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The last two decades saw multiple attempts to explain how the self is represented in the brain within the framework of the Bayesian brain. However, these attempts largely focused on describing a developed, adult self-representation. The current paper argues that looking at the developmental trajectory is crucial for understanding the structure of self-representation. It argues that emergence of self-representations should be understood as an instance of the process of acquisition of new internal models of hidden causes of sensory input. The paper proposes how such models emerge and develop over the course of life by looking at different stages of development of bodily and extra-bodily self-representations. It argues that the self arises gradually in a series of discrete steps: from first-person multisensory representations of one's body to third-person multisensory body representation, and from basic forms of the extended and social selves to progressively more complex forms of abstract self-representation. It discusses how each of them might emerge based on domain-general learning mechanisms, while also taking into account the potential role of innate representations. Finally, it discusses how predictions of the proposed model might be experimentally tested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the historically consolidated psychopathological perspective, on the one hand, contemporary organicistic psychiatry often highlights abnormalities in neurotransmitter systems like dysregulation of dopamine transmission, neural circuitry, and genetic factors as key contributors to schizophrenia. Neuroscience, on the other, has so far almost entirely neglected the first-person experiential dimension of this syndrome, mainly focusing on high-order cognitive functions, such as executive function, working memory, theory of mind, and the like. An alternative view posits that schizophrenia is a self-disorder characterized by anomalous self-experience and awareness. This view may not only shed new light on the psychopathological features of psychosis but also inspire empirical research targeting the bodily and neurobiological changes underpinning this disorder. Cognitive neuroscience can today address classic topics of phenomenological psychopathology by adding a new level of description, finally enabling the correlation between the first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases and their neurobiological roots. Recent empirical evidence on the neurobiological basis of a minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, is presented. The relationship between the body, its motor potentialities and the notion of minimal self is illustrated. Evidence on the neural mechanisms underpinning the bodily self, its plasticity, and the blurring of self-other distinction in schizophrenic patients is introduced and discussed. It is concluded that brain-body function anomalies of multisensory integration, differential processing of self- and other-related bodily information mediating self-experience, might be at the basis of the disruption of the self disorders characterizing schizophrenia. [Display omitted] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a dynamic multisensory representation of the space around the body, influenced by internal and external sensory information. The malleability of PPS boundaries, as evidenced by their expansion after tool use or modulation through social interactions, positions PPS as a crucial element in understanding the subjective experiences of self and otherness. Building on the existing literature highlighting both the cognitive and bodily effects of mindfulness meditation, this study proposes a novel approach by employing focused-attention meditation (FAM) and a multisensory audio–tactile task to assess PPS in both the extension and sharpness of its boundaries. The research hypothesis posits that FAM, which emphasizes heightened attention to bodily sensations and interoception, may reduce the extension of PPS and make its boundaries less sharp. We enrolled 26 non-meditators who underwent a repeated measure design in which they completed the PPS task before and after a 15-min FAM induction. We found a significant reduction in the sharpness of PPS boundaries but no significant reduction in PPS extension. These results provide novel insights into the immediate effects of FAM on PPS, potentially shedding light on the modulation of self–other representations in both cognitive and bodily domains. Indeed, our findings could have implications for understanding the intricate relationship between mindfulness practices and the subjective experience of self within spatial contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the issue of people with autistic functioning in relation to this call and develops the concept of bond from Golse’s perspective. Sensory experience is highlighted as the first link between the body, developing psyche, and environment. The expected development of the bodily self and sensory linkage from an intersubjective perspective are reviewed. Subsequently, sensory alterations in autism and their limiting effects on relationships with others and the world are analyzed. The aim is to integrate psychoanalysis with contributions from neuroscience. Finally, ideas are outlined about sensorialities and social, historical, and cultural context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Depersonalization is a common and distressing experience characterized by a feeling of estrangement from one's self, body, and the world. In order to examine the relationship between depersonalization and selfhood we conducted an experimental study comparing processing of three types of self-related information between nonclinical groups of people experiencing high and low levels of depersonalization. Using a sequential matching task, we compared three types of biases for processing of self-related information: prioritization of one's name, of self-associated abstract stimuli (geometrical shapes), and of self-associated bodily stimuli (avatar faces). We found that both groups demonstrated the standard pattern of results for self-prioritization of one's name and geometrical shapes, but they differed with regard to avatar faces. While people with low depersonalization showed the standard prioritization of avatar faces, people with high depersonalization showed overall better response accuracy with avatar faces, and faster response times for stranger-associated avatar faces. These results were complemented by the additional finding that people with high depersonalization reported being more likely to use avatars of a different gender to their own outside of the experimental context. Finally, in this large sample (N = 180) we investigated the relationships between different measures of self-related processing and self-identification, finding no correlation between explicit reports of self-identification with self-associated avatar faces and geometrical shapes, self-prioritization of these stimuli, and prioritization of one's name. Public Significance Statement: Depersonalization is a widespread phenomenon characterized by subjective experience of feeling disconnected from one's self. Our study investigated how people experiencing high and low depersonalization process information about themselves. We found that high depersonalization is associated with changes in processing of bodily, but not abstract self-related information, suggesting that depersonalization might be underpinned by changes in representations of one's own and other people's bodies. Our findings have implications for understanding and treatment of depersonalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a dynamic multisensory representation of the space around the body, influenced by internal and external sensory information. The malleability of PPS boundaries, as evidenced by their expansion after tool use or modulation through social interactions, positions PPS as a crucial element in understanding the subjective experiences of self and otherness. Building on the existing literature highlighting both the cognitive and bodily effects of mindfulness meditation, this study proposes a novel approach by employing focused-attention meditation (FAM) and a multisensory audio–tactile task to assess PPS in both the extension and sharpness of its boundaries. The research hypothesis posits that FAM, which emphasizes heightened attention to bodily sensations and interoception, may reduce the extension of PPS and make its boundaries less sharp. We enrolled 26 non-meditators who underwent a repeated measure design in which they completed the PPS task before and after a 15-min FAM induction. We found a significant reduction in the sharpness of PPS boundaries but no significant reduction in PPS extension. These results provide novel insights into the immediate effects of FAM on PPS, potentially shedding light on the modulation of self–other representations in both cognitive and bodily domains. Indeed, our findings could have implications for understanding the intricate relationship between mindfulness practices and the subjective experience of self within spatial contexts.

Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can't proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what's the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one's own, but as an object among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some people diagnosed with schizophrenia have an altered sense of self. From a psychodynamic perspective, it has been hypothesised that they have disturbances in the integration of self/other identification and differentiation processes. From a neuroscientific point of view, some patients diagnosed with schizophrenia show dysfunction of the neural correlates of both the representation of the bodily self differentiated from the other and the self united with the other. The scientific literature highlights the importance of affective sensorimotor interactions during early childhood between caregiver and infant in the process of developing the self and protecting its boundaries. In particular, studies have been carried out on affiliative touch, which acts at different levels, providing an anti-stress function, defining the boundaries between self and other, promoting a sense of social belonging, facilitating embodiment processes and balancing the mirror system in the process of differentiation and identification between self and other. The introduction of cutaneous interactions based on affiliative touch therefore seems relevant to the psychotherapy of psychosis, as suggested by some of the first pioneers of the psychoanalytic approach to psychosis. On this theoretical basis we have developed Amniotic Therapy, a method based on affiliative touch. Amniotic Therapy reproduces the affective-tactile parent-infant interactions of early infancy and aims to integrate the processes of differentiation and identification. In this article we present the results of a three-year study of a patient with psychosis who was involved in an experimental study of Amniotic Therapy. The results showed an increase in the patient’s interoception and global functioning, as well as a significant decrease in psychotic positive symptoms. This suggests that Amniotic Therapy contributes to increasing the protective strength of the patient’s self boundaries and the integration of identification/differentiation processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neurological evidence has shown that brain damages canselectively impair the ability to discriminate between objectsbelonging to others and those that we feel are our own. Despitethe ubiquity and relevance of this sense of object ownership forour life, the underlying cognitive mechanisms are still poorlyunderstood. Here we ask whether psychological ownership ofan object can be based on its incorporation in one’s body image.To explore this possibility with healthy participants, weemployed a modified version of the rubber hand illusion inwhich both the participant and the rubber hand wore a ring. Weused the self-prioritization effect in a perceptual matching taskas an indirect measure of the sense of (dis)ownership overobjects. Results indicate that undermining the bodily self hascascade effects on the representation of owned objects, at leastfor those associated with the body for a long time.

Background: Experiences of felt presence (FP) are well documented in neurology, neuropsychology and bereavement research, but systematic research in relation to psychopathology is limited. FP is a feature of sensorimotor disruption in psychosis, hypnagogic experiences, solo pursuits and spiritual encounters, but research comparing these phenomena remains rare. A comparative approach to the phenomenology of FP has the potential to identify shared and unique processes underlying the experience across these contexts, with implications for clinical understanding and intervention. Methods: We present a mixed-methods analysis from three online surveys comparing FP across three diverse contexts: a population sample which included people with experience of psychosis and voice-hearing (study 1, N = 75), people with spiritual and spiritualist beliefs (study 2, N = 47) and practitioners of endurance/solo pursuits (study 3, N = 84). Participants were asked to provide descriptions of their FP experiences and completed questionnaires on FP frequency, hallucinatory experiences, dissociation, paranoia, social inner speech and sleep. Data and code for the study are available via OSF. Results: Hierarchical linear regression analysis indicated that FP frequency was predicted by a general tendency to experience hallucinations in all three studies, although paranoia and gender (female > male) were also significant predictors in sample 1. Qualitative analysis highlighted shared and diverging phenomenology of FP experiences across the three studies, including a role for immersive states in FP. Conclusions: These data combine to provide the first picture of the potential shared mechanisms underlying different accounts of FP, supporting a unitary model of the experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Disembodiment and socio-emotional deficits are core features of the schizophrenia spectrum from the prodromal stages to chronic illness. A recent study documented anomalous emotional embodiment in individuals with schizophrenia. Although bodily self disturbances have been shown to precede and predict psychosis onset in at-risk populations, the etiology of anomalous emotional embodiment remains largely unexplored. The present study investigated bodily maps of emotions in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of embodied emotions in the schizophrenia spectrum. Methods: A total of 419 participants (312 female; 19.50 ± 1.22 years) completed a topographical body mapping task where they reported patterns of embodiment experienced in the context of eleven different emotions and a neutral state (EmBODY). Embodied emotions were investigated in relation to multidimensional schizotypy. Results: Individuals with elevated negative schizotypy experienced embodied emotions with higher intensity (r = 0.16, p = 0.003) but lower clarity (i.e., endorsing activation and deactivation in the same bodily location; β = -0.28, 95% CI [-0.54, -0.03], Z = 2.25, p=0.02) and endorsed more incongruent bodily sensations of emotions (i.e., reporting bodily activation in the context of a low-arousal emotion, r = 0.12, p = 0.05; reporting bodily deactivation in the context of high-arousal emotions, r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In line with the anomalous emotional embodiment documented in individuals with schizophrenia, some of these differences were particularly notable for low-arousal emotions. Discussion: These results reveal negative schizotypy as a significant correlate of differences in emotional embodiment. More work is needed to link these differences to the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions documented in schizophrenia and assess their functional impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increasing amount of recent research has focused on the multisensory and neural bases of the bodily