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Indian economic and strategic involvement in the Middle East has seen a transformation over the past two decades. This development has happened as many observers remark a gradual decline of US influence juxtaposed with China's growing presence in the region. This article aims to assess how India has managed its bilateral relations with China within this region of increasing economic and strategic interest. Despite a growing literature on the China-India rivalry in Southeast Asia, South Asia or Central Asia, there is a notable dearth of scholarship on the China–India rivalry and its implications in the Middle East. Filling this gap, this article focuses on explaining how India has adapted its policies towards China's rising influence in Middle Eastern politics. The core argument is that India's strategy has been shaped by both a perception of declining US' engagement in the Middle East and by opportunities created by new strategic hedging strategies from key regional players such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. The article determines that India moved over the last decade from a strategy of buck-passing on US' security provision to one of partial soft balancing of China's strategic presence in the Middle East. However, the article also notes the limitations of standard theories of balance-of-power and strategic hedging to account for India's multifaceted approach towards a regional order in flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and how do regional parties influence foreign policy in federal democracies with multiparty coalition governments? The existing literature has focused on situations of foreign policy disagreements between subnational parties and the central government in multinational states. By contrast, we argue that under varying conditions, central governments either decide to accommodate the preferences of small regional parties when designing foreign policies, or co-opt these regional parties to push their own foreign policy agenda. Some scholars looked at the role of decentralization and federal power arrangements in providing more control to political sub-units over the external affairs of a state. Other studies showed that certain coalition-building configurations facilitated the inclusion of the concerns of small parties in the foreign policy debate. Bridging these two literatures, we argue that both structural and agential conditions behind regional and national coalition building processes—visible in federal settings—affect foreign policy-making in different ways, and not necessarily toward disagreement and obstruction. To illustrate these hypothesized mechanisms, we look at two case studies in the Indian context: the role of regional parties in the debate over the US–India nuclear deal of 2008 and the role of regional parties in shaping India's Sri Lanka policy from 2009 to 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extant scholarship in international relations does not completely account for the role of sub-state organizations (SSOs) in foreign policymaking of states. Yet, international cooperation, especially, in specialized areas like defense, space and nuclear technologies that are intrinsically complex frequently witness extensive involvement of SSOs. In other words, SSOs often act as foreign policy agents driving the international partnerships. Why does this happen, and what are its causal mechanisms? In this study, we conduct a plausibility probe on the role of SSOs through examining India's partnerships with France and Israel in the specialized domains of nuclear, space and defense technologies, and find that the foreign policy executives (FPEs) within the governments frequently defer to relevant SSOs when specialized knowledge and expertise are required, thereby, conferring foreign policy agency to the SSOs. We also find that the SSOs select their international partners based on their goals of efficiency, common institutional designs and organizational cultures. Our conclusions lead us to draw scholarly attention to this largely ignored yet significant actor in foreign policy decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This forum comes from a 2016 panel at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. The forum participants offered mid-term assessments of the foreign policy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This forum considers whether Modi heralded in a new era in Indian foreign policy, or whether Modi's policies just repackaged older policies. The authors in this forum answer these questions by focusing on a range of issues from the role of religion to economic issues, to the relations between India and major foreign partners. The authors conclude that while Modi has undeniably put a personal stamp on foreign policy, substantive changes have been minimal. The first significant change lies in the centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the Prime Minister's Office. Second, while religious diplomacy played an important role, the version of Hinduism that Modi has adopted in foreign affairs is more inclusive than the one on display in domestic politics. Third, India's foreign economic policy has adopted a distinct nationalist tone. Fourth, Modi has signaled a "neighborhood first" focus in foreign policy. Finally, despite attempts at imparting his personal stamp, India's foreign policy towards major partners and in most issue areas remains substantively similar to those of the previous administrations.   Resumen: Este debate surgió a partir de un panel de la reunión anual de la Asociación de Estudios Internacionales realizada en 2016. Los participantes presentaron sus evaluaciones intermedias de la política exterior de Narendra Modi, primer ministro de India. El debate analiza si Modi instauró una nueva era en la política exterior india o si, por el contrario, simplemente les dio un lavado de cara a las políticas anteriores. Para responder estas preguntas, los autores del debate se centran en varias cuestiones: desde el papel que juega la religión y los problemas económicos hasta las relaciones entre India y sus principales aliados extranjeros. Los autores concluyen que si bien Modi puso su impronta personal en la política exterior, los cambios representativos han sido mínimos. El primer cambio significativo reside en la centralización de la toma de decisiones sobre temas de política exterior en la oficina del primer ministro. En segundo lugar, aunque la diplomacia religiosa tuvo un papel importante, la versión del hinduismo que adoptó Modi en la política exterior es más inclusiva que la que se muestra en las políticas nacionales. En tercer lugar, la política económica exterior de India ha incorporado un tono nacionalista distintivo. En cuarto lugar, Modi pone el foco en los países vecinos en lo que respecta a la política exterior. Por último, a pesar de los esfuerzos por darle su propia impronta, la política exterior de India sobre las principales áreas problemáticas y en lo que respecta a los aliados más importantes, no ha experimentado cambios relevantes en comparación con las administraciones anteriores.   Extrait: Le présent forum a comme origine un panel constitué en 2016 lors de l'assemblée annuelle de l'International Studies Association. Les participants du forum ont proposé des évaluations à mi-mandat de Narendra Modi, ministre indien des Affaires étrangères. La question est de savoir si M. Modi s'est fait le héraut d'une nouvelle ère dans la politique étrangère de l'Inde ou s'il n'a fait que présenter d'anciennes politiques sous un nouveau jour. Les auteurs de ce forum abordent la question en réfléchissant à diverses problématiques, du rôle de la religion aux problèmes économiques en passant par les relations entre l'Inde et ses partenaires étrangers principaux. Les auteurs concluent que si Modi a indéniablement imprimé sa marque sur la politique étrangère du pays, les changements de fond sont restés mineurs. Le premier changement d'importance est le recentrage du processus de prise de décisions en politique étrangère sur le portefeuille du Premier Ministre. Le deuxième changement, opéré dans un contexte où la diplomatie religieuse joue un rôle important, est l'adoption d'une version de l'hindouisme plus solidaire en politique étrangère que celle qui est affichée en politique intérieure. Le troisième est l'apport d'une touche nettement nationaliste à la politique économique étrangère. Le quatrième est l'annonce par Modi d'une politique étrangère axée en priorité sur les « pays limitrophes ». Enfin, et en dépit des tentatives de Modi d'imprimer sa marque personnelle, la politique étrangère de l'Inde envers ses partenaires principaux et dans la plupart des domaines reste en substance similaire à celle des administrations précédentes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes two arguments. First, it seeks to warn foreign policy analysis scholars against directly applying models and theories developed in the context of West European countries to other regions such as the Global South. More specifically, we highlight some of the particularities present in cases from the Global South that might limit any direct attempt to apply hypothesised mechanisms derived from the existing coalition foreign-policy literature. Second, we argue that the scholarship on coalition foreign policy needs to more systematically integrate the lessons and insights from coalition experiences from the Global South. We look at the recent Indian experience with coalitions to illustrate some of our arguments about the benefits and limitations of the existing scholarship as well as to explore the need to develop new frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]