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Various characteristics of the American university operate to constrain its participation in changing economic and social institutions. It is understood that the university has multiple roles, has a long legitimized public service role which is becoming a university-wide commitment, must respond responsibly to the pressures for wider involvement in problem solving, is acquiring responsibility for lifelong education, is an instrument of national purpose and is a major component of the power structure. We are a society of large scale organizations. The implications of a social order dominated by large scale organizations and the ideal nature of a university's problem-solving mission have a considerable impact on the strategy that is adopted. The organization of the university has prevented a coordinated assault on urban problems; and although campuses resent having new organizational forms imposed on them from the outside, a national interdependent system of higher education is developing which will, perhaps, be more effective in accomplishing social change. The university today is beset with conflicting pressures from both within and without. If it is to attempt to alter social institutions, the faculty must become more conscious and respectful of the diversity of norms underlying behavior within the university; the reward system must be changed; the nature and processes of the university should be communicated to faculty and students; and some university outreach activities should be instituted. (JS)

The U.S. agricultural policy process is marked by a proliferation of organized interests and rising transaction costs. These pose a barrier for countries negotiating with the United States on trade issues. This paper examines the causes of this proliferation of interests, the impact of this proliferation on trade policy decisions, and the consequences of these escalating transaction costs for countries negotiating with the United States. The results suggest that other countries must anticipate that the U.S. position in trade negotiations will be the result of an accommodation of conflicting interests and that any agreement will pass Congress only if it contains gains for U.S. export industries.

The financing of agricultural research presents a unique policy problem. While research is often funded by national or subnational governments, the benefits of research often spill across the boundaries of the government financing the research. Many observers of international agricultural research have noted that the spillover problem exists and that policy changes are needed if an internationally optimal level of investment in research is to be provided (Judd, et al., 1987; Idachaba, 1981; Ruttan, 1987b). Some empirical studies have attempted to measure international benefit spillovers (Evenson, 1977; Davis, et al., 1987; Edwards and Freebairn 1984), and others have attempted to establish criteria for allocating research resources (ldachaba, 1989, p. 6; Paz, 1981; Norton and Pardey, 1987; Fishel, 1971; de Castro and Schuh, 1977; Carter, 1985). None of these studies has addressed two central policy questions: what policy tools are available for achieving an optimal level of investment in research and what institutional innovations are required to make these policy tools operable? This paper uses public finance theory to address these questions. First, the sources of international benefit spillovers will be examined. Second, public finance theory will be used to examine the policy tools available for achieving institutional coordination in financing research. Third, empirical estimates of international benefit spillovers will be reviewed. Finally, the policy implications of this research will be examined, with special emphasis on the institutional innovations needed to finance an optimal level of agricultural research.