self. This pre‐reflective form of self is considered as multifaceted, incorporating phenomenal components, such as self location, body ownership, first‐person perspective, agency, and the perceptual body image. Direct electrical brain stimulation (EBS) during presurgical evaluation of epilepsy and brain tumor resection is a unique method to causally relate specific brain areas to the various phenomenal components of the bodily self. We conducted a systematic review of the literature describing altered phenomenal experience of the bodily self evoked by EBS. We included 42 articles and analyzed self reports from 221 patients. Three‐dimensional density maps of EBS revealed that stimulation in the middle cingulum, inferior parietal lobule, supplementary motor area, posterior insula, hippocampal complex/amygdala, and precuneus most consistently altered one or several components of the bodily self. In addition, we found that only EBS in the parietal cortex induced disturbances of all five components of the bodily self considered in this review article. These findings inform current neuroscientific models of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Bodily self-recognition requires the individual to be able to refer to himself through a reflexive representation, typically a schema or an image of one’s own body. Body ownership results from an interplay between exteroception and interoception (i.e., the ability to perceive one’s own body from the inside). It has been demonstrated that perceiving sensations inside the body could be associated with better regulation of emotions. Also, it has been reported that interoceptive awareness may be affected by gender. Therefore, this pilot study aimed to investigate gender differences in the interoceptive awareness among Italian people. Methods: 114 Italian volunteers (57 males and 57 females) completed the 32-item Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire to measure the multiple dimensions of interoceptive awareness. Results: The findings showed higher scores among females than among males for the ability to notice interoceptive input and the awareness of the relationship between bodily sensations and emotional states. Conclusions: Results suggested that women could be more inclined to notice and focus on internal cues. Also, the gender differences could be related to physical and hormonal changes that women experience during development. Future research on the relationship between gender and physiological responses (e.g., heartbeat, skin conductance) for a specific ethnographic sample is recommended.

BackgroundDisembodiment and socio-emotional deficits are core features of the schizophrenia spectrum from the prodromal stages to chronic illness. A recent study documented anomalous emotional embodiment in individuals with schizophrenia. Although bodily self disturbances have been shown to precede and predict psychosis onset in at-risk populations, the etiology of anomalous emotional embodiment remains largely unexplored. The present study investigated bodily maps of emotions in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of embodied emotions in the schizophrenia spectrum.MethodsA total of 419 participants (312 female; 19.50 ± 1.22 years) completed a topographical body mapping task where they reported patterns of embodiment experienced in the context of eleven different emotions and a neutral state (EmBODY). Embodied emotions were investigated in relation to multidimensional schizotypy.ResultsIndividuals with elevated negative schizotypy experienced embodied emotions with higher intensity (r = 0.16, p = 0.003) but lower clarity (i.e., endorsing activation and deactivation in the same bodily location; β = −0.28, 95% CI [−0.54, −0.03], Z = 2.25, p=0.02) and endorsed more incongruent bodily sensations of emotions (i.e., reporting bodily activation in the context of a low-arousal emotion, r = 0.12, p = 0.05; reporting bodily deactivation in the context of high-arousal emotions, r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In line with the anomalous emotional embodiment documented in individuals with schizophrenia, some of these differences were particularly notable for low-arousal emotions.DiscussionThese results reveal negative schizotypy as a significant correlate of differences in emotional embodiment. More work is needed to link these differences to the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions documented in schizophrenia and assess their functional impact.

Background: Bodily self-recognition requires the individual to be able to refer to himself through a reflexive representation, typically a schema or an image of one's own body. Body ownership results from an interplay between exteroception and interoception (i.e., the ability to perceive one's own body from the inside). It has been demonstrated that perceiving sensations inside the body could be associated with better regulation of emotions. Also, it has been reported that interoceptive awareness may be affected by gender. Therefore, this pilot study aimed to investigate gender differences in the interoceptive awareness among Italian people. Methods: 114 Italian volunteers (57 males and 57 females) completed the 32-item Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire to measure the multiple dimensions of interoceptive awareness. Results: The findings showed higher scores among females than among males for the ability to notice interoceptive input and the awareness of the relationship between bodily sensations and emotional states. Conclusions: Results suggested that women could be more inclined to notice and focus on internal cues. Also, the gender differences could be related to physical and hormonal changes that women experience during development. Future research on the relationship between gender and physiological responses (e.g., heartbeat, skin conductance) for a specific ethnographic sample is recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When attention is focused on self representation(s), the ability to evaluate one's internal sensations is enhanced, according to previous research by Ainley and colleagues (Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1231–1238, 2013). Self-representations are usually distinguished between bodily and narrative. Both bodily and narrative representations improve decision-making processes, in that the consideration of alternatives is informed by sensations experienced deep inside the body (e.g., anxiety) as suggest by the literature (Noël, Brevers & Bechara in Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 179, 2013). The objective of the present study is to analyze the decision-making process in multiple conditions of stimulated self-representations. