This dissertation addresses three issues related to food safety. First, it examines the economic efficiency of irrigation water quality guidelines of Food Safety Modernization Act. Second, it estimates the value of traceability in the U.S. lettuce supply chain. Third, it uses state-level data and panel regression models to examine the relationship between product liability laws and reported foodborne illnesses in the U.S. The second chapter develops a theoretical framework and a corresponding empirical analysis to analyze the Food and Drug Administration's irrigation water quality regulatory standard pursuant to the Food Safety Modernization Act. We develop a stochastic, price endogenous partial equilibrium model with recourse to examine the standard's efficacy under various scenarios of foodborne illness severity, standard implementation, demand response to foodborne outbreaks, and irrigation costs. The stringency of regulation is evaluated with endogenous producer response to regulatory requirements and corresponding implications for economic surplus. Lettuce industry in California and Arizona is used as a case study. The baseline results show that in the case of the lettuce market, the proposed microbial irrigation water quality regulation is not cost-effective relative to the existing Leafy-Greens Marketing Agreements (LGMA) and results in 2.57% and 1.84% increases in head and leaf-romaine lettuce prices, respectively. The third chapter estimates the value of traceability in the U.S. lettuce industry using a stochastic price endogenous partial equilibrium model. Using irrigation water as a potential pathogen source we show that if the average cost per foodborne illness is $8,500, then the annual benefits of traceability in the lettuce industry vary between $680,000 and $2 million, depending on the length of produce shelf life. Also, the number of avoided symptomatic cases of foodborne illness due to traceability is between 81 and 232 cases. We also observe that the benefits of traceability depend on microbial die-off rate, monetary value of foodborne illness damages, pathogen transmission from source water to crop, and pathogenicity of water per unit of Generic E. coli. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between product liability laws and reported foodborne illnesses in the U.S. using state-level data and panel regression models. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between strict liability with punitive damages and the number of reported foodborne illnesses. Most evidence, however, shows no statistically significant relationship between strict liability with punitive damages and the number of foodborne illness-related hospitalizations and deaths. Thus, the results suggest that strict liability with punitive damages encourages reporting but does not necessarily prevent serious foodborne illnesses.