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It is very complicated to give correct answer to the question “How to define human life?” Nowadays dilemmas consider the respect of human life from the birth to death involve not just biology but also other sciences like philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology, law and politics. These sciences evaluate the topic from different points of view. Integration of all of these perspectives could result with a proper definition. The principal purpose of this paper is to try to determine when a human individual begins. If this proves to be too difficult, we might have to settle for a specific stage in the reproductive process before which it would be impossible to say with any plausibility that a human individual exists. It is necessary to return the moral dimension of observation to the science of life. The point is to reconcile the universal ethical principles concerning the absolute value of life with the everyday challenges and dilemmas. It is our deepest conviction that life has an absolute value and that there always remains something indestructible and substantial in life, which may neither be evaluated by anything final, nor completely reduced to the material biological equivalent and the genetic substratum.

Introduction The act of caring in nursing requires previous deliberation and decision, however this perception only arises when an ethical problem emerges. Objective: Identify ethical problems of nurses action in the area of beginning of human life Method: Exploratory and descriptive method, with a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, who were submitted to content analysis. The sample was constituted by 26 nurses. Results 18 categories of problem areas and 56 ethical problems in early human life were identified. The results obtained are very diverse, including areas such as termination of pregnancy, informed consent or maintaining privacy. However, other problem areas also emerge and numerous new subcategories/ethical problems, including: dealing with miscarriage, extreme situations, minors’ pregnancy, serious malformations detected at birth, consent regarding care during childbirth, Non- identification of a ethical problem, nurse social recognition and non-involvement of the person in labour. Conclusion Nurses face different ethical problems that impact their lives. We intend to contribute in helping to make decisions in this field, which the outset is of hope and joy, but which hides, behind this evidence, countless situations of suffering for everyone involved. The identification of ethical problems in this field, it is the first step to reflect about theme and helping decision-making for nurses that are taking care in this area of beginning of human life, when confronted whit the same type of ethical problems.

Stem cells are increasingly being used to model human development and disease in the form of self-organizing embryo models, brain organoids, and neurological chimeras. These new research directions are resurrecting old embryo debates around moral status and personhood. Hyun considers how these old questions are tackled in these new contexts.

RESUMEN La fecundación consiste en la fusión de los gametos masculino y femenino en el tercio externo de la trompa uterina para constituir el cigoto, que inicia su división celular, viaja al útero, se implanta como blastocito en el endometrio a los siete días y comienzan los procesos de embriogénesis y morfogénesis. Concepción es la acción o efecto de quedar embarazada una mujer. En el tema de los derechos establecidos al concebido, el inicio de la vida humana plantea amplia discusión entre las definiciones que plantea la ciencia frente a las de grupos de la sociedad civil. No siendo el cigoto una persona humana, de acuerdo con la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y otros no sería sujeto de los derechos establecidos para la persona, los cuales estarían íntimamente relacionados a los derechos de la mujer embarazada. La concepción ocurriría cuando el embrión se implanta en el útero y no aplicaría el artículo 4 de la CIDH. La doctrina, la legislación y la jurisprudencia peruana establecen amplia tutela jurídica a favor del concebido e instauran el inicio de la vida a partir de la fecundación. La Sentencia de la CIDH para el caso Artavia Murillo contra Costa Rica introduce la figura española del preembrión, al cual no se le otorga tutela jurídica hasta los 14 días, momento en que la ciencia médica establece la implantación del embrión en el endometrio materno. Para consideraciones éticas actuales, el embarazo humano empieza con la implantación del blastocisto en el endometrio y no existe sustento para aceptar el derecho del concebido desde el momento de la fecundación como si fuera una persona. Empero se señala que la vida humana posee una continuidad ininterrumpida desde su concepción hasta su fin natural, la muerte. El cigoto es vida que se inicia con dotación genética propia diferente a la de sus progenitores. El embrión preimplantatorio solo podrá originar un ser humano que se gesta y desarrolla dentro del cuerpo de otra persona, con propia dinámica vital. ABSTRACT Fertilization consists of the fusion of the male and female gametes in the outer third of the uterine tube to form the zygote, which begins its cell division, travels to the uterus, implants as a blastocyst in the endometrium after seven days and begins the processes of embryogenesis and morphogenesis. Conception is the action or effect of a woman becoming pregnant. About the rights established for the conceived, the beginning of human life raises a wide discussion between the definitions proposed by science and those of civil society groups. Not being the zygote a human person, according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and others, it would not be subject to the rights established for the person, which would be closely related to the rights of the pregnant woman. Conception would occur when the embryo implants in the uterus and Article 4 of the IACHR would not apply. Peruvian doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence establish broad legal protection in favor of the conceived and indicate the beginning of life from the moment of fertilization. The Judgment of the IACHR in the case of Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica introduces the Spanish figure of the pre-embryo, which is not granted legal protection until 14 days, when medical science establishes the implantation of the embryo in the maternal endometrium. For current ethical considerations, human pregnancy begins with the implantation of the blastocyst in the endometrium and there is no basis for accepting the right of the conceived from the moment of fertilization as if it were a person. However, it is pointed out that human life has an uninterrupted continuity from conception to its natural end, death. The zygote is life that begins with its own genetic endowment different from that of its progenitors. The preimplantation embryo can only give rise to a human being that is gestated and develops within the body of another person, with its own vital dynamics.