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task three times (a baseline without stimuli and two randomly ordered stimulations to prime bodily and narrative self-representations). While no significant differences emerged regarding advantageous choices, participants showed loss frequency bias in the condition with bodily-self representation priming. Two interpretations are proposed: bodily-self focus acted as a distractor diminishing participants' commitment to long term outcomes or enhanced interoception promoted aversion to losses. Directions are given for future research and clinical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Two often proposed underlying factors of the developing bodily self were tested. • The sense of bodily self in early childhood is proposed to be malleable. • A self-recognition task was used to measure self-other blurring. • Multisensory stimulation altered the sense of bodily self in children. • Self-other blurring was diminished with the mother compared to a stranger. The mechanisms underlying the developing sense of bodily self are debated. Whereas some scholars stress the role of sensory factors, others propose the importance of contextual factors. By manipulating multisensory stimulation and social familiarity with the other person, we explored two factors that are proposed to relate to young children's developing sense of bodily self. Including an adult sample allowed us to investigate age-related differences of the malleability of the bodily self. To this end, the study implemented an enfacement illusion with children (N = 64) and adults (N = 33). Participants were exposed to one trial with synchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation and one trial with asynchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation—either with a stranger or with the mother as the other person. A self-recognition task using morph videos of self and other and an enfacement questionnaire were implemented as dependent measures. Results revealed evidence for the presence of the enfacement effect in children in both measures. The identity of the other person had a significant effect on the self-recognition task. Contrary to our hypothesis, the effect was significantly smaller in the caregiver condition. No significant differences between children and adults emerged. Our results demonstrate the role of both multisensory stimulation and contextual—here social familiarity—factors for the construction and development of a bodily self. The study provides developmental science with a novel approach to the bodily self by showing the validity of the self-recognition task in a child sample. Overall, the study supports proposals that the sense of bodily self is malleable early in development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schizophrenia is associated with self-disturbances and anomalous embodiment of emotion such that the distinct patterns of bodily sensations that typically accompany specific emotions are disrupted. Previous evidence indicated that cultural factors might shape the embodiment of emotion and therefore influence the subjective experience of schizophrenia.We investigated embodiment of emotion in individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and matched control participants (CO) from Korea (26 ​K-SZ and 26 ​K–CO) and the USA (26 US-SZ and US-26 CO), using a topographical mapping task that requires participants to indicate the locations of bodily sensations that accompany 14 distinct emotions. We found that emotion-related bodily sensations, especially for low-arousal emotions, were diminished in SZ compared to CO in both cultures. Cultural differences emerged in the embodiment of sadness, shame and disgust such that the patterns of bodily sensations associated with these emotions were more similar between SZ and CO in the Korean sample than in the US sample.These findings suggest that emotional embodiment anomalies are present in SZ regardless of culture, supporting the universality of bodily self-disturbances in this population. However, there are culture-specific features of embodied emotional experiences that may be important to consider for future research and treatment.

Background and Hypothesis A primary disruption of the bodily self is considered a core feature of schizophrenia (SCZ). The "disembodied" self might be underpinned by inefficient body-related multisensory integration processes, normally occurring in the peripersonal space (PPS), a plastic sector of space surrounding the body whose extent is altered in SCZ. Although PPS is a malleable interface marking the perceptual border between self and others, no study has addressed the potential alteration of its plasticity in SCZ. We investigated the plasticity of PPS in SCZ patients after a motor training with a tool in the far space. Study Design Twenty-seven SCZ patients and 32 healthy controls (HC) underwent an audio-tactile task to estimate PPS boundary before (Session 1) and after (Session 3) the tool-use. Parameters of PPS, including the size and the slope of the psychometric function describing audio-tactile RTs as a function of the audio-tactile distances, were estimated. Study Results Results confirm a narrow PPS extent in SCZ. Surprisingly, we found PPS expansion in both groups, thus showing for the first time a preserved PPS plasticity in SCZ. Patients experienced a weaker differentiation from others, as indicated by a shallower PPS slope at Session 1 that correlated positively with negative symptoms. However, at Session 3, patients marked their bodily boundary in a steeper way, suggesting a sharper demarcation of PPS boundaries after the action with the tool. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of investigating the multisensory and motor roots of self-disorders, paving the way for future body-centred rehabilitation interventions that could improve patients' altered body boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bodily self disturbances are core features of schizophrenia. Body ownership, one component of the bodily self, can be assessed with the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), which is induced by a synchronous brushing of a visible fake hand and one's own occluded hand. Schizophrenia is associated with increased RHI strength and diminished body ownership. This study examined RHI in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of self-disturbances in the schizophrenia-spectrum.Ninety-seven college students completed the RHI task and self-report questionnaires. Regressions were used to assess the RHI strength in relation to the 3 schizotypy factors (positive, negative, disorganized). We also examined the correlations between self-reported bodily self disturbances and RHI strength.Positive schizotypy predicted a stronger subjective experience of the RHI, whereas negative schizotypy predicted weakened RHI susceptibility. Questionnaire measures of self-disturbances correlated with stronger RHI. In sum, we confirmed the link between positive schizotypy and the subjective experience of the RHI, which suggests a weakened sense of body ownership. Interestingly, we also found a relationship between negative schizotypy and reduced RHI, which implies strengthened body ownership. These results also underscore the complexity of the link between the phenomenological experience of bodily disturbances and the experimentally measured sense of body ownership.

