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We examined differences in reactions to climate change as a function of belief in God. We studied four samples, convenience samples of university students in the USA (n = 627) and in Poland (n = 628), a nationally representative sample of adults in Poland (n = 1154), and a nationally representative sample of adults in the USA (n = 1098). In each study we measured the distress people felt about climate change, belief in God, and left–right political orientation. These constructs were measured slightly differently across the studies. Regardless of how these constructs were measured, believers were less distressed by climate change than non-believers, and with only a few exceptions, these differences disappeared after covarying political orientation (left–right or liberal-conservative). Contrary to those who argue that there is something inherent in religious belief that predisposes people to deny or ignore climate change, the present results suggest that it is the (growing) confluence of faith and conservative political orientation that is responsible for the fact that some people of faith tend to deny climate change or actively oppose efforts to combat it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aaron Rizzieri has recently argued that the problem of hell is a complicating factor for the issue of divine hiddenness. In particular, the problem of divine hiddenness is made much worse if anyone is threatened by negative afterlife consequences. While Rizzieri’s argument suffers from lack of theological nuance, there is a serious objection to Christian theism lurking in the vicinity of his argument. I offer what I take to be the best response to that objection.

Copyright of Journal of Young Intellectuals / Genç Mütefekkirler Dergisi is the property of Journal of Young Intellectuals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A traditionally salient topic of empirical investigation in the sociology of religion, this paper seeks to offer a recent investigation into the intergenerational transmission of religion and the parental forms of religious engagement that predict adult engagement with religion. The study of this paper explores the intergenerational transmission of religion, focusing on the parental forms of religious identity and engagement that influence religious identity, beliefs, and practices in adulthood. By analyzing the 2018 GSS dataset in the United States with multiple regression analyses, I found strong parental and childhood influences on adult religiosity, religious service attendance, and belief in God. Indeed, this engagement often mirrors parental engagement for these variables. However, while paternal religious identity often predicts these religious variables, I found that the religious identity and engagement of parents generally do not predict religious identity in adulthood. Ultimately, while these results generally show strong predictive mechanisms of intergenerational transmission, they also illustrate that these relationships are variably dependent on the form of parental and adult religious engagement, and which parent participates or is associated with that engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Humanities & Educational Sciences Journal is the property of Humanities & Educational Sciences Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Alustath is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Bilim ve din ilişkisi üzerine tartışmalar her dönemde popüler ve ihtilaflı olmuştur. Aralarındaki neden ve sonuç ilişkisi, hakkında kesin ve net yorumlar yapmanın zor olduğu karmaşık bir ilişkidir. Bilimin din ve inançlar üzerindeki etkisi iki zıt kutuptan değerlendirilmektedir. İlk görüşe göre bilim, kişileri düşünmeye ve sorgulamaya teşvik eden ve deneyler ile kanıtlanamayan bilgiyi kabul etmemelerine, yani metafizik inançlardan uzaklaşmalarına sebebiyet veren bir faktördür. Diğer kutupta ise, yaratılan bir evreni detaylı bir şekilde izah ederek inananların imanlarını artırdığı düşünülmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, doğa bilimleri üzerine akademik olarak çalışmanın kişilerin Tanrı inancını nasıl etkilediğini incelemektir. Çalışma nitel bir durum çalışmasıdır. İngiltere’de doğa bilimlerinin farklı alanlarında lisansüstü çalışmalar yapan Türkiyeli 7 genç bilim insanı ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Bu mülakatlar betimsel bir şekilde analiz edilmiş ve katılımcıların deneyimlerinden ortak temalar geliştirilmiştir. Ayrıca daha önceki çalışmalar da taranmış, çalışmanın bulguları yorumlanırken onlardan da faydalanılmıştır. Bu çalışma sonucunda şunlar tespit edilmiştir: Doğa bilimcileri arasında inançsızlık oranlarının yüksek olmasına ve doğa bilimleri çalışmalarının bireylerin dinleri sorgulamalarına ve bazı iddialarını reddetmelerine neden olabilmesine rağmen, bu çalışmalar Tanrı inancındaki köklü değişikliklerde birincil sebep değildir. Aksine bu çalışmaların bulguları hem inancı hem inançsızlığı gerekçelendirmek amaçlı kullanılabilmektedir. Aile dindarlığı ve dindar olduğunu iddia eden kimselerin ve dinî otoritelerin kötü davranışlarına yahut dini istismarlarına maruz kalmak yahut şahit olmak gibi çevresel faktörlerin bireylerin inançları üzerindeki etkisi daha ciddidir.