William Simkulet has recently criticised Colgrove et al’s defence against what they have called inconsistency arguments—arguments that claim opponents of abortion (OAs) act in ways inconsistent with their underlying beliefs about human fetuses (eg, that human fetuses are persons at conception). Colgrove et al presented three objections to inconsistency arguments, which Simkulet argues are unconvincing. Further, he maintains that OAs who hold that the fetus is a person at conception fail to act on important issues such as the plight of frozen embryos, poverty and spontaneous abortion. Thus, they are morally negligent. In response, we argue that Simkulet has targeted a very narrow group of OAs, and so his criticisms are inapplicable to most OAs. We then explain why his responses to each of Colgrove et al’s objections do not succeed, even for this restricted group. Finally, we note that Simkulet fails to provide evidence for his claims regarding OAs’ supposed failures to act, and we show that OAs veritably do invest resources into these important issues. We conclude that Colgrove et al’s reasons for rejecting inconsistency arguments (en masse) remain intact.

Recent scientific advances have indicated that it may be technically feasible to sustain human embryos in vitro beyond 14 days. Research beyond this stage is currently restricted by a guideline known as the 14-day rule. Since the advances in embryo culturing there have been calls to extend the current limit. Much of the current debate concerning an extension has regarded the 14-day rule as a political compromise and has, therefore, focused on policy concerns rather than assessing the philosophical foundations of the limit. While there are relevant political considerations, I maintain that the success of extension arguments will ultimately depend on the strength of the justifications supporting the current 14-day limit. I argue that the strongest and most prevalent justifications for the 14-day rule-an appeal to individuation and neural development-do not provide adequate support for the limit of 14 days. I instead suggest that an alternative justification based on sentience would constitute a more defensible basis for embryo protection and that a consideration of such grounds appears to support an amendment to the current limit, rather than the retention of it. While these conclusions do not establish conclusively that the current limit should be extended; they do suggest that an extension may be warranted and permissible. As such, this paper offers grounds on which a reassessment of the 14-day rule may be justified.

When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth.

Islam gives legal precedence to purity of lineage and known parenthood of all children. In Islam treatment to infertility using IVF is permitted within validity of marriage contract with no genes mixing. The paper shows that the Qur'ān, the word of Allah, and science, the deeds of Allah are not in major conflicts in defining the start of human life. The Holy Qur'ān provides an elegant description of origin, developmental stages of intra-uterine life. The Hadith explains two positions one that believes human embryo get ensouled at conception and the other after 40 days of conception. The paper aims to find that Islam confers moral respect to human embryo, but it also clarifies the absence of full human rights to a developing foetus. In Islam, human embryonic use is probably permissible for therapeutic and reproductive purpose keeping intact the principles of Shari'ah.

Under Chinese law, the juridical status of the embryo and the foetus is unclear, mainly because the existing legislation can be subject to diverse interpretations due to its ambiguous language. Lack of clarity with the law has led to different understandings amongst Chinese legal scholars. However, although there has been no consensus, there has been a clear tendency to deprive embryos and foetuses of legal status or personhood, thereby excluding them from entitlement to fundamental rights, an understanding reinforced by the Confucian view of the beginning of life. It is expected that in the near future the Chinese courts will face issues involving embryos and foetuses more often, such as disputes over in vitro embryos. The lack of legal precedent could result in contradictory resolutions, therefore, the law should clarify the legal status of embryos and foetuses and accord to prenatal life special respect and treatment.

