Search

Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Beschaftigungsentwicklung auf der einen Seite und den Einstellungen und Entlassungen auf der anderen Seite ist wichtig fur das Verstandnis der Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit in Rezessionen. Obwohl die Anzahl der Einstellungen und Entlassungen in Deutschland viel niedriger ist als in den USA, entspricht der Zusammenhang zwischen der Beschaftigungsentwicklung und den Einstellungen und Entlassungen weitestgehend dem Muster, das dort beobachtet wird (Davis et al. 2006, 2012). Es unterscheidet sich dementsprechend stark von dem in Frankreich (Abowd et al. 1999). Insbesondere Jungere mit kurzerer Betriebszugehorigkeitsdauer, niedrigerem Schulabschluss, niedrigeren Lohnen in geringfugigen Beschaftigungsverhaltnissen werden freigesetzt, wenn sich Betriebe hinsichtlich der Beschaftigtenzahl verkleinern, wenngleich dies nicht ausschlieslich gilt.

Ziel dieses Beitrags ist, einen Uberblick uber unsere neueren Forschungsergebnisse zum Spannungsfeld der Beschaftigung zwischen Mobilitat und Stabilitat – aus individueller und betrieblicher Sicht sowie unter Berucksichtigung institutioneller Einflusse – zu geben. Die vorgestellten Arbeiten gehen starker als die bisherige Literatur auf die Interaktionen zwischen Individuum und Betrieb ein. Die Ergebnisse lassen sich vier Projektschwerpunkten zuordnen. Erstens identifizierte eine Anzahl von Studien individuelle, betriebliche und gesamtwirtschaftliche Determinanten der Beschaftigungsstabilitat. Zweitens wurde die Bedeutung von Lohnen und Zufriedenheit auf Arbeitsplatzwechsel untersucht. Die Befunde zeigen unter anderem, dass hohere Arbeitsplatzsicherheit und hohere Lohne in Deutschland Hand in Hand gehen; allerdings lassen sich auch Hinweise auf kompensierende Lohndifferentiale finden. Ein dritter Schwerpunkt analysiert die Bedeutung von Institutionen fur die Beschaftigungsstabilitat. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Beschaftigung in Betrieben, die Tarifvertrage anwenden, stabiler ausfallt, wahrend betriebliche Bundnisse zumindest mittelfristig keine positiven Beschaftigungswirkungen hatten. Schlieslich ging ein vierter Projektteil der Wirkung von Eingliederungszuschussen auf Lohne und Beschaftigungsdauer nach. Dabei zeigte sich, dass geforderte Beschaftigungsverhaltnisse bei ungefahr gleich hohen Einstiegslohnen langer andauern.

"The study examined the relationship between employees' ability to achieve subjective success and their work attitudes. Four dimensions of subjective success were measured: fulfilling work, financial rewards, recognition, and authority. Hierarchical regression models predicting job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover were examined. Objective indicators of success (organizational level, promotions, and salary) were included as control variables along with importance scores and achievement scores for the success criteria. Results indicate that an employee's achievement of fulfilling work is the strongest predictor of their attitudes towards the job and organization. Together, the achievement of the four success criteria explained significantly more variance in attitudes than objective indicators of success or success criteria importance." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are used to examine the roles of individual heterogeneity and job match quality in generating commonly observed wagetenure profiles. The evidence presented in the paper indicates that once those factors are reflected in the estimations, the returns to seniority are no longer measurable. Job match quality appears to be the dominant factor in the German labor market in generating an upward sloping wage-tenure profile.

This paper examines whether or not a prolonged unemployment period can raise the quality of job matching after unemployment. We focus on job tenure as an indicator of a good quality job match after unemployment. We match two sets of Japanese administrative data compiled by the public employment security offices: one includes information about the circumstances of job seekers receiving unemployment insurance, and the other includes information about job seekers applying for jobs. We first show a negative relationship between unemployment duration and the subsequent job duration. Restricting the sample to job seekers who changed search behaviors in the final 59 days before expiration of unemployment insurance, we secondly show an even greater negative effect of unemployment duration on the following job duration. The importance lies not only in the duration of unemployment. If job seekers keep a high reservation wage and a low search intensity because of the benefits of unemployment insurance, and change them in response to the expiration of insurance, prolonged unemployment will result in short job duration after unemployment.