Medicine usually looks at the body as a biochemical and physical apparatus – from a distant third-person perspective, with fragmented, reductionist positions, unidirectional causal models, and highly selective foci. Even psychiatrists and psychotherapists focus more and more on the brain as an organ, look at genes and colourful pictures. And just as biomedical medicine stares at physical and chemical facts and ignores the person, one could say that psychotherapy stares at personality, cognition, and behaviour and ignores the body. But the lowlands where being-a-person and having-a-body meetmatter a lot for becoming ill, staying, and getting well. What attitudes and what approaches can help us understand the bodily self? After very briefly summarizing current understandings of embodiment and enactivism, we will suggest some practical consequences for everyday clinical diagnostics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fibromyalgia (FM) is characterised by chronic, continuous, widespread pain, often associated with a sense of fatigue, non-restorative sleep and physical exhaustion. Due to the nature of this condition and the absence of other neurological issues potentially able to induce disorders in body representations per se, it represents a perfect model since it provides an opportunity to study the relationship between pain and the bodily self. Corporeal illusions were investigated in 60 participants with or without a diagnosis of FM by means of an ad hoc devised interview. In addition, motor imagery was investigated and illusions relating to body part movements and changes in body size, feelings of alienness, and sensations of body parts not belonging to one's own body (disownership and somatoparaphrenic-like sensations) were found. Crucially, these symptoms do not correlate with any of the clinical measures of pain or functional deficits. The results showed that motor imagery was also impaired, and the severity of the deficits found correlated with the functional impairment of the participant. This indicates that disorders in body representations and motor imagery are part of the clinical expression of FM. However, while motor imagery seems to be linked to reduced autonomy and functional deficits, bodily illusions are independent and potentially represent a concurrent symptom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The tactile sense plays a crucial role in the development and maintenance of a functional bodily self. The ability to differentiate between self- and nonself-generated touch contributes to the perception of the bodies’ boundaries and more generally to self-other-distinction, both of which are thought be altered in anorexia nervosa (AN) and autism spectrum condition (AS). While it has been suggested that AN and AS are characterized by overlapping symptomatology, they might differ regarding body perception and self-other-distinction. Methods: Participants with a diagnosis of AN (n = 25), AS (n = 29), and a comparison group without diagnoses (n = 57) performed a self-other-touch task during functional brain imaging. In the experimental conditions, they stroked their own arm or were stroked on the arm by an experimenter. Results: As shown previously, the CG group showed lower activation or deactivation in response to self-touch compared to social touch from someone else. A main group effect was found in areas including somatosensory cortex, frontal and temporal gyri, insula, and subcortical regions. This was driven by increased activations in participants with AN, while participants in the AS group showed mostly comparable activations to the comparison group. Conclusions: AN diagnosis was associated with an increased neural activity in response to both self-touch and social touch. Failure to attenuate self-touch might relate to altered predictions regarding the own body and reduced perception of bodily boundaries. Participants with an AS diagnosis were mostly comparable to the comparison group, potentially indicating unaltered tactile self-other-distinction.

Fibromyalgia (FM) is characterised by chronic, continuous, widespread pain, often associated with a sense of fatigue, non-restorative sleep and physical exhaustion. Due to the nature of this condition and the absence of other neurological issues potentially able to induce disorders in body representations per se, it represents a perfect model since it provides an opportunity to study the relationship between pain and the bodily self. Corporeal illusions were investigated in 60 participants with or without a diagnosis of FM by means of an ad hoc devised interview. In addition, motor imagery was investigated and illusions relating to body part movements and changes in body size, feelings of alienness, and sensations of body parts not belonging to one’s own body (disownership and somatoparaphrenic-like sensations) were found. Crucially, these symptoms do not correlate with any of the clinical measures of pain or functional deficits. The results showed that motor imagery was also impaired, and the severity of the deficits found correlated with the functional impairment of the participant. This indicates that disorders in body representations and motor imagery are part of the clinical expression of FM. However, while motor imagery seems to be linked to reduced autonomy and functional deficits, bodily illusions are independent and potentially represent a concurrent symptom.

The bodily self is key to emotional embodiment, which is important for social functioning and emotion regulation. There is a paucity of research systematically assessing how basic and bodily self-disturbances relate to multimodal hallucinations. This study hypothesised that participants with greater hallucination-proneness would report greater degrees of basic and bodily self-disturbance and would demonstrate more ambiguous and less discrete mapping of emotional embodiment. Stage one screened non-clinical participants' degree of hallucination-proneness. Stage two participants completed seven further questionnaires. Hierarchical linear regression modelled the influence of hallucination-proneness and covariates on measures of basic and bodily self-disturbance and sensed presence. Stage two participants also completed a computerised body mapping task (EmBODY) which assessed emotional embodiment. Topographical maps were generated to compare patterns of embodiment between high and low hallucination-proneness groups. 55 respondents participated in stage two, with 18 participants from the high or low hallucination-proneness groups completing EmBODY. In the hierarchical regression analyses, the addition of a measure of hallucination proneness in the final step only increased predictive power where the dependent variable assessed sensed presence (p = 0.035 and p = 0.009, respectively). The EmBODY data revealed that participants with low hallucination-proneness consistently reported more bodily activation across 14 emotional states, whereas the high hallucination-proneness group reported more deactivation. In conclusion, hallucination-proneness was most strongly associated with sensed presence experiences. Patterns of embodiment appeared similar between the two groups, despite consistent differences in activation and deactivation. These findings are exploratory and need to be confirmed in a larger sample. • Basic and bodily self-disturbances are central to the schizophrenia syndrome. • The relationships between self-disturbances and multimodal hallucinations remain unclear. • Hallucination-proneness was most strongly associated with sensed presence experiences. • Hallucination-proneness may be associated with low emotional embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.

