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A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first vs. second order, first vs. third person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM. Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM.

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partner's mental states. This requires each party involved to posse ss the ability to represent and understand the other's mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human speci es at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, i nnate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.›

We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This a llows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness. ˇ

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental condition affecting social and communicative skills, including narrative ability, namely the description of real-life or fictive accounts of temporally and causally related events. With this study, we aimed to determine whether a communicative-pragmatic training, i.e., the version for adolescents of the Cognitive-Pragmatic Treatment, is effective in improving the narrative skills of 16 verbally fluent adolescents with ASD. We used a multilevel approach to assess pre- and post-training narrative production skills. Discourse analysis focused on micro- (i.e., mean length of utterance, complete sentences, omissions of morphosyntactic information) and macrolinguistic measures (i.e., cohesion, coherence errors, lexical informativeness). Results revealed a significant improvement in mean length of utterance and complete sentences and a decrease in cohesion errors. No significant change was found in the other narrative measures investigated. Our findings suggest that a pragmatically oriented training may be useful in improving grammatical efficiency in narrative production.

Effective communication is a fundamental aspect of children's daily living, enabling interaction with adults and peers. A rich literature suggests that communicative abilities develop with age, while little is known about cross-cultural differences and similarities. This study presents a comparison of the communicative performance of Finnish (n = 147) and Italian (n = 147) typically developing children, aged 4-8 years old, as assessed by the widely used Children's Communication Checklist--2 (CCC-2). The results reveal an effect of nationality in 9 of the 10 subscales. Finnish parents scored their children's communicative skill higher than Italian parents in eight of those subscales, but for the "social relation" subscale, Italian parents scored their children higher than the Finnish parents. Some of these differences are evident for the different age groups and are already present at early developmental stages. In both the Finnish and Italian samples, the parents rated the girls' communicative performance as more competent than the boys' on a number of CCC-2 subscales. The results are discussed in light of previous evidence highlighting that cultural features affect and shape communicative style within society, leading to differences (and similarities) that should be considered when assessing children's communicative abilities.

Background: Despite increasing knowledge of social communication skills of autistic people, the interrelatedness of different skills such as non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills is not much known about. A better understanding of the complex interplay between different domains of social communication helps us to develop assessment protocols for individuals with social communication difficulties. Aims: To compare the performances of autistic young adults, young adults with autistic traits identified in childhood and control young adults in social communication tasks measuring non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills. In addition, to examine associations between the different social communication measures. Methods & Procedures: Autistic young adults (n = 34), young adults with autistic traits (n = 19) and control young adults (n = 36) completed the extra- and paralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), the Faux Pas Recognition Test, Social-Pragmatic Questions (SoPra) and the Empathy Quotient (EQ). Outcomes & Results: Group differences were found in the performance in the ABaCo, SoPra and EQ scores. Compared with the control young adults, autistic young adults scored lower. The performance of the young adults in the autistic traits group fell in between the other two groups. There were no group differences in the Faux Pas Recognition Test. The variability within the groups was large in all measurements. In the control group, there was a significant correlation between EQ and SoPra scores and between the Faux Pas and SoPra scores. In the autistic group, a significant correlation was found between Faux Pas and SoPra scores. Also, other patterns were observed but these were not statistically significant. Conclusions & Implications: The young adults with autistic traits fell in between the control and autistic young adults, highlighting the presence of the continuum in the terms of features of social communication. The results support other current research that suggests that theory of mind and other social communication skills may not be universally or widely impaired in all autistic individuals without cognitive deficits. Although all tasks examined social communication skills, only a small number of significant correlations were found between test scores. This highlights that clinical conclusions about a person's social communication should be based on the outcomes of different types of methods measuring different aspects of social communication. It is clear that the interrelatedness of different social communication skills needs further research.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a complex pathology that includes impaired social interaction abilities. Insufficient attention has been paid to programs specifically devoted to improving communicative-pragmatic skills. Moreover, the majority of studies have focused on children, while programs specifically developed for the adolescents are lacking. The present study aims to test the feasibility and acceptability of the adapted version of the Cognitive Pragmatic Treatment for adolescents (A-CPT), a 15-session group training, as well as its ability to improve the communicative-pragmatic performance of adolescents with ASD. Twenty-one verbally fluent adolescents with ASD took part in the training; they were assessed in three phases, i.e., before, after and at three-month follow-up, using the equivalent forms of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), a tool for testing a wide range of pragmatic phenomena, such as direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceit and violation of Grice's maxims, expressed through linguistic, non-verbal, i.e., gestures, or paralinguistic expressive means. Furthermore, Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks and tests investigating the main cognitive domains, for example, Executive Functions (planning, shifting, working memory) and long-term memory, were administered. The results showed an improvement in participants' performance in all the four scales of the ABaCo, i.e., linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic and context scale; this improvement was maintained at follow-up assessment three months after the end of the program. No improvement was observed in the cognitive and ToM domains investigated, with the only exception of expressive vocabulary task. Despite the lack of a control group, the high degree of feasibility of the CPT, highlight the importance of more work needed in this research line.

