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We shed new light on a long-standing question in political science: When confronted with costly policy choices, do citizens form their preferences using material (economic) concerns or other-regarding motivations, such as the distribution of costs, and how are these moderated by political ideology? Using the case of carbon taxation, a widely advocated policy solution to climate change, we conducted survey experiments in Germany and the United States to assess the relative importance of these forms of preferences. The results show that individuals are primarily concerned with how a carbon tax would affect their individual income. There are also important cross-national differences with high-income German respondents being more receptive to redistributive policy design, especially in contrast to high-income Democrats who significantly decrease support for carbon taxation. These findings highlight how the constituencies generated by new policies can significantly alter the distribution of mass support for action on emerging societal problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies individual-level attitudes towards long-term investment policies using novel survey data for the case of Germany. Building on a budding literature on the relationship between environmental and social policy attitudes, our first contribution to research is to show that citizens, when prompted to think about their support for long-term investment policies, support welfare state related policies such as investments in education and pensions to a greater degree than non-welfare state issues such as public infrastructure investment or renewable energy. Citizens are most supportive of using present-day redistributive policies – in our case: increasing income taxes on the rich – in order to finance long-term investment. We also find evidence that political trust is positively associated with support for long-term investment policies, but in particular investments in education and renewables. Furthermore, our analysis reveals the importance of individual political ideology. These findings have implications for public demand for tackling the long-term issues faced by society today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stringent policies that significantly increase the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, such as CO2, are increasingly necessary for mitigating climate change. Yet while richer individuals in society generate the most CO2 emissions and thus will face the largest absolute cost burden, they also tend to be more supportive of stringent environmental policies. In this paper, we examine how information about the distribution of carbon emissions by income affects support for carbon taxation. While carbon taxation is widely advocated as the most efficient policy for mitigating climate change, it faces significant political hurdles due to its distributional costs. Using original survey data, with an embedded experiment, we find that providing information about the actual distribution of household CO2 emissions by income significantly changes individuals' support for carbon taxation. These effects are particularly pronounced at the bottom of the household income distribution, leading to increased support for costly climate policies. However, individuals who believe that carbon taxes will reduce their income continue to hold their level of support for carbon taxation. Our findings have significant implications for understanding the public's response to the distributional consequences of the green transitions and ultimately their political feasibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental protection efforts commonly make use of two types of government interventions: command and control policies (C&C) and market-based instruments (MBIs). While MBIs are favored for their economic efficiency, visible prices on pollution may generate political backlash. We examine whether citizens are more likely to support policies that tend to obfuscate policy costs (C&C), as opposed to MBIs, which impose visible costs. Using conjoint experiments in Beijing and New Delhi, we examine support for 'policy bundles', including both C&C policies and MBIs, aimed at limiting air pollution from vehicles. In both cities, increasing fuel taxes (a MBI) reduces policy support. However, pledging revenue usage from fuel taxes to subsidize electric cars or public transport eliminates this negative effect. Furthermore, individuals with a lower evaluation of their government respond more negatively to MBIs. MBIs may be economically efficient, but are politically difficult unless policy-makers can offset visible costs through additional measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key question in understanding barriers to climate and environmental policy is whether changing economic conditions weaken individuals’ support for climate and environmental action. The large body of literature examining this question, however, has come to contradictory results, with studies measuring changes within individuals typically finding no such effect (e.g. Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, Env Polit 26(5):801–824 2017). In this letter, I use the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic to provide a stringent test of how economic shocks affect concern for climate change and the environment. Using panel data from the UK, that was collected just before (November 2019) and just after (June 2020) the outbreak of COVID-19, I find that the pandemic caused individuals to significantly deprioritise climate change and the environment in absolute terms, and the environment relative to the economy. These effects significantly vary depending upon individuals’ employment trajectories, concerns about the cost of living, and ideological preferences, but do not significantly vary by individuals’ prior vote choice. The findings suggest that in times of severe economic distress, unlike smaller economic downturns, climate change and the environment is deprioritised. This has implications for our understanding of the political feasibility of climate and environmental action, when individuals are faced with harsh economic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While delegation of policymaking authority from citizens to parliament is the most defining characteristic of representative democracy, public demand for delegating such authority away from legislature/government to technocrats or back to citizens appears to have increased. Drawing on spatial models of voting, we argue that the distance between individuals' ideal policy points, the status quo, experts' policy positions and aggregated societal policy preferences can help explain whether individuals prefer to delegate decision-making power away from parliament and, if so, to whom. The effects of individual's preference distance from these ideal points are likely to be stronger the more salient the policy issue is for the respective individual. We test this argument using survey experiments in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The analysis provides evidence for the empirical implications of our theoretical arguments. The research presented here contributes to