In this paper, we consider a model of on-the-job learning where workers learn informally by watching and imitating colleagues. We estimate the rate of knowledge diffusion inside the firm using two matched worker-firm data sets from Morocco and Senegal. We rely on non-linear least squares to estimate the structural parameters of the informal learning model and account for firm heterogeneity using firm factors derived from a principal component analysis. We find that the rate of knowledge diffusion is around 7 percent in Morocco and Senegal, but part of the learning-by-watching returns stems from firm heterogeneity. Informal training significantly affects the shape of returns to tenure in these two countries. Finally, we estimate an extended model with both learning-by-watching and learning-by-doing and find significant benefits from imitating colleagues in Morocco.

We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as match-specific utility, incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if firm-specific human capital is not too important. The existence and structure of these wage premia is then investigated empirically using detailed personnel data from a large number of banks. We find that, on average, new hires earn more than comparable incumbent colleagues on the same job. But the size of the wage premia varies between jobs and indeed strongly depends on a measure of human capital specificity.

Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on excessive labor hoarding by firms. A single period private contracting model is used to investigate the interaction of these two seemingly distinct issues. Viewed singly, familiar results emerge. The absence of separation benefits of any kind leads to excessive labor hoarding as a primitive form of earnings insurance. In a limited information environment, the distribution of job displacement insurance between the two benefit types becomes important. Unemployment insurance benefits must be limited (relative to first-best levels) and severance pay made more generous. Firing cost considerations are less familiar. Because the firm wants to provide benefits, they cannot be contracted around. Although formally driven by the sum of (unsubsidized) severance pay and expected unemployment benefits, the second-best firing cost program limits severance pay only. Together the two constraints create an unpromising contracting environment. The firing cost constraint is the more easily relaxed by government action - subsidies of sufficient size to one or another of the separation programs will work. Offer acceptance requires restrictions on leisure (workfare). Unfortunately, if first-best benefits are mandated, efficiency requires that both be eased.

This paper summarizes the findings of studies which investigate the determinants of wages in Germany, using data of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The empirical analyses apply least squares estimates as well as the estimators developed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991). These estimators reduce the endogeneity of indicators of specific and general labor market experience. The studies focus on the heterogeneity in wage determinants in the private and the public sector, in East and West Germany, for men and women, as well as in large versus small firms. Among the most interesting results, we find clear differences in returns to experience between East and West and by employer size.

In this paper we show that panel estimates of tenure specific sensitivity to the business cycle of wages is subject to serious pitfalls. Three canonical variates used in the literature - the minimum unemployment rate during a worker's time at the firm (min u), the unemployment rate at the start of her tenure (Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy - can all be significant and correctly signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker's (1994) two step method. Our proposed solution method is however suboptimal because it removes a lot of potentially informative variation in average wages. Unfortunately cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.

This study analyzes real wage cyclicality for male full-time workers within employer-employee matches in Germany over the period 1984-2004. Five different wage measures are compared: the standard hourly wage rate; hourly wage earnings including overtime and bonus pay; the effective wage, which takes into account unpaid overtime; and monthly earnings, with and without additional pay. None of the hourly wage measures exhibits cyclicality except for the group of salaried workers with unpaid overtime. Their effective wages show a strongly procyclical reaction to changes in unemployment. Despite acyclical wage rates, salaried workers without unpaid overtime experienced procyclical earnings movements if they had income from extra pay. Monthly earnings were also procyclical for hourly paid workers with overtime pay. These findings suggest that cyclical earnings movements are generated by variable pay components, such as bonuses and overtime, and by flexible working hours. The degree of earnings procyclicality revealed for the German labor market is comparable to the United States.

Whilst existing efficiency wage literature assumes detection probabilities of shirkers are exogenous, this paper finds them positively and endogenously dependent on non-shirkers' effort. It shares the result with the endogenous monitoring models where, in some regions, workers reduce effort in response to higher wages, but differs in that firms never operate in those regions. The paper further provides theoretical reasons for the empirical regularity that increased usage of performance related pay (PRP) flattens the pay-tenure profile. Wages and effort increase over the lifecycle, both with and without PRP, but with late payments in PRP falling short of pure wage arrangements.

