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Reducing the arbitrariness of a metric is distinct from the pursuit of validity, rational zero points, data transformations, standardization, and the types of statistical procedures one uses to analyze interval-level versus ordinal-level data. A variety of theoretical, methodological, and statistical tools can assist researchers who wish to make their metrics less arbitrary. These approaches can be combined with perspectives from classic test theory, item response theory, or other scaling models. The importance of considering arbitrary metrics for some applied areas of research is reemphasized.

Many psychological tests have arbitrary metrics but are appropriate for testing psychological theories. Metric arbitrariness is a concern, however, when researchers wish to draw inferences about the true, absolute standing of a group or individual on the latent psychological dimension being measured. The authors illustrate this in the context of 2 case studies in which psychologists need to develop inventories with nonarbitrary metrics. One example comes from social psychology, where researchers have begun using the Implicit Association Test to provide the lay public with feedback about their "hidden biases" via popular Internet Web pages. The other example comes from clinical psychology, where researchers often wish to evaluate the real-world importance of interventions. As the authors show, both pursuits require researchers to conduct formal research that makes their metrics nonarbitrary by linking test scores to meaningful real-world events.

In their reply to our article, Greenwald, Rudman, Nosek, and Zayas offered comments on the use of their procedure relative to one that focuses on standard multiple regression (SMR) methods). Here we address five issues where we think a balance of perspective is called for: (a) issues of measurement, (b) the structuring and reporting of the simulations, (c) testing "pure" multiplicative models, (d) the meta-analysis, and (e) tests for deviations from bilinearity. On several occasions in their reply, Greenwald et al. stated our positions in the extreme (e.g., that we argued that no psychological measure can have ratio level properties). We will not react to these statements here, but we urge the reader to not be swayed by the setting up of straw men.

Theories that posit multiplicative relationships between variables are common in psychology. A. G. Greenwald et al. recently presented a theory that explicated relationships between group identification, group attitudes, and self-esteem. Their theory posits a multiplicative relationship between concepts when predicting a criterion variable. Greenwald et al. suggested analytic strategies to test their multiplicative model that researchers might assume are appropriate for testing multiplicative models more generally. The theory and analytic strategies of Greenwald et al. are used as a case study to show the strong measurement assumptions that underlie certain tests of multiplicative models. It is shown that the approach used by Greenwald et al. can lead to declarations of theoretical support when the theory is wrong as well as rejection of the theory when the theory is correct. A simple strategy for testing multiplicative models that makes weaker measurement assumptions than the strategy proposed by Greenwald et al. is suggested and discussed.

Cross-sectional research suggests that peer influence has a moderate to strong impact on adolescent risk behavior. Such estimates may be inflated owing to third-variable confounds representing either friendship selection effects or the operation of parallel events. Approximately 1,700 peer dyads in Grades 7 to 11 were studied over a 1-year period to estimate the influence of closest friends on sexual activity and binge drinking. Analyses suggested that peer influence was small but reliable when both selection effects and parallel events were taken into account. Peer influence varied as a function of individual-peer similarity and maternal relations but not in accord with other theoretical predictions. It is suggested that the magnitude of peer effects in previous research may be overestimated in many contexts.

The rebuttals offered by the authors whose data we reanalyzed (A. R. McConnell & J. M. Leibold, 2001; J. C. Ziegert & P. J. Hanges, 2005) address secondary issues that do not alter our primary message: The evidence for the predictive validity of the race Implicit Association Test is too fragile to support the strong claims that have been made about the pervasiveness of prejudice and the linkages between Implicit Association Test scores and discriminatory behavior. Greater caution in both the legal and scientific communities is warranted. Most importantly, scientific research on implicit bias needs greater transparency and willingness to open raw data to critical scrutiny, not greater trust and deference among researchers. Keywords: Implicit Association Test, implicit bias, predictive validity, discrimination, replication

