. Both defendants were required to pay for the cost of these special conditions. The article argues that such special conditions are inherently unfair because defendants who pose similar flight risks but who can't afford such extraordinary conditions are held in much worse conditions. The article also argues that neither the Bail Reform Act nor the U.S. Constitution provides for such extraordinary bail relief.

The 1984 Bail Reform Act, recognizing danger as well as flight as a reason for detention before trial and providing for explicit detention, offers an opportunity to evaluate the effects of more precise guidelines on the release/detention decision and to determine the relative importance of legal variables, community lies and other social background variables to that decision. In this study, that evaluation takes place in a jurisdiction with a new pretrial services agency. Release on own Recognizance (ROR) rates increased significantly, in conjunction with an even greater increase in the use of conditional release. Recommendations of the U.S. Attorney and the Pre-trial Services Agency (PSA) regarding release and detention were less predictable than judicial decisions. For the magistrates, the application of guidelines for detention led to clearer distinctions among the oilier three options. In separating detention from secured bail, the guidelines led to more similar recommendations from the government and PSA. Offense dominated the recommendations of both agencies before and after the BRA, which, in turn, determined judicial decisions. Community ties declined in importance as the concurrently introduced sentencing guidelines combined with the BRA's criteria for detention to institutionalize offense, sentence and prior record as the definition of danger to the community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Utilizing a longitudinal research design, this study evaluates the impact of the 1984 Bail Reform Act in the Eastern Federal District of California. Contrary to other experiments with preventive detention in the U.S., it was found that this legislation is being implemented on a substantial scale. The substitution of detention orders for secured bonds in most cases suggests that preventive detention before the Bail Reform Act was achieved by less formal means. Overall detention rates have remained unchanged as has average detention length, suggesting the law has not contributed significantly to overcrowding of detention facilities. The greatest impact was felt by drug offenders for whom rates of detention have significantly increased. Discriminant analysis suggests that the judicial decision-making process has been routinized by the law. Rates of pre-trial crime and failure-to-appear rates, extremely low before the law, were unaffected by the new legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the history of the pretrial services in the U.S. The services were established when then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan approved the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 on September 27, 1982 where the law fixes inequities in bail-setting practices and enables application of alternative stipulations to cash and surety standards. Reagan also approved the Bail Reform Act in 1984 to improve stipulations for post-conviction release and preventive detection.