Rozwój człowieka w prenatalnym okresie życia interesował ludzi już w czasach starożytności. I choć do dziś prowadzi się wiele dyskusji na temat początku ludzkiego życia, należy stwierdzić, że rozwój poczętego dziecka oraz jego kompetencje wskazują na to, że od początku swojego istnienia jest to osoba aktywna i samosterowalna, która czuje, zapamiętuje, uczy się, posiada pewien poziom świadomości. Radzi sobie z trudnościami hamującymi jego rozwój, przystosowuje do zmiennych warunków życia nie tylko wewnątrz-, ale i zewnątrzmacicznego, nabywa pewnych nawyków i przyzwyczajeń, reaguje w indywidualny, charakterystyczny dla siebie sposób

The 14-day rule restricts the culturing of human embryos in vitro for the purposes of scientific research for no longer than 14 days. Since researchers recently developed the capability to exceed the 14-day limit, pressure to modify the rule has started to build. Sophia McCully argues that the limit should be extended to 28 days, listing numerous potential benefits of doing so. We contend that McCully has not engaged with the main reasons why the Warnock Committee set such a limit, and these still remain valid. As a result, her case for an extension of the 14-day rule is not persuasive.

Progesterone is the ovarian steroid produced by the granulosa cells of follicles after the LH peak at mid-cycle. Its role is to sustain embryo endometrial implantation and ongoing pregnancy. Other biological effects of progesterone may exert a protective function in supporting pregnancy up to birth. Luteal phase support (LPS) with progesterone is the standard of care for assisted reproductive technology. Progesterone vaginal administration is currently the most widely used treatment for LPS. Physicians and patients have been reluctant to change an administration route that has proven to be effective. However, some questions remain open, namely the need for LPS in fresh and frozen embryo transfer, the route of administration, the optimal duration of LPS, dosage, and the benefit of combination therapies. The aim of this review is to provide an overview of the uterine and extra-uterine effects of progesterone that may play a role in embryo implantation and pregnancy, and to discuss the advantages of the use of progesterone for LPS in the context of Good Medical Practice.

As the largest family of E3 ligases, the Skp1-cullin 1-F-box (SCF) E3 ligase complex is comprised of Cullins, Skp1 and F-box proteins. And the SCF E3 ubiquitin ligases play an important role in regulating critical cellular processes, which promote degradation of many cellular proteins, including signal transducers, cell cycle regulators, and transcription factors. We review the biological roles of the SCF ubiquitin-ligase complex in gametogenesis, oocyte-to-embryo transition, embryo development and the regulation for estrogen and progestin. We find that researches about the SCF ubiquitin-ligase complex at the beginning of life are not comprehensive, thus more in-depth researches will promote its eventual clinical application.

I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analysing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims.

The somatic integration definition of life is familiar from the debate on the determination of death, with some bioethicists arguing that it supports brain death while others argue that some brain-dead bodies exhibit sufficient somatic integration for biological life. I argue that on either interpretation, the somatic integration definition of life implies that neither the preimplantation embryo nor the postimplantation embryo meet the somatic integration threshold condition for organismal human life. The earliest point at which a somatic integration determination of life could be made would be the beginning of the fetal stage, 9 weeks postfertilization. Bioethical implications are considered, specifically with respect to the moral status of the postimplantation embryo in embryo research and abortion.

One of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus. Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where ne of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus.Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where ne of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus. Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where to draw the fine line between the competence of science and methaphysics in this delicate philosophical field. To a large extent the drawing of this line depends on one’s fundamental philosophical outlook. The point at which human life begins will always be seen differently by different individuals, groups, cultures, and religious faiths. In democracy there are always at least two sides, and the center holds only when the majority realizes that without a minority democracy itself is lost. The minority in turn must realize its best chance lies in persuasion by reason and thoughtfulness rather than fanaticism.

It is often assumed that if the fetus is a person, then abortion should be illegal. Thomson1 laid the groundwork to challenge this assumption, and Boonin2 has recently argued that it is false: he argues that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. In this article, I explain both Thomson’s and Boonin’s reason for thinking that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. After this, I show that Thomson’s and Boonin’s argument for legalised abortion fail; they have not given us good reason for thinking abortion should be legal.1 Finally, I argue that—if we play Boonin’s game—abortion should be illegal. When discussing the ethics and politics of abortion, whether the fetus is a person is usually central.3 4.2 However, Thomson1 long ago challenged this view. She argued that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. To do so, she asks us to consider a case in which you (the reader) are non-consensually taken to a hospital and hooked up to a famous violinist. The violinist, if he is to survive, needs to filter his blood through your body. After 9 months, he will be fine and you can unplug yourself and go on your way. If you unplug yourself prior to this, however, he will die. Is it permissible to unplug yourself? Thomson thinks the answer is ‘yes’. And this, she thinks, shows that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. While the majority of her article focuses on the ethics of abortion, it is clear that she also aims to show that abortion should be legal if the fetus is a person; she would no doubt reject the view that the state is right to coerce you into …

This account of the moral status of the human fetus makes four interlocking claims, which together comprise the Fetal Life Moral Status Thesis: (1) life as a human organism begins at the fetal stage of development; (2) the non-organismal life of the human embryo begins at fertilization; (3) the human fetus has intrinsic moral status as a human being; and (4) the human embryo has extrinsic moral status as a non-organismal human individual. The somatic integration definition of human life functions as a premise in two supporting arguments: the Fetal Life Argument and the Fetal Moral Status Argument. These arguments are articulated, objections are considered, and the resulting account of the moral status of the human fetus is applied to the problem of abortion.