better understanding variation in citizens' support for representative democracy and preferences for delegating policymaking authority away from parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When considering public support for domestic policies that contribute to a global public good, such as climate change mitigation, the behavior of other countries is commonly regarded as pivotal. Using survey experiments in China and the United States we find that other countries' behavior matters for public opinion, but in a contingent manner. When citizens learn that other countries decrease their emissions, this leads to support for further domestic action. Yet, support for reciprocal behavior is not a necessary consequence of other countries increasing their emissions. Responding in-kind to emissions increases abroad depends upon the home country's past behavior and who the other country is. Our results imply that the international context remains important, despite global climate policy now relying more on coordinated unilateral action and polycentric governance. They also show, however, that we need to pay greater attention to contingent effects of countries' positive and negative behavior in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strong public support is a prerequisite for ambitious and thus costly climate change mitigation policy, and strong public concern over climate change is a prerequisite for policy support. Why, then, do most public opinion surveys indicate rather high levels of concern and rather strong policy support, while de facto mitigation efforts in most countries remain far from ambitious? One possibility is that survey measures for public concern fail to fully reveal the true attitudes of citizens due to social desirability bias. In this paper, we implemented list-experiments in representative surveys in Germany and the United States (N = 3620 and 3640 respectively) to assess such potential bias. We find evidence that people systematically misreport, that is, understate their disbelief in human caused climate change. This misreporting is particularly strong amongst politically relevant subgroups. Individuals in the top 20% of the income distribution in the United States and supporters of conservative parties in Germany exhibit significantly higher climate change skepticism according to the list experiment, relative to conventional measures. While this does not definitively mean that climate skepticism is a widespread phenomenon in these countries, it does suggest that future research should reconsider how climate change concern is measured, and what subgroups of the population are more susceptible to misreporting and why. Our findings imply that public support for ambitious climate policy may be weaker than existing survey research suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We contribute to the growing literature on how political support for domestic policies that contribute to global collective goods is impacted by other countries’ policy actions. To do so, we focus on carbon taxation, one of the most important yet contested policy instruments for mitigating global warming, in the world’s third largest economy, Japan. Using a combination of two experiments embedded in a representative public opinion survey, we examine arguments relating to how the adoption and level of ambition of other countries’ carbon taxes affect the public’s preferences for current and future carbon tax designs. We find evidence that the choices of other countries affect both support for carbon taxation and preferences over its design. More ambitious carbon pricing in other countries increases support for carbon taxation, while less ambitious pricing reduces support. Moreover, information about lower carbon prices in other countries decreases support more than other countries having no carbon taxation at all. Public support for more stringent domestic carbon pricing thus hinges on the policy choices of other countries, contrary to other environmental issues. Our research also shows, however, that particular domestic policy design choices can help in mitigating otherwise negative effects of non-cooperative behavior by other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A substantial literature in political science suggests that individuals' policy preferences can be shaped by the actions of elite actors and the policies they emphasize and implement. Yet can these actions and interactions have second order effects and actually affect individuals' beliefs about the causes of the problems that policy seeks to address in the first place? This research note identifies the effect of policy conflict upon individuals' beliefs about the societal problems, using original survey data from New Delhi. This effect is estimated by comparing beliefs about the causes of air pollution just before and after an unexpected policy conflict between the government and a judicial body over policy to limit vehicle usage. The results find that the policy conflict caused mass beliefs about the causes of pollution to change. In line with the theory of inferred justification, belief updating led individuals who generally approve (disapprove) of the government to believe vehicle usage was more (less) responsible for air pollution respectively. This is in spite of the fact that the spike in air pollution was caused by agricultural burning. The results suggest that policy conflict between political elites can not only affect mass policy preferences, but also alter beliefs about the cause of such societal problems policy seeks to address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we seek to identify robust predictors of individuals’ attitudes towards climate change and environmental degradation. While much of the extant literature has been devoted to the individual explanatory potential of individuals’ characteristics, we focus on the extent to which these characteristics provide robust predictions of climate and environmental attitudes. Thereby, we adjudicate the relative predictive power of psychological and sociodemographic characteristics, as well as the predictive power of combinations of these attributes. To do so, we use a popular machine learning technique, Random Forests, on three surveys fielded in China, Switzerland, and the USA, using a variety of outcome variables. We find that a psychological construct, the consideration of future consequences (CFC) scale, performs well in predicting attitudes, across all contexts and better than traditional explanations of climate attitudes, such as income and education. Given recent advances suggesting potential psychological barriers of behavioural change Public (Weaver, Adm Rev 75:806-816, 2015) and the use of psychological constructs to target persuasive messages (Abrahamse et al., J Environ Psychol 265-276, 2007; Hirsh et al., Psychol Sci 23:578-581, 2012), identifying important predictors, such as the CFC may allow to better understand public’s appetite for climate and environmental policies and increase demand for these policies, in an area where existing efforts have shown to be lacking (Bernauer and McGrath, Nat Clim Chang 6:680-683, 2016; Chapman et al., Nat Clim Chang 7:850-852, 2017). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]