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14. Management Fads, Pedagogies and Soft Technologies

Author

Bendor, Jonathan, Huberman, Bernardo A., and Wu, Fang

Subjects
Physics - Physics and Society, Condensed Matter - Statistical Mechanics
Abstract

We present a model for the diffusion of management fads and other technologies which lack clear objective evidence about their merits. The choices made by non-Bayesian adopters reflect both their own evaluations and the social influence of their peers. We show, both analytically and computationally, that the dynamics lead to outcomes that appear to be deterministic in spite of being governed by a stochastic process. In other words, when the objective evidence about a technology is weak, the evolution of this process quickly settles down to a fraction of adopters that is not predetermined. When the objective evidence is strong, the proportion of adopters is determined by the quality of the evidence and the adopters' competence.

Published
2005

25. A Behavioral Theory of Elections

Author

Bendor, Jonathan, author, Diermeier, Daniel, author, Siegel, David A., author, Ting, Michael M., author, Bendor, Jonathan, Diermeier, Daniel, Siegel, David A., and Ting, Michael M.

Published
2011
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50. Endogenous organizational restructuring: Status, productivity, & meritocratic dynamics

Author

Thakur, Ashutosh and Bendor, Jonathan

Subjects
D71, assignment, ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION, voting, ddc:330, organizational reform, institutions, status, meritocracy
Abstract

We model the dynamics of endogenous organizational restructuring, where those being assigned positions in an organization can themselves lobby for who gets which position. Internal labor market changes depend on how much individuals value their own status in the organization, the organizational output, their friends' welfare, and the quality of their own departmental colleagues. Meritocratic assignments are reached with probability one when agents value organizational output even with epsilon weight, provided friend networks and departments are not too large. We also characterize the effects of various voting rules, agendas, and specializations on the paths and the stability of organizational structures.

Published
2021

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