Taking advantage of a recent relaxation of Japanese government's data release policy, we conduct a cross-national analysis of micro data from Japan's Employment Status Survey and its U.S. counterpart, Current Population Survey. Our focus is to document and contrast changes in long-term employment and job security over the last twenty five years between the two largest advanced economies. We find that in spite of the prolonged economic stagnation, the ten-year job retention rates of core employees (employees of prime age of 30-44 who have already accumulated at least five years of tenure) in Japan were remarkably stable at around 70 percent over the last twenty-five years, and there is little evidence that Japan's Great Recession of the 1990s had a deleterious effect on job stability of such employees. In contrast, notwithstanding its longest economic expansion in history, the comparable job retention rates for core employees in the U.S. actually fell from over 50 percent to below 40 percent over the same time period. The probit estimates of job loss models in the two nations also point to the extraordinary resilience of job security of core employees in Japan, whereas showing a significant loss of job security for similar employees in the U.S. Though core employees in Japan turned out to have weathered their Great Recession well, we find that mid-career hires and young new job market entrants were less fortunate, with their employment stability deteriorating significantly. We interpret the findings, based on the theory of institutional complementarity, and derive lessons for policy makers around the world who are currently facing their own Great Recessions and developing effective policy responses.

"Weshalb bezahlen Arbeitgeber Löhne, die mit der Betriebszugehörigkeit steigen? Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie betont, dass Arbeitgeber ihre Beschäftigten an sich binden und motivieren wollen, indem sie ihnen einen relativ niedrigen Einstiegslohn sowie im Laufe der Betriebszugehörigkeit stärker steigende Löhne bezahlen, als dies deren steigende Produktivität rechtfertigen würde. Dieser Beitrag versucht die empirische Relevanz der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie zu testen und geht hierbei insbesondere auf die Rolle von Betriebsräten und Gewerkschaften ein. Er bestätigt die theoretischen Vorhersagen, die positive Einflussmöglichkeiten beider Institutionen nahelegen." (Autorenreferat) "Why do employers pay seniority wages? The principal-agent theory stresses that employers might want to keep and motivate their employees by paying them a low entry wage and wage increases with tenure, although this may not be justified by their productivity development. This contribution tests the empirical relevance of this seniority wage interpretation. Hereby, it focuses on the role of works councils and unions. The theoretical hypotheses predicting a positive impact of both institutions on seniority wages are confirmed." (author's abstract)

This paper summarizes the findings of studies which investigate the determinants of wages in Germany, using data of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The empirical analyses apply least squares estimates as well as the estimators developed by Altonji and Shakotko, Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 437 (1987) and Topel, J. Polit Econ. 99(1), 145 (1991). These estimators reduce the endogeneity of indicators of specific and general labor market experience. The studies focus on the heterogeneity in wage determinants in the private and the public sector, in East and West Germany, for men and women, as well as in large versus small firms. Among the most interesting results, we find clear differences in returns to experience between East and West and by employer size.

This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk-averse workers, both employed and unemployed, search for better paid job opportunities. Different firms typically offer different contracts. Workers accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing. With on-the-job search, a worker's wage evolves endogenously over time through experience effects, tenure effects and quits to better paid employment. This equilibrium approach suggests how to identify econometrically between experience and tenure effects on worker wages.

"Die Bruttostundenlöhne von Vollzeitbeschäftigten sind im Durchschnitt höher als jene für Arbeitnehmer mit reduzierter Stundenzahl. Darüber hinaus ist die Streuung der Löhne bei Teilzeitbeschäftigten weitaus größer als bei Vollzeitbeschäftigten. Das bedeutet, dass das Risiko, deutlich weniger als den durchschnittlichen Stundenlohn zu verdienen, für Teilzeitbeschäftigte größer ist. Ziel dieser Analyse ist es unter anderem, die Lohnunterschiede zwischen voll- und teilzeitbeschäftigten Frauen und Männern in Ost- und Westdeutschland empirisch zu messen und zu analysieren, in wie weit sie auf beobachtbare Qualifikationsunterschiede und weitere lohnrelevante Einflussfaktoren zurückgeführt werden können. Die empirische Analyse basiert auf Daten der 24. Welle des Sozio-ökonomischen Panels aus dem Jahr 2007. Die Ergebnisse der multivariaten Analyse deuten darauf hin, dass männliche Teilzeitbeschäftigte in Westdeutschland – unabhängig von der Definition von Teilzeitbeschäftigung - signifikante Lohnabschläge gegenüber ihren vollzeitbeschäftigten Kollegen hinnehmen müssen. Im Gegensatz dazu wird bei westdeutschen Frauen eine Abweichung vom 'Normalarbeitsverhältnis' weniger finanziell bestraft. Die Lohnabschläge betreffen insbesondere Beschäftigungsverhältnisse mit 10 bis 15 Stunden pro Woche, die häufig geringfügige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse sind. Weiterhin zeigt sich, dass die Lohnabschläge für Teilzeitbeschäftigte mit der Dauer der Betriebszugehörigkeit und teilweise auch mit dem Qualifikationsniveau variieren. Bei den ostdeutschen Frauen können keine signifikanten Lohnunterschiede festgestellt werden." (Autorenreferat). Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1 Einleitung; 2 Theoretische Argumente und empirische Evidenz zu den Lohnunterschieden zwischen Teil- und Vollzeitbeschäftigten; 2.1 Theoretische Argumente zur Erklärung von Teilzeit-Vollzeit- Lohnunterschieden; 2.2 Empirische Studien für Deutschland; 3 Datenbasis und deskriptive Analyse der Stundenlöhne; 3.1 Verteilung der vereinbarten Arbeitszeiten und durchschnittliche Stundenlöhne; 3.2 Einkommensrisiko; 4 Multivariate Analyse der Lohndifferenziale; 5 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick; 6 Literatur.

