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This paper explores the perspectives of expert analysts and policy-makers on the implications of Brexit for different parts of the UK economy. For local and regional areas, the need for such expert voices to be heard is urgent, given the fact that UK subnational and substate governance authorities have been effectively blocked out of all Brexit-related negotiations, and as such, are wholly unprepared for the post-Brexit realities. The issues discussed in this paper reflect the key themes that came out of four regional stakeholder participatory symposia organized by The UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE), which were held in Leeds, Birmingham, London and Edinburgh, and that focused on the Brexit-related economic and governance challenges for the different parts of the UK. These issues are examined in the light of the recent 'levelling-up' agenda prioritized by the UK government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that: The FPC should have a wider remit; a much broader membership (covering many specialisms); should be wholly independent of Government and outside the Bank of England; its aim should be to comment publicly and authoritatively on any possible areas of risk to financial stability while itself controlling few, if any, levers of policy. The rationale for these conclusions is that: Macroprudential/financial risks come from many sources; many of these sources are structural and outside of the Bank's regulatory purview/competence; in a sense, the Bank gets to mark its own homework as regards issues such as the SMR, resolution, appropriateness of capital, effectiveness of ring‐fencing etc.; many aspects of macroprudential actions have distributional implications, and hence, politicians, not the Bank or any other body, should take and justify, or not, these decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoliberalization is a variegated series of processes with a core policy set that comprises: liberalization, deregulation, privatization, recommodification, internationalization, reductions in direct taxation, and decriminalization of predatory economic activities. Compared to the era of Atlantic Fordism and Spatial Keynesianism, neoliberalization promotes uneven development in the name of competitiveness and pursues policies that largely neglect its adverse economic, social, and political repercussions. Growing inequalities of income, wealth and life-chances have been ascending the political risk agenda and, through works such as Piketty's Capital in the twenty-first Century, have been 'conversationalized'. Yet little concrete action occurs to remedy the results of uneven development in societies undergoing neoliberal regime shifts. This contribution relates these issues to Brexit as a symptom of the organic crisis of British society, marked by manifold economic, political and social crises, and the continuing failure to address uneven development. The referendum question falsely posited that Brexiting would resolve many of these problems. However, the real issue should have been 'in' or 'out' of neoliberalism. Failure to deliver the anticipated benefits of Brexit will interact with the continuing crisis of British society to reinforce environmental, economic, social, and political crises and provide further grounds for right-wing populist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vote for Brexit is not an isolated event, but part of a wave of populist, anti-elite revolts: a new 'anti-system' politics Western democracies are experiencing, shaking the existing consensus around economic integration, free markets and liberal values. This wave takes a variety of forms, but has in common a robust, even violent, rejection of the mainstream political elites and their values, and a demand for governments to act on the sources of social and economic distress and inequality. This article views Brexit as a part of this new anti-system politics, a reaction to the decline in ideological competition in democracies and the increasing impotence of politicians to address the upheavals wrought by global free market capitalism. This reaction has become particularly acute after the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which affected Britain disproportionately, and the failure of austerity policies to revive growth, crystallising the ineffectiveness of existing policies to deal with economic stagnation and cultural change. This policy failure is compounded by a perceived refusal of politicians to engage with the broader public and a lack of real choice between the mainstream political parties. The article will present evidence that a failed policy consensus, a rise in inequality and a decline in the representativeness of political elites, rather than a resurgence of intolerance or xenophobia, are the principal causes of the Brexit vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two taxes, introduced in 1643, became cornerstones of early modern English supply. Whereas that bureaucratic indirect tax, the excise, seems a natural part of a centralised and institutional Fiscal-military state, the Assessment appears mired in ancient practice. Yet this new tax was far heavier and more successful than any predecessor. This study attempts to explain that success, which continued as the eighteenth-century Land Tax, and proposes it was founded on