An increasing number of scientists, philosophers, and popular science writers claim that science is the measure of all. They assert that science can answer all questions, that there are no limits to science, or that only science provides reliable knowledge, either in a particular realm, such as morality, or about any subject matter whatsoever. This view is often referred to as 'scientism'. But what exactly is scientism? What is to be said in favour of it and against it? This paper suggests, after a careful evaluation of the arguments for and against scientism, that a helpful way to think of scientism is as of a variety of fundamentalism. It turns out that scientism meets nearly all conditions formulated in family resemblance accounts of fundamentalism. Finally, it is suggested that science and scientists can learn much from religion when it comes to how to deal with scientific fundamentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People tend to perceive atheists as being immoral. We tested whether this perception also applies to moral transgressions against animals. Study 1 (N = 288) and Study 2 (N = 306, pre-registered) utilized a conjunction fallacy paradigm to show that people attributed harming animals most frequently to criminals, then to God-believers, and least often to nonbelievers. Study 3 (N = 248, pre-registered) used a job-choice paradigm and found that people choose a God-believer over an atheist for a job involving animal harm because the God-believer was supposed to hold a more hierarchical view of the relationship between humans and animals than the atheist. Consequently, we discuss the limits of antiatheist prejudice in the domain of human-animal interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Individuals' values, attitudes, and behaviours are significantly influenced by their religious beliefs. The present study examines the demographic factors (gender, age groups, religion, employment status, household income, marital status, self-perceived adulthood, and country of origin) that may influence religious beliefs. Methods: The data was collected from September to December 2022 using an online survey. A cross-sectional design was used to collect data from 885 respondents from five countries: Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Kenya, and Indonesia. The survey included questions on five variables related to religious belief: religious certainty, religious culture, religious importance, religious practice, and belief in God. Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with statements related to each variable on a Likert scale. T-tests and one-way ANOVA were used to analyze the data and determine any significant differences in religious beliefs between the five countries. Results: The results revealed that female respondents held stronger religious beliefs than male respondents. Furthermore, respondents aged 30-45 rated themselves as having a higher religious culture and practice than respondents aged 18-29. Islam groups ranked highest in religious beliefs, followed by Christian, Roman Catholic, and Hindu groups. Full-time students rated themselves as less religious than full-time employed and other groups, while lower-income groups rated themselves as more religious than middle- and upper-income groups. Single groups rated themselves higher on belief in God than cohabiting and in-relationship groups. Conclusions: In conclusion, this study provides evidence that demographic factors influence religious beliefs among respondents from five different countries. These findings can contribute to a better understanding of how religiosity is shaped by various socio-demographic factors and can inform policies and interventions designed to promote religious tolerance and diversity. More research is required to investigate the complex relationships between demographic factors and religiosity, particularly in different cultural and religious contexts.