Dank Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeiten und großzügiger Regelungen zur Kurzarbeit hat die aktuelle Wirtschaftskrise bisher am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt erfreulich geringe Spuren hinterlassen. Dennoch kann man annehmen, dass sich viele Arbeitnehmer Sorgen über ihre berufliche Zukunft machen. Derzeit liegen noch keine Daten vor, die eine Beantwortung der Frage erlauben würden, ob diese Angst derzeit größer ist als in früheren Rezessionen. Die Betrachtung der langfristigen Entwicklung erweist sich jedoch als aufschlussreich. Dabei soll neben der subjektiven Beschäftigungsunsicherheit auch die Dauerhaftigkeit von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen (Stabilität) als objektivierbarer Indikator zur Beschreibung des Arbeitsmarktgeschehens betrachtet werden. Die in diesem Beitrag dargestellten Analysen basieren im Wesentlichen auf den Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP). Die Befunde zeigen, dass die Beschäftigungsstabilität in Deutschland langfristig nicht generell abnimmt, sondern erstaunlich stabil bleibt. Gleichzeitig aber offenbart sich in den letzten Jahren eine deutliche Zunahme der Angst vor Jobverlust. Nach der Präsentation der empirischen Befunde diskutiert der Beitrag daher die Gründe für diese scheinbar paradoxe Entwicklung, in dem der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Ausmaß der Beschäftigungsunsicherheit einerseits und der Arbeitslosenquote und der Einkommensungleichheit in Deutschland untersucht werden. Dabei ergeben sich Hinweise darauf, dass die zunehmende Wahrnehmung von Beschäftigungsunsicherheit in Deutschland mit den tiefgreifenden sozialpolitischen Veränderungen der vergangenen Jahre in Verbindung stehen könnte., Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren No. 44 (2010). Beginn und Erscheinungsfrequenz: Jahr: 1989, Ausgaben pro Jahr: 2, Social Indicators Information Service No. 44 (2010). Starting Point and Frequency: Year: 1989, Issues per Year: 2, Social Indicators Information Service, Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren

This paper shows that there are severe measurement errors regarding the occupational affiliations in the German Socio-Economic Panel. These errors are traced back to the survey structure: in years where occupational information is gathered from the entire employed population instead of only from those declaring job or labor market status changes, average occupational mobility is around five times higher. In order to construct reliable occupational affiliation data, a correction method based on related job or labor market status changes is proposed. The corrected occupational mobility patterns are then analyzed for different samples.

We use lifetime job histories from the pension records to evaluate changes in job stability in Finland between 1963 and 2004. We specify a duration model and estimate the effects of elapsed duration, age, and calendar time on the hazard of job ending using individual-level panel data spanning over four decades. We find that this hazard increased during the recession years in the early 1990s but has now returned to the level that prevailed in the 1970s. We also demonstrate that the fluctuations in the hazard rate together with the changes in labor market entry rates have complicated dynamic effects on the tenure distribution, and that analysing the changes in job stability based on the elapsed duration of ongoing jobs may be quite misleading.

