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Contains fulltext : 290919.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) 01 januari 2023

This article analyzes the differences between public and private health services regarding infrastructure and human resources at the state (subnational) and macro-regional levels in Brazil. The research collected monthly data on inpatient beds and the number of nurses, physiotherapists, and doctors from Brazilian states for 2020. Indicators were created following quarterly changes and comparing the actions of public and private healthcare entities. Variations were analyzed using temporal graphs based on means and standard deviation. The findings suggest: (1) exponential growth in health care infrastructure and human resources led by public sector investment in the second quarter, followed by a slowdown; (2) a more significant variation in the acceleration and deceleration of the public sector response in the North of Brazil and the states of Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, and the Federal District; (3) the public sector was the primary response mechanism to the pandemic considering the variations throughout the year. The study concludes that the government was the leading actor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil in 2020, pointing out that responses were uneven in the states.

Objectives: Recent literature points out that elderly people are psychologically resilient to COVID-19, but the studies were performed in specific contexts. We measured the link between the worsening of mental health symptoms, the epidemiologic situation, and control measures among European people aged 50 or older.Methods: We used data from the 2020 wave of SHARE, merged with Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker data (n = 38,358). We modeled the risk of worsening of depression, anxiety, sleeping trouble, and loneliness symptoms’ self-perception, as functions of control measures and 7-days death incidence, using logistic regressions.Results: The worsening of anxiety and depression perception were more common (16.2 and 23.1%, respectively), compared to that of sleeping troubles and loneliness (8.1 and 11.5%, respectively). The worsening of depression and anxiety perception was negatively related to the rigor of control measures. The seven-days death incidence was positively linked to all symptoms except sleeping troubles.Conclusion: Older people were the most exposed to death risk and were affected psychologically by the COVID-19 epidemiological situation; yet control measures were protective (or neutral) to their mental health condition.

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the thirdparty payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select a negotiated solution.

Recently the Portuguese Government announced the launching of public private partnerships to build hospitals with the distinctive feature that both infrastructure construction and the clinical activities management will be awarded to a private party. Accordingly there appear coordination issues that are novel in the design of PPP contracts. We explore the conditions allowing for the optimal design contracts design under several some plausible scenarios.

This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.

We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria area admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into account that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide sufficient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skimming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can bypass the analysis of doctors' behavior in the characterization of patient selection.