Discussions on the relationship between science and religion have always been popular and controversial. The cause and effect relationship between the two is a complex one that is difficult to make precise and clear interpretations of. The impact of science on religion and beliefs is evaluated from two opposite perspectives. According to the first perspective, science is a factor that encourages people to think and question and not accept the knowledge that experiments cannot prove; thus, it causes them to draw away from metaphysical beliefs. According to the other view, science is thought to increase the faith of believers by explaining a created universe in detail. In this study, the possible effects of natural science studies on the belief in God are examined. The study is a qualitative case study. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 7 young scientists from Turkey doing postgraduate studies in different fields of natural sciences in England. The interviews were analyzed descriptively, and common themes were developed from the experiences of the participants. In addition, previous studies were scanned, and they were referred to while interpreting the findings of the study as well. As a result of this study, the following were identified: Although the rates of disbelief are high among natural scientists and natural science studies may cause people to question religions and reject some of their claims, these studies are not the primary reasons for radical changes in belief in God. On the contrary, the findings of these natural sciences can be used to support both belief and disbelief. Social factors such as family religiosity and being exposed to or witnessing the wrong or abusive behaviors of those who claim to be religious and religious authorities have a more severe effect on the beliefs of individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A traditionally salient topic of empirical investigation in the sociology of religion, this paper seeks to offer a recent investigation into the intergenerational transmission of religion and the parental forms of religious engagement that predict adult engagement with religion. The study of this paper explores the intergenerational transmission of religion, focusing on the parental forms of religious identity and engagement that influence religious identity, beliefs, and practices in adulthood. By analyzing the 2018 GSS dataset in the United States with multiple regression analyses, I found strong parental and childhood influences on adult religiosity, religious service attendance, and belief in God. Indeed, this engagement often mirrors parental engagement for these variables. However, while paternal religious identity often predicts these religious variables, I found that the religious identity and engagement of parents generally do not predict religious identity in adulthood. Ultimately, while these results generally show strong predictive mechanisms of intergenerational transmission, they also illustrate that these relationships are variably dependent on the form of parental and adult religious engagement, and which parent participates or is associated with that engagement.

The fact that God is one and has no equal is a belief that all Jews must believe. In Judaism, the sentence expressing this belief and the sentence that comes after it and mentions the love of God are mentioned in the Torah and are known as Shema. Essentially, the Shema consists of three texts in various parts of the Torah. Jewish clergy recognized the connection between these three texts and brought them together. Thus, the Shema, which gained a wholeness, gained a distinctive character of its own. In this study, the most important sentence of the Shema, which also reflects the title of the study, is Deuteronomy 6/4 (Listen, O Israel! The Lord our God is the only Lord) and Deuteronomy 6/5 (you will love the Lord our God with all your heart, with all your soul, with your strength) is emphasized. Texts other than these are excluded from the scope of the study. As a result of some discussions, the Shema was created by bringing together the relevant texts towards the end of the 2nd century and has been said as a whole until today. Shema reading is the holiest and most important practice in Jewish life. Because the Shema is considered the essence of the Jewish creed. The Shema is a confession of the Jewish faith more than a prayer. According to Jewish belief, the Shema refers to the dialogue between God and the Jews on Mount Sinai. In this context, the Shema is the call of God and the response of the Jews to that call. Schema is also a political discourse for Jews. It is said that the Jews never let the Shema down their tongues until their last breath. As a matter of fact, it is pointed out that even if all traces of Jewish identity are lost, Shema will retain its place in Jewish memory. As a matter of fact, Jews taught their children Shema even under the most difficult conditions. On the other hand, it is also known that Shema was used to provide moral support to Jewish patients. It is accepted that the first words of Shema have a protective power as well as a healing quality. The Word “Listen” in the first sentence of the Shema (Listen, O Israel! The Lord our God is the only Lord) refers to obedient listening. Listening also means listening carefully and thinking about the subject, understanding and comprehending. Because the listener not only hears the words of the speaker, but also becomes aware of the deep meanings underlying those words. The word "Israel" in the Shema refers to the entire Jewish nation that Moses called to "hear the unity of God." The first sentence of the Shema also clearly expresses the monotheistic belief in Judaism: "God is one". In Jewish thought, monotheism means that there is no god but Yahweh. The following second sentence of the Shema (Deuteronomy 6/5) is also frequently repeated: “You shall love the Lord our God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength.” This statement emphasizes that a Jew should not only seek God's good pleasure, but also develop a loving relationship with God. According to Jewish belief, loving God is an act of worship. Recognition of God's oneness necessitates love of God. According to the generally accepted view, the love meant here should be a concrete love, not an