"Wie unterscheiden sich Löhne, Beschäftigung und Betriebszugehörigkeitsdauer von Personen, die mit einem Eingliederungszuschuss gefördert wurden, zwischen unterschiedlichen Branchen? Der vorliegende Beitrag beantwortet diese Frage auf Basis von Prozessdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit und nutzt dazu statistische Matching-Verfahren. In einem ersten Schritt erfolgt ein Vergleich gefördert und ungefördert aufgenommener Beschäftigungsverhältnisse innerhalb von Wirtschaftssektoren. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass geförderte Arbeitnehmer in den meisten Branchen kurzfristig ähnlich hohe Löhne wie ihre ungeförderten Kollegen erhalten, aber längerfristig durch höhere Beschäftigungsquoten von der Förderung profitieren. In einem zweiten Schritt werden die Löhne geförderter Arbeitnehmer in jeder Branche mit denen ähnlicher Personen verglichen, die in einem der anderen Sektoren eine geförderte Beschäftigung aufgenommen haben. Im Ergebnis differieren die kumulierten Entgelte über einen längeren Zeitraum zwischen den Branchen kaum; dennoch zeigen sich aber Unterschiede bei den kurzfristigen Löhnen, der Beschäftigung wie auch der Betriebszugehörigkeit. Ergänzende fiskalische Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen weisen darauf hin, dass sich die Förderung von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen in Branchen mit geringeren Nachfrageschwankungen eher "auszahlen" dürften." (Autorenreferat) "This paper explores whether wage, employment and tenure outcomes of workers taking up a job subsidized by the German Federal Employment Agency differ by industry. The analysis utilizes administrative data and statistical matching techniques; it covers an observation period of 3.5 years. First, we conduct a within-industry comparison of temporarily subsidized and otherwise similar unsubsidized workers. The findings show for most industries that subsidized workers had similar short-run wages, but fared significantly better in the longer run. Second, we compare labor market outcomes of subsidized workers within each industry with those of similar subsidized workers in other industries. The main result is that cumulated wages of workers would not have differed significantly, if they had been hired in another industry instead. However, we find significant differences in short-term wages, employment and tenure outcomes across industries. Finally, from a fiscal point of view it seems more advantageous to subsidize workers hired in industries that are less subject to demand fluctuations." (author's abstract)

We undertake the first empirical investigation of the relationship between the slope of the wagetenure profile and the level of monitoring. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we hypothesise that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wagetenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.

This paper characterises establishments that pay higher seniority wages than their competitors. It tests whether seniority wages are paid on the basis of agency, human capital or efficiency wage considerations. A representative linked employeremployee panel and an innovative two-step estimation strategy are used to first calculate individual seniority wages taking into account that match quality biases tenure effects on wages. Then individual seniority wages are aggregated to the establishment level. Finally, the seniority wage indicator is explained by establishment characteristics. This contribution shows that large, profitable and establishments with a highly qualified workforce pay high seniority wages. Also collective bargaining coverage and works councils have a positive impact and the share of foreigners, training intensity and initial wage levels have a negative correlation with seniority wages. The results support an agency based motivation for seniority wages.

We extend the literature on transition economies' wage structures by investigating the returns to tenure and experience. This study applies recent panel data and estimation approaches that control for hitherto neglected biases. We compare the life cycle structure of East and West German wages for fulltime employed men in the private sector. The patterns in the returns to seniority are similar for the two regional labor markets. The returns to experience lag behind in the East German labor market, even almost 20 years after unification with significant differences particularly for high skill workers. The results are robust when only individuals are considered who started their labor market career in the market economy. We expect that the different returns are related to the heterogeneity of work experience gathered in East versus West Germany.

Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.

We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined through multi-lateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of linearly separable production.

According to the aims of the labour market reforms of the 90s implemented in many European countries, workers may stay at their first job for a shorter time, but should be able to switch jobs easily. This would generate a trade-off between job opportunities and job stability. This paper addresses this issue using administrative longitudinal data for Germany and Italy, taken as representative examples of continuous and isolated reforms, respectively. The estimated piecewise constant job and employment duration models show that changes in the durations of the first job and employment - measured as the sum of multiple consecutive jobs - are observed in periods of labour market reforms. However, the existence of a trade-off is not confirmed by the results. In Germany, men have experienced an increase in employment stability over time, mated with somewhat longer job durations, while women have not benefitted from an increase in employment durations as a compensation for the marked decrease in their first job durations. In Italy, employment stability of the new entrants of both sexes has not improved after the reforms. The reduction in the duration of the first job has not been counterbalanced by an increase in the opportunity to find rapidly another job. These results suggest that the objective of increasing job opportunities by means of labour market deregulation has not been fully achieved.

