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The democratic significance of public broadcasting corporations has gained renewed urgency as a result of developments in the outside world and the ongoing public service committee (Dir. 2023:27). According to the accepted view, public broadcasting corporations serve democracy by strengthening the free expression of opinion. This paper argues that this argument is not sufficient. In addition to strengthening the free formation of opinions, the mission must be understood as part of democracy’s self-defense. The substance of this mission derives from the values and principles defined in the Swedish constitution (Regeringsformen). Based on the idea of a “public reason”, the democratic argument for public broadcasting corporations is that they contribute to an informative, balanced and restrained public sphere that enables a democratic overlapping consensus among citizens with otherwise conflicting interests and

Previous literature explains the fact that sub-national elections tend to be more inclusive than national elections by reference to the level of the election. This paper argues that the constitutional status of the election is more decisive. This is illustrated by evidence from the British Overseas Territories (BOTs) where resident citizens without ‘belonger’ status are excluded from the vote. Elections in BOTs are less inclusive because they are significant to the future constitutional status of the territory. Finally, the paper considers the implications of our thesis for the ongoing dispute on belongership between the UK and BOTs.

Recognising widely held concerns regarding ‘presentist’ biases in democratic institutions, thischapter challenges the contention that democratic legitimacy inexorably requires the inclusion of futuregenerations in democratic decisions. According to two requirements of democratic legitimacy – inclusionand constitutional empowerment – people should be empowered to participate in decisions about policyand law, and to determine the rules structuring the political framework. Drawing a distinction betweenthese requirements, this chapter contends that though it may be feasible to ‘include’ future generations forproxy representation, future generations cannot enjoy ‘constitutional power’.This chapter applies two separate understandings of constitutional power to future generations, the‘constituent power’ to create constitutional frameworks, and the ‘constituted power’ to amend suchframeworks’ norms. It contends that neither is achievable for unborn people and that full intergener‐ational democratic legitimacy is therefore impossible. Reason for concern with the long-term effectsof contemporary policies and political systems still remain, of course. But in attending to them, justicerather than democratic legitimacy should guide our judgments.