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AbstractThe privatization of public utilities marked a turning point in European capitalism, reshaping the relationship between the public and private spheres of the economy. However, the extent of state disinvestment varies greatly from country to country. While in some countries direct state ownership has disappeared, in others the state still acts as a reference shareholder in strategic companies. Despite their institutional similarities, Italy and Spain provide a puzzling example of this divergence. While Spain completed the privatization of all public utilities, the Italian state retains a controlling stake in many of them. Through historical case studies based on official documents, legal texts, archival research of newspaper articles, secondary sources and memoirs, this paper explains this divergence. Contributing to recent debates on patient capital and state-business interactions, it is argued that Spain completed the privatization process because the state was able to orchestrate the creation of shareholder alliances among private investors. Crucially, these investors were willing to ensure that management prioritizes long-term investment plans over the distribution of short-term financial profits. In the absence of domestic private providers of patient capital, the Italian state had to keep the role of anchor investor for itself after unsuccessfully experimenting with various privatization strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even when subject to comparable exogenous constraints during the Eurozone crisis and in its immediate aftermath, governments in Southern Europe have pursued distinct labour market reform agendas. What room for manoeuvre did governments of crisis‐struck peripheral countries really have in shaping their labour market reform strategies, and how can we account for the observed variation? We address these questions by making a twofold contribution to the debate on the political economy of austerity in the Eurozone periphery. First, through the first systematic analysis of all labour market and collective bargaining (CB) reforms implemented in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece over 2009–2019, we identify those elements of core labour market deregulation common across Southern European countries (namely, the loosening of employment protection for workers on open‐ended contracts and the decentralisation of CB to the firm level); and those elements of variation, both cross‐country and cross‐party, in the content of corollary labour market interventions that accompanied this core deregulation. Second, we explain these similarities and variations in reform outcomes as the product of the interaction of two factors: economic constraints and electoral dynamics. We argue that the implementation of the common core of deregulation is linked to the exogenous pressure to improve export competitiveness to which Southern European countries have been subjected since the crisis. Through the combination of survey data analysis and qualitative evidence, we then show empirically how the variation in the corollary measures accompanying deregulation is linked to the class composition of the electoral social blocs Southern European partisan governments rely on or aim to assemble. Based on this analysis, we identify four ideal‐typical labour market reformist strategies attempted by Southern European governments during the decade of the Great Recession. The analysis highlights that although domestic politics plays a crucial role in shaping structural adjustment under crisis conditions, not all reform strategies are equally viable within the framework of Economic and Monetary Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employer organizations have been presented as strong promoters of the liberalization of industrial relations in Europe. This article, in contrast, argues that the preferences of employers vis-à-vis liberalization are heterogeneous and documents how employer organizations in Spain, Italy, and Portugal have resisted state-led reforms to liberalize collective bargaining during the Euro crisis. It shows that the dominance of small firms in the economies of these countries make employer organizations supportive of selective aspects of sectoral bargaining and state regulation. Encompassing sectoral bargaining is important for small firms for three reasons: it limits industrial conflict, reduces transaction costs related to wage-bargaining, and ensures that member firms are not undercut by rivals offering lower wages and employment conditions. Furthermore, the maintenance of sectoral bargaining and its extension to whole sectors by the state is a matter of survival for employer organizations. The article presents rationales for employer opposition to liberalization that differ from the varieties of capitalism approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on insights from the comparative capitalism debate, this article compares the industrial policy strategies implemented by the Italian and Spanish governments to favor the internationalization of domestic electricity and telecommunications incumbents. It is shown how the cross‐sectoral and cross‐country variation in the outcome of their industrial policy efforts—that is, successful or unsuccessful internationalization—is explained by the reciprocal power relationship between governments and domestic large shareholders ("blockholders"). Successful internationalization is conditional on the availability of two power resources the government can use to influence blockholders' behavior: ownership power and regulatory power. When these resources were available, governments were able to impose a stable ownership structure on national champions, leading to successful internationalization. When they were not available, ownership instability led to failure. The findings presented here contribute to the debate on new forms of state involvement in the economy in the neoliberal era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contributing to the debate on the state's role in helping domestic firms to internationalise, this paper compares the divergent performance of the Italian and Spanish telecommunications incumbents Telefonica and Telecom Italia (TI). Telefonica has grown since the early 1990s to become one of the largest telecommunications utilities worldwide, while TI is now a small firm controlled by the French media group Vivendi. This divergence occurred even though both the Italian and Spanish government implemented an activist industrial policy strategy aimed at favouring the internationalisation of, respectively, TI and Telefonica. The paper shows how these contrasting outcomes can be traced to the different regulatory power relationship between the state and domestic blockholders in the two countries. The findings shed light on the factors that lie behind the successful internationalisation of inward-looking firms active in regulated sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains the process of change in domestic corporate governance. An actor-centred coalitional approach is applied to the Italian case to show how the main features of domestic corporate governance are a product of behavioural patterns (i.e. informal institutions), rather than formal legislation. Leveraging their superior financial means, business elites act as institutional incumbents shaping these informal institutions according to their preferences. It is argued that a change in corporate practices is more likely to be triggered by a socio-economic crisis, which weakens the domestic elite’s influence, rather than a legal reform. These findings call into question the excessively formalistic approach of many corporate governance scholars, and are confirmed by the Italian trajectory. After having resisted 20 years of liberalising legal reforms aimed at eroding their power, Italian blockholders are now being forced, as a consequence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, to dismantle their cross-shareholding networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]