well-designed administrative process and routine, engineered to tap rent-flows from an increasingly commercialised real estate sector. It was facilitated by effective and well-established local governors who had appropriate authority, capabilities and experience to operate that process, not always perfectly or fairly, but remarkably effectively for the state’s purposes. Members of Parliament bore a significant administrative burden as centre came to locality in a most direct way to ensure national coordination and shared ownership of fiscal success between London and locality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unless Labour in tandem with other parties of the parliamentary left offers a modernised Keynesian alternative to the neoliberal economic policies of austerity embraced across Europe, there is no prospect of winning again or defeating the right-wing populism eating into our voter base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Approaches to growth planning and spatial governance on larger-than-local scales are matters of entrenched contention. Following the annulment of regionalised patterns of working and policy coordination across England during the early 2010s, much of the country was left without suitable larger-than-local scales of spatial governance and planning arrangements for delivering growth ambitions. This paper analyses the emergence of new approaches to planning for growth that have arisen on larger-thanlocal scales since the abandonment of regionalised policy working. Specifically, the nature and capabilities of strategic economic plans are examined, derived from a national comparative analysis of all of them. The findings draw attention to some of the defining challenges of informal growth planning on larger-than-local scales, as the research considers the extent to which these plans address an apparent strategic void. A key distinction is drawn between plans resembling bidding documents and those that could be considered to be plans for the area. In doing so, the intent is that the research contributes new knowledge to the evolving practice of strategic planning and economic strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the positive and negative impact of Brexit or the decision of the British government to leave the European Union (EU). It mentions several reasons of Brexit including disillusionment with economic regulation, preference for parliamentary democracy over law-making, and fear of uncontrolled immigration.

In its neglect of cycling, the transport policy history of Great Britain is typical of many car-dependent societies. Policy inertia with respect to sustainable travel may be driven by the assumptions that, firstly, most households have access to the use of a car and are keen to preserve the mobility advantages the current system offers them, and secondly that environmental and health considerations should be subjugated to economic priorities. Thus, in spite of warm words about cycling, pro-car policies tend to dominate. Set against this policy backdrop, and taking the stance that public opinion can influence policy change, this paper reports the results of two large scale surveys of opinions regarding the practice of cycling and its role within society, carried out amongst samples of adults representative of Great Britain, in 2010 and 2013. Results indicated broadly positive opinions relating to cycling as part of society, albeit with these measures dropping slightly between 2010 and 2013. Opinions of cycling were found to be significantly linked to voting intention with, broadly speaking, a gradient of decreasing positivity when moving from the political left to right. These results imply a possible link of ‘surface’ opinions of cycling being influenced by underlying ‘deep-seated’ beliefs and values. These results are discussed in terms of policy options for pro-cycling groups wishing to influence the debate. Options include decoupling cycling from underlying belief systems and presenting simply as a form of everyday transport; promoting cycling as a solution to multi-social issues across health, the environment and economic considerations such as lower congestion; the pros and cons of de-marketing car usage; and finally, changing underlying belief systems. It is concluded that pro-cycling advocates may be pleased with the broad support of cycling’s contribution to society, but they may need to seek alliances with other environmental or health groups in order to turn these good intentions into genuine policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent months have seen the Government's endeavours to cut public sector borrowing stall. The UK's vote to leave the EU will now throw previous fiscal plans up in the air via both a likely slowdown in the economy and the possibility of a discretionary fiscal loosening. But the latter could prove a silver lining for the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the lessons that can be learned by Great Britain from the Isle of Man, a British Crown Dependency in the Irish Sea for its potential exit from the European Union (EU). Topics include the economic conditions and financial contribution of the Isle of Man to Great Britain, the similarities and differences between Isle of Man and a non-EU Great Britain in terms of economy, regulation, and legal relationship with EU, and the growing manufacturing sector in the Isle of Man.