abstract one. Concrete love, on the other hand, should be a concrete sign of fidelity, such as "obedience to God's law". On the other hand, the phrase you will love God “with all your heart” refers to all the passions of a Jew, including cognitive as well as emotional. In addition, with the command "You shall love God with all your might", Jews are asked to love God enough to sacrifice their possessions for God. However, the extent of the sacrifice to be made is a matter of debate. According to the most extreme view expressed in this regard, Jews are asked to give up all their material possessions for their faith and love for God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Erciyes Akademi is the property of Erciyes Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Analyses of the 2020 combined European and World Values Surveys (124,958 respondents from 77 countries) found that people who believed in God tended to be happier, more satisfied with lives, and healthier than non-believers. Believers trusted people close to them (e.g., neighbors) more than non-believers, although non-believers tended to trust people in general and trust people from other countries more than believers. Non-believers tended to be more ideologically prosocial than non-believers (e.g., belonging to an environmental organization, advocating freedom of speech vs. control). Such differences were stronger in countries in which there were more vs fewer believers. Moreover, these differences remained after controlling for individual differences in sex, age, education, income, and left–right political orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the increase in natural disasters and their effects on people, the emphasis on the role of spiritual factors in dealing with them has increased; but research has not yet clearly explained these factors. The purpose of this study was to represent the process of showing belief in God and the Day of Judgment in the resilience of earthquake survivors in Sarpol-e Zahab. The method applied was qualitative and of the foundation data type. For this end, 27 earthquake survivors of Kermanshah were studied by purposive sampling method and using in-depth interviews. Data were collected, recorded and coded into the main categories and analyzed through Strauss and Corbin coding techniques, open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Based on the results, belief in God and the Day of Judgment were chosen as the main category. The causal conditions were knowledge and trust in God, belief in divine judgment and predestination, and the administration of justice. Unity and cohesion were chosen as the contextual conditions and religious activities as the mediating conditions. The strategies used by earthquake survivors to deal with the earthquake and its consequences were: altruism and modeling. Finally, acceptance and view of life as a means rather than an end was introduced as a consequence of this model. This study provided a clear picture of the processes, responses and recovery after disasters. The findings of this study can pave the way for creating effective and quick responses in disaster survivors.

Apologetics since the Second Vatican Council has somewhat changed to deal more with reaching the person and sowing seeds rather than winning the argument. The traditional objective arguments for the existence of God are today less effective, especially when approaching postmodern non-believers. Subjective approaches are far more effective, dealing with personal experience. Covering a wide range, Peter Kreeft offers twenty arguments for the existence of God, which can be grouped according to objective, subjective, and a transition group between these. By using different approaches and combinations of these, a consistent ‘wall’ of reasons for believing in God’s existence can be created by combining these arguments like building blocks. This paper considers the range of arguments, giving summaries of the (semi-) subjective ones and commenting upon them with regards to their use, strengths, and weaknesses. It finds that as one purpose of apologetics is to assist the unbeliever in coming to know God, ways of helping bring the subjective thinker to belief in God should be developed further, and Kreeft’s offering is a very useful resource for the Christian in explaining why it is reasonable to believe in God.

In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

A commitment to truth requires that you are open to receiving new evidence, even if that evidence contradicts your current beliefs. You should be open to changing your mind. However, this truism gives rise to the paradox of empathy. The paradox arises with the possibility of mental corruption through transformative change, and has consequences for how we should understand tolerance, disagreement, and the ability to have an open mind. I close with a discussion of how understanding this paradox provides a new explanation for a certain kind of standoff between the believer and the skeptic with regard to religious belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A substantial body of evidence suggests that favoring reason over intuition (employing an analytic cognitive style) is associated with reduced belief in God. In the current work, we address outstanding issues in this literature with two studies examining the relationship between analytic cognitive style (as measured by performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test) and belief in God. First, prior research focused on Judeo-Christian cultures, and it is uncertain whether the results generalize to other religious systems or beliefs. Study 1 helps to address this question by documenting a negative correlation between CRT performance and belief in God, r = −.18, in a sample of 513 participants from India, a majority Hindu country. Second, among 150 participants from the United Kingdom, Gervais et al. (2018) reported the first and (to date) only evidence for a positive relationship between CRT and belief in God. In Study 2, we assess the robustness of this result by recruiting 547 participants from the United Kingdom. Unlike Gervais et al., using the same items, we find a negative correlation between CRT and belief in God (r = −.19). Our results add further support to the argument that analytic thinking undermines belief in God.