"Eingliederungszuschüsse sind ein zentrales Instrument der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Deutschland. Diese Studie untersucht für Westdeutschland, ob sich die Betriebszugehörigkeitsdauer von Personen, die im 2. Quartal 2003 aus Arbeitslosigkeit heraus eine mit Eingliederungszuschüssen geförderte Beschäftigung fanden, von der ungeförderter Personen unterscheidet. Die Untersuchung basiert auf Prozessdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Cox-Schätzungen zeigen einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen einer Förderung und der Betriebszugehörigkeitsdauer. Das Risiko, ein Beschäftigungsverhältnis zu beenden, fällt insbesondere während der Förderung als auch während der gesetzlich geregelten Nachbeschäftigungsfrist geringer aus. Unterschiede zwischen Frauen und Männern konnten dabei nicht nachgewiesen werden." (Autorenreferat) "Wage subsidies are a major instrument of active labor market policies in Germany. This paper analyses for West Germany, if tenure differs across individuals taking up a subsidized or unsubsidized job, respectively, during the second quarter of 2003. The study is based on process generated data of the German Federal Employment Agency. Cox estimations indicate a significant positive relationship between subsidy receipt and tenure, the risk of ending an employment relationship is in particular lower during the time of subsidization and the subsequent statutorily regulated period of employment. However, no significant differences between men and women could be established." (author's abstract)

This study examines the extent, duration and timing of employment breaks amongst a large representative sample of Jewish workers in Israel over the 13-year time period, 1983-1995. Work histories are constructed from a new joint database, unique in Israel, which was derived from a linkage of 1995 Population Census data with monthly employment records of the National Insurance Institute. The paper focuses on gender differences in work history patterns and, within each gender, breakdowns are provided by ethnic origin, marital status, age and education level. While most of the results are both expected and compatible with current economic theories of household behavior, some of the findings of the study are less expected, particularly those relating to the considerable amount of intermittent employment found amongst Israeli male workers. Also, women?s labor market attachment is stronger than is generally presumed. Gender differences in employment interruptions are greater for younger than older workers.

"This paper shows that the German labor market is more volatile than the US labor market at the business cycle frequency. Specifically, the volatility of the cyclical component of several labor market variables (e.g., the job-finding rate, the labor market tightness and vacancies) divided by the volatility of labor productivity is roughly twice as large as in the United States. We derive and simulate a simple model to explain this seemingly puzzling result. This new model provides explanations for this phenomenon, in particular the longer job tenure in Germany." (author's abstract) "Wir zeigen empirisch, dass die konjunkturellen Schwankungen am Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland höher sind als in den USA. Insbesondere ist die Volatilität von Arbeitsmarktvariablen (etwa der Vakanzen, der Arbeitsmarktanspannung oder der Wahrscheinlichkeit Arbeit zu finden) im Verhältnis zur Volatilität der Arbeitsproduktivität etwa doppelt so hoch wie in den USA. Wir präsentieren und kalibrieren ein einfaches Modell, das dieses scheinbare Rätsel löst. Das Modell bietet als Erklärung für dieses Phänomen insbesondere die längere Betriebszugehörigkeitsdauer in Deutschland an." (Autorenreferat)

This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm. Second, workers' wages rise with seniority, where seniority is defined as a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of his colleagues. Controlling for tenure, the probability of a worker leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in expected seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative duration dependence of the separation hazard. Conditional on ten years of tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 2.3-3.4 in Portugal., FEDER, QREN, COMPETE, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

This paper combines two strains of the literature on the employment effects of deferred compensation. The first strain separates seniority and job matching wage effects on the basis of individual data, but cannot look at employment consequences. The second strain explains the employment structure on the basis of establishment data, but cannot properly calculate seniority wages. This paper uses linked employer-employee data, aggregates individual seniority wages to the establishment level, and correlates them with the establishment employment structure. According to the deferred compensation hypothesis this paper finds that establishments with stronger seniority wages have a higher tenure but hire less older employees.