Surgical treatment of tumors, epileptic foci or of vascular origin, requires a detailed individual pre-surgical workup and intra-operative surveillance of brain functions to minimize the risk of post-surgical neurological deficits and decline of quality of life. Most attention is attributed to language, motor functions, and perception. However, higher cognitive functions such as social cognition, personality, and the sense of self may be affected by brain surgery. To date, the precise localization and the network patterns of brain regions involved in such functions are not yet fully understood, making the assessment of risks of related post-surgical deficits difficult. It is in the interest of neurosurgeons to understand with which neural systems related to selfhood and personality they are interfering during surgery. Recent neuroscience research using virtual reality and clinical observations suggest that the insular cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and temporo-parietal junction are important components of a neural system dedicated to self-consciousness based on multisensory bodily processing, including exteroceptive and interoceptive cues (bodily self-consciousness (BSC)). Here, we argue that combined extra- and intra-operative approaches using targeted cognitive testing, functional imaging and EEG, virtual reality, combined with multisensory stimulations, may contribute to the assessment of the BSC and related cognitive aspects. Although the usefulness of particular biomarkers, such as cardiac and respiratory signals linked to virtual reality, and of heartbeat evoked potentials as a surrogate marker for intactness of multisensory integration for intra-operative monitoring has to be proved, systemic and automatized testing of BSC in neurosurgical patients will improve future surgical outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Differentiation between self-produced tactile stimuli and touch by others is necessary for social interactions and for a coherent concept of “self”. In attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder (ADHD), tactile hypersensitivity and social cognition problems are part of the symptomatology, but pathophysiological mechanisms are largely unknown. Differentiation of self- and non-self- generated sensations might be key to understand and develop novel strategies for managing hypersensitivity. Here, we compared the neural signatures of affective self- and other-touch between adults with ADHD and neurotypical controls (NC). Methods: Twenty-eight adult ADHD participants and 30 age- and gender-matched NC performed a self-other-touch-task during functional magnetic resonance imaging: they stroked their own arm, an object, or were stroked by the experimenter. In addition, tactile detection thresholds and rubber hand illusion (RHI) were measured. Results: ADHD participants had more autistic traits than NC and reported to engage less in interpersonal touch. They also reported to be more sensitive to tactile stimuli. Compared to NC, ADHD participants showed enhanced responses to both the self- and other-touch conditions: stronger deactivation during self-touch in the anterior and posterior insula, and increased activation during other-touch in primary somatosensory cortex. ADHD participants had intact tactile detection thresholds, but were less susceptible to the RHI. Conclusions: Unaltered detection thresholds suggest that peripheral processing is intact, and that hypersensitivity might be driven by central mechanisms. This has clinical implications for managing somatosensory hypersensitivity in ADHD. The more pronounced differentiation between self- and other-touch might indicate a clearer self-other-distinction. This is of interest regarding body ownership perception in both NC and ADHD, and possibly other psychiatric conditions with altered self-experiences, like schizophrenia. A sharper boundary of the own body might relate to deficits in social cognition and tactile hypersensitivity.

Multimedia technologies and virtual reality offer unique possibilities to manipulate sensory, motor, interpersonal, and cognitive processes contributing to atypical developmental trajectories, thus holding an explosive potential to design innovative and engaging interventions. However, there has been little progress in developing interventions that go beyond the patient’s diagnosis or the fascination of technology and rather spring from a deep understanding of the specific neuropsychological processes to be nurtured in individuals. This perspective paper outlines how recent insights from developmental cognitive neuroscience can be leveraged to promote children’s multidimensional development and highlight future directions and challenges for innovating both research and clinical practice. Finally, we focus on some practical examples of multimedia and virtual reality activities we have designed to stimulate bodily-self experiences, which are crucial for building up a coherent sense of self and lay the foundation for interacting with the external world. Atypical bodily self is an early marker of heterogeneous neurodevelopmental conditions (such as autism spectrum disorders) and seems to be under-targeted in research and clinical approaches.

According to Freud, the dynamic unconscious has a: 1) social-relational nature, because it is strictly related to the internalization of early intersubjective experiences; 2) verbal-symbolic nature, in rapport with psychic representations (vorstellung); 3) repressive nature (the word repression is a synonym of unconscious). Contemporary psychoanalysis also considers the role of a more primitive and pre-reflexive type of unconscious: the unrepressed unconscious. This unconscious does not exist from the beginning, but is linked to the quality of sensory experiences between infant and caregiver. For several authors, the unrepressed unconscious is an emotional and preverbal unconscious useful to capture and to symbolize emotional stimuli. Moreover, it has a developmental bond with the repressed unconscious, in the sense that the development of the repressed unconscious is affected by the development of the unrepressed unconscious. Starting with an overview of neuroscientific and psychoanalytic literatures on this unconscious, the author explores the psychological characteristics of the unrepressed unconscious as well as its importance for clinical work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exteroceptive and interoceptive signals shape and sustain the bodily self‐awareness. The existence of a set of brain areas, supporting the integration of information coming from the inside and the outside of the body in building the sense of bodily self‐awareness has been postulated, yet the evidence remains limited, a matter of discussion never assessed quantitatively. With the aim of unrevealing where in the brain interoceptive and exteroceptive signals may converge, we performed a meta‐analysis on imaging studies of the sense of body ownership, modulated by external visuotactile stimulation, and studies on interoception, which involves the self‐awareness for internal bodily sensations. Using a multilevel kernel density analysis, we found that processing of stimuli of the two domains converges primarily in the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally. Furthermore, we found a right‐lateralized set of areas, including the precentral and postcentral, and superior temporal gyri. We discuss these results and propose this set of areas as ideal candidates to match multiple body‐related signals contributing to the creation of a multidimensional representation of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Many