The authors reanalyzed data from 2 influential studies--A. R. McConnell and J. M. Leibold (2001) and J. C. Ziegert and P. J. Hanges (2005)--that explore links between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior and that have been invoked to support strong claims about the predictive validity of the Implicit Association Test. In both of these studies, the inclusion of race Implicit Association Test scores in regression models reduced prediction errors by only tiny amounts, and Implicit Association Test scores did not permit prediction of individual-level behaviors. Furthermore, the results were not robust when the impact of rater reliability, statistical specifications, and/or outliers were taken into account, and reanalysis of A. R. McConnell & J. M. Leibold (2001) revealed a pattern of behavior consistent with a pro-Black behavioral bias, rather than the anti-Black bias suggested in the original study. Keywords: Implicit Association Test, predictive validity, discrimination, implicit bias

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.00437.x Byline: Patrick J. Sweeney (1), Vaida Thompson (2), Hart Blanton (3) Abstract: Two studies tested an interdependence model of trust development and the links between trust and influence in the in extremis environment of combat, and a non-combat replication. Structural equation modeling was used to test the model. Results from both studies suggested that a modified interdependence model provided a plausible explanation for how leaders may earn subordinate trust, through fostering the establishment of cooperative interdependence and being perceived as credible. Credibility was demonstrated through both competence and good character, and organizational structures that were in place contributed to trust by encouraging leaders to behave cooperatively toward group members. Most importantly, the level of trust subordinates had in their leaders determined the amount of leader influence subordinates accepted. Author Affiliation: (1)Department of Behavioral Sciences and LeadershipUnited States Military Academy (2)University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (3)Texas A & M University Article note: (1) Patrick J. Sweeney, Room 283, Thayer Hall, West Point, NY 10996. E-mail: Patrick.Sweeney@usma.edu

Several theoretical perspectives predict that social comparisons lead to simple, default-driven effects when triggered outside of conscious awareness. These theoretical perspectives differ, however, in the default effects they predict. Some theories argue for self-evaluative contrast, whereas others argue for self-evaluative assimilation. The current studies tested the prediction that the default effect would vary as a function of the social context and the type of self-concept activated. When attention was focused on the personal self, contrast effects emerged. When attention was focused on collective or possible selves, assimilation effects emerged. These findings suggest that a wide range of comparison effects can be triggered spontaneously and outside of conscious awareness. However, some results also show ways in which social comparison processes simplify when deliberate reflection is lacking. Keywords: assimilation, contrast, possible selves, social comparison, social identity

Three studies show that different forms of self-activation have differential influences on the processing of social comparison information. Activating neutral self-conceptions results in defensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 1). Participants maintain favorable self-evaluations in the face of upward comparison and rate the upward target of comparison negatively. Activating positive self-conceptions results in nondefensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 2). Participants endorse negative self-evaluations following upward comparison and rate the upward target of comparison positively. Activating negative self-conceptions maximizes defensive processing of threatening social comparison information (Study 3). Participants maintain favorable self-evaluations in the face of upward comparison and rate both upward and downward targets of comparison negatively. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for strategies to maintain self-esteem in the face of threatening comparisons. Keywords: self-activation; defensiveness; social comparison; self-processes; self-evaluation maintenance; self-affirmation

The authors hypothesize that social comparisons can have automatic influences on self-perceptions. This was tested by determining whether subliminal exposure to comparison information influences implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Study 1 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information increased the accessibility of the self. Study 2 revealed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information resulted in a contrast effect on explicit self-evaluation. Study 3 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information affects self-evaluations more easily than it affects mood or evaluations of other people. Studies 4 and 5 replicated these self-evaluation effects and extended them to implicit measures. Study 6 showed that automatic comparisons are responsive to a person's perceptual needs, such that they only occur when people are uncertain about themselves. Implications for theories of social cognition, judgment, and comparison are discussed.

