Search

Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we "live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin." Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief‐stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self‐conception in the latter half of the 20th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This brief commentary treats Polanyi's newly found lecture, "Rules of Rightness," as an occasion to revisit some earlier claims I made about the use of rating scales in social science research. It serves as something of an interim report on an ongoing inquiry into what an effective response to social science would look like from a Polanyian perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A climactic moment appears in Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge when he describes the modern predicament of humanity as a second ejection from paradise triggered by the uneasy discovery that our knowledge cannot be justified objectively. Polanyi's philosophy is a response to the cataclysmic consequences of this second fall from grace. It seeks to establish a "balance of mind" that yields neither to the Scylla of objectivism nor the Charybdis of nihilism. Such themes are reminiscent of Jungian psychology and the process of individuation, yet there is no evidence that Polanyi appreciated this. That he nevertheless employs metaphors and ideas suggestive of the psychical transformations recorded by alchemists is telling. It raises the possibility that while his work is evidently concerned with epistemology, it is, at another level, a highly sophisticated depiction of psychological growth—both for Polanyi, and for anyone who accepts his invitation to join the opus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People who experience a strong need to belong might be particularly inclined to forgive wrongdoings to preserve social bonds. Three studies that utilized different methods and measures of forgiveness consistently demonstrated this is not the case. The authors found that individuals high in the need to belong report practicing forgiveness with less frequency and value it no more than those low in the need to belong (Study 1). In Study 2, they found that satisfying the need to belong led participants to express greater willingness to forgive hypothetical offenses compared to participants in a control group. Finally, in Study 3, the authors linked the need to belong to forgiveness of specific transgressions and found that this negative relationship was mediated by offense-related anger and perceptions of offense severity. These findings suggest that needing to belong paradoxically interferes with forgiveness, even though forgiving could promote the satisfaction of belongingness needs following transgressions.

Rating scales that link numbers to verbal labels are ubiquitous in social psychological research and are used to re-express individuals' attitudes on wide-ranging matters in quantities that can be treated statistically. These re-expressions pay tribute to an objectivist framework, but at the expense of eclipsing the powers of personal knowing Polanyi attributes to other minds. This fact comes to the fore in the present paper through an investigation of Polanyi's analysis of linguistic indeterminacy, indication and symbols, and the application of neurological models to persons who are competent to make sense of their own lives. Accrediting the result of this inquiry compels one dedicated to Polanyi's thought to wonder how social psychology ought to be conceived. Clues to an answer appear in the educational bonds formed between mentors and pupils in the transmission of cultural lore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent article in the Annual Review of Psychology heralds the arrival of a renaissance in psychology that is improving research practices in the field. The present article evaluates this new epoch in light of Michael Polanyi's thought. While the reforms the renaissance celebrates are invaluable to psychology in its reliance on probabilities for hypothesis testing, they under appreciate the central place of personal judgments in research, portraying them instead and primarily as sources of error that must be curtailed by a narrow range of methods. Valuing the place of personal participation in probability judgments may embolden psychologists to accredit inquiries that more openly rely on discernment to declare truth and are better suited to the I-Thou relations that distinguish human psychology from the study of matter in motion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Matthew Crawford invites readers to consider how their contact with the real world has been imperiled by the notion that all experience is mediated by mental representations and how skilled activities providing bodily contact with the environment help recover us from this mistaken perspective. In this brief presentation, I ask whether in his critique of mediated experience by appeal to physical skills Crawford neglects to appreciate Polanyi's emphasis on intellectual probes as instruments for contacting reality and whether his doing so inappropriately--and perhaps inadvertently--diminishes the all-important place of belief in Polanyi's epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]