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Through the case of commercial timber production in Nepal's community forests, we uncover and explain how effective anti-corruption and harvest regulation have produced a kind of 'allowed' corruption that promotes forest conservation. An ethnographic study in four community forests and in-depth interviews of nearly 200 actors along the Sal (Shorea robusta) timber commodity chain showed that all actors participated in a highly organised form of collusive corruption. Anti-corruption officials call this practice "corruption without illegality" because it does not involve unauthorised harvest in community forests. Instead, it suppresses producer prices through legally required but rigged timber auctions that generate windfall profits, which sawmill owners share with upstream actors to ensure a steady supply of raw logs. Local-level timber brokers connect community forest user groups to sawmill owners. They also operate as stealth conveyers of unofficial payments to forestry officials and other upstream actors because they can camouflage such cash flows as transaction costs. Anti-corruption authorities enforce formal timber harvesting rules, which deters forestry officials from getting involved in overharvesting schemes. However, these same rules, plus some legal posturing, allow forestry officials to extract rents from legally harvested logs at minimum risk. This is hardly a coincidence because it enables the central administration to regulate difficult-to-control field-level forestry officials' behaviour without curtailing their access to informal incomes. Forest user groups lose out, but they could increase their timber income substantially by exercising their powers to decide whether or not to harvest timber. Elevating timber auction floor prices through state intervention is also feasible.

The study investigated the mechanisms through which the forest bureaucracy regain power over and maximise benefits from community forests in Nepal. Four different practices in community forestry formed the points of entry for the research; (a) revisions of community forest user groups' management (operational) plans, (b) promotion and implementation of socalled scientific forestry practices, (c) bureaucratic practices of community forest policy implementation, and (d) the practices of commercial timber production and sale. Based on these four independent yet interlinked cases, the study documents; (a) the forest bureaucracy's recentralisation tactics, (b) the forest bureaucracy's motives to re-centralise, (c) the role of other actors in strengthening/weakening re-centralisation processes and (d) the consequences for community forest user groups (CFUGs). The study relies on a power centred political economy approach. It brings together different actor-oriented power theories, namely, Actor-centered power, Bureaucratic politics, Streetlevel bureaucracy and Theory of Access to understand the politics of re-centralisation in Nepal's community forestry sector. The study followed a critical ethnographic approach with an intensive fieldwork in six CFUGs employing a qualitative methodology through semistructured interviews, focus group discussions, direct observation, and document analysis. Besides, a rapid survey was carried out in 74 CFUGs to understand their relationship with the forest bureaucracy focusing on discretion, accountability and control over the forest resources. Re-centralisation is about the recapture of once decentralised authority, i.e. decision-making powers over resources and revenue flow, in this case, forest and timber resources as well as revenues from commercial timber production. In Nepal, re-centralisation of the community forestry sector has not primarily occurred through policy and legislative reforms but through what one might call ever

This research explains the distributive effect of the implementation of scientific forestry practices in the community forests of Nepal. Taking a case from two community forests of Nepal, the study conducted financial analysis of scientific forest management, followed by semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and observation. Scientific forest management can be beneficial to forest user groups in rhetoric. However, forest user groups are selling timber at a price far below the cost of production and thus efficient economic model of scientific managment is compromised. Users should either pay the price at par with the production cost or increase their labor contribution. Surprisingly, forest user groups give priority to selling timber either in the market or to local elites, instead of distributing to the poor and marginalized members. Both elite capture and bureaucratic control take place during implementation. Paradoxically, scientific management is defeating the primary purpose of community forests, i.e. assisting local communities in fulfilling the basic needs of forest products and facilitating an equitable sharing of benefits. In Nepal, the forest bureaucracy has not only commodified community forestry for timber production but also succeeded to seize official and un-official revenue from the decentralized forests.

This paper explains how powerful actors use scientific forestry narratives to regain power over decentralised forest resources. Through elements of trust, incentives, coercion, and avoidance forest bureaucrats convince forest user groups of the need to implement so-called scientific management and planning principles to obtain predictable harvests. In reality, however, these principles replicate colonial-style Indian forest management and expand the involvement of forest bureaucrats in all aspects of community forestry to re-gain resource control and establish rent-seeking opportunities for forest bureaucrats. In this process, forest user groups lose authority over and income from their forests. We define this as “technical-sounding re-centralisation” since the forest bureaucracy has re-captured decision-making power over forest resources and associated revenue through narratives of scientific forestry. We argue that today's colonial-style re-centralised governance of community forests must give way to forest management principles, which devolve decision-making powers to local communities while ensuring conservation through utilisation, and reasonable taxation.