psychiatric disorders include alterations of the bodily self. • Disorders may link to dysfunctional predicting coding of multisensory information. • 5-HT 2A receptor agonism could remediate atypical perceptions of the bodily self. • Disintegration of associative and somatomotor networks could promote remediation. • Psychedelics may mediate these processes via predictive coding desynchronization. As a continual source of sensory input and fundamental component of self-referential processing, the body holds an integral modulatory role in cognition. In a healthy state, predictive coding of multisensory integration promotes the construction of a coherent self. However, several psychiatric disorders comprise aberrant perceptions of the bodily self that are purported to involve discrepancies in the integration and updating of multisensory systems. Changes in functional connectivity of somatomotor and high-level association networks in these disorders could be successfully remediated through 5-HT 2A receptor agonism via psychedelics. Reported alterations of bodily self-awareness during psychedelic experiences allude to a potentially central role of the bodily self. In this article, we bridge the domains of (aberrant) bodily self-awareness and psychedelics by discussing the predictive coding mechanisms underlying the bodily self and psychedelics. Furthermore, we propose that psychedelically-induced desynchronization of predictive coding might involve modulation of somatomotor, sensorimotor, and high-level association networks that could remediate aberrant perceptions of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is currently not fully understood where people precisely locate themselves in their bodies, particularly in virtual reality. To investigate this, we asked participants to point directly at themselves and to several of their body parts with a virtual pointer, in two virtual reality (VR) setups, a VR headset and a large-screen immersive display (LSID). There was a difference in distance error in pointing to body parts depending on VR setup. Participants pointed relatively accurately to many of their body parts (i.e., eyes, nose, chin, shoulders, and waist). However, in both VR setups when pointing to the feet and the knees they pointed too low, and for the top of the head too high (to larger extents in the VR headset). Taking these distortions into account, the locations found for pointing to self were considered in terms of perceived bodies, based on where the participants had pointed to their body parts in the two VR setups. Pointing to self in terms of the perceived body was mostly to the face, the upper followed by the lower, as well as some to the torso regions. There was no significant overall effect of VR condition for pointing to self in terms of the perceived body (but there was a significant effect of VR if only the physical body (as measured) was considered). In a paper-and-pencil task outside of VR, performed by pointing on a picture of a simple body outline (body template task), participants pointed most to the upper torso. Possible explanations for the differences between pointing to self in the VR setups and the body template task are discussed. The main finding of this study is that the VR setup influences where people point to their body parts, but not to themselves, when perceived and not physical body parts are considered.

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else’s arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional ‘alien’ arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient’s shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the ‘alien’ embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an ‘alien’ arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter’s left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter’s arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the ‘alien’ embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the ‘alien’ arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the ‘alien’ embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment.

Some people diagnosed with "schizophrenia" showed a fundamental alteration of the sense of self. From a psychodynamic perspective, it has been hypothesized that patients diagnosed as schizophrenic have disorders of the embodied self and its boundaries. Phenomenologically, it has been observed a self-disorder, at an implicit and pre-reflective level of bodily awareness. Neuroscientific evidence seems to confirm the aforementioned aspects. The mean levels of Interoceptive Accuracy (IA), which is an objective empirical measure of interoception, namely a measure of basic awareness distinct from subjective measures, are significantly lower in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia than among healthy controls. Affiliative touch is crucial for constructing a basic sense of self and its boundaries, and it affects interoception. In order to reduce the disturbance of the sense of self, Angelo participated for three years in an experimental intervention plan including Amniotic Therapy (AT) and individual psychodynamic psychotherapy. AT is a group-therapy based on sensory-motor interactions, especially affiliative touch, similar to those involved in "holding". Results showed an increase in the Angelo's IA and global functioning, as well as a significant decrease in positive symptoms. In Angelo, AT seems to strengthen a basic sense of self, reducing self-disorder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Embodied emotions arise from interoceptive and somatosensory processes, and are essential to the development of a stable sense of self. Emotional embodiment is therefore inherently interwoven with our sense of bodily self-awareness, and allows us to navigate complex social situations. Given that the core feature of schizophrenia (SZ) is characterized by the presence of bodily self-disturbances and social-emotional deficits, we hypothesized that embodiment of emotion would be disrupted in SZ. Method Twenty-six medicated individuals with SZ and 26 demographically matched controls used a computerized topographical mapping tool ("EmBODY") to indicate on a body outline where they felt bodily sensations while experiencing an emotion. There were 13 different emotions plus a neutral state. The resulting bodily maps of emotions were quantitatively compared between groups using linear discriminant analysis and similarity scores. Results Bodily maps of emotions were anomalous in SZ as indicated by indistinguishable maps across different emotions. Relative to the control group, patients reported less discrete and less clear bodily sensations across emotions. In particular, bodily maps for low-arousal emotions were atypical in comparison with healthy controls. Conclusions Anomalous and undifferentiated mapping of embodied emotions in SZ could lead to deficits in linking bodily sensations to conceptual categories of emotions. Disrupted emotional embodiment could also contribute to poor social functioning. Abnormal bodily sensations of emotions might therefore be a promising target for future psychosocial interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimentally induced strange-face illusions can be perceived when two individuals look at each other in the eyes under low illumination for about 10 minutes. This task of subject-other eye-to-eye gazing produces the following perceptions by the subject: (i) mild to huge deformations and color/shape changes of face and facial features; (ii) lifeless, unmoving faces and immaterial presences akin to out-of-body experiences; (iii) pseudo-hallucinations, enlightened 'idealized' faces and