Although often credited with prompting a paradigm shift in social comparison theory, T. A. Wills's (1981) downward comparison (DC) theory has received some criticism recently. In particular, several recent studies have failed to find support for T. A. Wills's (1981) contention that threat and accompanying negative affect lead to a desire for DC. These apparent failures have led some investigators to question basic principles of the theory. To resolve this controversy, 5 studies were conducted examining preferred comparison level (PCL) after performance; 4 of the studies also assessed change in this preference. Results supported DC theory, but with modifications. Specifically, individuals who performed poorly lowered their PCLs. Under some circumstances, this 'downward shift' included an increased interest in 'true' DC--comparing with worse-off others. A reconciliation of these results with those of previous studies is offered.

This article examines how stereotypes influence in-group behavior. The authors, analyzing data from an experiment in which women were told they were not as good at math as men, conclude that beliefs in the stereotype about an in-group causes the members to compare and contrast, even if the members' challenge the validity of the stereotype.

This study investigated the interactive influences of diagnosticity instructions, gender, and ethnicity as they related to task performance. In a laboratory experiment of 120 male and female, Latino and White college students, both a gender-based and an ethnicity-based stereotype-threat effect were found to influence performance on a test of mathematical and spatial ability. Closer inspection revealed that the gender effect was qualified by ethnicity, whereas the ethnicity effect was not qualified by gender. This suggests that the ethnicity of Latino women sensitized them to negative stereotypes about their gender, leading to a performance decrement in a context in which stereotype threat was activated. In contrast, it appeared that the gender of Latino women did not sensitize them to negative stereotypes about their ethnicity, because both male and female Latinos evidenced ethnicity-based stereotype threat. These findings have implications for the interplay between multiple group identities as they relate to concern for confirming negative stereotypes.

This study tested the hypothesis that unrealistic pessimism characterizes comparative estimates of coping ability. Participants rated their ability to adjust to a range of negative life events in comparison to the abilities of other same-sex students at their college. Most coping estimates showed signs of unrealistic pessimism, in that students rated their own abilities as worse than those of other same-sex students. Analyses indicated that this effect was due, in part, to the presence of an egocentric bias and, in part, to the absence of a self-enhancement bias. First, pessimism appeared to arise because participants paid more attention to the difficulties that they would have coping with severe misfortunes than they paid to the difficulties that others would have. Second, pessimism appeared to arise because participants were not motivated to enhance their coping appraisals, given that they were optimistic that they would not experience these events in the future.

A social cognitive model of overconfidence is presented, focusing on how a subject can display overconfidence in order to appear more knowledgeable and in control. Topics addressed include the relationship between accuracy and confidence, cognitive dissonance theory, and self-deception.

This study examines the effects of social comparison on self-esteem. Results indicate that African American students who were outperformed on an intelligence test by an African American confederate experienced enhanced self-esteem due to shared feelings of pride but experienced decreased self esteem when outperformed by White confederates.

Three studies are described that assess elements of a new model of adolescent health-risk behavior, the prototype/willingness (P/W) model (F. X. Gibbons & M. Gerrard, 1995, 1997). The 1st analysis examined whether a central element of the prototype model, behavioral willingness, adds significantly to behavioral expectation in predicting adolescents' smoking behavior. The 2nd set of analyses used structural-equation-modeling procedures to provide the 1st test of the complete model in predicting college students' pregnancy-risk behavior. Finally, the 3rd study used confirmatory factor analysis to assess the independence of elements of the model from similar elements in other health behavior models. Results of the 3 studies provided support for the prototype model and, in particular, for 2 of its primary contentions: (a) that much adolescent health-risk behavior is not planned and (b) that willingness and intention are related but independent constructs, each of which can be an antecedent to risk behavior.

Research shows that peer affiliations are the most accurate predictors of substance users' positive prototypes for smoking and alcohol, while prototypes are not greatly influenced directly by parents. However, negative prototypes were predicted by parental smoking. Positive prototypes of smokers and drinkers were developed by adolescents who associated with peers who used substances, and subsequent cigarette and alcohol use were predicted by such social images.

In numerous self-affirmation studies, Claude Steele and colleagues have demonstrated that self-affirmations reduce the need to justify dissonant behavior even when the affirmation is unrelated to the dissonance-evoking action. However, [...]