We used the three latest rounds of the religion module of International Social Survey Programme to study secularization in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, focusing on belief in God. We restricted our sample to the affiliated with the majority Protestant churches and the unaffiliated and analyzed the trends toward disaffiliation and disbelief in God. Then, we studied the association between confidence in churches, religious/secular upbringing, and demographic controls with belief in God using multinomial logistic regression models. Our treatment of belief in God as a nominal variable allowed the inclusion of both the element of doubt and different images of God in the analyses. The trends toward disbelief in God and disaffiliation suggest that secularization in Scandinavia accelerated in 2008–2018 relative to 1998–2008. In Norway, these trends were already significant in 1998–2008. Disaffiliation and disbelief in God are strongly associated, as both ‘believing’ and ‘belonging’ decayed in the three countries and seem to be strongly intertwined. We found that confidence in churches, and the frequency of attendance at church services (even if only about yearly) during the formative years are powerful predictors of belief in God. The strength of the association between confidence and attitude toward the church’s power in society suggests that these two variables are fundamental to the conceptualization of belonging in the Scandinavian countries and very likely in a more general context.

Apologetics since the Second Vatican Council has somewhat changed to deal more with reaching the person and sowing seeds rather than winning the argument. The traditional objective arguments for the existence of God are today less effective, especially when approaching postmodern non-believers. Subjective approaches are far more effective, dealing with personal experience. Covering a wide range, Peter Kreeft offers twenty arguments for the existence of God, which can be grouped according to objective, subjective, and a transition group between these. By using different approaches and combinations of these, a consistent 'wall' of reasons for believing in God's existence can be created by combining these arguments like building blocks. This paper considers the range of arguments, giving summaries of the (semi-) subjective ones and commenting upon them with regards to their use, strengths, and weaknesses. It finds that as one purpose of apologetics is to assist the unbeliever in coming to know God, ways of helping bring the subjective thinker to belief in God should be developed further, and Kreeft's offering is a very useful resource for the Christian in explaining why it is reasonable to believe in God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author analyzes the relationship between belief in God and enchantment in the Peruvian and, in general, in the Latin-American context. Concepts elaborated in secularized regions by Congar, Kasper, Taylor, Vattimo, Casanova and Berger, among others, must be redefined to be applied in countries which enter nowadays simultaneously in modernity and post-modernity. The author studies the situation using data from various polls and from a recent qualitative investigation on lived religion (2015-2017). She concludes: God's existence is a "strong belief" for Limenians but the content of belief in God is "weak", and it changes easily according to circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compensatory Control Model suggests that, when deprived of personal control, people compensate this lack by bolstering their belief in a controlling God. However, this is not the only way of reacting to control deprivation as past literature also depicted that people sometimes become motivated to restore their personal control. We argued that people with highly independent self-construal would not be comfortable with enhancing external control in the absence of a personal one. We conducted an online experiment (N = 246) and the results indicated that control deprivation actually decreased, not increased, belief in a controlling God for people with independent self-construal. Such finding suggested that not everyone compensates for the lack of personal control by enhancing external control. Implications of the findings and potential limitations were discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A substantial body of evidence suggests that favoring reason over intuition (employing an analytic cognitive style) is associated with reduced belief in God. In the current work, we address outstanding issues in this literature with two studies examining the relationship between analytic cognitive style (as measured by performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test) and belief in God. First, prior research focused on Judeo-Christian cultures, and it is uncertain whether the results generalize to other religious systems or beliefs. Study 1 helps to address this question by documenting a negative correlation between CRT performance and belief in God, r = -.18, in a