Background: The purpose of this study is to investigate the pragmatic abilities of individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Several studies in the literature have previously reported communicative deficits in individuals with TBI, however such research has focused principally on communicative deficits in general, without providing an analysis of the errors committed in understanding and expressing communicative acts. Within the theoretical framework of Cognitive Pragmatics theory and Cooperative principle we focused on intermediate communicative errors that occur in both the comprehension and the production of various pragmatic phenomena, expressed through both linguistic and extralinguistic communicative modalities. Aims: To investigate the pragmatic abilities of individuals with TBI. Methods & Procedures: A group of 30 individuals with TBI and a matched control group took part in the experiment. They were presented with a series of videotaped vignettes depicting everyday communicative exchanges, and were tested on the comprehension and production of various kinds of communicative acts (standard communicative act, deceit and irony). The participants' answers were evaluated as correct or incorrect. Incorrect answers were then further evaluated with regard to the presence of different intermediate errors. Outcomes & Results: Individuals with TBI performed worse than control participants on all the tasks investigated when considering correct versus incorrect answers. Furthermore, a series of logistic regression analyses showed that group membership (TBI versus controls) significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate errors. This result holds in both the comprehension and production tasks, and in both linguistic and extralinguistic modalities. Conclusions & Implications: Participants with TBI tend to have difficulty in managing different types of communicative acts, and they make more intermediate errors than the control participants. Intermediate errors concern the comprehension and production of the expression act, the comprehension of the actors' meaning, as well as the respect of the Cooperative principle.

Previous studies on children's pragmatic abilities have tended to focus on just one pragmatic phenomenon and one expressive means at a time, mainly concentrating on comprehension, and overlooking the production side. We assessed both comprehension and production in relation to several pragmatic phenomena (simple and complex standard communication acts, irony, and deceit) and several expressive means (linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic). Our study involved 390 Italian-speaking children divided into three age groups: 5;0-5;6, 6;6-7;0, and 8;0-8;6. Children's performance on all tasks improved with their age. Within each age group, children responded more accurately to tasks involving standard communication than to those involving deceit and irony, across all expressive means and for both comprehension and production. Within each pragmatic phenomenon, children responded more accurately to simple acts than to complex ones, regardless of age group and expressive means, i.e., linguistic or extralinguistic. Overall results fit well with the Cognitive Pragmatics theory (Bara, 2010).

The aim of the present research is to perform a detailed and empirical investigation of schizophrenia patients' deficits in recognizing and recovering a communicative failure. In particular, this paper investigates the role of Theory of Mind (ToM) and of the complexity of the mental representations involved in explaining patients' deficits in recognizing and recovering different kinds of communicative failures, i.e. failure of the expressive act, failure of communicative meaning and failure of the communicative effect. Twenty-two patients with schizophrenia and an equal number of healthy controls took part in the experiment. The experimental protocol consisted of videotaped stories in which two agents interact, showing a communicative failure; the participants were asked to recognize and repair the observed failure. Some classical ToM tests (Sally and Ann, Modified Smarties and a selection of six Strange Stories) were also administered. Our results revealed a deficit in patients, when compared with healthy controls, in recognizing and recovering communicative failures. Furthermore, focusing on schizophrenia patients' performance "per se", we observed a trend with regard to the increasing difficulty of understanding and recognizing different kinds of communicative failures, i.e. failure of expression act, failure of communicative meaning, and failure of the communicative effect. Learning outcomes: The reader becomes aware that schizophrenic patients perform less well than healthy controls in recognizing and recovering different kinds of communicative failures, and of the role played by Theory of Mind, and representational complexity involved in such different kinds of failures, in explaining patients' performance. (Contains 5 tables and 2 figures.)

The aim of this paper was to develop and test two equivalent forms of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), a tool for evaluating pragmatic abilities in patients with neuropsychological and psychiatric disorders. The equivalent forms were created using the data from a sample of 390 children, then tested in a sample of 30 patients with traumatic brain injury. Equivalent forms of the same test are useful in clinical practice and intervention research, when performance needs to be tested on two separate occasions, for example before and after a rehabilitation program. The present results provide additional evidence on the psychometric functioning of the equivalent forms of the ABaCo and their usability in a clinical context. (Contains 4 tables and 2 figures.)

We compared 1- and 2-year-old children's performance on Pretend and Reality tasks. Pretend tasks involved the comprehension of a pretend scenario, whereas Reality tasks did not. For example, the experimenter pretends to drink water from an empty cup, she fills another cup with imaginary water and then invites the child to drink. In the Reality version, the experimenter uses real water in making exactly the same actions and the same request to the child. Our aim was to verify when very young children understand pretense, and to determine whether failures to understand pretense are the result of difficulties specific to pretense or not. Results showed that starting from 16 months, children begin to understand pretense. At no time did performance differ between Pretend and Reality tasks, suggesting that young children's difficulties with pretense may not arise from causes specific to pretense.