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From being a relatively neglected field, the study of de facto states has developed rapidly in recent years. As the break-up of the Soviet Union produced seven de facto states – four that still exist to this day (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) and three that are now defunct (Chechnya, the Done – scholars from this region have contributed greatly to the development of this field. Russian scholars have been particularly active, with Russia serving as the patron state of three of the extant entities (having reintegrated/absorbed the three defunct ones), as well as of the patron of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia. But Western scholars have also made a sizeable contribution, although often working in relative isolation from “local” research. Whereas local researchers excel in in-depth knowledge of the history and culture of the region, their Western colleagues add to the comparative and theoretical approaches. And just as Russian researchers naturally focus on the relations of the Eurasian de facto states with their Russian patron, their Western counterparts often analyse the policies of their own countries towards these entities. Thus, we argue, two separate “ecosystems” of research into Eurasian de facto states have gradually developed: a “local” one and a “Western” one, each with its own peculiarities. In this article, we survey the “Western” literature on de facto states, noting the various assessments of the possibilities for US and EU engagement with the Eurasian de facto states. The scholarly literature discussing Western engagement emerges as partly analytical, explaining what Western states are doing and not doing and why, and partly normative, offering policy recommendations on how best to engage. Implicit in the concept of “engagement,” however, is the understanding that engagement is preferable to “ignoring” or “sanctioning.” According to this view, Western cooperation with de facto state authorities is inevitable.

De facto states – unrecognized secessionist entities that eke out a living on the margins of the international system – are often heavily dependent on external patron states for economic aid and investment. When the parent state – the state that the de facto state seeks to break away from – responds to the secessionist attempt by imposing sanctions or economic blockades, this further exacerbates such dependency. Moreover, due to their lack of international recognition, de facto states often have limited opportunities to engage with the outside world beyond the patron and the parent state. However, closer examination of one such de facto state, Abkhazia, reveals that de facto states can enjoy some bounded independent economic agency. Abkhazia’s maneuvering between Russia as “patron,” Georgia as “parent state,” and the wider international community (here exemplified by the EU) in the sphere of trade and economic interaction has important implications for de-facto state conflict transformation.