sample of 513 participants from India, a majority Hindu country. Second, among 150 participants from the United Kingdom, Gervais et al. (2018) reported the first and (to date) only evidence for a positive relationship between CRT and belief in God. In Study 2, we assess the robustness of this result by recruiting 547 participants from the United Kingdom. Unlike Gervais et al., using the same items, we find a negative correlation between CRT and belief in God (r = -.19). Our results add further support to the argument that analytic thinking undermines belief in God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract : The epistemological approach of evidentialism maintains that a belief must have sufficient evidence in order to be rationally justified. The belief in God is no exception, it must pass as well the litmus test of evidence as a measure of its rational justification. But what counts as evidence? Responding to this question and identifying the nature of the evidence that can be used to justify belief has become a point of contention among philosophers. While some evidentialists have denied the possibility of evidence for the belief in God, others have attacked the very basis of the evidentialist claim by promoting belief in God without evidence. The following paper aims at proposing an alternative way or approach to argue and to justify belief in God, that is, intuitive knowledge. To excute this aim, this paper tries at first to describe briefly those two currents of thought and, further, examines and criticizes them by discussing and analyzing the notion of innate concepts and presentational knowledge as known by an intuitive knowledge based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s view. According to some philosophers, this type of knowledge, presentational knowledge, can be included as “evidence” even from the evidentialist point of view which does not limit evidence to conceptual knowledge. By this, critical analysis will be applied here as a method to conduct the research. Key words : Belief in God, sufficient knowledge, justification, evidentialism, al-ʿilm al-”huḍūrī (presentational knowledge), innate concepts, Mullā Ṣadrā. Abstrak : Pendekatan epistemologis paham evidensialisme meyakini bahwa sebuah keyakinan sepatutnya memiliki bukti atau berpijak pada fakta untuk dapat diterima (dibenarkan) secara rasional. Tidak terkecuali keyakinan atau iman kepada Tuhan, harus pula berpijak pada bukti sebagai tolak ukur justifikasi rasionalnya. Akan tetapi apa yang dimaksud dengan bukti/fakta? Menanggapi pertanyaan ini dan menjelaskan hakikat ‘bukti’ yang dapat digunakan untuk membenarkan keyakinan telah menjadi hal yang diperdebatkan di kalangan para filsuf. Sementara sebagian (filsuf) penganut paham evidensialisme telah menolak kemungkinan adanya fakta untuk membuktikan iman kepada Tuhan, sebagian lainnya telah mengkritik basis (landasan argumentasi) klaim penganut paham evidensialisme dengan mengajukan (argumen) iman kepada Tuhan tanpa [harus berlandaskan pada] ‘bukti’. Makalah ini bertujuan untuk mengajukan suatu jalan atau pendekatan alternatif untuk menjelaskan dan memberi argumen terhadap iman kepada Tuhan, yaitu pengetahuan intuitif. Untuk mewujudkan tujuan ini, tulisan ini berupaya, pertama-tama, mendeskripsikan secara ringkas kedua arus pemikiran di atas dan, selanjutnya, menelaah dan mengkritik kedua arus pemikiran tersebut dengan mendiskusikan serta menganalisis gagasan konsep-konsep bawaan dan pengetahuan presentasional yang dikenal sebagai pengetahuan intuitif berdasarkan pandangan Mullā Shadrā. Menurut sebagian filsuf, pengetahuan jenis ini, pengetahuan presentasional, dapat dimasukkan sebagai « fakta », bahkan dari sudut pandang paham evidensialisme sekalipun, karena paham ini tidak membatasi fakta hanya pada pengetahuan konseptual. Berdasarkan hal ini, analisis kritis akan digunakan sebagai metode untuk melakukan penelitian dalam tulisan ini. Kata kunci : Iman kepada Tuhan, pengetahuan yang memadai, justifikasi, evidensialisme, pengetahuan presentasional, konsep-konsep bawaan, Mullā Shadrā.

The epistemological approach of evidentialism maintains that a belief must have sufficient evidence in order to be rationally justified. The belief in God is no exception and, hence, it too must pass the litmus test of evidence as a measure of its rational justification. But what counts as evidence? Responding to this question and identifying the nature of the evidence that can be used to justify belief has become a point of contention between philosophers. While some evidentialists have denied the possibility of evidence for the belief in God, others have attacked the very basis of the evidentialist claim by promoting belief in God without evidence. The following paper briefly describes these two currents and culminates by discussing the notion of innate concepts and presential knowledge as proposed by Mulla Sadra. According to the authors, this type of presential knowledge can be included as 'evidence' even from the evidentialist point of view which does not limit evidence to conceptual knowledge.