"Using a linked employer-employee dataset and taking the perspective of individuals rather than firms, this paper analyzes some effects of joining start-ups. We show that entrants in new firms differ from those joining incumbent firms, and we use a matching approach to compare a group of employees joining new firms in 1995/96 with a control group entering incumbent firms. Our results indicate that individuals' employment stability was higher in incumbent than in newly founded firms while their risk of becoming unemployed was lower. In particular in eastern Germany, joining firms that were older than six years was the best strategy." (author's abstract) "Die Arbeit analysiert unter Verwendung eines verbundenen Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Datensatzes einige Auswirkungen des Eintritts in Neugründungen, wobei die Sicht von Individuen statt von Firmen eingenommen wird. Wir zeigen, dass Personen, die in neue Firmen eintreten, sich von Eintretenden in bestehende Firmen unterscheiden, und wir verwenden einen Matching-Ansatz, um eine Gruppe von Personen, die 1995/96 in Neugründungen eintrat, mit einer Kontrollgruppe von Eintretenden in bestehende Firmen zu vergleichen. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Beschäftigungsstabilität der eintretenden Personen in bestehenden Firmen höher als in Neugründungen ausfiel, während ihr Risiko arbeitslos zu werden geringer war. Insbesondere in den neuen Bundesländern bestand die beste Strategie darin, in Firmen einzutreten, die älter als sechs Jahre waren." (Autorenreferat)

This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers' wages rise with seniority (= a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We seek to explain these regularities by developing a dynamic model of the firm with stochastic product demand and hiring cost (= irreversible specific investments). There is wage bargaining between a worker and its firm. Separations (quits or layoffs) obey the LIFO rule and bargaining is efficient (a zero surplus at the moment of separation). The LIFO rule provides a stronger bargaining position for senior workers, leading to a return to seniority in wages. Efficiency in hiring requires the workers' bargaining power to be in line with their share in the cost of specific investment. Then, the LIFO rule is a way to protect their property right on the specific investment. We consider the effects of Employment Protection Legislation and risk aversion.

Der Beitrag untersucht unter Verwendung der Daten des Sozio-ökonomischen Panels für Westdeutschland über den Zeitraum 1984-2005, ob und in welcher Form die individuelle Betriebszugehörigkeitsdauer von konjunkturellen Schwankungen beeinflusst wird. Als Analyseinstrument dient die parametrische Zeitdaueranalyse, wobei Weibull- und loglogistische Accelerated Failure Time-Modelle herangezogen werden. Festzuhalten ist, dass sich sowohl für Frauen als auch für Männer ein Einfluss der konjunkturellen Entwicklung auf die Beschäftigungsstabilität erkennen lässt. Die Beschäftigungsstabilität nimmt für beide Geschlechter zu Beginn eines wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs zu. Mit zunehmender Dauer des Aufschwungs setzt allerdings für Männer ein entgegengesetzter Einfluss ein und das Risiko einer Beschäftigungsbeendigung steigt aufgrund der hohen Wachstumsraten der Vorperioden.

We examine job durations of German workers using linked employer-employee data. Our results indicate that exit rates are strongly influenced by firm characteristics. The effects of some of these characteristics, however, are limited to particular job positions or skill groups. There is clear evidence for a sorting process whereby workers with long expected job durations are matched to firms offering stable employment (and vice versa). An extension of the model to a competing-risks framework shows that both individual and firm-level characteristics differ greatly in their impact on job exit to different destination states. Among the substantive results, it would appear that works councils decrease exit both to unemployment and to new jobs, but do so only for blue collar workers.

The paper deals with measurement error, and its potentially distorting role, in information on industry and professional status collected by labour force surveys. The focus of our analyses is on inconsistent information on these employment characteristics resulting from yearly transition matrices for workers who were continuously employed over the year and who did not change job. As a case-study we use yearly panel data for the period from April 1993 to April 2003 collected by the Italian Quarterly Labour Force Survey. The analysis goes through four steps: (i) descriptive indicators of (dis)agreement; (ii) testing whether the consistency of repeated information significantly increases when the number of categories is collapsed; (iii) examination of the pattern of inconsistencies among response categories by means of Goodman's quasi-independence model; (iv) comparisons of alternative classifications. Results document sizable measurement error, which is only moderately reduced by more aggregated classifications. They suggest that even cross-section estimates of employment by industry and/or professional status are affected by non-random measurement error.

"This study uses recent data taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (2002-2006) to evaluate the extent of and heterogeneity in returns to tenure for men in eastern and western Germany, employed in both the private and the public sector. We find significantly different wage patterns in eastern and western Germany as well as between the private and public sectors. Irrespective of the particular subsample, the application of the Altonji-Shakotko estimation approach yields minute and insignificant returns to tenure and more substantial returns to experience. The profile of the eastern German wage structure is surprisingly flat: after the first ten years of experience - and in contrast to the situation in western Germany - there appear to be no returns to additional general human capital." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) Additional Information Kurzfassung (deutsch) Executive summary (English)