personalities – rather than the other's actual face. Dissociative phenomena seem to be involved, whereas the effects of non-pathological dissociation on strange-face illusions have not yet been directly investigated. In the present study, dissociative perceptions and strange-face illusions were measured through self-report questionnaires on a large sample (N = 90) of healthy young individuals. Results of correlation and factor analyses suggest that strange-face illusions can involve, respectively: (i) strange-face illusions correlated to derealization; (ii) strange-face illusions correlated to depersonalization; and (iii) strange-face illusions of identity, which are supposedly correlated to identity dissociation. The findings support the separation between detachment and compartmentalization in dissociative processes. Effects of gender show that strange-face illusions are more frequent in men with respect to women if dyads are composed of individuals of different-gender. Furthermore, drawings of strange-faces, which were perceived by portrait artists in place the others' faces, allowed a direct illustration of examples of dissociative identities. Findings are discussed in relation to the three-level model of self-referential processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Self-face recognition is faster when a morphed picture is presented during cardiac systole. • This effect is stronger for stimuli with more self-cues and more 'ambiguous' stimuli. • These results, replicated in a second study, cannot be attributed to familiarity alone. Recent research has highlighted the contribution of interoceptive signals to different aspects of bodily self-consciousness (BSC) by means of the cardio-visual stimulation - i.e. perceiving a pulsing stimulus in synchrony with one's own heart. Here, for the first time, we investigate the effects of individual heartbeats on a critical feature of BSC, namely the recognition of one's own face. Across two studies, we explored the cardiac-timing effects on a classic self-face recognition task. In Study 1 , participants saw morphed faces that contained different percentages of the self-face and that of another unfamiliar individual. Study 2 used a similar design, albeit participants saw morphed faces of the self-face and that of a familiar other to provide a better control of self-familiarity. Results from both studies consistently revealed that the cortical processing of cardiac afferent signals conveyed by the firing of arterial baroreceptors affects the speed, but not the accuracy, of self-face recognition, when a single picture is presented during cardiac systole, as compared to diastole. This effect is stronger and more stable for stimuli with more self-cues than other-cues and for 'ambiguous' stimuli – i.e. at the individual point of subjective equality. Results from Study 2 also revealed that cardiac effects on the speed of self-face recognition cannot be explained simply on the basis of the imbalanced familiarity between the self's and other's faces used. The present findings highlight the interoceptive contributions to self-recognition and may be expand our understanding of pathological disturbances of self-experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anomalous or weakened sense of self was central to early theories of schizophrenia. Recent studies have also documented disturbances in body ownership and increased susceptibility for dissociative experiences, such as the out‐of‐body experience in individuals with schizophrenia, but further research is necessary to clarify components of bodily self‐disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum, and the stability of these experiences over time. With respect to methodology, self‐disturbances research in schizophrenia tends to rely exclusively on verbal self‐report questionnaires and interviews. Given that individuals with schizophrenia suffer from language and communication difficulties, verbal self‐report measures may be insufficient. To bridge this gap, we have developed a new picture‐based instrument, the Benson et al. Body Disturbances Inventory (B‐BODI), designed to quantify bodily self‐disturbances with respect to the frequency and vividness of these experiences, as well as the degree of distress associated with them. Drawings that depicted different aspects of aberrant bodily self‐experiences were presented with accompanying captions. Participants were asked to indicate the frequency, vividness, and distressfulness of the experience captured by the picture using a 5‐point scale. Individuals with schizophrenia, older healthy controls, and college students participated in two alternative versions of the B‐BODI. Participants were also asked to complete a battery of established questionnaires that probed psychosis proneness and a range of self, body, and perceptual aberrations. The results suggest that the B‐BODI is a useful tool that accurately captures bodily self‐disturbances and has the potential to predict psychosis risk in healthy young individuals. Furthermore, anomalous self‐disturbances seem to be relatively stable across time in individuals with chronic schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else's arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional 'alien' arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient's shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the 'alien' embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an 'alien' arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter's left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter's arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the 'alien' embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the 'alien' arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the 'alien' embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our interaction with the world rests on the knowledge that we are a body in space and time, which can interact with the environment. This awareness is usually referred to as sense of embodiment. For the good part of the past 30 years, the rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been a prime tool to study embodiment in healthy and people with a variety of clinical conditions. In this paper, we provide a critical overview of this research with a focus on the RHI paradigm as a tool to study prothesis embodiment in individuals with amputation. The RHI relies on well-documented multisensory integration mechanisms based on sensory precision, where parietal areas are involved in resolving the visuo-tactile conflict, and premotor areas in updating the conscious bodily representation. This mechanism may be transferable to prosthesis ownership in amputees. We discuss how these results might transfer to technological development of sensorised prostheses, which in turn might progress the acceptability by users. • The rubber hand Illusion (RHI) is used to investigate embodiment. • Visuo-tactile conflict induced by the RHI is resolved by multisensory areas. • These areas attenuate somatosensory information, in favour of visual one. • Embodiment in amputees relies on similar neurophysiological mechanisms. • RHI findings can be translated to design sensorised prostheses easier to embody. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the expression “sense of self” is more natural than saying “representing” or even “imagining one’s self”. It is also easier and neater to talk in French about “sentiment du moi” than “representation du moi”; the expression “das Ichgefühl” is less grating than “die Ichvorstellung”, the latter being rather used to mean the conceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. […]