Various views about the rationality/irrationality of believing in God have been suggested by western religious and secular thinners. The theory of "Basicalism" together with its similar views such as "Evidentialism", "Fideism" and"Pragmatism" is one of the epistemological views posed about the belief in God and seeks to prove its rationality. In general, based on this view, believing in God does not require any rational reasoning. Various versions of this view have been presented so far.One of its versions expressed by scholars like Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga is what is known as Experientialism. In his special exposition of Experientialism – which he refers to as "reformed epistemology" –Plantinga has had two different dictions in his works. In his early woks such as God and other Minds, "Is Belief in God Rational?", "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" and"Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics", he endeavored to prove the rationality and justificationof believing in God and tried to offer certain and compelling arguments to prove the existence of God. In these works, Plantinga has adopted an internal approach toward the rationality of believing in God and regards it as a basic belief. Criticizing classic foundationalism, he sought to expand a different version of foundationalism according to which God's existence is regarded as basic for a believer. Based on this approach, Palntinga, like other proponents of foundationalism, considers the knowledgea "True Justified Belief". His view is, however, different from other foundationalists in defining the nature of the third element of knowledge. According to Plantinga's early exposition of his theory, the criteria of rationality of believing in God include the principles of classic foundationalism(such as evident to senses, evident to reason and incorrigibility) and other elements. He rejected the deductive-priori method concerning the criteria of determining basic belief and suggested an inductive- posteriori one. Based on this view, the cause behind thebasic nature of belief is an internal aspect and consequently is completely personal and relative. That means any kind of assessment of one's beliefs should be made by referring to his/her cognitional structure. Consequently, no general criterion can be determined for making a belief basic because every individual can offer a specific criterion based on his own cognitional structure which differs from others. Thus, based on this version, the only difference between Plantinga and other foundationalists is in his different view about the basic belief of the individuals. He believes that to determine the basic beliefs, first the person should make distinction between what he considers basic from non-basic ones and then he should introduce a criterion by which his belief becomes basic. Therefore, by looking at the issue from a different angle, he offered a new and more expanded version of the basic beliefs according to which the belief in God becomes quite rational. Plantinga, on the other hand, in his later works (three Warrants)emphasizes that instead of having an internal approach toward the rationality and justification one should have an external approach and consider the believers' beliefs as warranted. This shift in Plantinga's approach stemmed from his theory about epistemological justification of which was reflected in his two impressive works entitled:Warrant: the Current Debateand Warrant and Proper Function(published in 1993). Based on the external approach, he shifts from the notion of justification to Warrant. He considers the rationality of religious belief not in being justifiable, but warranted which can be a guarantee for the rationality of believing in God. On the other hand, he changed the third element of knowledge from "justifiable" to "warranted" and defined the knowledge as "a True Warranted Belief"In this new approach, he doesn't seek to define the justification and the internal criteria of being justifiable, rather he emphasizes the Goldman's reliabilism and speaks out about the man's propercognitional system. Based on this view, if man's cognitional system works properly, he will possess epistemological rationality. In external approach, Plantinga believes that the theistic sensation is a mechanism producing faith which, if having proper condition,can cause a belief which doesn't evidently depend on other beliefs. Thus, if the person's perceiving powers work properly and they aim to catch the truth and there is no barrier, the person's belief in God can be counted as basic.

Prior research shows that the correlation between religiosity and support for animal rights can be positive, negative, or zero. We hypothesized that this relationship may actually be curvilinear, where a moderate degree of religiosity may reduce support for killing animals (compared with non-religiosity or atheism), but a very high degree of religiosity (e.g., fundamentalism) might increase support for killing animals. We tested this hypothesis in a large sample of American undergraduate students, using a correlational study design with self-report measures of religiosity and of support for killing animals in different domains. The results indicated that, in support of our hypothesis, the relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals is curvilinear, as moderate levels of religiosity were related to less support for killing animals. People who were either not religious at all or very religious were the ones who most supported the killing of animals. Belief in God in itself was related to less support for killing animals. We then replicated the curvilinear relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals using data from four experiments from a previously published article on support for killing animals. We briefly consider possible explanations for these findings, the limitations of the study, and propose directions for future research. Overall, we believe that this study helps clarify the complex relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals, and advances the scientific understanding of the psychological forces that motivate people to support or object to the killing of animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]