By using a large new panel of individual data, including objective measures of worker performance, we provide some of the most rigorous evidence to date on several related dimensions of enduring debates surrounding upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles. Most importantly we provide the first direct test of the relative validity of human capital and agency explanations in accounting for upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles; our findings strongly support the agency view. Our second area of interest concerns employee ownership (many workers at our case are employee owners). Consistent with agency theory we find that earnings-tenure profiles for employee owners are not upward-sloping but horizontal. In addition we find that pay-performance sensitivities are substantially weaker for employee owners than for other workers. Finally we investigate the impact of residential policies in China. We find that again consistent with the agency view, earnings-tenure profiles are considerably steeper for urban workers than for migrant workers with far more limited alternative employment opportunities.

This paper compares the cyclical behaviour of male real wages in Germany and the UK using the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2002 and the British Household Panel Survey 1991-2004. We distinguish between job stayers (remaining in the same job), and within- and between-company job movers. Stayers are the large majority in both countries. Using changes in the unemployment rate as the cyclical measure, we find real wages of stayers in the private sector in West Germany but not East Germany to be procyclical, and quite sensitive to unemployment, comparable to the US and the UK. We find cyclicality in the public sector in neither country. Thus real wage flexibility is similar in the two countries, apart from East Germany, despite apparent differences in wage-setting institutions.

(version July 2007) The paper investigates the evolution of wages and wage inequality in Germany based on samples from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984 to 2005. Real gross hourly wages for prime age dependent male workers increased on average by 23 percent between 1984 and 1994 in West Germany and the wage distribution was fairly stable. Between 1994 and 2005 average wages increased by 7 percent in West Germany and 18 percent in East Germany. In this period wage inequality, measured by the ratio of the ninetieth to tenth percentile of the wage distribution, increased from 2.5 to 3.1 in West Germany and from 2.4 to 3.2 in East Germany. In West Germany rising wage inequality occurred mainly in the lower part of the wage distribution, whereas in East Germany wage inequality predominantly increased in the upper part of the wage distribution. In West Germany the group of workers with low tenure experienced higher increases in wage inequality compared to the group of workers with high tenure.

Dieses Papier erläutert die praktische Umsetzung des Konzeptes der Einstellungsgutscheine (Kieler Arbeitspapier 1302 "Comparing the Effectiveness of Employment Subsidies" von Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl und Dennis Snower). Nach unserem Konzept werden den Arbeitgebern bei der Einstellung von Langzeitarbeitslosen und Geringqualifizierten Einstellungsgutscheine ausgehändigt, wodurch die Lohnkosten befristet während der ersten Zeit der Beschäftigung sinken. Die Höhe der befristeten Gutscheine soll mit der Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit steigen sowie mit der Qualifikation und der anschließenden Beschäftigungsdauer abnehmen. Exemplarisch wird für die selbstfinanzierenden Gutscheine dies für verschiedene Dauern der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit und verschiedene Qualifikationen konkretisiert. Es wird eine einfache Formel entwickelt, mit der die Höhe des Gutscheins in Abhängigkeit vom neuen Lohn, der Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und der Beschäftigungsdauer berechnet werden kann. This paper describes the practical implementation of hiring vouchers in Germany (Kiel Working Paper 1302 "Comparing the Effectiveness of Employment Subsidies" by Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl and Dennis Snower). According to our proposal employers receive vouchers for hiring longterm unemployed, low-ability workers. Thereby, labour costs are reduced for a limited period of time. The size of the vouchers increases with the duration of unemployment as well as with the qualification and decreases with the subsequent employment duration. We exemplify the concept for self-financing hiring vouchers for a broad range of unemployment durations and qualifications. We develop a simple formula to calculate the size of the voucher depending on the new wage, the duration of unemployment and the subsequent employment duration.

We estimate wage and job tenure functions that include individual and firm effects capturing time-invariant unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity using German linked employer-employee data (LIAB data set). We find that both types of heterogeneity are correlated to the observed characteristics and that it is therefore warranted to include individual and firm fixed effects in both the wage and the job tenure equation. We look into the correlation of the unobserved heterogeneity components with each other. We find that high-wage workers tend to be low-tenure workers, i.e. higher unobserved ability seems to be associated with higher job mobility. At firm level, there seems to be a trade-off between wages and job stability: High-wage firms tend to be low-tenure firms, which suggests that low job stability may be compensated by higher wages. High-wage workers seem to sort into low-wage/high-tenure firms. They seem to forgo some of their earnings potential in favour of higher job stability.