This policy brief provides recommendations for policy makers, implementers, funders and educators who engage in efforts to promote participatory forestry that is socially, economically and ecologically sound. The brief is based on a research project focusing on participatory forestry in the contexts of Nepal and Tanzania, but the recommendations are of general relevance.

Following a case study approach, this paper explains how scientific forest management plans were developed and implemented in community forests of a mid-hill district in Nepal. Field observations were carried over a period of two years (December 2014 to December 2016) in two community forests. User group members, forest officials, forest technicians and executive committee members were consulted. The plans were prepared simply by compiling the administrative requirements where management prescriptions were defined either based on forest technicians‘ knowledge or taken directly from the government guidelines with little reference to the actual site quality, management objectives, and forest stand conditions. Apart from harvesting of trees, users hardly implemented the plans‘ silvicultural prescriptions and forest restoration activities. Moreover forest officials administratively reduced the number of trees that users could harvest to around half of what the plans allow. Accordingly, forest user groups face a paradoxical forest administration that promotes timber harvesting according to so-called scientific principles, which it then brushes aside to satisfy bureaucratic demands. The study concludes that the concept of scientific forestry is merely used as a "brand" or a seemingly sound "narrative" in community forestry,while it is of little practical relevance because administrative decisions are more powerful in guiding forest management decisions. Hence, the study suggests a replacement of the current schizophrenic mix of so-called "scientific forest management" and sweeping administrative orders with adaptive management practices in community forests., Following a case study approach, this paper explains how scientific forest management plans were developed and implemented in community forests of a mid-hill district in Nepal. Field observations were carried over a period of two years (December 2014 to December 2016) in two community forests. User group members, forest officials, forest technicians and executive committee members were consulted. The plans were prepared simply by compiling the administrative requirements where management prescriptions were defined either based on forest technicians‘ knowledge or taken directly from the government guidelines with little reference to the actual site quality, management objectives, and forest stand conditions. Apart from harvesting of trees, users hardly implemented the plans‘ silvicultural prescriptions and forest restoration activities. Moreover forest officials administratively reduced the number of trees that users could harvest to around half of what the plans allow. Accordingly, forest user groups face a paradoxical forest administration that promotes timber harvesting according to so-called scientific principles, which it then brushes aside to satisfy bureaucratic demands. The study concludes that the concept of scientific forestry is merely used as a "brand" or a seemingly sound "narrative" in community forestry,while it is of little practical relevance because administrative decisions are more powerful in guiding forest management decisions. Hence, the study suggests a replacement of the current schizophrenic mix of so-called "scientific forest management" and sweeping administrative orders with adaptive management practices in community forests.

Inventory based management planning is a prerequisite for handing over forest management rights to community forest user groups in Nepal. However, the quality and rationale of such planning remains largely unexplored. Using a multiple case study approach, we aimed to assess the quality of community forest inventories in the mid-hill region of Nepal. We therefore conducted inventory in nine community forests, reviewed forest management plans and guidelines, and interviewed forest officials and representatives of community forest user groups to understand the procedures applied. Further we compared our inventory results with results presented in the plans and explored reasons for deviations. We found that the Inventory Guideline was frequently disregarded, both in design and implementation. Forest inventories were either poorly conducted or results simply fabricated. Significant differences were observed between the results of our inventories and those presented in the management plans. Furthermore, it turned out that growing stock volume was frequently manipulated to align with government circulars, specifying an upper limit of growing stock volume of 178 m3 ha−1. Seemingly, community forest inventories contribute to recentralizing community forestry through strengthening bureaucratic authority. Thus the inventory requirement serves mainly as a tool to satisfy bureaucratic requirements, rather than being a tool for guiding forest management decisions., Inventory based management planning is a prerequisite for handing over forest management rights to community forest user groups in Nepal. However, the quality and rationale of such planning remains largely unexplored. Using a multiple case study approach, we aimed to assess the quality of community forest inventories in the mid-hill region of Nepal. We therefore conducted inventory in nine community forests, reviewed forest management plans and guidelines, and interviewed forest officials and representatives of community forest user groups to understand the procedures applied. Further we compared our inventory results with results presented in the plans and explored reasons for deviations. We found that the Inventory Guideline was frequently disregarded, both in design and implementation. Forest inventories were either poorly conducted or results simply fabricated. Significant differences were observed between the results of our inventories and those presented in the management plans. Furthermore, it turned out that growing stock volume was frequently manipulated to align with government circulars, specifying an upper limit of growing stock volume of 178 m3 ha−1. Seemingly, community forest inventories contribute to recentralizing community forestry through strengthening bureaucratic authority. Thus the inventory requirement serves mainly as a tool to satisfy bureaucratic requirements, rather than being a tool for guiding forest management decisions.