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In this paper I analyze the relationship between the retributive and the preventive function of punishment, within the frame of Kant's juridical theory. Despite Kant's explicit rejection of the preventive function in his brief discussion on Criminal Law, his observations regarding right and coercion allow to establish an acknowledgement of the preventive function. In my discussion of this topic, I will consider some methodological, juridical and moral premises which influence Kant's emphasis on the retributive principle. I will also consider the relationship between both function (retributive and preventive) of punishment, within the frame of his brief treatment of Criminal Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I shall address a series of remarks made by Kant in the context of his pedagogical reflections in order to show the fundamental character that the idea (or ideal) of education must assume in every pedagogical project. The kantian conception of a perfectible human nature --and directly related to it, the idea of a progress of the social institutions, which can be reached through the improvement of educational institutions-- represents, for Kant, a fundamental principle of every pedagogical enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of Transcendental Object either refers, in the framework of the Critic of Pure Reason, to the cause or foundation of external phenomena, or, on the contrary, to the concept of an object in general as it is thought by the conscience so as to guarantee the objective validity of its representations. In this paper, I shall attempt to show that--contrary to what has been suggested by several interpreters--the ambiguity involved in the Kantian use of this concept is not the result of a terminological carelessness, but that it is founded on certain principles of Critical Idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we shall analyze two Kantian definitions of political freedom which have been considered mutually exclusive: one of them would allow us to consider Kant as an exponent of the liberal tradition; the other would lead to a republican interpretation of Kant's political thought. The analysis of both definitions will show that they are not necessarily incompatible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]