Study Objectives Evidence for the association between screen time and insufficient sleep is bourgeoning, and recent findings suggest that these associations may be more pronounced in younger compared to older children, and for portable compared to non-portable devices. However, these effects have yet to be investigated within the beginning of life. Importantly, there are no data for the relationship between screen exposure and objectively measured infant sleep. This study examined the moderating role of age for both touchscreens’ and television’s relationship with sleep, using auto-videosomnography within a big-data sample of infants. Methods The sleep of 1074 infants (46% girls) aged 0–18 months was objectively assessed using computer-vision technology in this cross-sectional study. Sleep was additionally reported by parents in an online survey, as was infant exposure to screens. Results Age significantly moderated the relationship between daytime touchscreen exposure and sleep with a distinct pattern for younger infants, in which screen exposure was associated with decreased daytime sleep, but with a proposed compensatory increase in nighttime sleep consolidation. Compared to touchscreens, television exposure was less likely to be associated with sleep metrics, and age moderated this relationship only for daytime and 24-hour sleep duration. Conclusions In young infants, a daytime-nighttime sleep “trade-off” emerged, suggesting that the displacement of daytime sleep by screens may lead to greater accumulation of sleep homeostatic pressure, which in turn facilitates more consolidated nighttime sleep.

New techniques to generate and culture embryo‐like structures from stem cells require a more fine‐grained distinction of potential to define the moral status of these structures.[Image: see text]

I appreciate all of the commentaries for their careful and thoughtful engagement with my article. Because of limited space, I can only focus on some criticisms and cannot develop my responses as fully as I would like. This is probably best for the reader anyway. John Keown worries about the ‘dualism’ of the third objection against expressivism. By this I think he means that critics of the expressivist argument at the beginning of life view a certain class of human beings as ‘non-persons’ and therefore not worthy of protection (‘dualism’ thus refers to two classes of human beings). Obviously, a pro-life stance will take issue with classifying the unborn as non-persons, as defenders of selective abortion and other biotechnologies do, but I did not think it relevant to get into the weeds on this issue. Keown claims that the worrisome dualism views those with intellectual disabilities, whether ‘newborns or adults’, as non-persons who lack a right not to be killed. However, I do not think defenders of either selective abortion or assisted suicide are committed to this. Many would insist (whether they are justified in doing this is another matter) that once you are born, you are a person and therefore cannot …

The aim of the study was to study the initial moment of a person's life, which is important for a clear determination of when it begins to be protected by the legislation of Ukraine, and differentiation from legal or illegal abortions, as well as to propose an approach to determine the initial moment of life that is more consistent with the logic than exists in the current one the legislation of Ukraine. Today, the initial moment of life in Ukraine determines the beginning of childbirth, and the final - death of the brain, that is, the criteria for determining the beginning and end of life are different - the beginning of childbirth and brain death; we offer to connect the initial and final moments of life with the brain - from the formation and beginning of the functioning of the human brain to his death, that is, the only criterion is the brain) and a more humane approach to determining the initial moment of life than exists now (life if we take into account our proposals the legislator will be protected at earlier stages - from the 12th week of pregnancy). We examined the results obtained by other scientists, as well as normative acts, in particular, the Law of Ukraine «Basics of the Legislation of Ukraine on Health Protection» № 2801-XII of November 19, 1992. As a result of the study, individual proposals were made to improve the legislation of Ukraine in the field of protecting the human right to life. It is proposed to amend Part 1 of Art. 50 of the Law of Ukraine «Basics of the Legislation of Ukraine on Health Protection», in particular, replace in the text «The operation of artificial termination of pregnancy (abortion) can be performed at the request of a woman in health facilities during pregnancy for a period not exceeding 12 weeks».

Common-sense morality seems to dictate that newborn babies strictly outrank non-human animals on an ordered list of subjects of moral consideration. This is best described as the view that newborn babies have a higher moral status than any non-human animal. In this article, I will argue that this common-sense claim about the special moral status of newborn babies makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that fetuses, including pre-conscious fetuses, also have a higher moral status than any non-human animal-indeed, as high as newborn babies. While this conclusion does not quite entail that abortion is generally seriously immoral, it does seem to follow that it would be no less difficult to justify (even relatively early) abortion than it would be to justify killing a newborn.