Search

This chapter develops a metaphysical approach to the ethics and theology of fittingness, inspired by the traditional conception of the convertibility of being (c.q. of the environment) and goodness. Both a pre-given (e.g., teleological) goodness and an externally imposed subjective goodness are deemed inadequate for that task. Instead, the vantage point is a concept borrowed from ecological psychology, namely affordances. Affordances are what the environment affords the actor, for good or ill, being neither an objective property of the environment nor a subjective one ‘in the eye of the beholder’. They are incorporated in a metaphysics of powers as mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners. Good or ill as the presence or absence of value is then a mutual manifestation by actors and environment together. Since powers precede their contingent manifestation, value also precedes its contingent manifestation, making the environment a treasure trove of possible value whereby we contingently uncover what was always already there. The ultimate origin of all earthly value can lead towards theological concepts like grace, affording salvation. These graces will then likewise have always already been there to providentially guide us along our earthly path.

This paper addresses the question what the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutional reality is. Besides the recent debate with Tony Lawson, Barry Smith is also one of the relatively few authors to have explicitly challenged John Searle's social ontology on this metaphysical question, with Smith's realism requirement for institutions conflicting with Searle's requirement of a one‐world naturalism. This paper proposes that an account of institutions as powers or dispositions is not only congenial to Searle's general account, but can also satisfy both the realism and the one world requirements. Searle's worry that such a dispositional account is unable to account for the deontic nature of institutions is countered by an appeal to higher‐order powers as well as Searle's notion of the gap and desire‐independent reasons for action.

ispartof: The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics vol:20 issue:4 pages:366-372 status: published

In his stimulating contribution, Corrado Roversi uses speech act theory to propose a more nuanced and shaded account of how agents can relate themselves to institutions than H. Hart’s binary distinction between the internal and external point of view. Although we agree on the central importance of Hart in charting recent work in social ontology, we propose to recast Roversi’s contribution in terms of the various ways in which an agent’s (lack of) commitment to an institution can corrode or strengthen an institution. In the first part we highlight several features of the internal/external distinction as developed by Hart and others. Whereas the internal point of view is manifested by following the rules and criticizing others for failing to do so, the external point of view can be characterized by, amongst others, a rejection of the rules or a theoretical understanding from the outside. The second part critically examines Roversi’s proposal as exemplified with the different kinds of chess players. Instead, several points at which a player might fail to commit himself to the institution of chess are identified, arguing that this provides a better taxonomy than the one proposed by Roversi. The last section deals with the ‘perlocutionary’ goal of institutions, stressing that all institutions attempt to solve pre-institutional coordination problems. ispartof: Methode - Analytic Perspectives vol:4 issue:6 pages:213-221 status: published