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Given the dynamic nature of traffic, we investigate the variant of robust network design where we have to determine the capacity to reserve on each link so that each demand vector belonging to a polyhedral set can be routed. The objective is either to minimize congestion or a linear cost. Routing is assumed to be fractional and dynamic (i.e., dependent on the current traffic vector). We first prove that the robust network design problem with minimum congestion cannot be approximated within any constant factor. Then, using the ETH conjecture, we get a $\Omega(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})$ lower bound for the approximability of this problem. This implies that the well-known $O(\log n)$ approximation ratio established by R\"{a}cke in 2008 is tight. Using Lagrange relaxation, we obtain a new proof of the $O(\log n)$ approximation. An important consequence of the Lagrange-based reduction and our inapproximability results is that the robust network design problem with linear reservation cost cannot be approximated within any constant ratio. This answers a long-standing open question of Chekuri (2007). We also give another proof of the result of Goyal\&al (2009) stating that the optimal linear cost under static routing can be $\Omega(\log n)$ more expensive than the cost obtained under dynamic routing. Finally, we show that even if only two given paths are allowed for each commodity, the robust network design problem with minimum congestion or linear cost is hard to approximate within some constant., Comment: Preprint accepted to Elsevier Theoretical Computer Science

We propose a setting for two-phase opinion dynamics in social networks, where a node's final opinion in the first phase acts as its initial biased opinion in the second phase. In this setting, we study the problem of two camps aiming to maximize adoption of their respective opinions, by strategically investing on nodes in the two phases. A node's initial opinion in the second phase naturally plays a key role in determining the final opinion of that node, and hence also of other nodes in the network due to its influence on them. More importantly, this bias also determines the effectiveness of a camp's investment on that node in the second phase. To formalize this two-phase investment setting, we propose an extension of Friedkin-Johnsen model, and hence formulate the utility functions of the camps. There is a tradeoff while splitting the budget between the two phases. A lower investment in the first phase results in worse initial biases for the second phase, while a higher investment spares a lower available budget for the second phase. We first analyze the non-competitive case where only one camp invests, for which we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal way to split the camp's budget between the two phases. We then analyze the case of competing camps, where we show the existence of Nash equilibrium and that it can be computed in polynomial time under reasonable assumptions. We conclude our study with simulations on real-world network datasets, in order to quantify the effects of the initial biases and the weightage attributed by nodes to their initial biases, as well as that of a camp deviating from its equilibrium strategy. Our main conclusion is that, if nodes attribute high weightage to their initial biases, it is advantageous to have a high investment in the first phase, so as to effectively influence the biases to be harnessed in the second phase.

We study a stochastic game framework with dynamic set of players, for modeling and analyzing their computational investment strategies in distributed computing. Players obtain a certain reward for solving the problem or for providing their computational resources, while incur a certain cost based on the invested time and computational power. We first study a scenario where the reward is offered for solving the problem, such as in blockchain mining. We show that, in Markov perfect equilibrium, players with cost parameters exceeding a certain threshold, do not invest; while those with cost parameters less than this threshold, invest maximal power. Here, players need not know the system state. We then consider a scenario where the reward is offered for contributing to the computational power of a common central entity, such as in volunteer computing. Here, in Markov perfect equilibrium, only players with cost parameters in a relatively low range in a given state, invest. For the case where players are homogeneous, they invest proportionally to the 'reward to cost' ratio. For both the scenarios, we study the effects of players' arrival and departure rates on their utilities using simulations and provide additional insights.

One of the challenges of cloud computing is to optimally and efficiently assign virtual ma- chines to physical machines. The aim of telecommunication operators is to minimize the map- ping cost while respecting constraints regarding location, assignment and capacity. In this paper we first propose an exact formulation leading to a 0-1 bilinear constrained problem. Then we introduce a variety of linear cuts by exploiting the problem structure and present a Lagrange decomposition based B&B algorithm to obtain optimal solutions efficiently. Numerically, we show that our valid inequalities close over 80% of the optimality gap incurred by the well-known McCormick relaxation, and demonstrate the computational advantage of the proposed B&B algorithm with extensive numerical experiments., Comment: submitted for journal publication; copyright preserved

We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, where two camps aim to maximize adoption of their opinions by the population. In particular, we consider the possibility of campaigning in multiple phases, where the final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its initial biased opinion for the following phase. Using an extension of the popular DeGroot-Friedkin model, we formulate the utility functions of the camps, and show that they involve what can be interpreted as multiphase Katz centrality. Focusing on two phases, we analytically derive Nash equilibrium investment strategies, and the extent of loss that a camp would incur if it acted myopically. Our simulation study affirms that nodes attributing higher weightage to initial biases necessitate higher investment in the first phase, so as to influence these biases for the terminal phase. We then study the setting in which a camp's influence on a node depends on its initial bias. For single camp, we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal way to split the budget between the two phases. For competing camps, we show the existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions, and that they can be computed in polynomial time.

We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics, we formulate the problem as a zero-sum game with its players being the two camps. We derive optimal investment strategies for both camps, and show that a random investment strategy is optimal when the underlying network follows a popular class of weight distributions. We study a broad framework, where we consider various well-motivated settings of the problem, namely, when the influence of a camp on a node is a concave function of its investment on that node, when a camp aims at maximizing competitor's investment or deviation from its desired investment, and when one of the camps has uncertain information about the values of the model parameters. We also study a Stackelberg variant of this game under common coupled constraints on the combined investments by the camps and derive their equilibrium strategies, and hence quantify the first-mover advantage. For a quantitative and illustrative study, we conduct simulations on real-world datasets and provide results and insights., Comment: The original version of this paper is accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering. The copyright for this article belongs to IEEE

We consider linear programs involving uncertain parameters and propose a new tractable robust counterpart which contains and generalizes several other models including the existing Affinely Adjustable Robust Counterpart and the Fully Adjustable Robust Counterpart. It consists in selecting a set of poles whose convex hull contains some projection of the uncertainty set, and computing a recourse strategy for each data scenario as a convex combination of some optimized recourses (one for each pole). We show that the proposed multipolar robust counterpart is tractable and its complexity is controllable. Further, we show that under some mild assumptions, two sequences of upper and lower bounds converge to the optimal value of the fully adjustable robust counterpart. To illustrate the approach, a robust problem related to lobbying under some uncertain opinions of authorities is studied. Several numerical experiments are carried out showing the advantages of the proposed robustness framework and evaluating the benefit of adaptability., Comment: 35 pages, 1 figure, 9 tables, submitted journal paper

Consider a connected network of agents endowed with local cost functions representing private objectives. Agents seek to find an agreement on some minimizer of the aggregate cost, by means of repeated communications between neighbors. Consensus on the average over the network, usually addressed by gossip algorithms, is a special instance of this problem, corresponding to quadratic private objectives. Consensus on the median, or more generally quantiles, is also a special instance, as many more consensus problems. In this paper we show that optimizing the aggregate cost function regularized by a total variation term has appealing properties. First, it can be done very naturally in a distributed way, yielding algorithms that are efficient on numerical simulations. Secondly, the optimum for the regularized cost is shown to be also the optimum for the initial aggregate cost function under assumptions that are simple to state and easily verifiable. Finally, these algorithms are robust to unreliable agents that keep injecting some false value in the network. This is remarkable enough, and is not the case, for instance, of gossip algorithms, that are entirely ruled by unreliable agents as detailed in the paper.