Deficit reduction continues to be a slow process. And while the Government officially remains on course to meet its objective of a budget surplus by the end of the decade, it will not take much to knock that target off course, including an acceptance of the implausibility of current plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price-sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate., Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016., Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer., Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Job quality has become a prominent issue in recent years - and with good reason, say Francis Green, Alan Felstead and Duncan Gallie. Their findings on inequality and job quality and how they have changed illuminate the true state of Britain's labour market, and make clear the need for changes in policy to improve working lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2010-15 UK coalition government's commitment to 'localism' in planning was in marked contrast to the emphasis on cross-boundary strategic planning initiatives under the preceding Labour government. Against this background, the paper examines the implications of evolving economic governance arrangements in three subregional 'soft spaces' in England's South East region. A distinctive evaluative frame derives a set of criteria for 'good economic governance' as perceived by the stakeholders concerned, and a judgement regarding the 'quality' of economic governance in each case is presented. The conclusion triangulates these results against economic growth outcomes across the respective subregions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Conservative party's ability to embrace popular concerns around value, place and equality has enabled it to resurrect the old pre-crisis growth model, says Craig Berry, in a move which none of the post-crisis narratives offered by the Labour party has yet been able to disrupt or overturn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The supranational strategy ' Europe 2020' came along with two main innovations for social policy coordination in the EU: a quantified poverty reduction target and a new governance framework - the ' European Semester'. Aiming to assess the effectiveness of the novel strategy in prompting the emergence of a European(-ized) anti-poverty arena - thus inherently multilevel and multi-stakeholder, as well as integrated (across policy sectors) - the article first presents the strategy evolution at the supranational level in 2011-14. Then it analyzes its implementation in five member states - Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK - through the first four annual cycles. By directing the analytical focus on processes - rather than outcomes - in order to capture the domestic changes produced by the Europe 2020 anti-poverty strategy, the article argues that the latter marked significant discontinuity with the Social Inclusion Open Method of Coordination. The new strategy increased the political salience of the poverty issue both at the supranational level and in the selected member states, while leading to a 'competence clash' between national governments and the EU in Germany, Sweden and the UK. The emergence of such main tension substantially constrained the Europe 2020 potential in these three countries. Differently, in Italy and Poland, the implementation was smoother and the effects along the participation and integration dimensions were more evident. We contend that national policy legacies, the relevance of EU social funds, as well as partisan preferences, help to explain the differential effects of Europe 2020. The article concludes by suggesting that recent decisions at the EU level might eventually bring European anti-poverty coordination beyond soft-law towards 'hybrid' governance solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the way in which the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) is returning an economic growth agenda to the centre of its mandate. The private sector is pitched as the primary engine of this strategy, with a growing place for corporations, consultancies and the financial sector in particular. The shift can be understood as a strategic response to an increasingly challenging domestic context, and to a turbulent external arena for the “traditional” donors. This strategy may well achieve growth outcomes in partner countries, but without sufficient conceptual rigour, regulatory oversight or attention to the “connective fabric” between growth and “development”, the latter is more uncertain. DFID's direction reflects wider trends in international development norms, finances and actors. While in some regards we could say that the “traditional” donors are “returning” to older development models, they are doing so with new tools and in new contexts. An optimistic assessment is that this will result in a more effective “beyond aid” development agenda, but there is a significant risk of capture by state-corporate interests that will not aim for or achieve progressive, just development outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 2013, the Bank of England adopted a new monetary policy known as ‘forward guidance’. This paper sheds light on this landmark moment and this rather obscure policy instrument. The authors unpack the rationale of this policy, its implementation modality and provide international evidence on its impact. Important questions are then raised about whether this policy is needed in the UK, and about the downsides of this seemingly innocuous monetary experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our modelling suggests that, based upon the three main parties' economic and fiscal plans, the outcome of the General Election would have a modest, but not immaterial, impact on the UK's economic and fiscal outlook. The Liberal Democrat plans would deliver the strongest GDP growth, followed by Labour, but both would also involve higher debt servicing costs and a higher level of government debt than the plans of the Conservatives., In our view these premiums on debt and borrowing costs are so small that it is very difficult to argue that the UK should pursue a more austere fiscal policy and reject the opportunity of stronger growth. But with the latest opinion polls suggesting that it is likely that the next government will be either a