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Policies that shift the costs of higher education from the taxpayer to the university student or graduate are increasingly popular, yet they have not been subjected to a thorough normative analysis. This paper provides a critical survey of the standard arguments that have been used in the public debate on higher education funding. These arguments are found to be wanting. In their place, the paper offers a more systematic approach for dealing with the normative issues raised by the funding of higher education. This approach is drawn from the political theory of John Rawls, whose view seeks to reconcile the values of equality, efficiency, and liberty. I show that, contrary to what we may think at first, an egalitarian approach like Rawls' does not in principle rule out policies that shift the funding burden from taxpayers to students or graduates. Which funding policy that approach selects as most fair will instead depend on the likely impact on the lifetime income prospects of the worst-off group in society, and this is a question which will need to be settled by empirical evidence.

When skilled individuals emigrate from developing states to developed states, they leave a burdened state behind and bring their valuable human capital to a state that enjoys vast advantages by comparison. Most of the normative debate to date on this so-called 'brain drain' has focused on the duties that skilled emigrants owe to their home state after they emigrate. This article shifts the focus to the question of whether their host state acquires special duties toward their home state and argues for an affirmative answer to that question. After identifying the conditions under which 'exploitative free-riding' can occur, the article shows that the brain drain is a case of exploitation that gives rise to special duties of compensation for developed host states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter. Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument. He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.

According to Cécile Laborde, persons with religious commitments that are incidentally burdened by generally applicable laws should, under certain circumstances, be provided with an exemption from those laws. Laborde's justification for this view is that religious commitments are a type of commitment with which a person must comply if she is to maintain her integrity. I argue that Laborde's account is insufficiently demanding in terms of the other-regarding attitudes it expects people to have before they can make claims to exemptions based on their integrity. The reason it is insufficiently demanding is that Laborde's account rests on what I call a 'non-moralised' view of integrity. I raise some criticisms of this view and defend the alternative, 'moralised' view of integrity, according to which the value of a religious person's integrity depends on whether the practice she wishes to perform complies with certain moral constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the nature of the demographic policies that developed states should pursue in response to population ageing. The need for the states to have a relative emphasis on two types of demographic policy, pronatalism and replacement migration, that aim at increasing the proportion of working-age persons in their populations is tackled. The conditional duty of developed states to prioritize replacement migration over pronatalism is also explored.

In this comment, I reply to two objections John Tate raises against my discussion of the trajectory of Locke's ideas on toleration (in an earlier article published in EJPT, ‘Locke’s Tracts and the Anarchy of the Religious Conscience’) Tate maintains that I misunderstand the role of natural law and civil peace in Locke's thought. I defend my interpretation of the role of natural law and show that Tate is mistaken in his claim that Locke's concern to preserve civil peace conflicted with his separate concern to protect individual rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines a novel line of argument in support of welfare-state capitalism proposed by Gerald Gaus. The novelty of Gaus' argument lies in its contention that welfare-state capitalism can be justified on the basis of the contractualist mode of justification made famous by Rawls. Gaus argues that economic regimes, such as property-owning democracy, are more coercive than welfare-state capitalism insofar as they require a greater degree of tax-imposed redistribution among citizens. Given the degree of coercion needed by these regimes, he contends that parties to a contract would not agree to them, whereas they would agree to welfare-state capitalism by virtue of the lesser degree of coercion it needs. It is argued in this article that Gaus fails to show that welfare-state capitalism is less coercive than property-owning democracy. Indeed, once one directs one's attention towards those with the smallest range of valuable opportunities for action, there is reason to worry more about the coercion imposed by welfare-state capitalism than by property-owning democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most distinctive features of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is its commitment to holding individuals responsible for the costs to others of their ambitions. This commitment has received much criticism. Drawing on Dworkin’s latest statement of his position inJustice for Hedgehogs(2011), we suggest that it seems to be in tension with another crucial element of Dworkin’s own theory, namely, its endorsement of the importance of people leading authentic lives – lives that reflect their own values. We examine this tension between responsibility and authenticity, and some strategies Dworkin does and could deploy to defuse it, which we think are unsuccessful. We then propose a solution for reconciling the demands of responsibility and authenticity, which is, so we claim, friendly to Dworkin’s fundamental commitments but which leads to a revisionist interpretation of the demands of equality of resources. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reconstructs the main arguments in John Locke’s first political writings, the highly rhetorical, and often obscure, Two Tracts on Government (1660–1662). The Tracts support the government’s right to impose religious ceremonies on its people, an astonishing fact given Locke’s famous defense of toleration in his later works. The reconstruction of the Tracts developed here allows us to see that rather than a pessimistic view of the prospects for peace under religious diversity, what mainly animates the young Locke is a desire to defend the rule of law against an anarchical conception of religious freedom. The article also argues that the evolution of Locke’s thinking on religious freedom was in large part governed by Locke’s attempt to interpret religious freedom in a way that avoids its having anarchical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on parental partiality which, according to the author, consists of actions by which parents bestow greater resources and affection on their own children than on others. The author believes that parental partiality contributes to inequality amongst children because different parents are not equality able or willing to provide support for their children. The author stresses the importance for parents to comply with the demands of morality.

This article develops the argument that the state must provide parental subsidies if, and to the extent that, individuals would, under certain specified hypothetical conditions, purchase ‘insurance cover’ that would provide the funds they need for adequate childrearing. I argue that most citizens would sign up to an insurance scheme, in which they receive a guarantee of a means-tested parental subsidy in return for an obligation to pay a progressive income tax to fund the scheme. This argument from insurance bolsters the weaker case that proponents of parental subsidies might offer were they to rely exclusively on arguments from fair play and efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]