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In this paper we want to explore different epistemological benefits that we gain by dealing with some artworks, and our focus is on narrative arts. We claim that there is a sense in which narrative arts (e.g. literature, film and possibly even some expressions of visual art) can be similar to testimony, in that they provide information which can be epistemologically valuable for cognitive agents such as we are. We identify at least two broad categories of these epistemological benefits, the first one includes ‘facts stating’ and in that sense is parallel to the paradigmatic case of testimony in which what the testifier says can be a source of knowledge as mere acquisition of facts for his audience (this is the first case when we speak of artworks as ‘tellings’). This, however, is not the most peculiar and distinctive kind of epistemological benefits we can gain from art. The other one has to do with raising awareness, of deepening our understanding about some issues either by a specific, powerful and involving way of providing us facts (this is the second way in which we speak of artworks as ‘tellings’), or by presenting us the stance, the attitude, the opinion of the artist that can be enlightening, or challenging for us (in this case, we speak of ‘sayings’).

Eberhardt Schockenhoff se u svojim studijama o ljudskom dostojanstvu suočava s tradicionalnim temama o pridijevanju moralnog statusa i moralne zaštite ljudskoj osobi unapređujući raspravu na relevantnim elementima. Autor teksta bavi se isključivo postavljanjem nekih pitanja koja mu izgledaju i dalje otvorenima

Rasprava o ovoj temi počinje još pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća u tekstovima Patricka Devlina. Devlin je zastupao stajalište da zajednica, radi svoje stabilnosti, ima pravo nametnuti moralne standarde putem zakona, i to u odnosu na one radnje koje izazivaju neslošljivost, srdžbu i gađenje. Devlinovi se argumenti odvijaju na nekoliko osnova. Ponajprije, prihvaća se Hartov argument koji upućuje na to da nema izravne veze između takvih moralnih stavova i stabilnosti zajednice. Potom, odbija se temelj morala koji postavlja Devlin. I, na kraju, predlaže se alternativni model stabilnosti zajednice u Rawlsovu prijedlogu društvenog ugovora