minority administration, or a coalition consisting of three or more parties, it is most likely that we will ultimately see some combination of the main parties' plans enacted., The experience of 2010 suggests that such political uncertainty could mean that we see several bouts of market nervousness between now and May 7th, particularly in equity markets. However, such turbulence is likely to be short-lived, providing that the resulting government is perceived to be strong and durable. Even a multi-party coalition may not be such a bad thing, particularly if it watered down the more contentious policies of the main parties. The worst-case scenario would be a weak minority government which is both unable to pass any meaningful legislation and unable to seek a fresh mandate. Such a scenario could seriously undermine confidence amongst investors and firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 2010 George Osborne put deficit reduction and control of debt at the centre of his economic strategy, announcing a much more radical fiscal retrenchment than the plan inherited from Alastair Darling. The key reason for this was political. Osborne sought to redefine the terms of the debate on economic policy, enabling the Coalition to blame the recession on Labour and to create a new narrative to bolster its claim to economic competence. He failed to achieve his fiscal targets, but his statecraft was highly successful, allowing him to claim the credit when recovery finally started in 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between electoral support and the economy over the period 2004-2013, paying particular attention to the impact of the economic strategy pursued by the Coalition government in Britain since the 2010 general election. This involves modelling the relationship between voting intentions, perceptions of economic performance and a variety of other variables using survey data collected from 2004. The evidence shows that when Labour was in office, support for the party was strongly influenced by the state of the economy, as was support for the opposition parties. However, since the Coalition came to power, the relationship between the economy and political support has changed, with neither the Conservatives nor the Liberal Democrats gaining from a fairly rapid growth in economic optimism which has taken place since early 2013. The article explains this change in terms of a growing perception among the public that none of the major parties can effectively manage Britain's economic problems. Optimism about the national economy has not significantly percolated down to the level of the individual voter. So individuals may be more optimistic about the future of the national economy but they are still being badly affected by the recession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores everyday interactions with the British welfare state at a moment when it is attempting to shift and transform its funding regimes. Based on a study of two London legal services providers, it draws attention to a set of actors poised between local state officers and citizens: the advisers who carry out the work of translation, helping people to actualize their rights and, at the same time, forcing disparate state agencies to work together. Advice and government services providers are increasingly part of the same system, yet advisers' work runs counter to the state's aims when formal legal process is used to challenge unfair legislation. The article reveals that ever more complex, vague, and idiosyncratic interconnections between state, business, and the third sector are emerging in the field of public services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Atlantic Gateway -- including the cities of Liverpool and Manchester -- is a proposition to create the critical mass to achieve a new level of sustainable economic growth not previously achieved in the UK outside London. The Atlantic Gateway Partnership's aim is to attract investment and accelerate growth as a transformational contribution to rebalancing the UK economy. The author sets out the challenges and the context and describes the proposition, the partnership and the priorities. The paper concludes with an exploration of future options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 30 years, British unions have been marginalised from economic policymaking. Union membership and collective bargaining coverage have fallen dramatically, and the sometimes negative economic impact of unions at the workplace level has disappeared. While strong unions were once key contributors to macroeconomic problems such as high inflation, the weakening of organised labour has created other economic problems for policymakers in Britain, such as rising inequality. The social and political consequences of deepening inequality may force a reconsideration of the role of both the state and of unions in upholding labour standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Workforce development partnerships between higher education institutions and employers involve distinctive social and technical dynamics that differ from dominant higher education practices in the UK. The New Labour government encouraged such partnerships in England, including through the use of funding that aimed to stimulate reform to institutional processes and build capacity. In the broader policy context, greater workforce development activity had the objective of supporting national skills policy targets and increasing industrial productivity. In this article, the notion of the productive system is used to identify factors influencing the outcomes of this policy, using three models of the production of higher education provision. Attention is paid both to the structure in which these productive processes are situated, and the stages that result in new higher education programmes. To evaluate the sustainability of the productive systems, the development of mutual interests between participants is examined, in addition to the norms that structure culture and relationships and the distribution of power and influence. The role of the institution in respect of the employer and the student is also addressed, with reference to uncertainty regarding the value of workforce development provision in economic and political contexts of perpetual change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]